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ARTICLE I.

BUCKLE'S HISTORY OF CIVILISATION IN ENGLAND.

"History of Civilisation in England. By HENRY THOMAS BUCKLE. Volume I. From the Second London Edition. New York. D. APPLETON & Co., 346 and 348 Broadway: 1858."

No one can read a page of this imposing volume without recognising the hand of a master. By its publication, Mr. Buckle has risen, from a comparatively unknown man, into the position of a new power in the world of mind, regarded by general consent as the ablest, most honest, and least commonplace of modern British sceptics. Elaborated in the quiet of his study, his adventurous work was launched forth upon the ocean of speculative conflict as a Man-of-War, self-poised, *animus opibusque paratus*. Its influence upon the human mind will be profound and durable. A monument of erudition, labor, and thought, it will mark an epoch of opinion, and change the lines of attack and defence in the discussion of nearly all great social, political, and religious problems for the present age at least, if

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ARTICLE II.

THE BEAUTIFUL.

Every one feels the power of the beautiful; hence, it is a subject ever new and fresh in the souls and words of all who think and feel in every age. The artist seeks for the ideal beauty, and labors to express it in his productions; the philosopher interrogates his soul in its presence, and seeks to unfold the nature of the emotion he feels, and to discover the cause which excites it; and the divine sees it in his theology, and seizes upon it as a line to lead him up to his God. Nothing affords a more exquisite pleasure, or attracts more universal attention; and yet, perhaps, there is nothing more inadequately understood. What is the beautiful? And what is the nature of the emotion it excites? These are questions which every one asks; but who has given satisfactory answers? Philosophers conflict; they contradict each other, and often answer in unintelligible jargon; and if we appeal from the decisions of the schools to the voice of the people, we shall not find uniformity among them; for it often happens that what one calls beautiful, is pronounced by another to be absolutely ugly. All this shows that the question of the beautiful is a difficult one—a *quæstio verata*. It is, therefore, with much distrust that we approach a subject so difficult and confessedly intricate; but we hope that, if unable to unravel the difficulties in which it has become entangled, we shall not leave the matter in worse confusion than we find it.

Because the theories of the beautiful advanced by philosophers are so contradictory, and there is such a want of uniformity in the opinions of the people in regard to its nature, some have been led to doubt the real existence of any such thing as the beautiful. Voltaire, the arch-sophist, who, sacrificing every thing to the spirit of levity and wit, made the vain attempt to

laugh religion out of the world, also thought that he could laugh the world out of a belief in the beautiful. It was his way, when he could not refute an opponent with an argument, to silence him with an unanswerable sneer. He read Plato's Hippias, Phædrus, and Banquet, and saw theory after theory demolished, and the ruins repaired by nothing comprehensible to his intellect; and not being able to excogitate from his own mind any solution of the perplexities in which he saw this delicate point involved, he turned the whole matter into ridicule. After stating what Plato had said on the subject, and confessing that his understanding could get no clear idea from him, "Ask," says he, in his Philosophical Dictionary, "a toad what is beauty—the great beauty; he will answer, it is his female, with her two great round eyes coming out of her little head, her large flat mouth, her yellow belly, and her broad back. Ask a negro of Guinea; beauty to him is a black oily skin, sunken eyes, and a flat nose. Ask the devil; he will tell you the beautiful consists in a pair of horns, four claws, and a tail. Then ask the philosophers; they will answer with jargon; they must have something conformable to the archetype of the essence of the beautiful." In all this there is nothing but ridicule and ridiculous sophistry. He speaks of what is agreeable to the toad, the Guinea negro, and the devil; but what has this to do with the beautiful? The beautiful and the agreeable are not the same; and the jargon among the philosophers only proves that there are difficulties in the matter.

All the world knows that the human soul, (and we have nothing to say about toads and devils,) is susceptible of a peculiar emotion denominated *the feeling of the beautiful*. Every one has felt this emotion, and it is certain that it could not exist without a cause; and the cause which produces it, is *the beautiful*. The emotion itself is an undoubted and indubitable fact of consciousness, and, as it is an effect, it must have a cause. In looking for the beautiful, we are in search of this cause. We are not in pursuit of a phantom, or following a mere *ignis fatuus* of the brain through the bogs and fens of metaphysical subtleties. The beautiful is a reality, and the only question now is, Can it

be discovered? Let us spread our sails on the sea of investigation, trusting to the Author of the true, the good, and the beautiful, to guide us prosperously to the object of our search in this voyage of exploration.

