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*MONISM AND ITS BEARINGS ON PHILOSOPHIC
AND RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN AMERICA.*

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A Graduating Thesis; Course A, Philosophy.

*Εἰς Θεὸς ἐν τε Θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος—
Οὐλος ὄρα, οὐλος δὲ νοεῖ, οὐλος δὲ τ' ἀκούει.*

—XENOPHANES.

*Εἰς Θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ πάντων, ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων καὶ διὰ
πάντων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν.*

—THE APOSTLE PAUL.

Our theme is, in part at least, an old one. Monism as a doctrine has been held in some form or other by philosophers in almost every age of the world. It is closely related to the most important concerns with which man has to deal in this life. Monism relates to man himself in both his physical and his psychical being. It relates to the animate and inanimate universe in which we exist; and to Deity, the uncreated and infinite Father of all being.

If Monism in either of its distinctive forms be the true philosophy, our ideas of God, of the material universe and of ourselves must be essentially modified. Our whole religious system must be recast,—or rather we must devise a new religious system in harmony with this philosophy,—and we must look elsewhere for the solution of the problem of human existence, of the universe, and of God.

If, however, Monism be not true, it is still interesting as a study from a philosophical point of view, showing us some of the ways in which the mind of man attempts to solve the great question of being, by mere speculative reason and human wisdom.

Is there a diversity of personalities in the universe? Am I a personal entity distinct from you as another personal entity, and are both of us distinct from a third personal entity? Am I as a subjective, thinking soul distinct from the objective world surrounding me, or am I only a modification of it? In short, is this universe made up of beings and things organized into a government over which there presides an intelligent, personal, infinite Ruler and Father, or is all only an indefinite, impersonal oneness? Is it a constantly modifying idea, or a mass of mere matter endowed with certain curious incomprehensible functions? Or is it an ever self-evolving and self-absorbing Deity, over reappearing in an endless variety of phenomena? Is the true and final philosophy Monism, or is it some other form of philosophy yet undeveloped? Is philosophy the science of an everlasting, ever-changing, ever-reabsorbing, impersonal oneness, or is it the science and explanation of the phenomena of rational, intelligent, personal beings? In this monograph we shall not attempt to do more than give an imperfect outline of a discussion of this theme.

I. DEFINITIONS. Monism in its widest sense may be defined as *the unity of all being into some form, either of mind, or of matter, or of Deity*. It is the doctrine of universal oneness, *henism*, as opposed to the doctrine of the *duality of being*. The essential nature of this *oneness* depends upon what is taken as the fundamental basis or centre or substratum of the unity of being.

If Deity is the $\tau\acute{o} \pi\tilde{\alpha}\nu$ out of which all things emanate and into which all are again absorbed, Monism becomes absolute *Pantheism*.* If human thought or consciousness is the $\tau\acute{o} \pi\tilde{\alpha}\nu$, and all things are only phenomena and unconscious modifications of the human mind, Monism takes the form of

*So *Speusippus*, *Dicacarch*, the *Stoics*, *Scotus Erigena*, *David of Dniant*, *G. Bruno*, *Spinoza* and others.

absolute *Idealism*.* If, however, matter is the $\tau\acute{o}\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$, and all theistic and mental phenomena are only modes of matter, then Monism becomes absolute materialism.†

1. The fundamental question in the study of Monism proper turns on the correct interpretation of consciousness as it relates to a contrast between *subjective* and *objective existence*.

The doctrine of Monism rejects the testimony of consciousness to the ultimate duality of the subject and the object, mind and matter, in perception. The doctrine of Dualism, on the other hand, holds to the testimony of consciousness as affirming the essential distinction between mind and matter in the universe.

Dualism is in opposition to *Materialism*, on the one hand, and to *Idealism*, on the other hand, and to *Pantheism*, in the centre.

