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ARTICLE I.—HUMBOLDT, RITTER, AND THE NEW
GEOGRAPHY.

Humboldt's Kosmos. Four Vols. 8vo. Stuttgardt. 1845-1858.

Ritter's Erdkunde. AFRICA. One Vol. 8vo. ASIA. Eighteen Vols. Berlin. 1822-1859. 8vo.

Guyot's Earth and Man. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 12mo.

ONE of the well known master-pieces of Raphael, which adorn the *stanze* of the Vatican, presents to our eye "the School of Athens," an assembly of philosophers studying, teaching, arguing, and disputing within the porch of a temple of science. Aristotle and Plato, the former extending his hand over the visible earth, the latter pointing upward to the unseen world,—representatives of material and speculative philosophy,—form the center of the group, while around them Socrates, Diogenes, Pythagoras, and Epictetus, with a score of lesser luminaries, are engaged in earnest discussion. The

ARTICLE II.—THE POWER OF CONTRARY CHOICE.

THE question whether the soul has the "power of contrary choice" is one of the utmost importance in its bearings upon theology, and all moral science. It is high time that the subject was thoroughly understood. The orthodox faith has lost much by its dullness of apprehension and its incompleteness here, and entirely failed of that "vantage ground" which it would have held but for its unwillingness to concede what is intuitionally true at this point, and what the common sense of men concedes in all the relations of life. Happy the day, for the cause of truth generally, and for the power and spread of the gospel, when our metaphysics on this and other subjects shall agree with the acknowledged principles of common sense, and be but the philosophic and comprehensive statement of them! Ask any man of a thousand you may meet, whether he thinks he could have done right yesterday when he did wrong, and he will say "Yes." It is the sentiment of common life, and of humanity, for all time, everywhere. Not whether he acted freely and with consent of will in doing wrong. That of course. But whether situated as he then was, he could have refrained from the wrong and done the right, and he will still say "Yes," if his conscience is tender, and bad theology does not come in his way. And he will sustain his position by asking further, "If I could not, how then was I responsible for my sin? If it was 'inevitable,' situated as I was, how am I answerable for it? If the temptations to it took away my power to the contrary, I feel absolved for what I could not help;" and the conscience of mankind will go with him in this, philosophize about it as we may.

It is not to be expected that a great mind of any given age should see all sides of all subjects, for all time. The error of the colossal "Treatise on the Will," is just at the point un-

der review. No man has proved that choice is always as is the greatest apparent good, and it is not an intuitional idea. Edwards found it in the dialectics of previous periods, and accepted it without special investigation, we may hope. It was, too, a link in a chain and scheme of doctrine. It was not investigated on its intrinsic merits as a psychological question. It stood in the light of a consequence, and was for its sake. It was deemed needful to Divine government, though without good reason. The argument was, that God could not be supreme, or secure results, unless he had sovereignty of all volitions and made them but modifications of the infinite cause. But there never can be more than the "*petitio principii*" here. You can only beg the question. Who knows that I always do what I think is best? It seems to me far otherwise. The sense of the inquiry is not altered if I add the phrase, what I think *at the time* is best. All volition is in the present tense. The statement, however expressed, must be tantamount to this, that all men always act from the conviction of what is the greatest good. And can this be said of all the foolishness, and lust, and wickedness of earth and hell? The expression is a misnomer. It does not characterize the act. It has credence for the sake of an end to be gained by it, and yet that end, when thus reached, falsifies a moral government and ignores the distinction between nature and the supernatural.

If motives govern choice, with no power to the contrary, then "*the is*" is the exponent of "*the can be.*" Then the past could be only as it has been; the present cannot be otherwise than as it is, or the future than as it will be. The forces are all "*ab extra.*" We have no power to alter them, or their effects. The stream is from the beginning downward and onward, and we have no power to change its course. All is a Divine programme, and must be fulfilled in this way or the reins are taken out of the hands of God, and he has no way left to be supreme. It is an outside pressure on us, or one "*ab extra*" to ourselves, which is only to be yielded to, and which can only be yielded to freely, you may say. But even that you get not from the doctrine, or the scheme it serves,

