

THE  
SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW,

CONDUCTED BY

AN ASSOCIATION OF MINISTERS.

Vol. XXXIII.

APRIL, MDCCCLXXXII.

No. 2.

CONTENTS.

ARTICLE	PAGE
I. HOME MISSIONS—HOW SHALL THEY BE CONDUCTED? By the Rev. J. LEIGHTON WILSON, D. D., Baltimore, Md., . . . . .	219
II. A MEMORIAL OF THE LIFE AND LABORS OF THE REV. STUART ROBINSON. By the Rev. Prof. THOS. E. PECK, D. D., Union Theological Seminary, Va., . . . . .	237
III. PRESBYTERIAN GOVERNMENT NOT A HIERARCHY, BUT A COMMONWEALTH. By the late Rev. R. J. BRECKINRIDGE, D. D., LL. D., . . . . .	258
IV. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT., . . . . .	290
V. THE NEW THEORY OF THE MINISTRY, . . . . .	313
VI. THE REPORT OF THE LAST ASSEMBLY ON THE OFFICE OF EVANGELIST. By the Rev. D. E. JORDAN, Henderson, N. C., . . . . .	333
VII. THE PRESBYTERIAN DIACONATE AGAIN. By the Rev. J. A. LEFEVRE, D. D., Baltimore, Md., . . . . .	346
VIII. THE DIACONATE OF SCRIPTURE AGAIN. By the Rev. J. A. LEFEVRE, D. D., Baltimore, Md., . . . . .	359
IX. WHY WAS JESUS BAPTIZED? By the Rev. HERBERT H. HAWES, Farmville, Va., . . . . .	369
X. THE REVIEWER REVIEWED. By the Rev. S. T. MARTIN, Mills River, N. C., . . . . .	386
XI. CRITICAL NOTICES, . . . . .	413
XII. RECENT PUBLICATIONS, . . . . .	428

COLUMBIA, S. C.

PRINTED AT THE PRESBYTERIAN PUBLISHING HOUSE.

1882.

# THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

VOL. XXXIII.—NO. 2.

---

APRIL, MDCCCLXXXII.

---

## ARTICLE I.

### HOME MISSIONS—HOW SHALL THEY BE CONDUCTED?

It is generally agreed among our Christian people that the work of Foreign Missions ought to be conducted under the direction and superintendence of the General Assembly. Presbyteries and Synods are fully competent to carry on the work, if they had the means and facilities, and could do it as effectually and economically in their separate character as in combination with other Presbyteries. But as Presbyteries, with few exceptions, perhaps, have not the means of themselves, and as separate action would involve a great increase of machinery as well as of expense, the work, by common consent, is committed to the General Assembly, the proper representative of the whole body. Presbyteries, in accordance with our Book of Order, in ordaining men to the work of foreign evangelisation, have agreed to transfer them to the control of the Assembly, so far as their general work is concerned, but without abdicating their right of control, so far as the moral and ministerial character of these brethren is concerned. In this view of the matter, our Church, so far as is known, is very nearly a unit.

In relation to the Home work, however, as also of Education, there is some diversity of views as to the mode in which it should be carried on. The great mass of our people hold that so far as

name and advocacy. We have done the disagreeable work only for the sake of the Church. And now we will say to him, in all candor, that we believe that the very acuteness of his powers of analysis has betrayed him, in the defence of a bad cause, to deal as unjustifiably with the laws of the interpretation of Scripture, as he has with the laws of logic and the laws of thought. This charge we now proceed to make good, giving notice, however, that we will drop the language of logic and metaphysics, so far as possible, and use the language of exegesis—a better tongue to speak, and a sweeter voice to hear.

J. A. LEFEVRE.

---

ARTICLE VIII.

THE DIACONATE OF SCRIPTURE AGAIN.

I.

In a former article it was shown that the New Testament uses the word *deacon*, *first*, in two secular senses, to wit, (*a*) that of *servant*, in a wide or general signification, and (*b*) in a narrower or special sense, that of *table-servant* or waiter; also, *secondly*, in a religious and ecclesiastical signification, parallel with the secular sense, to wit, (*a*) that of a general ecclesiastical servant, and (*b*) that of a special ecclesiastical servant to the poor saints.

