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ARTICLE I.

HOME MISSIONS—HOW SHALL THEY BE CONDUCTED?

It is generally agreed among our Christian people that the work of Foreign Missions ought to be conducted under the direction and superintendence of the General Assembly. Presbyteries and Synods are fully competent to carry on the work, if they had the means and facilities, and could do it as effectually and economically in their separate character as in combination with other Presbyteries. But as Presbyteries, with few exceptions, perhaps, have not the means of themselves, and as separate action would involve a great increase of machinery as well as of expense, the work, by common consent, is committed to the General Assembly, the proper representative of the whole body. Presbyteries, in accordance with our Book of Order, in ordaining men to the work of foreign evangelisation, have agreed to transfer them to the control of the Assembly, so far as their general work is concerned, but without abdicating their right of control, so far as the moral and ministerial character of these brethren is concerned. In this view of the matter, our Church, so far as is known, is very nearly a unit.

In relation to the Home work, however, as also of Education, there is some diversity of views as to the mode in which it should be carried on. The great mass of our people hold that so far as

ARTICLE VII.

THE PRESBYTERIAN DIACONATE AGAIN.

I.

1. It is with extreme reluctance that the writer again asks the ear of his brethren to an essay on the diaconate. Since the issue of last October's number of this REVIEW, he has written out, with a fulness that is far beyond his custom, a review of every complete paragraph of "*The Diaconate Again*," as he had previously done with the "Report" to the last Assembly of its "Committee on the Diaconate." As the article and the Report were written by one and the same distinguished ecclesiologist, and the documents themselves are but two aspects of the same thing, the publication of either of those essays would be an answer to both of the papers. But neither our conscience nor our judgment will permit us to seek the publication of these replies. It would be to the REVIEW a waste of space; to the reader, a waste of time; and to our "good brother," cruelty. We therefore prefer the less of two evils (wasting our own time and our own space, and crucifying ourselves), and recast and publish only a few passages in rejoinder. Of course this procedure compels us to bury much that is *essential*, and more that is *material*, to a complete answer.

We have also *pondered* the article in the last number of this REVIEW, of which we may say that its positions and arguments had been substantially anticipated from their previous appearance in the Report. Modifications have been made in the prepared specimens of the reply we were tempted to write, in order to allude to their form; and a few new paragraphs have been added, to meet unanticipated matter.

2. So much for our own benefit: now a few words for the benefit of our "good brother." And *first*, we recall his attention to the fact that *he* was the man that cast the argument into that syllogistic form which sophisticated his admirers and co-Committee men. To be sure, his syllogism was abridged to the last degree, and was both enthymematic and prosyllogistic.

This, however, is a legitimate abridgement of logical processes; legitimate, indeed, but dangerous, both to the author and to the reader. *Secondly*. We take his appeal from the court of Logic to the higher court of Metaphysics, (a) as a regular procedure of which no prosecutor has a right to complain; (b) as a confession, that in the court of original jurisdiction, the verdict has gone against him; and (c) that he judges the cause of his failure to be the necessary limitations of the logical science; *i. e.*, that Logic properly deals only with *symbols* of notions, and not with their *matter* and *essence*. Exactly so; and that is the *point* of "The Presbyterian Diaconate" to which he replies, both in the Report and the articles. That article was intended to show that his *consequence was false*, without deciding on the truth or falsity of the consequent.

This is the end of Logic, and we went no further. But (d) we do feel *logical* indignation at the appellant when he introduces his appeal with a sneer at the Court. Of course, "Logic would be content with arbitrary symbols," and it would be salutary for the logician to imitate her—*secundum quid*.

Thirdly. We notify our "good brother" that in examining his metaphysics, we intend to use the established *language* of Metaphysics as far as necessary, just as we used the language of Logic, when his exploits on that battle-field were tested. We decline to discuss any question in any other language than that of the science to whose sphere it belongs. We shall therefore speak of the *matter of a genus* and the *essence of a species*, matter being that which is *given* and is *prior* to an operation, essence being that which is *given* by the operation, and is, in the order of thought, *posterior* thereunto.

Logic rattles her dry bones, for the excellent reason that she is a skeleton, and has nothing else to rattle; and the *drier* they are, the more completely the moisture of rhetoric is *wiped off*, the better will they rattle.

