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ARTICLE I.

THE SUFFERINGS OF CHRIST.

By Prof. TAYLER LEWIS, LL. D.

The Sufferings of Christ. BY A LAYMAN. Harper & Brothers.

WHO was HE that died on Calvary? What was the nature of HIS sufferings? What bearing have they upon our salvation?

We may well ask, What is all science, and all philosophy, when compared with the infinite importance of these momentous inquiries? What utter triflers are those who can occupy their minds with other questions of history, of economy, of politics, of ethics, of metaphysics, of theology even, whilst these remain, not only unsettled, but unheeded! According as they are determined in one way or the other, must religion, especially revealed religion, rise into a matter of awful solemnity, or cease to be a subject of alarm, of earnestness, or even of settled seriousness, to any thoughtful soul.

If Jesus was merely a man, if his sufferings were only those of a man, if his death has no other relation to our sal-

ARTICLE III.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE AFFECTIONS.

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THOSE discussions in mental science, which have, of late, enriched the pages of our American quarterlies, have done essential service to this interesting study.

It may fairly be submitted, whether the controversy of the elder Edwards, with his Arminian opponents, has not bequeathed to his disciples a phraseology somewhat liable to misconstruction, on the subject of the Will. This would not be surprising, even though no essential error were entertained by him in respect to this faculty. His object was single: his attitude antagonistical. He wished to place in a strong light, the Calvinistic bearings of his subject, and in doing this, was comparatively unmindful of other points, to which it was more remotely affiliated. This is perhaps a uniform feature of controversial writings. But the progress of a century since, has given opportunity to look at the subject of mental science in attitudes and relations, not distinctly recognized by the giant intellect of Edwards, and which has led many to the conviction that he has used forms of speech, in pointing out the connection between *the Will* and the predominant motive, which does not the most accurately describe the intimations of consciousness respecting it.

These extant discussions are having the effect to redeem the doctrine of the Will from any tendencies toward fatalism, and relieving it from the impression of a literal analogy between cause and effect in physics, and motive and volition in the department of mind. They sustain the full responsibility of our acts of will, as reported by consciousness, and place motives in their true position as the *condition* of the mind's voluntary action;—as the intelligent considerations in view of which it originates choice in conscious freedom and accountability; while most readers will doubt whether the advocates

of *contingent action* have succeeded (if that has been their aim) in effacing the conviction that *willing is always* in the direction of the greatest motive.

But the difficult point in the science of mind, is not yet reached by the very distinguished writers who have appeared upon the arena of this discussion. After conceding that, even with the broadest construction of the conscious freedom, sovereignty, and responsibility of the Will, its acts, *in fact*, are in the direction of the leading consideration present to the mind, the inquiry goes back a step, and asks after the doctrine of *motive-influence*. It seeks for the law of the subjective motive. What are the elements of which it is composed? What do we mean by propensity, bias, or native inclination? What by the accustomed habitudes of the spirit, whether derived from Adam, or acquired in any other way? What is the true analysis of that discolouring medium, through which the *objective* motive passes, often, in coming to the Will, and influencing the choice? A psychological solution of this problem would solve also many affiliated difficulties in metaphysics and theology, and go far toward making plain our pathway in the researches of mental science. If the generic classification of the powers of the mind be into the *understanding, sensibility, and will*, the inquiry would relate to the second item in the enumeration, and its actual states and *affections*; the law of their rise and inhabitation in the soul, and of their correlation with objective truth, and the determinate acts of the will.

This subject would also seem to be next in order, and may be fruitful of good results in the department of religious instruction, of morals, and of common life.

With the view of calling attention to it, we throw out the following suggestions, without pretending to exhaust the subject, or to speak with much authority among the *savans*, who are in arbitration upon the true lineaments of the mental economy.

1. *Affections are not substantive properties of the mind.*

They are distinguishable from its essence. They are accretions in its history,—matters of its experience,—feelings, emotions, states; attitudes of the mind in view of other objects, and not its created, substantive being.

Practical error may have arisen on this point, from that classification of the powers of the mind which makes the *affections* one of them; a misnomer avoided by most modern writers.

There is in the mind a constitutional susceptibility of emotions, an inherent provision and adaptedness to be affected by objects from without, by all truth, and by all the relations appropriate to our moral being. This we know from the fact, that we *have* emotions, and *are* affected in view of the various objects of our knowledge. This, doubtless, is a quality of all mind, infinite and finite—angelic or human—fallen or unfallen—intelligent, brute or insect. But every where too, the distinction between the mind and its affections is that between the container and the thing contained—between reason and reasoning—will and willing—agent and action. Thus Dr. Woods (*Bib. Repos.*, Jan., 1842, p. 168): “I maintain that the mind *acts as really and powerfully*, in loving, and hating, and desiring, as in willing and choosing. It is indeed the *subject* of an influence from without, but it is an *intelligent, active* subject. It is not properly a *recipient* of its affections, but an *agent* in them.”

2. *Affections arise in view of objects made known to the mind.* We here refer to the great law of mind, that *feeling*, as well as thought, implies the presence or recollection of an object on which that feeling terminates; that knowledge is the prerequisite of emotion, and that we have no affections concerning an object of which we know nothing. Some report of the senses, some reminiscence of memory, or some combination of the intellect, must awaken emotion, or we shall have none. This matter is as well understood in the nursery, as in the cabinet; in the pastimes of childhood, as in

the laws of evidence, and the instructions of philosophy. The true position for emotions, is on the report of the understanding ; on the decision of the intellect ; on the apprehension of the mind as to the state of facts in given premises. So is it on the arena of human life. So, it would seem, it must every where and always be. The man who knows nothing of China takes no interest in the destinies deciding there. Your child may have died, but until you know it, you do not *feel* your loss. Revenge is consequent on the apprehension of wrong ;—envy sees a successful rival ;—hatred is in view of conflicting claims, or defeat, in respect to cherished objects. Faith apprehends the grounds of confidence, and love the characteristics of loveliness. On this principle are arranged the intercourse, and courtesies, and friendships of life. The commerce of the mind with objects presented to it, is in the order of this process,—its perception of them—its judgment on them—its emotions in view of them, and its determinate acts of Will respecting them. I perceive the house I am in to be on fire ; I judge the fire will reach me ; I feel the emotion of fear, and will the requisite means of escape. The mind, in a given case, may pass to conclusions with the rapidity of light, but this must be the order of the process, or it is devoid of intelligence.