2. Another form of Monism is distinguished as the doctrine of *absolute identity*. According to this theory, consciousness bears testimony to the reality of mental and material phenomena, and the two cannot be reduced to one and the same. It denies however that consciousness bears testimony to the real antithesis, in existence, between the material and the mental. It makes the conceptions of mind and matter only phenomenal modifications of the same common substance. This form of Monism was first propounded and elaborated by Spinoza. The same doctrine in a modified sense was held by Schelling, Hegel and Cousin.

3. A third form of Monism denies the theory of the absolute equipoise of the phenomena of mind and those of matter, the subject and the object. They are not coördinate phenomenal modifications of a common substance. But one or the other may be the stronger. If the balance is inclined toward the mental, the result will be *Idealism*. But if it be in favor of the material, the result will be materialism‡

4. There is still another form of monism, represented by Rudolph Hermann Lotze and his followers. The *Infinite* is

*So especially *Hegel* and modified by *Schelling*.

†Held by the *Epicureans*, and renewed by *Gassendi*, and applied to psychology by *Hartley* and *Priestley*.

‡See *Hamilton's Metaphysics*, lecture 16.

the one Power which has given itself numberless accordant modes of existence in the whole world of spirits. The substantial cause of the world must be a necessary unit, and this accounts for the co-existence and the phenomenal interaction of the numerous monads in existence. All monads are but modifications of the one Absolute Spirit.*

5. Monism as a doctrine may then be defined as that system of philosophy which holds that there is no ontological distinction, no distinction in reality, between mind and matter; that both are one and the same; and that there is no true philosophy until all things are traced to one single principle of being.† Having thus given a brief definition of Monism in its general and widest sense, we will now study the definitions of each the grand divisions of this system of philosophy.

II. DIVISIONS OF MONISM. There are three great branches of Monism corresponding to the three great divisions of being, *Soul, Matter and Deity*.

1. *Idealistic Monism*. This form of philosophy unifies all in human consciousness. The universe exists for me only as my representation in thought. Thought and real being are absolutely identical. To think a thing is to give it the only kind of existence it can have. Creation *ex nihilo* is impossible. The absolute, eternal First Cause is not an infinite, personal, spiritual Being, but only an infinite, impersonal, universal self-consciousness, the absolute ego.

The self-consciousness, this absolute ego, produces the universe, the worlds and all their contents, physical and psychical (if there be such), including myself and all other beings, by a single act of thought. And they continue to exist only as this absolute ego continues to think them, and in the form in which it thinks them. There is no other substance nor being except this continuously producing thought in its absolute consciousness. But this absolute self-consciousness is only myself thinking, myself in the act of being and creating. Hence I am my own continuous self-creating creator, and at the same time and by the same psychic act I

*See *Ueberweg's History of Philosophy*, II, 312.

†See *Presbyterian Quarterly*, January, 1895, Art. *Idealistic Monism*, by Prof. R. L. Dabney, D. D., LL. D.

am the continuous creator of all else that exists. However antagonistic to my feelings existing things may be, however incongruous and absurd the process may appear, all creation with its endless variety of beings is only the result of my own creative, thinking mind, the unconscious self-modification of my thought, which thought is itself only the creation of itself. I am not authorized to believe in the real existence of the things in the material world. They are not even phenomena of an underlying substance, for such a substance exists only as a modification of my thought. Neither is there any substance underlying my own subjective affections in me. The substratum of my own thought is only the continuous creation of my thought thinking.

Hence my own ontology, so far as concerns my being, is limited absolutely to this, viz., I am nothing but a series of unconscious, mental modifications,—a self-producing, non-substantial self-consciousness. I am my own God, my own creator, and the universe is only the result of my mind thinking, at the same instant I am the creator of my thinking mind. *Jam satis, reductio ad absurdum.*

2. MATERIALISTIC MONISM. This phase of this philosophy goes to the other extreme and reduces all existences to oneness in matter. Every thing is only some form of matter. Materialistic Monism makes mind only a special function of the brain. Thinking is a refined form of cerebral motion, or action. "The brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile."