Metaphysics, however, is a cold and murderous blade; and the colder and keener it is, the better will it be suited to divide between one concept and another.

3. We wish also to call the *special* attention of the reader to

the *fact* that our "good brother," even in the latest amendments of his argument, has not dared to assert that his premises give any other conclusion, or can *by possibility* justify any other inference, than that which was allowed, in our criticism, to flow legitimately from them, to wit, that one *group* excludes every other *group*, or that one *unit* excludes every other *unit*; that is to say, again, as we said before, that "the roll of presbyters does not contain the name of a single deacon, or that Rev. Mr. P. does not include Deacon D." We added the words, "*Who ever* affirmed that there was not as clear a distinction between them as that between a ten-foot pole and a yard-stick?" And yet our learned opponent has imputed to us the very position which we have shown to be *his*, and which we have repudiated as totally irrelevant to the question in debate. He says, triumphantly: "What now becomes of the reviewer's illustration, that 'a ten-foot pole' *includes* a yard-stick"? Now we appeal to the reader to say whether wrong has not been done us. We do *now* affirm that a ten-foot pole contains one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten *feet*—all these *marks*; but we have never said that a yard-stick includes a foot *rule*, or that a ten-foot *pole* includes a yard-stick; and what is more, we have never attempted to *prove* that the one *excludes* the other; and we beg the reader's pardon for showing before, and now showing again, that this is exactly the supererogatory work that our "good brother" has done in the great travail of his logical and metaphysical soul.

4. The attention of the reader is called also to the aim of our essays, to wit, that our fathers had some good sense, and (a) expressed a sensible and *pertinent* thought, when they affirmed that "the higher office includes the lower," and (b) that this thought is perfectly scriptural. They could not have meant to deny the truism that one group or unit excludes any and every other group or unit; but meant to affirm that the higher office *as such* includes the lower office *as to its nature*. Our illustration was the stock illustration of books on logic, but it seems that we must explain it further, lest perchance some reader may miss the point as completely as our opponent has done. When it is said that man includes animal, it is meant that *man* has an animal nature united

with his personal rational nature, and that he truly performs all animal functions, but it is not meant that he performs them as a mere animal or as a brute. On the contrary, he performs them all as a rational animal, though he performs them in his animal nature. Take any animal actions for example—say eating and walking—man does not eat and walk as a brute, but as a man. The person of the agent lifts all the acts of his animality out of the conditions under which the irrational animal acts, and raises them into the sphere of rational actions. In like manner the presbyter deacons, not as a mere deacon, but as a presbyter. His higher nature, in which his personality resides, in the one and sole agent of all the deeds done in his diaconal nature, and lifts them up into the sphere of episcopal actions.

II.

The articles and the Report precipitate themselves suddenly and with dangerous momentum into the cold metaphysical operation of dividing a genus into its species, and, for a while, get along very well indeed. If, however, the author had started with less heat, and had kept himself cool, he would probably not have lost his head, but perceived that the result of his metaphysics was precisely coincident with the result of his logic. Here is the whole conclusion—all the fruit of his great hunt on the fields where genera and species “most do congregate.”

Hear his own words. “In order to set this matter in a clear light, we will employ the illustration repeatedly adverted to by the reviewer. The species, man and brute, are included under the genus, animal. Consequently the essential attribute of the genus, viz., animality, is included in each of the species. But who would say that, because animal is included in man, therefore the species brute is included in the species man?” Verily, *who?* Most certainly not the present writer, especially as that is the very thing which our former article showed to be the only legitimate outcome of our antagonist’s logic, and, as such, totally irrelevant to the question in dispute. We hold and believe that every unit and every group, whether higher or lower, or in the same plane, *excludes* every other unit and every other group, as such.

What we contend for is that the higher species (man) *as such* includes the lower species (brute) *as to its nature*; or, to put it in another way, as man includes animality and performs the functions of animality, so the higher church officer includes *diaconality* and performs all its functions. We never said or thought, and know no *a priori* laws of thought by which we could *begin* to think, that a dollar *coin* or a ten foot *pole* includes a dime *coin* or a yard *stick*; and we are firmly persuaded that it is perfectly *immaterial* to this exclusion whether the *matter* of the coins or the sticks be the same, or one be gold and the other silver. Every office and every officer excludes every other office and every other officer *as such*. "It is a mere waste of time, in controversy, for one of the contestants elaborately to prove what the other concedes." A dollar can buy whatever a dime can buy, and something of greater value besides. Each higher deacon can perform all the services of the lower, and some more important services besides. All this is just simply saying that the higher species contains in it all the *marks* of the lower, besides its own specific nature, which gives it *name* and fixes its relative rank.