Habit and the principle of association vastly facilitate the classification of objects ; but the mind stands affected toward them, according to their apprehended qualities and relations. It may be mistaken, but its affections in any given instance, are the result of its mental notices ; and hence they change with these notices. A friend approaches in the dress of an enemy ; I feel aversion. He comes nearer ; I see it is my friend, and my feelings change. So a familiar illustration. I hear a noise like that of thunder ; I deem it to be thunder, and enjoy its sublimity. I learn it to be but a rumbling of a cart upon the pavement, and all sense of its sublimity passes from my mind. We here ask, Does not this law of *intelligent* action obtain in respect to all our moral and religious affections ?

At what point does the affection of hatred against God arise in the sinner's bosom? Is it in man "or angel fallen," to hate simple, unmixed excellence, irrespective of its bearing upon their cherished course and objects? Is there, what for want of more descriptive phraseology, may be called disinterested malevolence? Will a man hate perfection *per se*—justice and righteousness for their own sakes, or their legitimate exercise, if it bear not adversely on himself or his, and he has no fear that it will? We think he will not. And hence the cheerful acquiescence of men in the inflictions of human law on offenders, and the public sentiment of the community on this point. All cannot be resolved into the principle of mere self-love or self-protection. There is a cordial approbation of the issue, as inherently righteous and deserved. Hence also, to a large extent, the admiration of God and the eulogies on his character, which obtain in deistical and Unitarian writers, and the well-known effects of their teachings. They are not of necessity hypocritical, though destitute of evangelical character; but their instructions bring not down the claims of God, as a righteous governor, holy, just, and true, across the path of man in his sin; and they leave their disciples undisturbed in the way of their own hearts.

Other forms of depravity they may evince; but those emotions of hatred and enmity are not excited which the sinner sometimes feels when "the commandment comes,"—when the truth of God is the sword of the Spirit in his soul, and the prerogatives of God hedge up his way. He hates that authority which is against him—that righteousness which condemns him—that supremacy which is his overthrow. The feeling of enmity toward God occurs at precisely the point where it does toward perfection in other beings—at the point of conflict and counter-claim—where he demands the surrender of objects and principles and habits to which the mind is devoted:—when God is revealed as the avenger of sin, and asserts his claim, against all the idol-abominations of our own hearts. It is at the point of strife in the soul, between

the supremacy of God, and the supremacy of self;—when, though unwilling to yield to the authority of God, the sinner yet dreads it, and anticipates its retribution—when the arrows of the Almighty stick fast in his spirit, and he yet refuses obedience.

Again: Under what circumstances does the feeling of penitence and submission arise? This state of mind involves a further progress of conviction than the affection just considered. Here, the sinner not only fixes on the controversy between himself and God, but is convinced too, that in this controversy God is right, and *he* himself is wrong. Truth, reason and conscience have gained ground on depraved affection; and, under a prevailing sense of the reasons for penitence and submission, he repents and submits.

What, also, is the analysis of the affection of love to God? It is our intelligent nature, apprehending the overwhelming reasons for this affection, in the perfections and ways of God, and in view of them, loving him. The grounds and nature of the emotion are the same in angels or men;—in its first or its subsequent exercise.

The emotion of esteem towards our fellow men, apprehends loveliness in its object; gratitude springs from a sense of kindness; and such is the solution of any affection attributable to man, as a moral, accountable agent. Some object must be present to the mind,—some reason, right or wrong, justifiable or unjustifiable, must call out its emotions, or it would, for aught we know, be in a state of utter quiescence, without evincing either conduct or character.

3. *Affections follow the law of habit.* The same general phenomena attend both. The law of the rise of affections and of their influence, is the same with that of habit, and, for aught we know, that of their dormant inhabitation (to use that language) in the soul, in constituting its predisposed susceptibilities. For all practical and important purposes, the doctrine of the one may be taken for that of the other; and the leading desires and propensities may be accounted as its

abiding states and habits. A conventional distinction is made between the two, by accounting one the accretions of our own personal lifetime, and extending the other to the entire, hereditary proclivity of the race; though this is not always clearly marked, and the things respectively denominated, run comminglingly into each other. Particular desires and propensities, may be the formation and growth of one's own personal experience, while the degenerate habits of a father may lay a foundation for those of his son; and we speak of the *habits* of a family or clan in referring to its characteristics in successive generations.*

The identity of the *doctrine* of the affections with that of habit, is very obvious wherever the subject can be brought out for illustration in human experience, and upon the theatre of active life. We can trace the analogy between them in their formation, their increase, their eradication, as well as in the fact of their being interchangeably cause and effect to each other.