but in spite of, and in exception to, them. These would be complete, with this element left out. The whole subject is viewed theologically, and for a theological result. It is a mere matter of cause and effect, to enable God to govern mind and secure results in the moral, as he does in the physical world. That the mind is free in the process, at the point of contact with it, is intuitionally learned indeed, but it does not belong to the scheme or the object of it, and does not make one hair white or black, in the matter of results. All is from God, and resistless as the lightning, and all a Divine method to gain a Divine end. And in gaining that end, the mind is no real factor. It has no discretion, no power of resistance, no sovereignty over the issue. At any given point of wrong it could not hold up, for it has no power to the contrary. It goes as it is led, and because it is led. You say freely, "Yes," as the wheel on its axle, or the joint in its socket, or the door on its hinges, and by subsidizing this foreign element to your doctrine you relieve thus empirically the unutterable repulsions of it. But in all this you do not describe the conscious intuitions of the mind in its free acts. The view is not authentic. More is wanting to it. It lacks vitality. It does not give object or character to the freedom it admits. There is in it no discretion, no power of discrimination, no election as to what the act shall be in the given circumstances. You have not got up into the region of personal cause. There is no self-origination of conduct, or character, or destiny. You have not risen into the region of the "supernatural." You have not stepped from the tread-mill policy of mere physics into the appropriate sphere of the will. The man as yet is but a mere tool in the hands of another—a thing acting as it is acted on—a means, worked by another for the sake of something beyond itself. And the picture is unmeaning. The view is lame and inadequate. It fails integrally to complete the intimations of consciousness in our free acts, and tantalizes us with the name of freedom, while it takes its gist and import, aye, its real life away, and makes it at once without significance or value.

We never did wrong without the conviction that, at the

time and under the circumstances, the act was needless and avoidable. Could we, one of the sharpest pangs of remorse would be extracted, if not all remorse effectually quieted and removed. No man was ever placed where he could not do right. A virtue that is "inevitable," is no virtue. The plea, "I could not help it," is always in bar of imputed wrong, and equally excluding merit, in action formally right. Of course we would guard against the predisposing tendencies to existent wrong, which are found in habits and propensities formed and resultant of the earlier history of the individual or the race, and our friends, in controversy, will, we judge, agree with us in this. But if I have no power against an existing temptation and array of motives, how have I against a previous habit? Such a habit is nothing to me now, in the matter of a current responsibility, except as a present influence. And if I have no capabilities concerning it, but only to freely do its bidding—if I may not at any stage, and under any circumstances, arrest and throttle it and deliver myself from it, and proclaim the freedom of eternal victory over it, from the force of the very elements of the intelligence that is in me, and of me as a creature of God, and more especially now as aided and encouraged by the assurances of the gospel, then indeed am I "led as an ox to the slaughter, and like a fool to the correction of the stocks."

But it has been objected "*cui bono*," "What is the use of claiming the power of contrary choice—it never is exercised?" But are you sure of that? We believe that the power of contrary choice is, and is exercised in thousands and thousands of instances every day. Indeed, not a sinner turns to God without it. Let a great revival of religion sweep through the city, and over the land, and you have it everywhere. We see not how any one gets to Christ without it. He must wake it up, and stake his salvation, under God, upon it. He must summon it to the work of resistance and counteraction. He must contravene the prevalent propensities, and temptations, and habits of a whole life of impenitence and alienation from God. He must encounter the cherished lusts of a life time, and go right abreast of all he has ever been, to resist all, and against the pleadings, and pretensions, and tyranny of all, and turn

unto God and live. And in this he needs the power of contrary choice, and uses it. So that for all the purposes of this discussion this power to the contrary is, under God, the life of the world, and is seen wherever a sinner is converted from the error of his way, or a soul saved from death. How can you break away from a dominant propensity, or change a course of action, without calling up an element of being like that for which we here contend?

The objector will not surely take shelter under the poor subterfuge that we cannot have two and opposite choices, or go two ways at once; for what does this amount to, reduced to the last analysis? It is just equivalent to the insignificant, identical proposition, that *we do as we do*—that personality is a unit, and not a duad. A given volition or exercise may be no measure of the powers of its author. Powers may lie dormant, or await the occasion for their use. We should be sorry to conclude that one who is only doing wrong, is exercising all the powers he has, or that we ever lose the power of right action, whatever, in fact, our conduct may be.

The poor deceit practised on the mind of such an objector, and which he would doubtless hold as a conceded and legitimate postulate, and which has been the occasion of more discussions and logomachics since its invention than almost anything else, is that of two sorts of necessity—physical and moral—the last always retiring, on the analysis of its friends, into a mere certainty, only. But how is the merely certain a correlate of the possible? Only by begging the question again, in view of the *theological necessities* of the scheme. A certainty may be no more allied to a necessity than an uncertainty, unless, as before, you restrict the thought to the mere inanity, that what will be, will be. But much will be that need not be, and that ought not to be, and that is under no necessity of being whatever. Shall we use a nomenclature, in dealing with abstract truth, which obliges us to say that *that* is necessary which God has forbidden, and which he is opposed to, and all good agencies in the universe, and the constituent elements of our own being? Temptation is one thing, but the necessity of compliance quite another. I may be greatly tempted, but the greater is the resistance, and the

use of my power to the contrary, which I can and should make; and if I foolishly comply, the fact would be the exponent of no necessity thereto. Of course we object not to the forms of conventional speech, found in or out of the Bible, and for popular use, where great temptation or a perpetuated depravity is correlated with, or expressed by the words "can," and "cannot;" as, the brethren of Joseph hated him so badly that they "*could* not speak peaceably to him;" when every one knows they could and should.