The cause of our opponent's mistake, as far as metaphysics is concerned, is the confusion of the *name* with the *thing*. If he had only *named* his species, simple deacon and higher deacon, or simple animal and higher animal, it would have put his candle on a candlestick, and manifested in a clear light that there is a good deal in the art of putting things; and that it is better *metaphysics* to say that a man is an animal than to say that a man is a brute!

III.

The author of the articles and the Report, with singular rashness, goes on, immediately after "carrying coals to Newcastle," in order to set his conclusion in "a clear (!) light," to say: "What makes man" (higher animal) "and brute" (lower animal) "species relatively to each other? Their specific marks. One of those characterising man, as contradistinguished from the brute, is the faculty of speech—he is a speaking animal. One of those characterising the brute, is dumbness—he is a dumb animal. Now to say that the brute is included in man, is to say that

is, as dumb, so included. And then by virtue of this conclusion, we have man a dumb, speaking animal." This is a specimen of our opponent's skill in the *reductio ad absurdum*. We well remember, though it was a third of a century ago, our first recitation on specific Difference and Property, and the art of dividing a genus into its species. We have hunted up the dusty book, and here is the text, italics included. "That is the most strictly called a *property* which belongs to the *whole* of a *species*, and to that *species alone*, as polarity to a magnet. And such a *property* it is often hard to distinguish from the *differentia*; but whatever you consider as the most *essential to the nature* of a species you must call the *differentia*, as rationality to man, and whatever you consider as rather an *accompaniment or result* of that difference, you must call the *property*, as the use of speech."

The last number of "The American Journal of Philology" contains an article by W. D. Whitney, maintaining the same ground, viz., that the want of articulate speech in brutes is not due to any *organic* deficiency, but to the absence of a rational power. We rely, however, on the judgment of the reader. It is plain that in every individual there must be the whole matter of its genus and the whole essence of its species. If speech, as a faculty or function, is essential to his *species*, then man cannot lose it without falling out of his species. But may not a man be dumb and "be a man for all that?" On the other hand, the very power of some lower animals to imitate human speech, shows that dumbness is only a *property* of brutes, and not a *mark* of their species. On this point, however, we have Scripture to help us out. Balaam's ass used human speech, (2 Pet. ii. 16,) and still only an ass, though it was "the dumb ass speaking." The miraculous element did not change the *species* of the brute. To suppose so would be to carry the whole narrative quite out of the domain of the scriptural miracle into that of heathen metamorphosis. Now, if one wishes to make logical divisions, he may choose his principle, but *may not* change it afterwards.

We thus divide an *omne* by species, or by opposite states, etc.; but whatever principle of division is assumed must be carried *all*

the way through, or we get *cross* divisions, which logic abhors quite as much as nature abhors a vacuum. Suppose one should divide *animal* into men, bipeds, and negroes; or books into quartos, English and historical,—this would be simple fumbling. To be sure, a class formed on one principle may happen to coincide so nearly with that formed on another that the novice may be deceived himself and deceive others thereby, but it is none the less fumbling. When we divide animals into men and brutes, we use the principle of *differentia*; but when we divide animals into speaking animals and dumb animals, we use the principle of *properties*. The divisions thus reached cannot be compared *in logic*, and are not even plausibly coincident. The property of speech may be taken from a man—as from Zacharias—and that man still belong to his species; and the same property be added to a brute—as to Balaam's ass—and that brute still remain in his species. But what has our antagonist gained by his blunder? His own words are: "By virtue of this conclusion we have man a dumb, speaking animal. The same fallacy is perpetrated when we say that one species of church officers is included in another species." There it is again! Now we never said it, and we do not believe it; we have said and do believe that the *nature* of one species is included in the higher species of the same genus. But his paralogism will not yield to him even that "lame and impotent conclusion," for its premises contain cross divisions. It may be further remarked that, if that excluded property is *nothing*, like dumbness, we see no difference between its inclusion and its exclusion. We hold that man, as man, includes the lower animal *as to its nature*. Suppose that our opponent was making an argument to prove that the South was *justifiable* in engaging in the late war, and that we should reply by solemnly showing that *evil* ought not to be done that good may come, it is very probable that even he would feel tempted to say something severe *about the day on which we were born*. We remember that this mode of reply is called, in treatises on logic, *the ignorantio elenchi*.