Habit is formed through the commerce of the mind with the objects of its knowledge; the affections arise in the same way. Habits strengthen by indulgence, so do the affections. Given habits must be overcome by conflict, by successful effort and resistance, by the introduction of counter currents of thought and feeling, and by being *gradually* subdued and effaced by the energies of our moral being in uprooting and supplanting them by other mental associations, by new trains of thought, and the formation of new habits of feeling and action. And is it not so with the affections? Must not our evil passions and propensities be encountered in the same way? Do we not pursue the same mode of treatment in the prescriptions of morality and religion, in relation to both sinful habits and sinful desires? Is not all sin of the general nature of any particular sin, and all sinful propensity of the nature of

* It may be objected here, that habits respect the outward manifestations of the life. But do we not also speak of habits of mind and feeling? Besides, I refer to the one (habits), as being more extant and obvious, to illustrate the principle of the affections as more recondite and out of view.

any particular propensity? Is not the propensity of the drunkard similar to that of the debauchee in its formation, and growth, and uprooting too? And may we not put that of the liar or the thief in the same category; and that of the revengeful man or the envious, or of whoever is the dupe of any wrong affection or passion; of whoever follows the lust of the flesh, or of the eyes, or the pride of life? Does the Christian never complain of the sins of his youth, and find those wrong propensities and habits which were most indulged "in the days of his vanity," the most troublesome and restive of any in his pathway homeward to the kingdom of God?

If, then, the doctrine of the affections bears these analogies to the law of habit, they need not be so entirely that *terra incognita* which they have been thought to be. The passions and propensities may not be in such a sense primordial, as to be incapable of solution. They may submit to analysis as resultant states of mind, and with benefit also both to our apprehension of the truth of God, and to its dispensation for the acceptance of men.

The law of habit is extensively illustrated in the various trades and professions and occupations of life, and in the deceptive arts of the necromancer and buffoon. It can perhaps be resolved into the ready flow of the thoughts, and the easy presence and influence of all the requisites to action in accustomed channels. The principle of association comes into play at this point. The mind is familiar with the grounds of action; the motives for it stand readily out and prominent to its view, to the depression of those which have influence in a contrary direction. This is observable in our habits of *thought*. See this in the dexterity of the practised accountant; in the wonderful skill with which the voice or the instrument is managed in music; in the mental analyses and combinations indispensable in the use of language, and which are witnessed in the eloquence of the bar, the pulpit, or the senate chamber. Observe it in the mechanic arts, where often the most rapid and complicated movement of various

members of the body is carried on with uniform accuracy, and with scarcely sufficient attention of mind to enable the memory to retain the *steps* of the movement.

The same is easily detected in the department of our moral being. All the sentiments and emotions may be cultivated. The taste for the fine arts may become exquisite and impassioned. The charms of music may become captivating to the soul. The susceptibility to emotion may be vastly quickened, in the direction of any given passion or propensity.

In view of the analogies here traced, and the law of the affections here evinced, what is the analysis of that passion or propensity which is denominated *selfishness*, the most general of all, perhaps, in our apostate race? It is the regard for personal good, unduly excited. The desire for happiness improperly stimulated—the principle of self-love wrongfully in the ascendant and wrought into a passion, exclusive and overbearing from fictitious, illegitimate sources of influence. It is the due balance of mind worked out of proportion at this point: an excrescence based on the principle of self-love.

Its rise in our first parents, and in our world, is thus described: “And when the woman (under the temptation of the adversary, ‘Ye shall be as gods,’ etc.) saw that the tree was *good* for food, and that it was *pleasant* to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one *wise*; she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat, and gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat.” The pretexts in themselves are plausible. They contain matters calculated to influence the mind, and to sway it when held in check by no counterbalancing considerations. And taking possession of the mind so strongly as to overmatch the force of the interdict and authority of God, the issue is not unaccountable. There was deception practised,—there was a beguiling of the understanding—an inflated motive in a wrong direction—an enlistment that way of the susceptibility to responsible, moral action. The taste, the eye, and the love of knowledge were addressed; and the force of the considerations to obedience which should have prevailed, were thereby depressed to a minor influence, and

transgression occurred. And are not the elements of selfishness as since practised, traceable in this process, though not seen there in the gross and palpable form of its confirmed ascendancy ?

In the same way may any sinful passion or propensity be analyzed, and its growth and strength accounted for. It rises in the wrong use of inherently right powers, and principles of mind, and is confirmed by repeated acts of transgression. All sin follows the analogy of any particular sin. All sinful bias and propensity, that of any particular bias and propensity, as intemperance, thievishness, etc., both in respect to transmission from parent to child, and as to growth in individuals, and is to be accounted for generically and psychologically on the same principles as are family traits—distinctive marks in clans and tribes, and national characteristics. The grand difference is, that generic sin is an attribute of the race,—a peculiarity of the inhabitants of earth, contrasted with those of other worlds, which have not turned apostate. This analogy holds in the progressive degeneracy of both individuals and nations, unrelieved by the economy of grace. The first sin occurred under circumstances of great external temptation, applied to the desire of knowledge. Its enormity is seen in the light and obligations it violated, rather than in the strength of ripened and inveterate sinful propensities, inducing it. They are its fruit according to the principle of this article, and the inheritance of the race, rather than the special type of the first transgression.

Some have supposed that the intellectual powers were crushed in the fall, and that they need to be restored by an agency similar to a new creation, in order to their right action again. But the idea may be carried too far. We know not that the wrong action of mind has the necessary effect of marring its framework, or lessening its powers of intelligent action, or the scope of its being. The arch adversary may have as bright an intellect as unfallen angels. Adam knew more after the fall than before ; and the craft and cunning of practised wickedness is often quite astonishing. Besides, if

transgression necessarily deranges and stupefies the intellectual powers, and lessens the capacity for intelligent action, it proportionally lessens responsibility ; and man apostate is not properly chargeable with the full weight of the penalty propounded to him before the fall, etc.