The error lies not in accepting this metaphoric language of the Orient and of common life, as implying hardened iniquity, or in reference to hereditary propensity, or great, overt wickedness, as when it is said that such an one is so great a liar that he "cannot" speak the truth, and the like phrases that are well enough understood among men—not this, but in running this phraseology into a universal dogma of Occidental metaphysics, and constituting it a battery in the discussions of exact truth and science behind which to screen the exigences of a theological system. But the doctrine is vital to the theory which it subserves. The aim is to secure a Divine government in the moral sphere. And to secure this, it is deemed needful to give to God the sovereignty of all volitions, that they may thereby be as on the whole he would have them to be, and as will best promote his great end in creation. And as this can be done only in the way of influence "*ab extra*" to the mind, (proper,) there is established from the very demands of the system this doctrine of necessity, and the coalescence of the "is" and the "can be." The error lies in bringing in this idea of necessity at all within the sphere of the will, and in taking this way of securing a Divine moral government. It is inherently vicious as a method, and can but subvert the superstructure it would raise. What, in the convictions of any man, would be the value of, or what would be that moral government or universe which absorbed into the Deity all the sovereignty of volitions, and found in him alone all the discretionary movements of mind? A *thing*, it might be; more than that, it could not be.

The doctrine of cause is as legitimate and appreciable in derived as underived being. God made man in his own image,

and after his own likeness. Intelligence is cause "*per se*," dependent for its being, but with a full and unrestricted personality as to its voluntary and responsible acts. Where would be the personality of God without the sovereignty in himself of his voluntary states and acts, and if we might suppose them to be in another, and to be caused by any other than himself, we could no longer see in him the element of personal cause; nothing would remain but irresponsible effect. He must have the control of his forthgoing volitions, or he is no person; he has no discretion in respect to what he is, or will be; he is without individuality or accountableness, to himself or to another. Such is all intelligence. It must, on the last analysis, be itself the umpire in respect to its voluntary states—be itself the sovereign, and have the control over them, and say what they shall be, and whether or not they shall be. Without this you do not get a personality into the intelligence, and abstracting this you destroy it as intelligence, and convert it into a mere effect, moved by causes from without, either material or immaterial. They shall say what it shall be and do, and not the intelligence itself; and theirs should be the responsibility of its course. It is no longer a "*causa causans*," but merely a "*causa causata*." But God deals with derived intelligence as if it were a "*causa causans*," and could put forth volitions without his influence therein, or with his influence therein, or against his influence therein. "Ye stiff necked and rebellious, ye do alway resist the Holy Ghost." What mean those exhortations, and promises, and comminations, and eventual retributions, which are everywhere propounded in the Bible, as related to this subject? What is the doctrine that underlies them, or what relevancy in them, if the sovereignty of our voluntary states is not in ourselves, but in God? Does one exhort another to that over which he has not the control and jurisdiction, but which, after all, is with himself? We are aware of indicating here, but what is well nigh common-place in philosophy, that all moral influence is inherently resistible, and that individual mind would be without self-respect, if it were without self-control. We prize as highly as any the work of the Spirit in the repentance and sanctification of men; but we would not thereby take from and absorb away the

responsible personality of the soul. Much is resistible that will not be resisted. Men will repent when they could hold out in sin, as others will continue to hold out in sin when they could and should repent; and God knows all results in both kingdoms of his empire, and has indicated them, so far as he has thought best, to us.