The emotion of the beautiful is a primary *datum* of consciousness, the existence of which we can no more doubt than the existence of the soul. In our search for the beautiful, we assume this emotion as an effect, and proceed, *a posteriori*, to deduce from it its cause; and when this is discovered, we have the beautiful as it exists in itself and in nature. This is what we conceive to be the true Cartesian method of philosophizing, and the only sure method of arriving at the truth. Here let us premise a word of caution. In deducing causes from their effects, we must be careful that we consider a simple effect. It frequently happens that with an effect there are blended many accidental circumstances, which do not essentially belong to it. If these are not most carefully eliminated in our deduction from the effect in question, we will also include their causes, and thus become involved in interminable difficulties. This danger is greater no where than in the case of the beautiful, as this emotion seldom exists alone. The pleasurable emotions of the agreeable, the useful, and the suitable, are all so intimately connected with it, that each of them in its turn has been taken for it, and considered as identical with it. Now, in our consideration of the emotion of the beautiful with the view of deducing its cause, we must most carefully discriminate and separate from it all other emotions with which it is closely interwoven. If we would get the simple and single cause, we must consider the simple and single effect.

A correct insight into the philosophy of the feelings is necessary to an intelligible analysis of any emotion; therefore, we begin with a brief statement of our doctrine on this point. We adopt the Kantian tripartite distribution of all psychological phenomena into the powers of cognition, feelings, and conation. This is preferable to the old dualistic division into speculative and practical powers, which obtained from Aristotle to the great philosopher of K enigsberg. The importance of this distribution

to the matter in hand is found in the fact that it asserts for the feelings the dignity of a separate science, and places *Æsthetics* in correlative honor and glory with *Metaphysics* and *Ethics*. And also following the beautiful and perfect system of philosophy which Sir William Hamilton has erected as a compact superstructure on this solid foundation, we claim for the feelings their separate *phænomenology*, *nomology*, and *ontology*. A complete discussion of the feelings in these several aspects would fill a volume; and in an article like this, we can give only general outlines.

We begin with their *phænomenology*. We know that in the presence of certain objects we are conscious of certain feelings of pleasure or pain, and also that certain objects produce in our feelings certain permanent affections and sentiments; that the objects which excite our emotions are sometimes external and sometimes internal, and that our emotions vary according to the peculiar nature of the objects which occasion them; and moreover, that we are never conscious of pleasure except in a state of free and unimpeded activity, or of pain except in a state of forced or repressed exertion. These are the observed *phænomena* from which we are to evolve the laws and causes of the feelings.

Next we consider the *nomology* of the feelings. We have seen that they appear under, and are regulated by the grand law of energy. If the energy is spontaneous and unobstructed, the soul experiences pleasure; but, if forced into activity, or repressed when it springs spontaneously into exertion, it experiences pain. We also know, as we are conscious of certain permanent sentiments, that we have certain energies which may be either sustained in continuous exercise, or be continuously repressed, producing in the one case permanent affections of pleasure, and in the other of pain.

On this point Plato's doctrine is, that pleasure is nothing positive and absolute, but a mere negation of pain, the mere replenishing of a vacuum, the mere satisfying of a want. Aristotle denies this, and holds that pleasure is the concomitant of the free and unimpeded exercise of virtuous energy. Sir William

Hamilton shows that there is only an apparent contradiction between Plato and Aristotle, and that their counter theories are but the partial expression of one, which comprehends and consummates them both, which he proposes as his own theory of the feelings. This is correct as far as it goes, but, in our humble judgment, it does not go far enough; it does not adequately account for all the phænomena of the feelings. This theory makes the permanent affections merely the reflex of an energy. Love and hatred, joy and sorrow, admiration and disgust, are affections and sentiments which can not be accounted for on the supposition that they are merely inseparable concomitants of virtuous or vicious energies of the mind. It seems to us there must be certain peculiar and distinct powers in the soul, by which these feelings and others of a similar nature are experienced, which are excited into conscious activity when the mind perceives the appropriate object of each, and experiences the simpler feeling which the energy of that perception causes.

As to the ontology of the feelings, we infer from the above mentioned facts that the mind is endowed with certain powers of transient feelings and permanent affections; that certain external objects and internal conceptions have the property of exciting and sustaining these powers in conscious activity; that each peculiar property produces its own peculiar feeling or affection; and that there is a peculiar property in nature which produces the peculiar emotion of the beautiful.

In our remarks on these points we are compelled to be brief, but we hope that we have made ourselves intelligible to the careful reader, and that we have given a sufficient outline of the philosophy of the feelings to make plain our views of the beautiful. Let us now apply what has been said to the point in discussion.

It follows from the points already made, that, whenever a peculiar emotion is felt, this feeling proves the existence of a peculiar activity, and this activity demonstrates the existence of a peculiar power in the mind, and also of a peculiar cause in nature, which excites this peculiar power into exertion. There-

fore, the well-known and indisputable fact, that in the presence of certain objects, we experience a peculiar emotion, which we call the emotion of the beautiful, proves these two things: *the Beautiful does exist, and we are endowed with a power by which it is perceived and felt.* The emotion of the beautiful, like all others, is indefinable. We bring a person into the presence of an object universally admitted to be beautiful, and there he experiences a peculiar emotion. That emotion is an effect, and its cause resides in the object contemplated. We inquire for this cause, and when we find it, we have found the beautiful. What is this cause? The answers are many and various. We will notice some of the most prominent given by others and give our reasons for not adopting any of them, and then give our own opinion on the subject.