No attempt is made to explain the origin of matter; it is uncreated, eternal and uncaused. The ultimate atoms of matter differ in form and in their relations to each other, giving rise to different forms of beings and activities. So every thing is only the result of different atoms in their various relations, whether it be the most powerful convulsions in the physical world, or the calmest emotion of the human soul. The belching of the volcano and the quaking of the earth are only the results of atomic force. But they are no more so than the force that produces the most spiritual lyric poem, or the tenderest parental love. All is only matter operating in its various functions.

3. *Pantheistic Monism.* The third form of this philosophy is that which centres all in Deity, *Pantheism*. In its strictest sense Pantheism is the doctrine that teaches the necessary and eternal co-existence of the finite and the infinite. This co-existence means the absolute consubstantiality of God and nature. God and nature are two different, but at the same time inseparable, existences.

This species of Monism has two forms, or two conceptions of the essential unity of all things in one.

(1) The higher form, called *acosmism*, holding that the unity consists in the absorption of all things into God. Hence all that we experience in the universe is only some form of the manifestation of God, or rather it is God manifest in some form, for all is God, and God is all.

(2) The second form of Pantheism, which is *practical Atheism*, is the absorption of God in all things, which in its ultimate analysis means no God at all.

The older form of Pantheism maintained the unity and identity of all being, and denied the existence of the finite and changeable. The more recent form is the idealistic Pantheism of the transcendental school, represented by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. And here it may be difficult to draw the line between Idealism and Pantheism proper. Transcendentalism in philosophy, like infinity in mathematics, may mean almost anything. And as parallel lines are said to meet at infinity, having reached the mathematical *æ plus ultra*, so in the mysticism of skeptical transcendental philosophy the lines of distinction between these various isms seem to vanish and all is merged into a shoreless sea of chaotic agnosticism.

III. HISTORICAL. It is necessary in the study of Monism to take a brief view of the history of its rise and development. And in this historical sketch we will reverse the order of the grand divisions of the subject as followed in the preceding portion of this thesis, as it is our purpose to enlarge especially on Idealistic Monism in the sequel, as the most important and interesting branch of the subject.

1. PANTHEISTIC MONISM had its first formal statement in the Eleatic school in Greece, of which Xenophanes was the founder. Xenophanes was born in Colophon in Asia Minor in 569 B. C. He removed in later years to Elea in lower Italy, and there founded his school of philosophy.

In his poetical writings, he combats the anthropomorphic representation of God as presented by Homer and Hesiod, as being unreasonable, and he propounds the doctrine of the One, the all-controlling God-head. God is all eye, all ear, all intellect, all everything. His doctrine was metaphysically developed, as a distinct doctrine of being, by Parmenides of Elea. It was farther developed and somewhat changed by Zeno, and later assimilated in some degree to natural philosophy by Melissus of Samos. Speusippus, the nephew of Plato and his successor as scholiarch, held and taught Pantheism. Dicaearch of Messene, Sicily, taught that there are no individual souls, but only one universal, vital, sensitive force which is diffused through all existing organisms and is transiently individualized in different bodies or beings. This philosophy was doubtless a form of the doctrine of the transmigration of souls held in Greece and farther east. The Stoics were essentially pantheistic in their philosophy, in which there were several minor forms of doctrine that it is not always easy to distinguish.

In the Scholastic age, John Scotus Erigena developed Pantheism in his speculations on Gnosticism and Alexandrian Neo-Platonism. Amalrich of Bene* and David of Dinant restated the pantheistic doctrines of Dionysius Areopagiticus and John Scotus Erigena.

Pantheism was first formulated out of the mysticism of German philosophy by Giordano Bruno,† an anti-ecclesiastical free-thinker. The German type of Pantheism reached its climax in the system of Spinoza.‡ It has reappeared in more recent times as the Idealistic Pantheism of the transcendental school, of which the conspicuous leaders were Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. According to Hegel, the Absolute as pure immaterial thought manifested itself first in nature, next in spirit, and through spirit returns upon itself. Hence the unity of being is essential to this doctrine. This unity of being is the ever evolving and devolving Absolute or Deity, the *τό πᾶν*.