The confinement of the mind to small, grovelling, and unworthy objects, doubtless prevents the full development and just balance of its powers, and induces hereditary degeneracy, distortion, and imbecility. But this result is to be accounted for, by reference to the slow operation of the principle of association and habit, and the gradual assimilation of the mind to the objects with which it is conversant, and not from the direct and necessary effect of sin, to shatter and break up the mental constitution. Mind, as a generic fact, is advanced, and the Divine economy is of a higher cast, and richer development, through the existence of sin, or by reason of the moral system to which it is adjunct, and so we reason on the subject, in vindication of the government of God.

4. *Affections are responsible states of mind.* They possess the quality of conformity or contrariety to the law of God. This is true of those appropriate to us as moral beings, and such are now under consideration. They are the subject matter of requirement, or prohibition. Sin is predicated of some, and holiness of others. With some God is pleased, and with some displeased. Look at the great commandment in the law, "Thou shalt *love* the Lord thy God with all thy heart," etc. "The end of the commandment is love." This state of mind towards God, is the required conformity to him. God requires love to enemies, and forbids anger, wrath, malice, hatred, strife, emulations, and such like. The elements of character are found in the affections.

The conviction of this truth is matter of consciousness. Every man lives under the abiding impression, that he is responsible for the state of his affections. He refers to the temper or spirit in which he acts in explanation of his conduct. He charges corruption upon his neighbour, or excul-

pates him, by reference to his affections. Human law fully recognizes this principle, as well as the intercourse of life.

Efforts to repress wrong emotions, it is true, are praiseworthy, as are efforts to repress sin in any form, in ourselves or others. But what virtue would attach to the stifling of emotions which are *not* wrong? The duty found in rebuking forbidden affections, arises from their essential sinfulness. There is duty, too, in having and cherishing good affections. They, in themselves, are excellent and praiseworthy, and commended alike in the word of God, and in the convictions of our own bosoms.

5. *Affections are voluntary states of mind.* This might be inferred from the fact of their being required or prohibited, and of our own conscious accountability for them. They do not occur without the consent of the will. They are, indeed, an order of its acts. Did one ever love God or his neighbour against his then present will? Do any of the unholy affections transpire without the commerce of the will therein? Every active state or attitude of the mind implies the correspondence of the will in it. The attention we give to external nature is voluntary, although we cannot correct the representations of the landscape. Our processes of reasoning as facts in the mind's history, are voluntary, although necessarily determined. So are the creations of the imagination and the flights of genius. The mind acts as a unit. Its denominated powers are but our classification of its varied states. They hold correspondence with, and run into each other. In one important sense we are responsible for our judgments, and our faith. Emotions are in view of objects adapted to excite them, but, as *existent facts*, are of the mind's will, for which consciousness convicts us of responsibility. Accustomed emotions and passions are the most easy and ready to the mind. Habits of *feeling*, as well as of thought and action, are formed. These become the beaten pathway of the affections in relation to given objects, and, with their associated and readily present reasons, induce the strong desires and propensities of the soul.

“Good and evil,” says Dr. Woods, “are found ultimately in the disposition or affection of the heart, or nowhere.” Bib. Repos., Jan. 1842, p. 156. Again, “Whether we call love to God voluntary or involuntary, an affection or volition, it is really the same thing. Whatever epithet we apply to it in a metaphysical discourse, it is the sum of obedience to the moral law.” Ibid, p. 157.

6. *Affections are controllable.* True, when an affection transpires, and becomes an existent fact in the history of the mind, it cannot be otherwise than it is. It must go to the judgment as it has transpired, and be so known on the records of eternity. But what we assert is, that the affections and states of mind which have characterized it, may at any time be interrupted and intermitted. The mind is inherently changeable in respect to its predominating affections. We can, at will, change the character of its affections, and put forth others, instead of such like as we have put forth. The predominating characteristic of the mind to-day, need not of necessity be its predominating characteristic to-morrow. The will has control over its future history, to shift and vary the current of the affections at pleasure. We are not obliged to sin to-day, because we did yesterday; or to sin any longer because we have up to this moment. We are under no necessity of hating God any longer, because we do now. There is no physical necessity upon us, that our affections should be *continuous* in kind. They may at any time be arrested, and the characteristics of our mental operations and history change. The mind is open to *various* currents of feeling—to the *conflict* of motives, and their neutralizing force upon each other;—it can derive motives from reason and conscience. The senses may supply motives, opposed to the impulses of propensity, habit, and previous moral history. The suggestions of our intellectual nature may successfully compete with passion and long cherished affections. The drunkard may become a sober man; the thief be honest; the false-swearer cease his profanity; and the sinner against God, of whatever type, re-

pent of his sins and be found at the feet of Jesus in his right mind.

This is evident—

1st. From the fact that affections are the subject of requirement and prohibition.

God enjoins right affections and forbids wrong ones. The decalogue is an interesting point of reference here. Thou shalt have such and such affections, and thou shalt not have others. The principle of the requirement and prohibition is the same before the fall and since,—to man in innocence and in apostacy; to angels as well as to men. But how could this be, if affections are no way controllable by us? As well might the beating of the pulse, or the motions of the planets, be the theme of command to us, as affections over which we have no control. We are admonished, exhorted, commanded, dissuaded, characterized in view of our affections. We are instructed, counseled, warned respecting them; and the question of choice, concerning them, is submitted to us in a thousand ways, and the responsibility is thrown upon us, of following the one or the other, and choosing between them, and choosing our course among them; possessing those which God approves, and repudiating those which he condemns. With as much directness as God enjoined obedience on Adam or the angels, Christ says to the sinner, “Repent, and believe the gospel.” The prophets are equally unembarrassed and direct, in the requisition of right affections, and their issues. “Turn unto me, O backsliding daughter.” “Break off your sins by righteousness, and your iniquities by turning to the Lord.” “Let the wicked forsake his way and the unrighteous man his thoughts,” etc. “Be ye *holy*, for I am holy, saith the Lord.”