1. The disciples of Locke's sensational philosophy have attempted to reduce the Beautiful to the Agreeable. Consistency required this of them; but the truth is, this school has almost entirely ignored the existence of beauty. Locke has not left a single page on the subject, and his disciples in France, we are informed by Cousin, have treated it with the same disdainful silence. Francis Hutcheson, who published in Ireland, in the year 1720, his "Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue," can not be considered as an exception; for, while he professedly belonged to the school of Locke, he maintained in that work that in addition to the five senses, to which his illustrious master attributes primarily the origin of all our ideas, we possess also certain internal senses, one of which gives us the various emotions of beauty and sublimity, and the other gives rise to our moral feelings. This supposition of internal senses indicates a departure from Sensationalism, and shows a revolt from the authority of Locke, and gives to Hutcheson the honor of being the first to strike out the idea of a better and more satisfactory system of philosophy. The fact is, it only needed that some acute intellect should attempt to apply the principles of the sensational philosophy to the development of the ideas of Taste and Morality, to discover its weak side; and when Hutcheson made this attempt, he unconsciously gave a

mortal thrust into the vitals of the philosophy of which he professed himself a disciple. The only idea of beauty of which Locke's philosophy can admit, is one that finds the beautiful in that which is agreeable to the senses. We admit that every emotion of the beautiful is always agreeable, but it by no means follows from this admission that every agreeable emotion is that of the beautiful. If the beautiful were identical with the agreeable, they would both always coexist and be commensurate; but many things are agreeable which can in no proper sense be called beautiful. We speak of agreeable tastes and smells, but who ever speaks of a beautiful taste or a beautiful smell? It even sometimes happens that the agreeable dispels the idea of beauty. The image of Byron's Dudu expels from the soul the idea and emotion of the beautiful, and yet fills the corrupt heart of the sensualist with agreeable sensations. The agreeable is not only not identical with the beautiful, but it often exists apart from it, and frequently obscures it, and sometimes utterly obliterates all idea and emotion of beauty from the soul.

2. It is a very ancient theory that makes the beautiful identical with the useful. It was refuted by Plato in his *Hippias*, but was again revived and adopted by Berkeley and Hume and some other modern philosophers. A few words will suffice to set this view aside. We consider many objects, of whose utility, if they possess any, we are entirely ignorant, and because they never fail to excite the emotion of the beautiful, we judge them to be beautiful. On the other hand, we contemplate many useful objects in which we can see no beauty, and which never excite the feeling of beauty. A pitchfork may be very useful, and at the same time utterly devoid of beauty. It is true that the ornamental is not unfrequently combined with the useful in the same object; and when we contemplate such objects, we experience two emotions which must never be confounded with each other. Here we might notice the distinction of beauty into absolute and relative, made by Hutcheson in the work already mentioned. When a thing is beautiful in itself, he says it is *absolutely* beautiful; but when it is not beautiful in itself, but in reference to something else for which it exists, he calls it *rel-*

actively beautiful. This distinction is without foundation; for his relative beauty is no other than a skilful adaptation of means to an end—the useful. It is, as Sir William Hamilton remarks, “only a beautified utility or a utilized beauty.”

3. We next notice the theory of *association* advanced by Alison, and adopted and advocated by Jeffrey. These gentlemen deny that there is any intrinsic beauty in the qualities of objects, and hold that we only judge objects to be beautiful as they suggest, by the law of association, the pleasurable emotions of a prior experience. Alison says in Essay ii. chap. 1, “Although the qualities of matter are, in themselves, incapable of producing emotion, or the exercise of any affection, yet it is obvious that they may produce this effect from their association with other qualities, which are signs or expressions fitted by the constitution of our nature to produce emotion.” And Lord Jeffrey says, in his review of Dr. Alison’s Essays, “In our opinion, our sense of beauty depends entirely on our *previous experience of simple pleasures or emotions*, and consists in the suggestion of agreeable or interesting sensations, with which we had formerly been made familiar by the direct and intelligible agency of our common sensibility.”*

We have given the theory of these learned gentlemen in their own words, and it amounts to this: objects are beautiful only as they possess the power of suggesting by the law of association the pleasurable emotions of our previous experience. The fundamental principle with them is, that the beautiful is identical with the agreeable, and, as we have seen the refutation of this idea, we must conclude that their theory can not stand, because its foundation is rotten. In the next place, if objects possess no intrinsic beauty, and are only beautiful as they express, by the law of association, the pleasurable emotions of a prior experience, we would wish to be informed *what first excited the simpler emotions thus suggested*. Lord Jeffrey replies, “the direct and intelligible agency of common sensibility.” This appears to us very much like raising a dust to cover a retreat. The