IV.

The articles and the Report reiterate that our position is absurd

because it requires us to take the deacon as a species of church officer without any specific essence. He maintains that the essence—"peculiar attribute"—of the preacher is preaching; of the ruling elder, ruling; and of the deacon, distributing. We maintain that the essence of the deacon is deaconing; of the elder, a double unit, ruling and deaconing; of the preacher, a triple *unit*, preaching and ruling and deaconing; and that the elder and the preacher do their deaconing in their diaconal nature. Now attention is called to the fact that the matter of the genus is bare *deaconing as opposed to ruling*; and this matter as the *πρώτη ἕλη* of a common term, is without "*form*." Butler's Hudibras "professed

He had *First Matter* seen, undressed,
And found it *naked* and alone,
Before one rag of *Form* was on."

Now we have on our side every metaphysician that ever lived, when we affirm that the *lowest* species of every genus is just this *unformed* matter *informed*. Form is the *essence* of an essence, or its "peculiar attribute." Take the naked matter of any genus and add to it primary form, *separate subsistence*, is the metaphysical recipe for making the "*infima species*." Our opponent, notwithstanding the horrible storm of genera and species which he rained down on our naked head, has failed to make a fracture. He himself speaks more than once or twice of cases in which the matter of a genus and the essence of a species "*coincide*." There is nothing, our critic affirms exultingly, in this *infima species* that was not previously in the genus. Nothing, we reply, *except species itself*. *Subsistence in re* of the generic matter *is* always the essence of the lowest species and defines it. When our opponent conceives of presbyters as a genus, and divides them into preaching elders and ruling elders, he does the same thing precisely, and does it very properly. Why then should he find fault with us for doing the same thing?

V.

The Report and the articles make much of *distributing* and *collecting* as pertaining to the *essence* of the diaconal office. In

the test passages, these words must be taken as referring to *acts* and not the *authority* by which they are performed.

Now we formally decline to discuss so small and barren a question. The words do not occur in "The Presbyterian Diaconate," except twice, in close connexion, where the bare act had to be spoken of. Believing that *qui facit per alium facit per se*, as far as official responsibility is concerned, is common sense and common law and common religion, the writer cares little *who* performs the *acts* of distributing and collecting. The deacon may send to the beneficiary his share of the relief by a child or a servant or a grocer, provided it be the diligent and affectionate expression of his official and personal "care of the poor." Of course, he must discharge his duties, which are far higher than mere distributing, not in a formal and perfunctory manner, but in great love to the poor, and realise in himself and his work Christ's love and the Church's love "to the poor saints." Of course, too, this requires that he should *visit* the poor and pray with them and console and advise them.

Now, it is eminently proper for the mere deacon, as for the higher deacon, to perform the *acts* which his office requires to be done, provided he can do so without the sacrifice of aught that is *essential* to his office. What the writer holds is, that the essence of the deacon, as a church officer, is "the care of the poor saints;" he cares not at all *who* "takes up the collection," or who carries the collection-money to the treasurer or to the poor saint.

VI.

The author of the articles and the Report is perpetually perpetrating the metaphysical and logical crime of filching from the writer his *secundum quid*, and then parading a *reductio ad absurdum*! Of course, this unlawful procedure "leaves us poor indeed." To give two examples out of many. We had said, as he quotes: "Let it be remembered at the outset that the name can never lose the odor of the thing which it represents, and, therefore, that our search for the ecclesiastical significance of these terms must start with the idea of service as opposed to rule;" and again: "The search for the ecclesiastical meaning of the word

