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I. REVIVALS OF RELIGION.

The word Revival implies the previous existence of life ; more properly, it means resuscitation or resurrection from the dead. But according to usage, and with reference to the secondary meanings of the word *life*, it means calling into active exercise a life which has become torpid or has been slumbering. Hence, it has special application to the church, not to the world outside. In Acts 2: 41 ff. we have an account of a revival in the proper sense of the word ; for all the statements there concern the members of the visible church of God. What is commonly called a revival—a general religious movement among the unregenerate—was called by our fathers an “awakening.” There is a sense in which such an awakening may be called a revival, to-wit : a revival of God’s work, (Hab. 3 : 2)—that work of salvation, of calling in His elect—which He has been doing from the beginning. This work seems at times, and in some places, almost to cease ; the Lord seems to abandon His church and give it up to the power of Satan, as in the days of Elijah, at the crucifixion of Jesus, and in the “Dark Ages.” Then comes a time of reviving, a great movement among the dry bones, and a great multitude stand up for the Lord. (Josh. 24—1 Sam. 12.—Judg. 2.—1 Chron. 29.—Hezekiah, Josiah, the Maccabees, Pentecost, the Wilderness, the Brethren of the Common Lot, the Reformation, the Kirk of Shotts, Northampton,

righteousness of a glorious Substitute who finished the probation of his people before the New Testament dispensation was inaugurated.

We have also to demur to the author's endorsement of Pres. Edward's speculation touching the constituted identity of the race with Adam—a speculation based upon his philosophical crotchet of a continuous creation, and incapable of adjustment to his own better view of the federal headship and representative character of the first man. Nor can we see how the author's views as to the universal fatherhood of God, unless more qualified than they are in this work, and his doctrine that "in some deep sense" Christ died for all men individually, can be harmonised with the Calvinistic doctrines of regeneration, adoption and particular atonement.

But notwithstanding these theological statements to which we have been constrained to except, and apart from them, we cheerfully yield to the author the palm for a triumphant refutation of the heresy of future probation. The final argument from the witness of christian experience we have not room to notice. We hope that this work, so timely and so able, may be blessed of God to check the spread of an hypothesis which threatens to subvert the foundations of the orthodox faith, to chill the fervor of evangelical preaching, and to arrest the progress of the foreign missionary enterprise.

JOHN L. GIRARDEAU.

BOWNE'S PHILOSOPHY OF THEISM.

PHILOSOPHY OF THEISM. *By Borden P. Bowne, Professor of Philosophy in Boston University, author of "Metaphysics," "Introduction to Psychological Theory," etc.* Pp. x. 270. 8vo. Cloth, \$1.75. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1887.

The wide reputation of Professor Bowne insures a large and appreciative audience ready to listen attentively to this his latest word on a topic of such commanding dignity and importance; a topic, too, which long experience in his chosen field of study has furnished him rare qualification to discuss not only intelligently but with authority.

The form of the work is prepossessing; it is a portly volume, substantially bound, and printed in large restful type on clear white *extra-heavy* paper.

It opens the discussion proper with an *Introduction* of forty pages, following which we have seven formal chapters, *viz.* :

- I. Unity of the World-Ground.
- II. The World-Ground as Intelligent.
- III. The World-Ground as Personal.
- IV. The Metaphysical Attributes of the World-Ground.
- V. God and the World.
- VI. The World-Ground as Ethical.
- VII. Theism and Life.

The discussion ends with a *Conclusion* comprising twenty pages. It will be seen at once, therefore, that the work is an elaborate treatise, thoughtfully and faithfully prepared.

Much may be said in its favor; the tone of the book is decisive, it is healthy, it is hopeful. The author wins confidence by his evident knowledge and firm grasp of the subject, by his convictions and the courage of them. There is so nauseously much of the *suaviter in modo* attending modern apologetics, that it is at once novel and refreshing to light on an author who has faith, character and courage enough to exhibit somewhat of the *fortiter in re*.

The preface is a tonic. There is something bracing in the following: "Fundamental problems are seen to remain about what they always were in spite of the advent of the 'New Philosophy.' When that philosophy first appeared in the wilderness of the old philosophy and theology, announcing that the kingdom of science was at hand, high hopes were entertained by some, and gloomy forebodings by others, as to what the end would be. But as the attraction of novelty and denial wore off, it became clear that the 'New Philosophy' could not hit it off with criticism any more happily than the old. To the apostles, this was both a revelation and a sore disappointment. They meant well and were gifted writers, but they were lacking in patient reflection. They took more heed to their speculative ways and became less enthusiastic, but wiser men. Some proof of this is found in the fact that the British Association for the Advancement of Science has not favored us with a cosmological manifesto for the last dozen years. All parties have learned wisdom. Theists have gained breadth and courage. Anti-theists have found that the way of anti-theism is hard. The critic must allow that the theistic outlook was never more encouraging. The only exception to this general growth is in the case of the newspaper and magazine scientist—that well of omniscience undefiled. Here, as ever, one finds chiefly words and hearsay, an *exploitation* of what the writer does not know."

The style and character of the work are always vigorous, its conclusions are sound and fairly reached. We fear he sometimes concedes too much; a fear mitigated, however, by the reflection that, as this spirit of concession is evidence both of fairness and fearlessness, so perhaps it may prove strength rather than weakness in its effect upon such as really need the argument; moreover, to one who will faithfully follow him through the *whole* discussion, no damage will come.