* Edinburgh Review, May, 1811.

answer is very fine, but it lacks sense. It is a mere collocation of words without meaning, which serve only to disclose the confusion of the writer. Here this theory breaks down. But, to make the refutation complete, we add, in the third place, that it not unfrequently happens that objects, with which we have associated every thing averse to the excitation of pleasurable emotions, do, by the power of their intrinsic beauty, dispel all these vile associations, and in spite of them, excite the emotion of the beautiful in the highest degree. We give the following historical illustration: "When it was heard amongst the multitudes of Paris that their idol, Marat, had been stabbed to the heart by Charlotte Corday, every thing infamous was immediately associated with that young woman; the multitudes conceived her as a hideous fury, and were ready to tear her in pieces. When on her way to execution, she appeared dressed in the red chemise of the assassin, they sent forth hootings and execrations at the sight of the infamous garb so full of vile associations. But as the exquisite loveliness of her pure and serene countenance, and the sculptured beauty of her figure, became more and more fully revealed to their eyes, as she rode along the street to the place of her execution, all associations of crime and infamy gradually faded away, and the multitudes calmed and subdued and melted by so much loveliness, took off their hats in homage to the transcendent power of intrinsic beauty." Like mists before the rising glory of morning, the infamous associations were dispelled by the shining beauty of her person and bearing. The intrinsic beauty of her face and form awakened that exquisite pleasure of soul and homage of heart which the Creator has made the actual effect of beauty.

So far from beauty being dependent on association, it has power to overcome all influence of the strongest antagonistic associations; yet, we readily admit that an object, when present in consciousness with its proper thought, feeling, or desire, is not present isolated and alone, but draws with it the representation of other objects with their respective feelings and desires, with which it may happen to be associated. Thus it may happen that the effect upon the soul of the beauty of an object may be

enhanced by accidental or arbitrary association; but so far from the principle of association being competent to account for all the phænomena of beauty, it presupposes, as its condition, that there are emotions not founded on association; and the attempt to make this principle account for all these phænomena is guilty of the double vice of converting a partial into an exclusive law, and of elevating a subordinate into a supreme principle.

4. Some have thought that they could find the beautiful in suitableness, proportion, or order. All these are but partial statements of the theory that beauty is *variety in unity*. This theory is as old as Aristotle, was embraced by Cousin, and has been forcibly defended and supported by Sir William Hamilton. "To realise an act of the imagination," says the latter philosopher, "it is necessary that we grasp up—that we comprehend—the manifold as a single whole; an object, therefore, which does not allow itself, without difficulty, to be thus represented in unity, occasions pain, whereas an object, which can be easily recalled to system, is the cause of pleasure. The former is the case when the object is either too large or too complex to be perceived at once; when the parts are not prominent enough to be distinctly impressed upon the memory. Order and symmetry facilitate the arts of reproduction and representation, and, consequently, afford us a proportional gratification. But on the other hand, as pleasure is in proportion to the amount of free energy, an object which gives no impediment to the comprehensive energy of the imagination, may not be pleasurable, if it be so simple as not to afford to this faculty a sufficient exercise. Hence it is, that not variety alone, and not unity alone, but *variety combined with unity*, is the quality in objects which we emphatically denominate *beautiful*."* It is with unfeigned regret that we are compelled to dissent from the voice of this illustrious philosopher, whom above all others we admire. Our only apology is to be found in the fact that he has taught us to be independent, and to think for ourselves. We cannot receive his definition, because we regard the beautiful as one and

* *Metaphysics*, Lect. xlv.

invariable—the same always and every where—whether it be physical, intellectual, or moral; and this definition is, by no possibility, applicable to an explanation of spiritual beauty. The emotion which we experience in contemplation of the beautiful, whether it resides in a physical object, or a mental conception, or a moral deed, is always the same; and hence, the cause which produces it must in all cases be the same, only existing under different circumstances. Using the word spiritual as comprehending both intellectual and moral, we ask, Does spiritual beauty consist in “variety in unity?” Consider any moral deed you please which excites the emotion of which we speak, and which all the world pronounces beautiful, and answer, is its beauty found in “variety in unity?” Take for illustration the following example from Voltaire, which even he styles “un beau trait de desintressement.” He relates: “In one of the wars of Germany, a captain of cavalry was ordered with his company on a foraging expedition. He entered a lonely valley and found in it an humble hut, out of which there came, upon his calling, a very old man with a long white beard, whom he commanded to show him a field of barley where he might gather forage for his army. The old man led the way, and they soon came to an extensive field of fine barley. The captain ordered his men to dismount and to reap the grain; whereupon his venerable guide said, ‘Wait a while and go with me a little further, and you shall be satisfied.’ In a short time they came upon another field of barley equally as fine, but not so extensive as the former, yet amply sufficient for the captain’s wants. ‘Here,’ said the old man, ‘you may gather forage.’ ‘But,’ said the officer, ‘it was not necessary for you to bring us here, as the other field is sufficient for our need.’ ‘I knew that,’ replied the old man, ‘but that field is not mine; this belongs to me, reap here.’” Who will not agree with Voltaire that this old man exhibited a beautiful trait of disinterestedness? Here is moral beauty, but where is the *diversity in harmony* which invests the deed with its beauty? It is not seen; and hence, this definition does not explain the nature of moral beauty.