starts with an *a priori* conviction of the impropriety and violence of distinguishing the office of presbyter from that of a deacon by the scope or objects of their official powers." On these passages he remarks: "We cannot understand this passage. What *a priori* convictions have to do with defining church officers, we are unable to see. But how with any convictions, we can define them without considering their object matter passes our comprehension." And no wonder! It passes our *apprehension*. The only objection to the statement is that this deponent did not attempt to perform such a feat. He merely proposed to *start* on his ecclesiastical voyage with a little *subject-matter* on board, very little indeed, only the *smell* of the word, and then *define* it by the object-matter as soon as that precious substance was discovered. The writer is not aware that any metaphysician ever undertook to create even a concept *ex nihilo*. He always starts with *something* as a pure subject, some virgin matter, and "puts the tunic on," when it is convenient or possible to perform that useful work. How an unprejudiced mind, as keen and analytic as our opponent's, could mistake his contestant's *subject-matter* for his *object-matter*, the author of the Report and the articles "may tell, but we cannot."

But the next sentence of the article "out-Herods Herod." Here it is: "But, moreover, the ruler, according to the reviewer, is a deacon, since all church officers are deacons. He is not Christ's servant when he rules, he is his servant only when he cares for the bodies of the poor. This, we say, it tasks our understanding to apprehend." And *we say* that it tasks our charity very severely. We were speaking of *church* officers, of preaching to, ruling, and serving *the church*. We were not speaking of the relation of these persons or acts *to Christ*. We started out with the bare concept of service *as opposed to rule*, nay, only the lowest concept of that concept, "service rendered to the body immediately." To this subject-matter we gave the primary form of a "*church officer*," and this constituted "the deacon," or *the servant of the church*. So far as the nature of this deacon is included in the higher classes of *church officers*, just so far are they also *servants of the church*. There is no sense in the discussion if one

shifts the *secundum quid*. Are we talking about preaching to or ruling *Christ*? If not, then we are not talking about *servi*ng Christ. It is taking a foul grip in logic to say, "the service of rule," and, "the ruler serves," when in this contest it is confessed that *service and serving are opposed to rule and ruling*. There is indeed a beautiful metonymy in the language, and *the ruler* should reverently look upon his *ruling*, and the preacher upon his authoritative declaration of Christ's will, as a strict *service* done to *Christ*, for he says: "Inasmuch as ye did it to one of the least of these, *my* brethren, ye did it unto *me*." But nevertheless our opponent has committed the same sin, metaphysically and logically considered, as if he had changed the servants of the church into the servants of the devil; and it is all the worse for the ascertainment of the truth on this question, because the devil of logic is like the great Antichrist, *simia Dei*.

VII.

The articles and the Report are very severe on the writer's position, that the church must be regarded under *two aspects*: that of an ecclesiastical body, and that of a secular body. On this part of our previous essay our adversary roams around, in the highest state of distraction, between conflicting hypotheses and supposititious conclusions from hypothetical premises. He commits the enormous blunders of mistaking two *aspects* of one and the same thing as *species* of a *genus*, of mistaking the *matter of an aspect* for the matter of a genus, or the *substance of the body of which it is an aspect*, and of mistaking the *nature* of an aspect for the *essence* of a species. No wonder that he finds it "a hard endeavor to reach an intelligent construction" of such a theory! But that theory is none of ours, no more than the theory that a ten-foot pole includes a yard-stick. The necessity of regarding the church in these two different aspects is as old and as sensible and as pertinent as the necessity of regarding the distinct orders of the church as constituting species, higher and lower, of church officers. To be sure, an aspect may be made a species of some other more extensive aspect to which it stands related as its genus, but then it ceases to be one of several aspects

of the same body, and disappears from the theory and the argument. The church here is any body of men associated together voluntarily for the worship of God according to the Christian religion. Now, such a congregation is not an *ecclesiastical* body or a *civil* body, but may become either or both. This *capacity* or passive power is the *logical matter*. The body is, or is conceived to be, the *same in numero* under all its aspects. Give to this body the *energy* or active power to perform ecclesiastical actions, and it becomes an ecclesiastical body: give it the energy to perform civil actions, and it becomes a secular body. This *energy* is *logical nature*. By ecclesiastical incorporation, it becomes the former; by civil incorporation, it becomes the latter. The functions, etc., of the one are defined in its form of church government; the functions, etc., of the other are defined in its civil charter.