All the instructions of the Bible, over the entire field of obligation; all its inculcations of moral and practical truth, recognize the control which we have over the affections. Speculation and metaphysics apart, the common sense of all men agrees, that the injunctions of duty and obligation are connected with the voluntary principle in the soul; and that

at whatever point command, exhortation, counsel, and the pressure of obligation are found, there, too, is the conscious presence of the will, in its responsible office-work on character and destiny; *there* is planted its prerogative of deciding for or against the claims of the subject-matter submitted to its discretion.

2d. The fact that *character* and *destiny* are predicated of the affections, shows them to be controllable. This is but a distinct announcement of principles already evolved. The appeal is to the common sense of men—to reason—to the sense of justice. If unavoidable, how are they responsible states of mind?

3d. If affections are uncontrollable, then are they *perpetual*. An affection or propensity once in the ascendant, must then always be in the ascendant. Having gained the mastery, what shall displace it? If other motives may not come in, and other considerations simultaneously influence the choice, an affection having got predominance, will for ever maintain it. A man once angry must be always angry. Love or hate once ruling must perpetually rule. A *passion* uncontrollable must be unchangeable; and a being once swayed by one emotion can have no other. Every subsequent act of will must follow in the track of that which went before, and be of the same kind, and so on *ad infinitum*.

4th. The decisions of the reason and conscience are in their *nature* independent of the disposition or desire. When proceeded in they must be according to truth as received, whether agreeable or not. The judgment and conscience were given for the regulation of the affections and conduct. In all well-regulated minds they are uniformly the supreme faculties. In *all* minds they supply motives of conduct. They concur with the instructions of objective truth and the objective motives. They often come in conflict with the past experience, habits and biases of the soul, and suggest considerations counter to those supplied from the storehouse of the affections. Acting on our intelligent moral nature, these motives may prevail over those supplied by passion, habit, or propensity,

and bring the mind from its lusts, into obedience to reason and truth. They always do prevail when the mind is brought off from a wrong course of action, to one which is right. They often do. A man may be strongly tempted to steal; and yet the conviction that it would be wrong and unwise may withhold his hand. He may have a vehement appetite for ardent spirits; but a sense of duty to his family, his country, to himself and to God, may dash the cup from his lips, and forbid the gratification of what may have long been an indulged, and actually dominant passion. "A soft answer may turn away wrath;" the cry for mercy unnerves the arm uplifted in revenge, and "*the goodness of God leadeth to repentance.*"

It is not denied that passion, propensity and habit, strengthened by indulgence;—that they may become inveterate, and that in some cases, as in that of the sinner always in conversion, the instructions of truth, and the convictions of reason and conscience, need a co-ordinate Divine influence in order to preponderance. Our position is, that there is no metaphysical necessity for the continued dominance of any given habit or passion.

Agencies and motives are flowing in from various directions, to change the state and attitude of the will, and to break up the monotony of its acts. Conflicting passions may strive for mastery over *each other*. Fear may quench hate. The love of praise may unclench the hand of selfishness. So the gentler emotions may prevail over the more severe and malignant. A sense of justice may overcome the spirit of rapine, and the warning voice of conscience may cause the whole framework of the murderer to quake in his deed of death. Hence the resort to artificial stimulants, to quiet this monitor within, and make crime more easy. Hence the false reasonings which Shakspeare puts into the mouths of such monsters as Richard III. and the murderers of the children of Clarence, to make them equal to their task.

If affection sare not controllable, what mean all the beacons lights set up in our world "to warn the wicked of his way," to guide the unwary, to admonish the heedless, and allure the

tempted to the paths of peace? What place indeed for objective motive *at all*, if it be not, in its nature, independent, and may not be found in conflict with any and every previous state or habit, or desire of the mind; and have influence to change and modify the current of the acts of the will? Motives to action come in between successive volitions and from various and independent quarters, with the prerogative of ever changing the character of the acts of the will. A present volition may take its place among them, in relation to future acts, but not for exclusive control. I may desire an orange, but from conviction that it will injure me, may decline to take it. Appetite and passion may powerfully urge me in a given direction, from which I may be effectually restrained by the warning voice of conscience. I may be strongly disposed to have my own way, but may have such an overwhelming view of the rightful supremacy of God, and of the binding obligations of the command, "My son, give me thy heart," as to yield my heart to God. I may have run greedily in the ways of sin, but be overtaken with such a sense of my sinfulness therefor, as to cry out, "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" Indeed, causes are continually operating to alter and modify the affections, and give new form and direction to the character. Nothing is more common than this, or more proverbial on the theatre of human life.

The sin of our first parents is illustrative of the position we here take. They may be supposed to have had a strong inclination to holiness and quite confirmed habits of obedience; and yet the force of counter motive was not lost on them. They were susceptible of temptation to sin. Without any previous sinful affection, and against every previous affection, they sinned. Considerations entirely *ab extra*, prevailed over all their habits of holiness; the current of their affections changed, and their character became the reverse of what it was. The same principle is seen in the history of the angels, which kept not their first estate, and in every sinner who is converted to God.

To suppose that Adam or the angels fell, by reason of the withdrawal of the motives to obedience found in the light and habits of all their past history, would turn the transaction to a farce, and annihilate the character of God. No, they had a fair trial of the question of obedience. God did not eclipse his glory or depart from them, or implant in them a new nature, as a prerequisite to their sin, and congenial thereto. All of the past remained as it was. Knowledge, motives, habits, reasons for obedience, were out on the field of strife. Temptation combated them. It entered by the ear, the eye, the taste, and the conceit of increasing wisdom, and overcame them. There was a conflict of motives. The woman hesitated; she remembered the interdict, and presented it. Considerations were there on either hand; and the wrong prevailed, though they never had before.