All accurate thinkers distinguish between a "*sine qua non*" and a cause. Intelligence acts in the way of intelligence. If there were nothing to choose, there would be no occasion for choosing. The mind determines itself in view of considerations present to it; but these are not the causes of its acts, nor the exponents of its power. The atmosphere is not the cause of breathing, though indispensable to it. The mind has laws of thought and principles of action. It dwells in a sea of motive influences, variant often and contradictory, and from all the sources of truth within its range; and it selects its course among them without being commanded by any. It is itself the real and sole agent in the matter of volition, from the inherent "*nisus*" of its own interior sphere, with power to accept any or refuse any. It can act foolishly or wickedly, or wisely, in the same circumstances. All the motives in creation may surround and press upon it to do right, and yet it may do wrong. It holds a power within, and deeper than any external appliances can master. We present them, and leave them, and must leave them short of the result desired, and let that go to the sovereign arbitrament of the respondent mind, from its own interior sphere, in compliance or rejection, on an election and responsibility all its own. Motives do not secure choice, or necessitate it. They present its grounds, but give not its actuality, and are often doomed to bitter disappointment there. The voluntary activities of the will are inherently contingent, and so we reason in all the intercourse of life. We do in the pulpit, and in personal appeal. We are not sure of results till we get responses. Other principles of mind, and the facts of history and experience, help us to calculate results, but with much imperfection and many failures. The necessitated faculties and well known laws of mind show the ordinary range of its voluntary being, but do not necessitate its volition, in any given instance. It can will anything, and that it does

not, in its voluntary history, abide in the extravagant, and ludicrous, and unreasonable, and wrong, is to be attributed to other reasons than a limit of power.

The doctrine of necessity is, then, out of place in the sphere of the will, and the position that motives necessitate choice, with no power to the contrary, is fairly open to the following objections, which, with these preliminary suggestions, may be now more formally stated.

1st. *It cannot be proved.* From the nature of the case it can be but an assumption, and ask the point in debate. How prove this coalescence of the "is" and the "can be," in respect to any given volition, and that it is the measure and limit of the powers of the mind, at the time, and that it cannot be arrested, or diverted, or changed and countermanded at any and every stage of it? We can only say that what is, is—only make a true note of history in the premises, without at all saying what might or might not be in its place. It takes for granted that we *must* will what we *do* will, and that we have no power against present consent of will, but only in its direction and fulfillment. And there is, there can be no psychological stand-point from which to maintain the position which can make it more than a "*petitio principii*," in behalf of some theological necessity supposed to demand it.

2d. *Its definition of choice is logically incomplete and defective.* Its claim for choice is freedom in merely *one* direction, whereas the true import of it is freedom to *either*. It is liberty to accept or decline a given object. It implies a freedom, and of course a power, to either. The object can be received or rejected. The mind is sovereign over the issue, and is competent to a decision either way. It can act wisely or foolishly in the premises—choose life or death—act right or wrong—according to the light it has, or against it—obey or disobey—love God or hate him—repent of sin or hold out in impenitence—follow Christ or the world. What would that choice be, which presented no alternative—which involved the liability of but one issue, and made only that possible in the premises, and necessitated that? The element and the object of choice has now evaporated out of it, and it settles down into a fatality or a farce. The logical demands of the subject

involve the principle and the power of contrary choice. "Choose ye this day whom ye will serve," says the Christian preacher; and does he not know that each one of his people, under every possible presentation of the subject, can at any time say, "Yes" or "No," to his plea? What would compliance be worth, but for this; or what vitality, or value, in character or destiny? And hence,

3d. *It gives no real election in choice, and no true personality to the intelligence.* All personality claims discretion over the issues presented, and as presented. It is not content with mere willingness of consent; it must have coördinately the power of refusal. That consent must not be, because it could not be withheld. It must be with liberty to the contrary, or there is no virtue in it, no dignity of manhood, no prerogative of one, made in the image of God. Carry the opposite view to the marts of business, to the subject of religion or morality in the common walks of life, or even to the sports of childhood, and let the umpire be the common sense and sentiments of men, and the dogma would scarcely fail of ridicule and contempt.

The conviction of a practical and competent jurisdiction over influences brought to bear upon us, to say what we will do and what the act shall be in view of them, is *everywhere*, and is everywhere essential to all acknowledged responsibility. With its abandonment would go all sentiment of personal accountability, and all idea of the characteristic difference between a person and a thing.

4th. *It does not meet the demands of consciousness in volition or the sentiments of praise and blame which attend it.* Suppose the volition be a sin. Does it describe the conviction of him who committed it, to say that it was in any sense necessary and unavoidable?—that certain influences were imposed on me, and I complied, of course, without power to the contrary? Something approaching this was attempted in behalf of the primeval sin; but our first parents broke down with shame in giving it. They had courage only to say, "The serpent beguiled me, and I *did* eat;" "The woman which Thou gavest me, gave unto me and I *did* eat." Not that we could not help it, or avoid it, and that it was "inevitable." The