We feel persuaded that our readers will generally reach, not only without any severe labor, but also with positive comfort to their unsophisticated judgment, "an intelligent construction" of this theory, and a ready acquiescence in all its "good and necessary consequences." We therefore pursue it no further. But we do just here formally enter our "complaint" against our able and honored antagonist. We had a *right*, when making so full and formal and careful a statement as "*different in matter, nature, orders, officers, functions, and ends,*" a statement that is conspicuous for the *absence* of three words *substance, form, and essence*, which generally figure in such affirmations—we had a *right* to suppose that *he*, of all men, would take their exclusion as expressly *intended*, and spare us the pain of *supposing* that we had affirmed a *difference in substance and form and essence*.

VIII.

The author of the articles and the Report, by the same facility of substituting one concept for another, exhibits many other imaginary inconsistencies in our previous essay. He actually puts into our mouth a syllogism, which he says (!) "he meets *passim,*" to *prove* that "the higher order of presbyter must include the lower order of deacon." Now, we did attempt to *prove*

that very thing *by Scripture*, but we have never felt the slightest temptation to try to *prove* it by a syllogism, or by the manufacture of concepts in the laboratory of metaphysics, *or to evolve it out of our dogmatic consciousness*. We did attempt to prove that *he* had not proved any relevant cases of exclusion; and his criticisms and refuges have given us perfect assurance of our success. We *assumed* that our fathers meant something capable of an intelligent construction by their *dictum* concerning inclusion, and then merely translated it into the language of logic. But this imputed syllogism, which is adduced to show that we have violated our own principle, is a conspicuous example of exchanging furtively one concept for another. We had said that the *syllogism*, "in any given case, does not and dares not take notice of the principle of classification, or the natures that are unified." Very true; but does this imply in the least that *natures* may not be classified or unified, and *as classes or units*, appear in formal logic? Verily, *no*. But, furthermore, the syllogism itself is faulty in form, though professing to be exact. The minor premise ought to have read: *Presbyter is a higher order which has the nature of the lower order of deacon*. The taking of *such liberties with formal accuracy* is the very thing that is continually betraying the constructive imagination of our noble brother, and robbing him of all likeness to Saturn, who "devours his own children," and digests them in great comfort.

The same documents change the concept of *preaching* the truth into that of *truth* itself, the concept of *administering* the sacraments into that of a *sacrament*, the concept of *ecclesiastical* nature into that of *nature*. Indeed, we could go on *ad nauseam* if it tended to edification. But surely the reader must be weary. At any rate the writer is *very* weary of untying knots which do not deserve even to be cut. We have written what we have written, *first*, to show that our honored brother had not fairly gotten out of his premises the conclusion which he wanted; and, *secondly*, to show that when he undertook to improve the matter and amend the argument, he was rewarded with no better success. It is our whole aim, in these logical and metaphysical strictures, to rob the Reform movement of the powerful influence of *his*

name and advocacy. We have done the disagreeable work only for the sake of the Church. And now we will say to him, in all candor, that we believe that the very acuteness of his powers of analysis has betrayed him, in the defence of a bad cause, to deal as unjustifiably with the laws of the interpretation of Scripture, as he has with the laws of logic and the laws of thought. This charge we now proceed to make good, giving notice, however, that we will drop the language of logic and metaphysics, so far as possible, and use the language of exegesis—a better tongue to speak, and a sweeter voice to hear.

J. A. LEFEVRE.

ARTICLE VIII.

THE DIACONATE OF SCRIPTURE AGAIN.

I.

In a former article it was shown that the New Testament uses the word *deacon*, *first*, in two secular senses, to wit, (*a*) that of *servant*, in a wide or general signification, and (*b*) in a narrower or special sense, that of *table-servant* or waiter; also, *secondly*, in a religious and ecclesiastical signification, parallel with the secular sense, to wit, (*a*) that of a general ecclesiastical servant, and (*b*) that of a special ecclesiastical servant to the poor saints.

Just here we wish to warn our reader against that abuse of language which transfers this established terminology of exegesis to the sphere of logic, as if the *general* sense of a word was equivalent to logical *genus*, and the *special* sense equivalent to logical *species*. The very opposite is much nearer the truth. In exegesis, the general or wide sense always *includes* the narrower sense; the narrower always excludes a *part* of the general sense. In the English New Testament, not in the original Greek, there is a fine illustration of this use of *servant*. “But which of you, having a *servant* plowing or feeding cattle, will say unto him, by and by, when he is come from the field, Go and sit down to meat?”