Every change of character proves irrefragably that all the resources of a state, or emotion, or volition of mind, are not found in that state, emotion, or volition which preceded it; but that they come in from different and independent quarters; that they enter through various channels to influence the will from the senses, the reason, the conscience, the fears, the hopes, the imaginations, as well as the passions, to form the conditions of the existent chain. On what principle but this is the inebriate redeemed, or the tempted recovered, or any reform wrought in the character of individuals, or on the face of society? "My son, if sinners entice thee, *consent thou not,*" is a passage based on the principle here stated. It charges the tempted youth to give heed to reason, and to give supremacy to the promptings of his intellectual nature, against the suggestions of passion.

How, on any other principle, is the conviction of sin, and its issue in repentance, intelligent and accountable? The whole process is one of reason and conscience, against propensity and passion; and whenever reason and conscience supply the greater motive under the aid furnished in the Divine economy, repentance occurs; the sinner repents, and is turned or converted to God.

Piety is coincident with the reason and conscience, and it is continued in the soul by substantially the same process as that by which it is first induced and seen in the first emotion of penitence or faith; with the advantage found in the signal victory of that first act of repentance, and the habit of right action then commencing, and ever increasing afterward, and, under the Holy Ghost, rendering obedience against old propensity more and more easy, and more and more the permanent habit and character of the soul.

Coincident with these views are the instructions of consciousness with regard to the affections. We are ever conscious that the past trains of our affections might have been otherwise than they have been; and that we can cherish or suppress those we now have; and that we can change and modify our emotions. Our memory is full of expedients by which we have done this, and by which we have put check or spur to the passions,—have given them prevalence, or brought them in, under the restraints of reason.

It does not satisfy the report of consciousness, that we have freedom of action in a given direction under the promptings of desire or propensity. That report embraces also the conviction, that our past course of action was not inevitable,—that it might have been otherwise than what it has been,—that it could have been arrested at any stage, and been turned into other channels at any moment. Abstract from that report the idea that our past course could have been otherwise than it has been, and you mutilate that report. Take from a wrong action, in any given instance, the attribute, that it might have been avoided, and you take something from the integrity of the impress of it which lies in the conscious recollection of it:—the positive transaction as recorded in the treasure-chamber of the mind, is shorn of some of its characteristics. Hence the feeling of regret, compunction, and the bitterness of remorse that we should act so foolishly—that we did not let reason reign, and were not more influenced by other considerations than those on which we acted. How often are these the compunctions of the murderer—how strikingly depicted

in the accents of the returning prodigal, and in the confessions of the publican in the Gospel! It is not denied that the statements under this head do, in some respects, contravene a perhaps favourite position of the distinguished writer already quoted in this article. In his reply to "Inquirer" (Bib. Rep., Jan., 1842, pp. 166-70), Dr. Woods asks (meaning to deny it), "Does even conscience or the moral sense govern him (man), except as the *inclinations* or *desires* of the heart give force to its dictates?" In answer to the question, whether "volition depends on motives *ab extra*," he says, "It depends ultimately on *inward* motives,"—that "the soul wills or chooses, from its own nature, state, or condition." "Whatever may be the motives presented from without, it is a well known fact that a man's inward *disposition*, or the character and state of his mind, does in reality determine his choices, and his voluntary actions." "The mind wills and chooses from its own *nature*," etc. "There is no more necessity in respect to the affections, than in respect to the volitions." "But our volitions and choices take place from the same necessity; that is, they proceed from the nature, state, and condition of the soul." Thus in former articles (see Theo. Review, June, 1834), he reasons at length, "that man in his natural state has *no susceptibility*" to morally right affections, and that the begetting of such a *susceptibility* is the work of the Holy Spirit in regeneration, and endeavours to avoid the consequences to human responsibility resulting from this position.

That volition flows easily in accustomed channels, and that the impulses of the inward disposition or propensity, are wont to prevail in choice, is unquestionable; but that this is *invariably* and of *necessity* the case, is not conceded; and this is the point here raised. The above extracts overlook the state of facts occurring in a *change* of character,—in the breaking up of previous habits,—in the successful resistance of previously reigning appetite and passion. They leave out of view one feature of the general subject of the mental phenomena; viz., that to an *existent* affection or volition, past

affections or volitions, the whole moral history, the passions, propensities, habits, and nature of the soul, stand related as *motives* and *inducements* to choice, and that this being their position in respect to the existent volition, they are *inherently* capable of being resisted. Choice involves a conflict of motives. It contemplates counter currents of influence in the mind,—motives opposing and neutralizing each other. Those from propensity may be in one direction, those from reason in another. The different propensities indeed may not harmonize in the direction of their influence. Motives *ab extra*, may enter in among those from *within*, and be among the prerequisites of the existent choice, to compete with the suggestions of propensity and habit, and according to their strength prevail against them,—break off the chain of coincident affections, and work a change in character and conduct. Success may be difficult in proportion to the inveteracy of previous habit and propensity; but from the very terms of the statement (a choice in view of motives) is not inherently impossible. It is often witnessed on the arena of human life. See it illustrated in thousands of instances in the temperance reformation. The man turning away from his cups has not his propensity for strong drink cured as a prerequisite to his first effort in the direction of reason and duty. It is not first exchanged for a new propensity, *inducing* reform in the current of which he moves on easily and *naturally*, under the impulses of an “*inward disposition*,” of “*necessity*” governing his volitions in the work of recovery. He has at first but a bare preponderance of motive inducing choice in a right direction, and that from *without* or aside from his “*inward disposition*” and propensities; and every step onward in reform, is in conflict with “propensity and inward inclination,” and in the use of every *outward means* and inducement, until counter habits are *formed*, and his reformation is established.