*Died in Paris, 1206 or 1207.

†Born in 1548 and was burned in Rome on account of his teachings, in 1600.

‡1632 to 1677.

There are other minor forms of modern Pantheism which we need not here mention.

2. MATERIALISTIC MONISM. This form of philosophy was first formulated by Leucippus, with Democritus, both of Abdera or Elea. Leucippus was forty years younger than Anaxagoras, and hence was born about 460 B. C. The principles of things, according to these philosophers, were the *full* and the *void*, which they identified with being and non-being, something and nothing, yet both as having simultaneous existence. Epicurus* and his school were materialistic in their doctrine.

The modern form of Materialistic Monism is more sharply defined than the ancient and is much more dogmatically expressed. Gassendi† restated the Epicurean doctrine. This is a matter of more historical importance than the renewal of any other ancient system of philosophy, and Gassendi may properly be considered the renewer of systematic Materialism in modern times. The doctrine of Gassendi has in it more of life than that of Epicurus.

Hartley and Priestley, under the influence of Locke's principles, developed a form of materialistic psychology, with which they attempted to combine theological convictions and thus form a system of materialistic theology.

In France, La Mettrie‡ and Baron von Holbach§ developed this doctrine. La Mettrie taught pure Materialism chiefly as a psychological doctrine. But Baron Holbach in his *Systeme de la Nature* taught Materialism as an all-inclusive, anti-theological philosophy.

Many of the so-called Free Thinkers were avowed Materialists, and frequently pushed the doctrine to the most absurd extremes.

The materialistic view that matter apart from spirit or without containing any psychic elements becomes conscious, is a wild assumption without logical connection and without proof.

*341-270 B. C.

†1592-1655 A. D.

‡1709-1751.

§1723-1789, at Paris.

3. IDEALISTIC MONISM. The doctrine of absolute Idealistic Monism was created by Hegel.* This was reached by developing Schelling's *principle of identity*, according to the dialectical method of Fichte.

According to Hegel, the Absolute as pure thought, immaterial reason, manifests itself first in nature, then in spirit, and through spirit returns into itself. The absolute unity of all being thus becomes a necessity. The Absolute as pure thought is the underlying substance of both nature and spirit, and is at the same time the rational subject of which nature and spirit are manifestations or phenomena. The doctrine of Idealistic Monism, that the world of objects is nothing more than a fiction of consciousness, is absolutely devoid of proof, or even of probability.

IV. Having given a brief outline of Monism in general from a doctrinal and historical point of view, we will now devote a few pages to a consideration of the special relations and effects of Monism on philosophical and religious thought in America. And here we must consider:—

1. *Some of the errors of Monism in general.*

(1) A careful examination of the whole field of Monism will reveal to us the fact that there is a fatal error, a *πρωτον ψευδον*, which is the root of all Idealistic Monism. This error is the fatally false dictum *that there can be no such thing as contingent, substantive being*. All being must be necessary, and therefore necessarily eternal being. This leads at once to the conclusion that the creation of any material thing *ex nihilo* is impossible and unthinkable, and hence no substantive being ever begins or ends. This error is apparent throughout the whole range of Idealistic Monism. We see it in the teachings of the Eleatics, of Heraclitus, of Plato, as well as of Bruno, of Spinoza, and of the more recent German philosophers.

The most difficult fact in the way of these philosophers is the universal and invariable experience that there are beginnings and endings of things in the course of the world. Things do become and again cease to exist. In fact a large amount of human experience, if not all of it, is of this kind. These experiences that seem to show us the beginnings and

*Born at Stuttgart, 1770; died 1831.

endings of things were variously explained by Monists. Zeno explains them as mere deceptions of our senses,—a very easy but not very satisfactory way out of the difficulty. Heraclitus and Plato explain them as the constant and perpetual recurring of the transition between the becoming and the ending of phenomena. Spinoza says that it is the one eternal substance passing through temporary modifications, coming out of and returning into itself. More modern idealists hold that the beginnings and endings of things are only passing phases of conscious self-projections of the Absolute Ego. This explanation is no more satisfactory than the other.