Let us next see whether this theory is competent to explain
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the phænomena of intellectual beauty. Now, according to Sir William Hamilton's definition of a mental concept, there is in each a plurality of attributes brought into the unity of a single conception. Now, if beauty be variety in unity, every concept and judgment of the mind ought to be beautiful; but this is not the case. Therefore variety in unity in intellectual conceptions does not always constitute beauty. And when a thought is judged to be beautiful, no one thinks of the variety in unity which exists in it. There is, therefore, a beauty in thoughts not reducible to this diversity in harmony. Now, every perfect definition embraces all the properties of the thing defined and excludes all foreign matter, and in both these respects this definition is defective as applied to intellectual beauty.

In the next place, we inquire, Can the beauty of material objects be explained on the principle of variety in unity? If we can find one instance in which we undoubtedly recognise the beautiful, and in which this variety in unity is not found, that instance will be sufficient to disprove this theory; and on the other hand, if we can point to one instance in which this variety in unity is perceived, and no beauty is recognised or felt, the theory will be met and refuted from another direction. Now, behold that purple smoke floating in the atmosphere, and curling gracefully as it gently rises. It is beautiful; but where is the variety in unity that invests it with its beauty? And now let us stand on the street and consider the wheel of a passing cart. It is strong and well adapted for the purpose for which it is intended, but it is heavy and clumsy. Who would call it beautiful? Not one of the dozen with me can see any beauty in it; yet that wheel has variety in unity. It has its clumsy hub, its strong spokes, its massive felloes, and its heavy tire; and all these are reduced to a perfect unity in the wheel. We see, therefore, that every variety in unity in material objects does not make them beautiful; and there are many which have beauty and yet do not manifest any variety in unity.

But we have a profounder objection to this theory than any yet mentioned; one that strikes at the root of the defective philosophy on which the hypothesis stands. It was intimated in

the closing remarks when we were giving the outlines of the philosophy of the feelings. It rests on the assumption that every emotion of pleasure is the mere reflex and inseparable concomitant of a spontaneous and unobstructed activity. The whole theory with Sir William Hamilton amounts to this: when a variety is perceived and the mind finds no difficulty in reducing it to unity, free play is given to its energies, as the reflex of which, a peculiar emotion is felt, which is the emotion of the beautiful. In all this we see nothing more than the energy of the mind in bare cognition. Then, is beauty nothing more than a bare cognition of relations, and the emotion of the beautiful nothing more than the mere pleasurable sensation that springs from the energy of perception? Is emotion nothing but the friction of the mind in action? To say this is to rob beauty of its beauty. But there is a sentiment as well as the mere pleasure of exercise in the perception of the beautiful, and any theory which does not account for this sentiment is insufficient, and despoils beauty of her charms.

Without transgressing further on the patience of the reader, in the refutation of false theories, we will proceed to give what we conceive to be the true theory of taste and beauty. In doing this we will have much to say respecting Cousin's views on this point; and we frankly acknowledge that we caught the suggestion of our ideas on this subject from him; but it will be perceived that his theory has undergone much modification in our hands, whether for the better or the worse the reader must judge. He holds that there is an absolute ideal of beauty, in which physical, intellectual, and moral beauty has its unity; and with him God is this absolute ideal. All things are beautiful so far forth as they suggest God *as he is the ideal of beauty*.

We agree with Cousin in supposing that there is an absolute ideal of beauty, in which all beauty, physical and spiritual, finds its unity, but we can not agree with him in regarding God as this ideal as it is conceived in the human mind. In his philosophy of the absolute, God,—the Infinite and the Absolute,—is conceivable, but in the Hamiltonian philosophy of the conditioned, which we adopt, God is only negatively conceivable. In our

philosophy, Cousin's ideal of beauty is only negatively conceivable, and we can not believe that the ideal beauty—the standard of human taste—is placed above the conception of created mind. God is the eternal and absolute beauty, but this is not the beauty we see in the world—in matter, in mind, and in morals. Our ideal of beauty is not God himself, as Cousin teaches, nor the *idea of the Divine Mind*, as Plato taught, but the perfect conception of beauty in the human mind. Not God himself, but his image as imprinted on creation is the archetype of the ideal of beauty in created minds. The image of God, as it was stamped upon our first parents in their creation, is our highest beauty. A perfect humanity is the ultimate beauty for man. This gives us an ideal that is finite and relative, and therefore conceivable. We conceive this ideal, and think away from it all finitude and relations, and thus arrive at a negative conception of the eternal beauty, which is God himself.