If motives *ab extra* may not prevail, why use them? If appeals to the understanding and conscience are unavailing, “except as the inclination and desires of the *heart* give them force,” what encouragement to make them, with a

view to correct "the desires and inclinations of the heart?" How must we account for that struggle of the conscience with propensity which is often witnessed? Why does the dagger fall from the hand uplifted for murder, or concealed guilt rankle to despair? How shall we account for conviction of sin, or the first emotion of penitence for it, or for a change of character, inclination, habit or conduct, in any being, on any subject, if propensity *must* always govern, and the type of the precedent affection be seen in the existent one? It would surely be unphilosophical to say that character changes before volition does;—that a man is holy before he repents, or has one holy emotion of soul,—that right propensities, inclinations and desires, precede the first right affection. They are not so formed. They are resulting states of mind. They are the growth of its history in a direction calculated to induce, form and strengthen them. They, like habit, arise out of the action of mind. They yield no help in behalf of a change of affection or volition. Their force is the other way. At the point of change they are balanced, overcome, through motives and influences *ab extra*. See this in the apostacy of the first human pair, or that of the angels who sinned,—in the forming or reforming of the inebriate, as before mentioned. Trace it in the contraction of any habit or propensity, bad or good.

We acknowledge the doctrine of innate depravity; but the propensity there involved *results* from our connection with the fallen Adam, and does not deviate from the general law of habit and propensity as here stated, and as admitted in the ordinary concerns of life. Nor does the agency of the Divine Spirit, involved in the sinner's repentance, make it an exempt case. The influences of the Spirit do not constitute the sinner's holiness. Their commerce is with the constitutional elements of our being and the considerations of truth and obligation acting on them, and against the propensities and depraved sympathies and habits that hitherto have swayed the soul,—getting the victory over them, and inducing right affections in opposition to them.

True, these are not wholly destroyed in the first triumph over them. They often show themselves with mischievous influence afterward; but are progressively undermined and supplanted by new and right inclinations, dispositions and habits, formed in the succeeding history of the converted man.

To call the predominating motive in changed volition, desire, inclination, propensity, is but to confound terms. Besides it is manifest that the predominant motive in this case is not alike in kind with the propensity, and does not spring from it; but from truth, and objective sources of motive in correspondence with principles of our being other than and aside from depraved propensity.

The principle of the above extracts is carried into Dr. Woods's theory of the power of the sinner to repent; pp. 166, 167. "Whenever the question concerning power or ability comes up, put it thus: Has man a power which ever has accomplished the thing? a power which has, in any instance, availed? Has he a power which ever will avail, in the most favourable circumstances?" "Let us look at the question respecting the power of the unrenewed to repent and believe, without the regenerating influence of the Spirit. We inquire, then, whether any sinner has actually repented and believed without that influence? Whatever motives may have acted on him, and whatever efforts he may have made in his natural state, has he ever done this? And has he *power* in himself which will prove to be sufficient in future time?" etc.

We object not to the popular use of the word power, in sermons, and treatises for general reading; but of course do not expect that use of it in an essay, aiming at metaphysical accuracy, in respect to the constituent elements and powers of the mind. We have some doubts, also, as to the infallibility of the issue here joined. Is it always safe to infer from what is, what can be? and to settle definitely from the achievements, the powers of the human spirit? Will Dr. Woods say that the converted sinner has no "*power*" to fall from grace, because he never *has* fallen from grace, and never will,

“even under any circumstances?” or that Adam had no power to sin, before sin became an existent fact in respect to him? or that fallen angels received the “ability” to sin, at the *punctum temporis* of sinning? or, as the statement requires, afterwards? One might be tempted to deem it almost as conclusive to reason from what *can* be, to what *is*, and admit perfectionism in the gross, though Dr. Wood does not. May we not, on the subject of mind, as elsewhere, reason from admitted principles to legitimate conclusions; and from the well known attributes of the mental economy infer its capabilities in respect to a given subject, or course of action? Besides, is the want of power the real reason why the sinner does not repent and believe the gospel? and is it fair to truth to represent him as not having “the power, whatever efforts he make,” to this end; and is the Holy Spirit given to supply this lack of power? We have always supposed that the Holy Ghost was given to induce the right action of powers already in possession; to induce repentance,—not to communicate the power of repenting; and that it is not philosophical to say, that the fallen or the recovered sinner is, in the changes of character therein involved, put in possession of powers previously not belonging to him. Is not the existence of power presupposed in its use? Does it take other and different powers to see and regret our offences against God, than against our fellow-men? Is not every sin against God, and are not the constituents of right action, the same in respect to both tables of the law? and are not those constituents inherently in our moral being?

The Spirit of God is needed in conversion, to overcome propensity, not to communicate it;—to break the force of inclination and habit, by giving success to truth against it;—to counteract the motives to action in the whole assemblage of influences from the “old man, which is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts,” and give prevalence to motives *ab extra*, over them; and make considerations drawn from truth, reason, conscience and God, predominant in volition:—and the first right affection or volition thus secured makes it true

of a man, that "he is born of the Spirit." The work of the Spirit correlates with the prerequisites of volition viewed as motives, and comes in aid of motives *ab extra*, against the depraved and hitherto prevailing biases and habits of the soul. In the first right affection or volition of the sinner, be it repentance, faith or submission in its special type, or whatever one of the Christian graces it assumes, as determined by the appropriate circumstances of it, commences the new nature:—the repetition and progress of such affections, thus secured, strengthen, and issue it at length into the confirmed inclinations and habits of the devotedly pious man. The presence of the Holy Spirit is not essential to obligation, showing that its office-work is not the supply of defective power. His influence in the *conversion* of man, is at the point where that of Satan was, in his *fall*. Its correlation with truth and motives, and their efficacy on the will, is often seen in conviction, and the progress thereof—gradually deepening it,—taking away excuses,—troubling the sinner in his course of transgression, and bringing him more and more under the influence of objective truth, against his yet predominating state of mind, until at length it prevails:—truth, reason, conscience by the Spirit, become ascendant over wicked propensity and appetite; volition changes, and the sinner repents, believes, submits and loves, in view of considerations adapted to these results.