The book contains much excellent analysis, and several very happy and forceful summations. In some minor particulars we think he is unfortunate: *e. g.* his discussion of the nature of time and space. Though he disarms criticism by avowing in advance that he has "no expectation of clearing up all the puzzles of metaphysics," yet he here attempts one of its most insolvable problems; he encounters the difficulty gratuitously, and worse still, he encounters it to no purpose; for in saying that time "is only the form of change in general; the cosmic process is not in time, but by its incessant change it produces the form of time;" and then adds that God, by creating, "gave time its existence"—in saying this, we very much fear, he will suggest to most readers the criticism, *vox et præterea nil!*

We must differ from him in his estimate of the difficulty attending God's foreknowledge of free acts; we do not believe that "a foreknowledge of a free act is a knowledge without assignable grounds of knowing." His difficulty doubtless derives its force from the confusion inhering in the familiar Arminian conception of a free act *i. e.* an act lawless, capricious, and therefore of necessity *uncertain*.

We do not consider our author happy in his discussion of the temporal and eternal in creation, and we cannot agree with the statement that a temporal creation seems an act of pure arbitrariness. Indeed we confess a most decided jealousy of this word *arbitrary*; as applied under any circumstances whatever to the Almighty; the word may be of honorable origin, but "evil communications corrupt good manners," and its regular associations are none of the best.

Again, the Professor is at fault, we think, in discussing God's will and its realization, asserting essential identity between the two; "with him willing must be identical with realization." If so, then the will emerges only at the instant of fulfilment. But this is obviously impossible, and we fail to find any relief in a distinction between the intention and the will, and still less in the aforementioned account of time and space which occurs just here.

We deny also that "a changeless knowledge of a changing thing is a contradiction." *E. g.* I have a present knowledge of the changes to occur on the face of the clock above me on the mantel, I have a changeless knowledge of that very changing thing, the minute hand, as it pursues its way. The face of that clock will change every moment during the next twelve hours. Lastly, in this line, we are not prepared to admit that "our formal judgments of right and wrong have no direct dependence upon theistic faith." Our author goes on immediately to add:

"It is at this point that the moral argument has been most mismanaged. How can the obligation of justice, truth, benevolence, gratitude be made to depend even on the existence of God? And with what face can we pretend that atheism would make these virtues less binding than they are? These are absolute moral intuitions."

Sometime ago I was amused by the proceedings of a cock; he called his hens most vociferously and continuously, going laboriously through the motions of picking up dainties, interspersing his pantomime the while with most insistent calls; finally his harem came running, to find absolutely nothing, no faintest sign or semblance of grub, grain, seed or anything on the hard bare path. Indeed, his cockship made no pretense of offering them anything; he simply strutted off to lead them to another part of the premises. *Now did the cock lie?* When I go out and take an egg from the nest of my hen, do I steal? When a farmer sticks a pig or slaughters an ox, does he commit murder? The answer in each instance is ready. But acts of the same nature committed against our fellow-men would be, respectively, lying, theft, murder. What constitutes the difference? In the last instance the distinction

is clear; the sacredness of human life is expressly grounded in the image of God. But Atheism reduces man to the level of the brute, differing from the latter in degree only; it sweeps away all essential distinction between them; man becomes then merely a wondrously developed beast. If there were no God, we confess we could see no more intrinsic crime in slaying a man than in killing a horse. True, such a conception seems impossible to us; impossible because of those "moral intuitions" to which our author refers; *but the beast has no moral intuitions*. This suggests a very pertinent question, Whence come these absolute moral intuitions? The answer is decisive.

Be it remembered, however, that these objections do not obtain against the argument as a whole, but only against certain details of it; details, moreover, that are somewhat of the nature, or effect at least, of digression. This suspicion of irrelevance suggests a criticism on our author's style; we fear he lacks clearness, his thought seems clear but his expression is at times really obscure; the book exacted more study than it ought to have done, and we feel by no means sure, even now, that we have fully caught the Professor's meaning in every instance. We repeat, however, that the points we have felt constrained to criticise unfavorably are minor blemishes; the work is an excellent one and will serve to strengthen the faith and hope of many in these days of aggressive infidelity and insinuating pessimism. We cordially thank the author for his tonic and heartsome treatment of Theism, as well and equally for his trenchant and vigorous satire on the crudities and contradictions, the emptiness and insolence of Atheism.

SAMUEL M. SMITH.

PROF. BRUCE'S "MIRACULOUS ELEMENT IN THE GOSPELS," ETC.

THE MIRACULOUS ELEMENT IN THE GOSPELS. A Course of Lectures on the "Ely Foundation," delivered in Union Theological Seminary, by *Alexander Balmain Bruce, D. D., Professor of Apologetics and New Testament Exegesis in Free Church College, Glasgow*. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 714 Broadway. 1887.

THE PARABOLIC TEACHING OF CHRIST. A Systematic and Critical Study of the Parables of our Lord, by *the same*. Third Revised Edition. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 714 Broadway. 1887.

THE HUMILIATION OF CHRIST, In its Physical, Ethical and Official Aspects. The Sixth Series of the Cunningham Lectures. By *the same*. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1887.

Professor Bruce has now added another to the series of works, each occupying a rather portly octavo volume, which has made him famous as a theological writer all over the English-speaking world. The present contribution in no way falls short of its predecessors in learning or ability, or in freshness of presentation, and is in some respects the most notable if not also the most debatable of the entire series. The subject