The image of God on man—a perfect humanity—is our ideal of beauty; and whatever exhibits or suggests this ideal is beautiful, and beautiful in the degree of vividness of the exhibition or suggestion of this ideal. But the beautiful is not the whole of this image; the true and the good are also found in it. We have a distinct power by which each one of these classes of properties is perceived and felt; the understanding perceives the true, conscience the good, and taste the beautiful. These three, the understanding, conscience, taste, find their unity in a higher principle—the *reason*. The reason is not, as Cousin imagines, something impersonal and divine that belongs to no particular individual; but it is personal and human, and belongs to every individual. The taste, the conscience, and the understanding, are correlative faculties, or rather correlative complements of faculties, which centre and find their bond of unity in the reason, which is that which constitutes man a rational and responsible being. In this essay we confine our attention to taste; and to its object, beauty.

Man is the most perfect of God's terrestrial works, and the perfections of his nature in body, mind, and morals, constitute the image of his Creator in which he was made; and in this

image is found the ideal of beauty, physical, intellectual, and moral. Before we go farther, we would better settle the question about this image extending to his body. This image has its seat in the soul, and principally in the moral nature; hence, moral beauty is the highest kind. While the image is spiritual, there is no part of the human body through which its glory is not reflected. This is not anthropomorphism. We do not suppose that God has a body, in the image of which man was created; but in his upright, noble, and dignified position, in the sympathy of his form and the divine expression of his face, we think lineaments of his Maker's image appear. As Calvin expresses it, and we hereby bring the authority of that great theologian to the support of our opinion, "though the primary seat of the divine image was in the mind and heart, or in the soul and its powers, there was no part even of the body in which some rays of its glory did not shine." This truth is so patent that it did not escape the notice of the ancient heathen philosophers and poets. Ovid refers to it in the following words:

"Pronaque cum spectant animalia cætera terram,
Os homini sublime datum est, cœlumque videre
Jussus, et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus."

The sceptical, egotistical, and obscene Montaigne has attempted to ridicule this idea, but he has only succeeded in making himself ridiculous in a foolish effort to bring man and brutes on a level, by half brutalizing the one and half humanizing the other. Man is fallen and the glory of his original nature is beclouded in sin, the image of his Creator is defaced and almost obliterated; therefore, in our present state, it is impossible to get the perfect ideal of beauty. This accounts for the obscurity of our ideas on this point. This image has a second time been presented to the world in all perfection in the humanity of our Saviour. In him humanity, physically, intellectually, and morally, was perfect; and beauty, in every aspect, shone in him in all the brilliancy and glory of original perfection. And notwithstanding this image has been shivered to pieces in the fall, traces of it are still discoverable in man, and whenever we see them we recognise beauty and feel its emotion.

Do we, then, confine all beauty to man? By no means. We derive our ideal of beauty from the perfections of humanity; and then, whatever in nature corresponds with this ideal awakens within us the emotion of the beautiful. In God's image in the person of man we find the standard of taste; and one has a correct taste in proportion as he has a just conception of the ideal of beauty as it exists in this image; whatever conforms to taste, when taste itself conforms to this ideal, is beautiful; and whatever in nature exhibits or suggests this ideal, as it is conceived in taste, excites the emotion of the beautiful. We say, *exhibits* or *suggests* this ideal, because spiritual beauty is the direct *exhibition* of some spiritual excellence, which is a feature in the image of God manifested in a perfect humanity, and physical beauty is the mere *suggestion* of mental or moral excellences. Some make physical beauty consist in one thing and some in another. Suitableness, proportion, order, variety in unity, and many other properties of material objects, have been taken as the essence of beauty; but no theory that seeks the solution of the mysteries of beauty by supposing that there is a particular property of matter that is the essence of beauty, can ever give a full and perfect explanation of all the phænomena of taste. Beauty may arise in some instances from the suitableness of objects, or from their order, or from their variety in unity; but beauty is not tied to any particular property or combination of properties. Physical beauty is that in material objects which suggests spiritual beauty. Adam's body only suggested the ideal beauty by reflecting the image of God engraven on his soul; and it is only as the face and form and manners of man suggest an excellent soul within, that they are judged beautiful. It is only as the silvery clouds, the curling smoke, meandering brooks, and flowery meadows, suggest life, mind, and spiritual excellences, that they are judged beautiful. It is only as the picture, the statue, the poem, and the song, express life and mental superiority, that they are judged beautiful. Spiritual beauty is the image of God on the soul of man, and physical beauty is this image reflected in material objects.