conviction in sinning, is, that it is needless as well as wrong; avoidable as well as blameworthy, and that unless it were the one, it would not be the other. I am assailed with temptation in the streets. Until I comply, I have the power not to, as by all admitted. When do I lose it? Does the consent to sin abolish it? Does the act of compliance abnegate the power of resistance, and necessitate my sin? This but confounds cause and effect, and gives an excuse beside. It makes the success of crime its apology. This would be a wonderful opiate to administer to those in sin—a wonderful relief to the pangs of remorse. A child shall say, "I could not help it," and you will accept the excuse; while with perfect consistency society will inflict a severer punishment on the second or third or fiftieth offense, even up to a hardened iniquity, than on the first; showing indubitably that in the convictions of all men there is no relation between the indulgence of sin and its necessity. Consent, merely, does not, then, exhaust the conscientious convictions of the soul, in respect to its volitions. It is consent when it might be withheld; compliance when it could have been resistance; wrong, perhaps, when it could and should have been right. Indeed, what is that voluntariness that cannot be withheld, that compliance which cannot be refused, that acceptance of a position or a boon which cannot be resisted? So that consent itself implies a power to the contrary; and hence,

5th. *Its theory of the intelligence is fundamentally incompetent and unsound.* It constitutes the mind a mere effect, in nature, moving as it is moved upon, by something else. It does not rise to the dignity of the supernatural, in its view of mind. The intelligence according to this scheme is not cause "*per se*,"—originating its own thoughts,—acting from the principles of its own constituent being, as inherently cause with self-control and jurisdiction over its voluntary movements to say what, and whether they shall be,—to comply or not comply with any motive influences that may be brought to bear upon us from any quarter, and to stand erect in the rectitude and dignity of our personal being, whatever the currents of adverse influence may be, that are sweeping by us; but only to comply with that which may be deemed the strongest, and be

alike at the mercy of any and every wave that comes. Mind has no power in itself. No element of simple cause inheres in it. It may arrest no movement, debate no question, counteract no issue, prevent no conclusion. It is only a "*causa causata*." The real cause is elsewhere,—it is "*ab extra*" to the mind, which is mere effect, differing from the water-wheel in the feature of consciousness, but not in the relations of cause and effect. Just this is the demand of the scheme. It is an indispensable link in the chain, without which the whole would be valueless. If the sovereignty of volitions was of the personality, and one might at any time say yes or no to any amount of temptation that might be on him, who could predict its uniform success, according to any preconcerted programme that might be laid down, or know but that he did in thousands of instances deny its prerogative, and break in upon its line of things, and thus vitiate this method of moral government, whether human or divine? It must then deny all real cause to the finite, and with it all actual control over its voluntary history or jurisdiction and sovereignty in respect to what at any given point it shall be, and demand as the content of the mind's experience and its power, that it move contentedly and freely in the grooves marked by another's hand, in obedience to influences *ab extra* to itself. That this leaves little to the mind that is really intelligent in itself or of the nature of a *bona fide* personality, and that it is utterly aside from all the dictates of our conscious being, we need not here repeat, and pass therefore to the consideration, that,

6th. *It supplies no valid basis of MORAL GOVERNMENT.* Such a government always submits a question to the respondent under it, and gives him the jurisdiction over that question. It acknowledges a discretion on his part,—a power at all times to comply or not comply with the requisitions proposed. It furnishes a test,—it presents an alternative, and presumes him competent to either course. It holds him responsible for the right, but capable of the wrong. This is the language of all law, of all character and destiny,—the doctrine of all promises and exhortations, all rewards and punishments, all probation and retribution. It defers to a personality, in the subject under it, that is always equal to the test given, and

to the alternative proposed, to avoid the evil and choose the good,—a competency that is not compromised by the actual facts of the case,—a competency that sits president among them and over them, and abides inherently in the personal being of the soul. It is a power to will or not will in any given case,—to will as he does or otherwise,—to will as he does or as he should, at any and all times, and that, too, whether he does so will or not. This element of power and sufficiency of soul for all right action, and all the intelligent responsibilities of moral government, lies inherent in the personality and back of all influences made to bear upon it. Without it, such a government is a mere pageant, and personal being a mere thing. Without this you could not have an intelligent accountability. You could never charge that an act was needless and could have been avoided. You could only say to the subject under it, “you could if you would.” And he must reply “inasmuch as I *would* not, I *could* not,” and the act is of *necessity*, a part of my integral life and history—and any government in heaven or on earth would break down on this issue and at this point. You must divorce the “is” from the “can be” under moral government, and account the one to be no necessary exponent of the other. A power to do right is a power to do wrong. Moral government has its legitimacy within that sphere. It furnishes the elements and grounds of an intelligent electivity, but does not constrain or necessitate it. From the nature of the case it could not, and it never will. Its methods are inherently resistible, and must be so. It cannot necessitate its moral issues. *There may be that under it which it does not design or want.* There may be that which is like rebellion to the strategy of a state, which is no part of that strategy or of its normal working, and which it cannot prevent, or dispose of, but in the way of a resultant retribution, which takes on the element of physical power. Thus there is that under Divine Government, which God in no respect sympathizes with or would have, and which all the prerogatives of the Infinite combine to prohibit and resist, and overcome and cure. Probation from its very nature may not see the will of God fully met, and there may be no other way of controlling the spirits of lost men, than that of confining