The position here controverted is, that the soul *invariably* acts from its own "inward disposition and character,"—that propensity is, and of "necessity" must be, the *inevitable* law of choice, uncontrollable by considerations of truth or obligation, or motives of whatever nature, or from whatever source, or however sustained from without; and that conscience has force only as aided by the *inclination* and *desires* of the heart. It overlooks the fact that the agency of the Holy Ghost is foreign in its nature to the mind, and that "the word of God is the sword of the Spirit" in conversion, and contemplates his work as a previous preparatory process in the mind: a process whose effort is to make the act in

repentance the legitimate result of a pre-existing propensity. This position assumes that the sinner is converted before he repents, or has any conscious and responsible movement of soul in accordance with required duty. But in what way a propensity having relation to law and duty, can be changed without the agency of the truth, and considerations from without addressed to reason and conscience, is not stated, or any analogy traced between the law of the Spirit's influences, and that of those influences derived from other sources. That there is no such analogy we are not prepared to believe; nor do we apprehend the philosophical accuracy of the idea that propensity must change, as an indispensable prerequisite to changed volition. The preponderance of motive must be in the other scale, but we see not why we are dependent on a change of propensity for this. To say that we are, first begs the question in debate, and then only encumbers the subject of mental philosophy, by moving the process one step further back, with no conceivable advantage. If the predominating motive may not change without a previous change of propensity, then how can we account for a change of propensity? Does not the propensity change through the influence of motives? How is a man cured of a thievish propensity? Is it not by instruction and discipline,—by motives and considerations drawn from the sources of truth, and addressed to his reason and conscience? So is it with all propensity. It is properly the result of mental action,—it is the accustomed state or habit of mind, which has grown out of its previous active states, and is to be rebutted, overmatched in its influence on choice, and eventually superseded, and worn away by an appeal to the sources of conviction, and the reasons for choice in a direction the opposite to which the given propensity would lead us. Those states of mind which are denominated desires, dispositions, inclinations, and propensities, are voluntary states of it, and of course are identical with volition in a large sense, and thus evince their position as the result of the predominating motive, and not its antecedent. Indeed the legitimate prerequisites of choice are

found in the universe of existent things and truths, brought to the mind. Their motive-influence in volition is in its nature, independent of previous propensities and habits, and though facilitated or impeded by propitious or adverse dispositions and habits of the soul, is not necessarily controlled by them. The Bible states the office-work of the Spirit to be, to reprove (convince) of sin, of righteousness and of judgment, on principles, as we suppose, every way rational and adapted to the ends of truth.

If Dr. Woods, by "want of power in himself," etc., means only to express our dependence on the Spirit, in the prevalence of objective truth in repentance, on the same principle as changes in volition, character and conduct occur on other subjects, without the superadded economy of the Spirit, neither our position here or belief would put us in controversy with him on that point: our objection is to the making of the predominant motive in volition identical with propensity, or the *necessary* fruit of it.

Speaking of man as a free agent, and at the point of his repentance, Dr. W. employs language quite in coincidence with the views we would here maintain. "He (man) is the *subject* of the Divine influence, or is *acted upon* by the Spirit; and he himself *acts*, that is, repents and obeys in consequence of that *influence*. God works in believers, and in consequence they work," "in our affections and desires we are truly *active*." "These mental actions are of as *high an order at least* as our *volitions*." "Our desires are exercised spontaneously *in view of appropriate objects*, and are *not controlled by a previous act of the will*. I hold that we are free, especially free in these mental acts,—free, certainly, in as high a sense as in those external acts that are completely dictated and controlled by volition." "Love and hatred and all the affections and emotions which *we exercise in view of moral objects*, are free, *unforced* moral acts, for which we are justly accountable." That is, voluntary states of mind, uncontrolled by any previous volition or state of mind; they are volitions in view of appropriate

objects brought to the mind and in accordance with the views which are entertained in this article.

We detect the same admission in the following extracts on the 170th page. "Let Inquirer tell how *he* exercises this power of choice. In all his more important and deliberate choices does he not carefully *weigh* the *motives* or *reasons* which come before him, and then decide *in accordance* with those which appear to him the strongest?" "And if at any time we will act *suddenly*, without deliberation, and from the *impulse* of some strongly *excited passion*, is not this very impulse of passion the motive that governs us?" "I predict that Inquirer and all other men, in the free exercise of the power of choice, will, in all future time, determine, will or choose, *either* according to what appear to them the strongest reasons, *after deliberation*, or under the influence of some strongly excited affection or passion, which leaves them no time for deliberation."

The theory of volition is in these extracts happily sketched, and the correlation of motives from truth, and reason, and conscience, with those from indulged propensity and habit, as antagonist forces often, is lucidly grouped; but whether in conformity with what has been the subject-matter of animadversion in our previous inferences, the reader must judge.

Here we close the present article, and if it shall help in any degree to illustrate the doctrine of the affections, or shall enlist abler pens and wiser counsels in the service, we shall not have written in vain.