It will not follow from what has been said that every superior

soul has a beautiful face, for the face is not always an index to the soul within. It often happens that persons whose minds are endowed with the highest types of beauty, possess faces far from beautiful when in repose; but it is true of these same persons when their souls begin to act, that their countenances kindle into radiance and glow in beauty. Byron said of Mme. de Stael, though mortally ugly, she could talk herself beautiful in ten minutes. Socrates had a face by no means beautiful according to the Grecian models, but it always shone with an unearthly beauty when his soul was animated in the delivery of his sublime discourses. And on the other hand, there are those who are endowed with no beauty of mind, and yet have forms and faces accounted beautiful. They are beautiful, not by the *exhibition* of the soul residing within, but by *suggesting* another and superior soul. The beauty of such persons is exactly the same as the beauty of a painting or the sculptured marble; and these are beautiful as they suggest, through expressions imparted to them by the genius and skill of the artist, some mental or moral excellences. Socrates, in conversation with the artisans, arrives at the true end of their work. He tells Cleito that the end of the statuary is to express the "workings of the mind by the form," and informs Parrhasius that the end of the painter is to represent the "dispositions of the mind in colors on canvas." While in the portrait and statue there is no mind, yet by color and form they suggest intellect, and it is in the power of this suggestion their beauty resides. So it is in regard to Nature's works. Every thing has beauty in the degree of its power to suggest mental or moral excellences. What we would here say has been so well expressed by Cousin, that we will use his words. "Consider," says he, "the figure of man in repose; it is more beautiful than that of any animal, and the figure of an animal is more beautiful than that of any inanimate object. It is because the human figure, even in the absence of virtue and genius, always reflects an intelligent and moral nature; it is because the figure of an animal reflects sentiment at least, and something of the soul, if not the soul itself. If from man and the animal we descend to purely physical nature, we shall still find beauty

there, as long as we find there some shade of intelligence, I know not what, that awakens in us some thought, some sentiment. Do we arrive at some piece of matter that expresses nothing, that signifies nothing? Neither is the idea of beauty applied to it. But every thing that exists is animated. Matter is shaped and penetrated by forces not material, and it obeys laws that attest an intelligence every where. The most subtile chemical analysis does not reach a dead and inert nature, but a nature that is organised in its way, that is neither deprived of forces nor laws. In the depths of the earth as in the heights of the heavens, in a grain of sand as in the gigantic mountain, an immortal spirit shines through the thickest coverings. Let us contemplate nature with the eye of the soul as well as with the eye of the body: every where a moral expression will strike us, and the forms of things will impress us as the symbols of thoughts. Form can not be simply a form; it must be the form of something. Physical beauty, therefore, is the sign of an internal beauty, which is spiritual and moral beauty; and this is the foundation, the unity of the beautiful." Physical beauty is, then, the power which material objects possess of suggesting spiritual beauty; that is, the ideal beauty as it exists in the soul. Cousin says this ideal is God himself; and we say it is a perfect humanity, or the image of God in which man was created. Our ideal is conceivable, because it is limited in time and space; in our judgment, Cousin's is not; but according to his philosophy, it is, because he holds to the conceivability of the infinite and the absolute. .

There is a power in nature which suggests the supernatural, and objects which possess this power are said to be sublime. The emotion of sublimity is essentially different from that of beauty; the latter is one of pure and unmingled pleasure, and the former is a mingled feeling of pleasure and pain. There is pleasure, because a faculty is called into activity, and pain, because it is afterwards repressed in its energy. Why is it repressed? Because the idea suggested transcends the power of the mind's comprehension. These facts justify the distinction which we have made. The mind has grasp enough to comprehend

the ideal of beauty, which is the image of God; and hence in the perception of the beautiful, no energy is repressed, and the emotion is one of unalloyed pleasure: but the emotion of the sublime is one of mingled pleasure and pain; as an energy is called into activity, there is pleasure, but as the mind can not grasp the ideal suggested, which is the supernatural, its energy is repressed and pain ensues. The sublime is that in nature which has the power to express or suggest the supernatural.

Each of these emotions is accompanied with its appropriate sentiment. The sentiment of the beautiful is love, and that of the sublime is adoration. Each of these sentiments exists in two degrees. Physical beauty, which is the mere suggestion of the spiritual, is liked; spiritual beauty itself is loved. That which only suggests the infinite is admired; but the infinite itself is adored. So far as we conceive of God in his image, we love him; but when our notion of the Deity rises above the conceivable into the infinite and absolute, we cover our heads and adore him.

In a brief recapitulation we give our theory of taste as follows: The æsthetic ideal is found in the image of God in which man was created. In other words, it is perfect humanity. This ideal is not all that is in this image or perfect humanity; the ideals of truth and goodness are also comprehended in it. These ideals are distinct, but not necessarily separate, for the same thing may be true, good, and beautiful at the same time. Each of these ideals has in the soul its appropriate faculty, or rather complement of faculties, by which their proper ideas and objects are perceived; the understanding for the true, the taste for the beautiful, and the conscience for the good. The ideal of beauty, which is the standard of taste, is but imperfectly apprehended in our present fallen state; but the nearer our conception of it approaches what it was in our unfallen integrity, the purer the taste. Whatever conforms to taste, when taste itself conforms with the ideal, is beautiful. This ideal has its seat in the soul; therefore, all beauty at bottom is spiritual beauty. Physical beauty is the power which mate-

rial objects possess of expressing or suggesting spiritual excellences.