their persons in "their own place." Their moral state is not such as God would have it, or such as it would have been, if he had control of it, and never will be, and their condition will be a *dernier* resort under moral government, from the in-inherent liabilities of it. Such a government must be where God is, and creatures in his image, and it is the dignity and glory of creation. But this is necessarily of it too, and without which neither could virtue, or character, or moral excellency, or intelligent destiny, or heaven, be. All the wealth of character and destiny, of morality and religion, of likeness to God and companionship with angels, lies in this catagory of thought. Indeed what would that virtue and obedience be, which could not be withheld, but which was necessitated and "inevitable." Change the terms of the problem as you will, and that which takes from the intelligence the essential control of its voluntary states, and gives its volitions into the keeping of another, destroys it, and blots out all that distinguishes moral government in its methods and results from one of brute force. The resistibility of moral means is their excellency and glory, as well as of all moral action in view of them. If they were otherwise they would not be moral, nor would action be in view of them.

7th. *The position here controverted is not taken for its own sake.* We certainly intend no disrespect, and think we do no wrong in saying this. The historical relations of the question show this, and the effort of its friends now, as already intimated, is ulterior, and with a view to a *theological* position. They would find here the basis of Divine government, and of the supremacy of God, and build on this pedestal the doctrine of decrees, and their fulfillment, and the security of the plans and purposes of God, and of his great end in creation. The line of argument is, that all is by a Divine decree and according to a Divine programme, and tending to a Divine end,—that the transpiring of each particular is essential to the grand result which is God's great end in his works, and that this necessary fulfillment in the moral sphere and its relations to the physical, cannot be secured unless motive governs choice and necessitates it, and that as God has the supreme direction

of motive influences, he can and does determine all volitions in accordance with the prescribed plan, and thus effectuates and secures his end. Now, without stopping to inquire whether it is quite authentic to solve a purely *psychological* problem by a *theological* formula, and taking up the question on its merits, and assuming that what is theologically true is true every way and everywhere, which we admit; are we sure that this is the only, or the best, or the true way at all, to constitute a Divine moral government? Would such a government be able to redeem itself from the simple pageantry of its movement as a Divine fatality, with really but one cause, one discretionary impulse and one effective personality, and all else reduced to mere effect? But how is this? Does not moral government imply a commerce of forces?—a commingling of different and variant and it may be antagonistic personalities and agencies? Must there not be the reciprocities of governor and governed? The mutual consilience of distinct, individual personalities, each with its own agency and scheme of things, and will there not of necessity be as many plans of action as there are agents to enact them? Is it not so among men, as by all confessed, and how does the scale of the infinite change the terms of the problem? God “worketh all things according to the counsel of his own will,” but we are not quite so sure that sinners do. At least God says they do not. Besides, it is unphilosophical to say that one being purposes the purposes of another. This is not the way of securing from others our own ends. We present considerations and inducements, but we do not invade their agency and constitute their purposes. The plans of different agents may coalesce in the same result, but the plans are distinct and peculiar to each, and each is his own plan and not another’s, and his decrees and purposes are but the mental condition of his own acts. We see this everywhere. It is of the individuality and responsibility of all personal intelligence. And we see no need of disturbing the law of these well known principles and facts, in our reference of the subject to its divine relations. Indeed, in the light of revealed truth we have them in their perfection there.

God is in the infinite and in the right, and we are intelligent beings. The constituent being of man is a plea for the truth, and righteousness, and course of God. Much that is resistible will not be resisted. The resources of the Infinite are with God, to bring light out of darkness and order out of confusion. "Better is the end of a thing than the beginning." Moral means, though inherently resistible, will have increasing success, and under the conduct of the Spirit of God will yet gain a glorious and permanent triumph over the tempter, death, and sin. Men will give heed to that Spirit, and all right agencies and influences, when they could hold out against them, and their repentance will be a *freedom* and not a *necessity*. Though none will repent without the Spirit, yet multitudes will with. Nations will be born in a day, and earth become a type of heaven. "God sees the end from the beginning." He *sees* it. It is intuitional with him everywhere and always, and He has intimated results to us, for our encouragement, in the use of means. Probation will do much in behalf of "God's great end in all things," though it will witness much that He would not have, and fail of much that He would have. He would "have all to be saved," but they will not be. His own chosen methods will not be attended with universal success. Some, yea, many, alas! too many, will resist his will and his Spirit with its array of means and influences, and have to be turned over, to the dernier and less acceptable, but necessary retributions of moral government. "For he must reign until he hath put all his enemies under his feet." A supreme governor does not in the moral sphere always have all things subdued to him. There may be rebellion, and in it much that he does not will or wish, and it may bring disturbance into the physical relations of his subjects, and there may be a process of things, before the issue comes. But he will maintain himself against that rebellion, and succeed in putting it down, if not in one way, then in another. If mercy fails in anything, then retribution will take up the work, and the principles of his government will be vindicated,—“the righteous shine as the stars,” and his great end be attained in all honor, and justice and mercy and truth. Thus God's relations to wrong are right, and he is in-