(2) Another error of Idealistic Monism is in the dogmatic statement *that in the act of perceiving an object we have no real knowledge of substantive spirit, but only a knowledge of a train of consciousness.* This view contradicts the immediate, necessary and universal law of thought, *that there can be no thoughts at all unless there were beforehand a substantive mind to think these thoughts,* and give rise to these trains of consciousness.

The universal common judgment of men will answer that there must of necessity be a substantive agent in order that any action may take place, or any properties manifested. How can there be action without a something already existing to act? These philosophers seem to overlook the important and necessary distinction between *consciousness of objects,* and *objects of consciousness.* These two orders of reality evidently exist. The mental phenomenon, *consciousness of objects,* necessarily implies other phenomena, *objects of consciousness.* And we cannot by any process translate one of these into the other.

(3) Fichte, Herbert Spencer, and other modern monists dogmatically assert that the only true philosophy *must be Monism.* This they say, but they fail to prove the truth of the statement.

Fichte, however, in attempting to formulate subjective Idealism, says that every judgment is conditioned on the distinction between subject and object. But after admitting this fact, Fichte proceeds to show that somehow this subject and object must be reduced to unity. But as it is impossible to reduce the subject to the object, the object must be reduced to the subject. Hence Idealistic Monism is the necessary

result. Fichte does not, however, show why this union of the subject and the object must take place, while universal self-consciousness tells us that such a union as a matter of fact does not and cannot take place.

(4) The statement that all true philosophy *must be Monism* is based upon another assumption equally false, viz., that admitting for the sake of argument that mind and matter do exist separately and independently, interaction between them would be impossible from the very nature of the distinction between mind and matter. This assumption is, however, purely gratuitous. It assumes that because we cannot apply the essential attributes of matter to mind, therefore there can be no interaction between mind and matter. It assumes further, that the mind must itself be actually qualified by the essential attributes of matter before it can even have its own spiritual cognitions of the attributes of matter. The mind can not have cognitions of the attributes square, hard or red, as belonging to matter, unless the mind itself has these attributes. But we need not stop here to show the extreme absurdity of such reasoning. No sane man will seriously speak of a square thought or an oblong volition or a scarlet colored emotion.

(5) The fatal objection that lies against the whole theory of Idealistic Monism is in the fact that consciousness tells us absolutely nothing of its processes. If it be true that the whole external world is only a creation of our own thought, it must be an unconscious process, a process beyond the utmost limits of knowledge and experience. This difficulty drove Hartmann into his preposterous *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, in which he has argued himself clean out of the court of science. His position is a confession that Idealistic Monism is only an idle dream, unworthy of being called a scientific theory at all. It not only has no evidence in its favor, but by its own hypothesis it makes it impossible to be evidenced or demonstrated in any way. Consciousness is the only field that mental science can really investigate. In that field all of its facts must be sought and obtained. If, however, there are mental processes going on back of consciousness, as Leibnitz claims to have proved, those processes can be known only upon valid *a posteriori* evidences connecting the visible results in the mind with their invisible causes or sources. Beyond this we cannot go.

2. *The relations of Idealistic Monism to theological and religious thought and experience.* From the foregoing review of this subject it will not be difficult to see that Monism, and Idealistic Monism in particular, is wholly antagonistic to religious doctrine and experience. It is also quite evident that there is no possibility of reconciling the two systems.

(1) Idealistic Monism must of necessity deny the individual personality of man, and consequently there can be no personal immortality of the human soul. German Idealistic Monism is closely allied to Buddhism. The only heaven of Buddhism is Nirvana, the final cessation of individuality, of the desire of existence and of consciousness, and a total absorption of all into the infinite Brahm. This is Hartmann's conception of salvation, which is nothing less than practical annihilation, which follows strictly from monistic premises. Hence the very things that are essential to make us religious beings, such as personality, personal responsibility, faith, rewards and punishments and a multitude of other essentials must be counted out, if we accept the doctrine of Idealistic Monism.