The last point raises the inquiry, Do we at last adopt Dr. Alison's theory of association? By no means. He and Lord Jeffrey deny the existence of intrinsic beauty, and hold that objects are beautiful only as they suggest pleasurable emotions with which they have become associated through a prior experience. In our opinion physical objects suggest the ideal beauty on an entirely different law; to wit, through an intrinsic power inherent in them—a power which excites the emotion of the beautiful in spite of the vilest associations which may be linked to the object that possesses this intrinsic beauty. It is impossible to say what in every instance this intrinsic beauty in objects is. In some it is one thing, and in others it is something else. Whatever in form or color invests a material object with the power of suggesting spiritual excellences, is the intrinsic beauty of that object.

In regard to the fundamental principles of taste, there is a proximate uniformity in the opinions of men; but in regard to their details in their application, there is a great diversity of views. Can this circumstance be explained on the theory we propose? Let us see. At all events, the circumstance is not to be wondered at, for the same thing obtains in the operations of the understanding and conscience in regard to the true and the good. This fact made such a deep impression on the master mind of Pascal, that it gave birth to the following remarkable words: "We see," says he, "scarcely any thing, just or unjust, that does not change its nature in changing its climate. Three degrees of higher latitude reverse all jurisprudence. A meridian determines a truth. Fundamental laws are changed by a few years possession. Right has its eras." This shows that there is as great diversity in the opinions of men in regard to the true and the good, as there is regard to the beautiful; and as there have been sceptics in metaphysics, and sceptics in ethics, we naturally expect sceptics in æsthetics. As there was a Pyrrho to deny the existence of truth, and a Hobbes to deny the reality of moral distinc-

tions, we might expect a Voltaire to deny the existence of beauty.

As the difficulty here alluded to is found in precisely the same way in the understanding and conscience as in taste, it is very probable that, if the solution can be found in any one instance, it will be applicable to the other two. At least there is such a striking analogy between taste and conscience that we can safely reason from the one to the other. We find in the opinions of men a proximate uniformity as to the fundamental principles of virtue, and at the same time a great diversity of views as to their application in detail. Now, right itself is immutable, and these variations must be found in the conscience itself, and not in the things about which it is conversant. The explanation is found in the fact that we are a fallen race. In the fall, the conscience was vitiated; not destroyed, but darkened and perverted. The image of God, which is the ideal good, as well as the ideal true and beautiful, is defaced and almost entirely obliterated by sin. However, the striking outlines of the ideal good in this image are easily perceived; hence the proximate uniformity of men's opinions in regard to the fundamental principles of right. The finer lineaments of this image can be but dimly and uncertainly traced, and hence the great diversity in the nicer discriminations in morals. These same facts will form a solution to similar difficulties in taste. Taste is fallen, vitiated, and darkened by sin. The ideal beauty was defaced and obscured by the fall. Its bold outlines are yet easily perceived; hence the proximate uniformity in the fundamental principles of taste. The finer traces of the beautiful are with difficulty found in the shattered image; hence the great diversity in the details of the application of the fundamental principles of taste. A man's taste is pure in proportion to its degree of conformity to the original ideal of pure and perfect beauty, as it existed in the image of God in which man was created.

As a consequence of this striking analogy between taste and conscience, for every error in taste, there has been a similar error in conscience. As Voltaire denies the existence of beauty,

Hobbes denies the existence of moral distinctions; as Locke's sensational philosophy makes the beautiful identical with the agreeable, the Epicureans make virtue and pleasure the same; as Berkeley and Hume see the beautiful only in the useful, so Dr. Paley finds in his own mind the thought that virtue is identical with one's self-interest; as Dr. Alison would find the beautiful in our sympathy with the object by the law of association, so Dr. Adam Smith would find the principle of virtue in our sympathy with the moral agent; and as many would find the foundation of the beautiful in suitableness, so Dr. Samuel Clark conceives virtue to be the doing of that which is suitable to be done. We might trace this parallel farther, but it would only weary the patience of the reader.

We may be permitted to add a single remark, in order to point out the analogy between our theory of beauty and Bishop Butler's theory of virtue, with which we will close this article. Virtue, according to him, is a peculiar quality of certain actions of moral agents, which quality is perceived by conscience. The perception of this is accompanied by a peculiar emotion, which is distinct from all others, and is called the emotion of the good. We would define beauty to be a peculiar quality of certain objects, actions, thoughts, and expressions, which quality is perceived by taste; and which perception is accompanied by a peculiar emotion, distinct from all others, which is called the emotion of the beautiful.