finitely happy in himself and in the prosecution of his great end, though all are not saved and though "he has no pleasure in the death of the wicked." And this style of moral government is legitimate, and appreciable, and satisfactory. It is moral government, and free from the insuperable objections, which must forever attend the view above referred to,—and to which we now present the still more serious and ultimate disclaimer, that,

8th. *It sanctifies sin.* It constitutes sin the Divine method of the universe,—as integral in the Divine economy,—as a Divine strategy and expedient, introduced therein with a view to the glory of God and his great end in creation. As such he decrees it, its time, and manner, and amount, and all the concomitants of it, so that there shall be just as much sin as God has decreed, without power to the contrary. All sin is a Divine method, and according to the Divine programme, and as such inevitable, and without the ability on our part of preventing it. We state the case sharply, but truly. However stated, it comes to this. All this, and much more indeed, in the same direction, is the logical sequence of the position we controvert and its theological adjunct and reason. Any form of thought which takes sin into the Divine economy, obliges us to give a good reason for it. The doctrine of any strategic, propositional relation of God to the introduction of sin, commits us for the whole, and we must view all the wrong of earth and hell, as comprehensively according to the mind and will of God, and must hold him responsible for all there is of it, and then the doctrine of "no power to the contrary" is legitimate and necessary. And thus its friends understand it. Not to go further back, Dr. Hopkins of Newport wrote a volume to justify God as the proponent of moral evil, in which, with other language equally decisive, he says, "If God did will and choose that sin should exist, (which he maintains,) this necessarily implies, as has been before shown, all that energy, exertion and disposal of things that is necessary, previous to the existence of sin, in order that it may actually take place, and without which it could not have existed. For there is an infallible connection between the will of God that

sin shall exist, and the actual existence of it, and this will of God is the cause or reason why it has taken place rather than not."*

Dr. Bellamy, in a more apologetic tone, writes a volume on the "wisdom of God in the permission of sin," while Dr. Emmons, with his sturdy and unflinching logic, carries the subject up to its only legitimate conclusion, in his "Divine efficiency scheme." For surely if God ordains sin, and causes and controls sin in accordance therewith, "without power to the contrary," how on any other scheme does it take place? Current theology of the Princeton type, pressed in this matter, flies to the extreme, that "God is above morality," and that "no rule reaches him,"† while others, better posted, if not less unscrupulous, run the whole subject into mystery, and frankly acknowledge that the "rationale" of wrong, a matter in respect to which we have had and must have more practical experience and constant responsibility than on any other, is incapable of being understood. And so it is on the principle here objected to. The great Neander so esteemed it, and so it ever must be esteemed, as an element in a Divine economy. The future will be further from appreciating it than the past. No man will ever again write about it as did Hopkins, or with Emmons assume the logical sequences of the "efficiency scheme." The maturity of the study of *moral science* forbids it. *No one, on that side, will again encounter a discussion of the subject on its merits.* With a stand-point in the Divine economy, the existence of sin is an insoluble mystery, and must ever remain so. The studies of eternity will not reconcile us to the doctrine that God is the proponent of sin in a scheme of things, and as such has decreed it and its accomplishment, and then, as an indispensable adjunct, necessitated it in the volitions of his creatures. It would be far wiser to take a lesson or two from conscience here, as this is essentially a moral question, and the solution of it practically in and of our convictions every time we sin. No one has ever introverted his attention at such a time, without the

* System of Divinity—Decrees.