(2) Idealistic Monism denies the personality of God. Fichte himself admits this. It must inevitably lead to some form of Pantheism, an absolute ego, of which all phenomena are only modifications. But this absolute ego is, from the very nature of the case, impersonal, without moral qualities, and must be responsible for all the evil as well as the good in the universe, thus producing an eternal pandemonium. Seeing this inevitable conclusion, it is not strange that Schopenhauer and Hartmann should declare themselves pessimists. Many of the advocates of Idealistic Monism were avowed Pantheists. The process by which Idealistic Monism is reached is in its beginning and in its conclusion practically the same as that of the absolute pantheist, Spinoza.

(3) This scheme is expressly *Anti-Scriptural*. It not only contradicts the plain testimony of Scripture regarding the duality of our being, the origin of man and of the world, the being and personality of God, etc., but of necessity it does away with divine inspiration. However many of our learned and great men may claim not to know what divine inspiration is, we are certain that it is not Idealistic Monism. For in this doctrine, philosophical mysticism takes the place of super-

natural revelation and inspiration. The highest place that this philosophy can ever assign to the Bible is to class it with the writings of Zoroaster, Confucius, Buddha, Brahm, Mohammed and Spinoza.

(4) *Idealistic Monism* contradicts all personal religious experience. Just as it contradicts the clearest *dicta* of consciousness and gives us over to the wildest presumptions and speculations, so it contradicts all religious consciousness and sets men adrift on a shoreless ocean without chart or compass, without helm or sail. It takes from man the only source of truth and comfort, the only anchor of hope, the only light and guide to a higher and nobler existence, and it offers instead a mere figment, the very *ne plus ultra* of misguided speculative thought. It robs the heart, the home and the commonwealth of what God has given for their elevation, their happiness and their salvation.

3. What are the *relations of monism to philosophical Thought in America?* It may be not so difficult to ask this question as to answer it. It may not be easy to determine how far, and in what form Monism has been held and taught in America. There are, however, some things that will enable us to throw some light on the present status and trend of philosophical thought in our own country, and what will be its future and final form when fully developed.

In Germany, and to some extent in England also, the study of philosophy has been presented almost exclusively as a speculative science, and philosophy itself has been purely abstract, while in America philosophy has been studied chiefly as applied with special reference to its relations to practical life in theology, morals and politics. The circumstances of the people in the new world would naturally lead to this kind of philosophical and scientific investigation. Hence in America there has not been developed any well defined school of philosophy. This is doubtless due to a combination of influences and circumstances. But it is reasonable that the same combination of causes and influences that have prevented the minds of the American people from adopting any existing system of philosophy, are the very forces that are operating to produce a definite type of philosophy in our country. There are in America representatives of almost every phase of

philosophical thought, from the most conservative and orthodox Dualistic Realism to the wildest speculative Monism. Monism is represented in America at present by a comparatively small number who may be classed among philosophers of any note. A very brief notice of these will be sufficient for our present purpose.

(1) Monism in certain forms is recognized and taught by the Carus school of philosophy at Chicago. According to this school there are two forms of Monism:—

(a) *Materialistic Monism*, holding substantially the doctrines of the more recent monistic writers of Germany.

(b) *Pantheistic Monism*, which does not differ essentially from the modern pantheism of Europe.

According to Carus there are two fundamental problems in philosophy.* First, what is the origin, the foundation and the method of our cognition, and, second, what is its purpose? The solution of the first is *Monism*. The solution of the second is *Meliorism*. Meliorism rests on the doctrine of Monism, making man a part of All-existence, and as a part of the whole he is in a state of constant progress, ever developing higher forms of existence. This lands the system in a scheme of pantheistic evolution.

(2) The *Theistic Monists*, following the doctrine of Lotze. This form of Monism has been sufficiently explained above. Prominent among the followers of Lotze in America are Dr. B. P. Bowne of Boston University, and President D. G. Hill of the University of Rochester.

It may not be easy to determine just how much influence the philosophy of the past may have on the minds of the American people in formulating their philosophy. Two things, however, must be true. First, all ultimate philosophical truths, if such can ever be discovered, must be the same with all peoples. There cannot be as many systems of philosophy as there are nations of people, and all of them ultimately different, and yet all of them true. Second, ultimate philosophical truths can never change. The ultimate data of consciousness are unchangeable. So the ultimate facts of science and of religion are in themselves unchangeable. These two

*See "Fundamental Problems," by Paul Carus, p. 252.

facts must be fundamental in the formation of any true and final system of philosophy. Philosophy must seek the final and unchangeable and must rest upon that alone.

Now taking into consideration the forces and circumstances that have made Americans what they characteristically are in politics, in religion and in the general habits of life, we may be safe in drawing some general conclusions regarding the development and type of philosophy in our country.

(1) American philosophy is ready to accept whatever of truth has been discovered by philosophic investigations in the past. The minds of philosophers in America are not so prejudiced against the philosophy of the old world as to reject the facts it may have discovered. It may at times require a very closely sifting process to separate the true from the false, a work which can be successfully accomplished by American students who have not had their minds befogged by mystified skeptical German teachers.

(2) American philosophy will earnestly and faithfully strive to discover and formulate the true and ultimate philosophy. By ultimate or final philosophy we mean a philosophy based upon ultimate or final truth, absolute facts, data beyond which we cannot go.

(3) The characteristic form of American philosophy will most probably be *Dualistic Realism*. This form of philosophy in America may hardly be considered the direct and positive result of Monism, but rather a negative result of the combined influences of the various schools of philosophy, of which Monism is one. And as Monism in its widest sense has to do with the whole of existence, and touches the physical and mental and moral elements of our nature, it may have been the most potent agent in leading indirectly to the ultimate form of philosophy.

That Dualistic Realism should be the type of philosophy in America and the final philosophy appears probable for various reasons:

First, Dualistic Realism is really the only common sense philosophy. It is that alone to which consciousness bears universal testimony, and which alone is attested by the universal experience of man.

Second, the older schools of philosophy have all been thoroughly discussed and modified and restated and recast, but

none of these systems have been accepted even in Europe as universally satisfactory. Much less can it be expected that the students of America will be satisfied with any of these forms of philosophy, or ever adopt them. America will no more adopt the philosophy of Germany than her customs and manner of life. The philosophy of the past has to some extent at least succeeded in demonstrating what is not the true and ultimate philosophy and so has prepared the way in a negative sense for the discovery and development of the true philosophy.

Third, Americans are a composite people, made up of material from all parts of the old world. This material is worked over and Americanized, and by our form of government it is brought into a unit. The same forces are tending to unify religion—not in form perhaps—but in spirit and in aim, to make it the power of God for the salvation of the people. And just as the government has been constructed on common sense principles to meet the common demands of the people, so will our education be moulded by the people and for the people. And it is reasonable to believe that America will formulate a system of philosophy in harmony with her other great systems.

Fourth, the peculiar characteristics of the American people, as Americanized Anglo-Saxons, tend to formulate a realistic philosophy. The American people are intensely practical and realistic. They are opposed to mysticism of any sort, and slow to accept anything that does not apply to real life. It would have been unnatural for Germany to have produced a system of realistic philosophy, and it would be equally unnatural for America to produce a system of idealistic mysticism.

Fifth, American philosophy is earnestly and conscientiously seeking for the truth rather than to indulge in speculations. And it is evident that truth in philosophy lies in the direction of Dualistic Realism. This is the only philosophy in harmony with common sense, and common sense must certainly be heard as a witness in this case. It is the only philosophy that is supported by the universal experience of mankind, a testimony exceedingly strong. It is the only philosophy that is in concordance with the *dicta* of human consciousness. When common sense and universal experience and consciousness all agree to the truth of this philosophy not much is left in favor of any other system.