† See Review of Beecher—Princeton Repository.

unequivocal conviction that, in this, he is outside of a Divine economy, and counter to all Divine will and purpose respecting him. He would himself be shocked to think that he was then fulfilling a Divine decree concerning him, and obeying a Divine arrangement for its execution, and, moreover, that this was all he *could* do in the premises. If there be a theology that cannot be preached, we apprehend that this is it. For ourselves we prefer one that can be preached, and to take counsel of that of "*the feelings*," if that of the "*intellect*" must be so lame and ungodlike. We scarcely know how to sympathize with those who find so much difficulty with the theology of sin. Perhaps we have had more experience of sin than they have. We would hope so for their sake. For ourselves we view it as wholly a wrong seed—that it stands out in a plan of its own, and a plane of its own, and has about the relation to the economy of God, that rebellion has to the strategy of a state, and that while intelligence is and must be capable of it, and moral government inherently liable to it, as its abuse and perversion, it is no way of God, that it is in no sense according to the will of God, or has his consent or purpose in its behalf, or that it should be, or that we should commit it, but that, on the contrary, "His will is our sanctification," and that God sustains none but antagonistical relations to sin and wrong in every respect, and that he is taking the best methods of the Infinite to subdue and overcome it and instruct the universe out of it as a real dualism in finite cause. We have here the first truths of reason as well as the gist and spirit of Revelation, and we get a theology that can be preached, that the conscience endorses, and that does not outrage its convictions of what must be the being, and perfections, and work, and way of God. Whatever else is true, we think this is, and that, based on the principles of truth, it will be found to justify itself in the light of all well balanced investigation that may be made respecting it in the future, while it is free from the insuperable objections of the scheme which makes God the proponent of wrong, and constitutes sin an integral element in the Divine economy of the universe.

Finally. *The view we oppose is virtually surrendered in the explanations of its friends concerning it.* Its "necessity" is resolved into a mere "certainty," but how the one becomes a correlate or synonym of the other is not so well shown, and though this seems to be an advance in the right direction, yet its meaning is not fully obvious. It cannot be intended to refer to an existent volition and reduce itself to the insignificant proposition that what is, is. It is prospective in its aim, and would make sure the future of our voluntary history and describe its law, and constitute that law, in the doctrine of motive influences on the will. And then to make that doctrine efficacious for its theological intent, that influence must be a Divine method, in the interest of and to insure a Divine government, and the carrying out of a Divine programme, in our voluntary history, and to give a Divine control in it, as being that which God has ordained, and, comprehensively, would have. This was the sense and the aim of the distinguished men already quoted, and it is necessary to the validity of the scheme. We regret to say that it was an integral element in the great work of "Edwards on the Will." But it forgets that the mind is a "*causa causans*,"—that it has in itself a real personality and control of its voluntary states,—that it is a power in itself and capable of resisting any force of motives thus imposed, and, of course, of breaking up any scheme of things thus devised,—that Propensity is no authorized law of choice, and that no constraint of wrong can apologize for it, or place us beyond the power and obligation of right action. Derived intelligence is made in the image of its author, capable of originating its voluntary states, on a plan of movement and progress which is its own and not another's. Self-origination of plan and style and parts of voluntary movement is essential to all personality. God has his plan and angels and devils theirs and men theirs, but we shall be slow to conclude that the converse of this is true, and that the plan of each is that of all, and that the plans of all the apostate spirits of earth and hell are, also, that of God for them. "For my thoughts are not your thoughts, nor your ways my ways," saith the Lord. But if only a certain futuri-

tion of volition is intended by the necessity scheme, then what is to be understood by that? Of the future *we* know very little, and with all the power of forecast, that the experience of the ages or our own has given, we are often sadly disappointed in respect to the conduct and course of men. God knows all, always from the intuitions of his own infinite mind, and is competent from the resources and prerogatives of his own infinite being to bring out, in mercy and in judgment, a final result, glorious to himself and to the principles of all righteousness, in which his kingdom is founded.

But why not go a step further, and acknowledge that derived intelligence is a power in its sphere in the sense that its author is,—that it is self-acting from the resources of its own interior and essential being, in view of the elements and grounds of choice, within its reach, competent always for right action, and intelligently responsible for its course,—self-sustained and approved in all right action, and self-convicted and self-humiliated for all sin, as that which is needless and unnecessary as well as hurtful and wrong,—that the method and government of God is a perfect righteousness, and his influence and will and purpose for a perfect rectitude and virtue, in those “created in his image,” and his end, a holy, happy universe in his love and likeness—that all other and else than this in the moral sphere is not of him—that he is filling the universe with motives and incentives to love and obey him, and furnishing none to the contrary, and no excuse for sin, and that he is taking the best methods to reduce and bring all into subjection, in mercy and judgment and will, “until all his enemies be put under his feet,”—the “righteous shine as the stars in the firmament,” and “God be all in all.” Doing this, we should not feel much disposed, as we *certainly* should be under no *necessity* to complain. But our limits are up and we here close, commending this whole subject to the careful study of those who would seize on the true lineaments of the Divine government, and of the intelligent accountability of man.