Just here we wish to warn our reader against that abuse of language which transfers this established terminology of exegesis to the sphere of logic, as if the *general* sense of a word was equivalent to logical *genus*, and the *special* sense equivalent to logical *species*. The very opposite is much nearer the truth. In exegesis, the general or wide sense always *includes* the narrower sense; the narrower always excludes a *part* of the general sense. In the English New Testament, not in the original Greek, there is a fine illustration of this use of *servant*. "But which of you, having a *servant* plowing or feeding cattle, will say unto him, by and by, when he is come from the field, Go and sit down to meat?"

and will not rather say unto him, Make ready wherewith I may sup, and gird thyself, and *serve* me, till I have eaten and drunken, and afterward thou shalt eat and drink?" (Luke xvii. 7, 8.) Here we have one who is servant of all work, very properly transferred to the work of a *waiter*. Of course he performed only one service at a time. As examples of the wide ecclesiastical sense of the word, besides other references, we quoted at large: Acts, i. 17, 25; xx. 24; xxi. 19; Rom. xi. 13; 1 Cor. iii. 5; 2 Cor. iii. 6; iv. i; v. 18; vi. 3, 4; xi. 23; Eph. iii. 7; Col. i. 23, 25; Eph. iv. 12; 1 Tim. i. 12; Eph. vi. 21; Col. iv. 7; Col. i. 7; 1 Thess. iii. 2; 2 Tim. iv. 5; Col. iv. 17. It is confessed by all, and by none more freely than our opponent, that in these passages apostles, evangelists, pastors, preachers of every kind, are called *deacons*, in an official sense; their office a *diaconate*; and their work a *deaconing*. How, then, it may well be asked, can any man deny that the pastorate includes the diaconate? Our opponent answers, that these terms are applied to them in their *wide* or *general* ecclesiastical sense. We reply: *Beyond all doubt*; and that is precisely what we contend for; *but remember*, that it is an *established rule* of interpretation, that the wide sense *includes* the narrow. Our critic excludes the narrow sense from the wide one, and then propounds to us a number of exegetical puzzles to solve on his theory; all of which we give up, simply saying that we hold to *two senses*, a wide and a narrow one; and also that wide deaconing includes narrow deaconing. It is this mistaken interpretation of his that involves him in a battle in which, as he confesses, "the presumption seems to be against" him. He says, also: "The array of Scripture passages which has been marshalled against us is portentous; and one would be apt to think that the least regard for inspired authority should, in view of this mass of evidence, induce in us a speedy abjuration of our errors. But it sometimes happens that one does not know what his assailant sees clearly: that he has been beaten, and ought incontinently to surrender." Now, we do believe and grieve that he is, in this matter, on the wrong side, and we pray and labor to make him see it clearly. If, indeed, this happy result should happen, then, of course, he ought to

surrender, not incontinently, but with dignity and self-respect, as one of the most faithful and able *deacons* of our beloved Church. We therefore call his attention to another established rule of discourse and exegesis, the neglect of which has involved him in no little perplexity. It is this: that when a subject has a dual nature and two names, one may affirm of it, under one name, what is true, logically, only of the other. Thus the Scriptures affirm of the Son of Man what is true only of the Son of God, and of the Son of God, what is true only of the Son of Man. The name loses, as it were, the consciousness of its origin, and vicariously represents the complete subject. This use of language will not do for science, which is always a dead thing; but for discourse, which is a living thing, it is often unavoidable and always beautiful and natural. Our brother gives us many examples; for instance, "The ruler *serves* the church," but all of them out of place. The superficial inconsistency of predicate with subject pointing to the fact that the *name* is taken from only a *part* of the thing named. We stop, not to justify or illustrate this rule, as no denial of its validity is anticipated. We simply apply it as we did the other rule, to the passages in hand. The subject of this discussion is called, say, both preacher and deacon. Why has he these two names? Because the sacred writers, from their stand-point, view him as having two natures. Well, then, preaching may be affirmed of the deacon, and deaconing may be affirmed of the preacher; and this is exactly what is done in that "portentous array of Scripture passages."

On the other hand, there is not a solitary passage in the New Testament where preaching or ruling is predicated of the *deacon* in the narrow ecclesiastical sense of the word, as the lowest class of church officers; thus showing that the sacred writers did *not view him* as having a dual nature. The rule of interpretation here applied we have never heard called in question. It relieves the passages of all obscurity, the mind of all perplexity, and our Presbyterian fathers of all heterodoxy. We would define the deacon just as our catechisms define *every* "*quid*," say, a sacrament, by enumerating its *scriptural* characteristics in logical or-

der, but not in the terminology of logic. We say, then, in the common language of the Presbyterian Church, that the deacon is that officer of the church to whom is committed the official care (*a*) of the poor saints, and (*b*) of other poor persons who are not saints, according to the church's ability. We defy any one to show from *Scripture* that they even were the trustees of the church's property. If any one wishes a more minute description of the diaconal office, and a touching illustration of the spirit and diligence of the true deacon, let him read those two eloquent chapters (2 Cor. viii., ix.) of holy writ, which tell us of the Apostle Paul's "care of the poor saints." What he did there *is deaconing in the narrow sense of the word*; and what he did there he did *in virtue of his status and functions as a deacon*. And if these statements need further confirmation, Paul says, referring to the same facts, the collections in the Macedonian and Achaian churches (Rom. xv. 26), "But now I go to Jerusalem *to deacon unto the saints*, for it hath pleased them of Macedonia to make a certain contribution for *the poor saints* which are at Jerusalem." The apostle here expressly states that it was his purpose *to deacon* to the poor saints. In what did *this deaconing* consist? Not in the simple carrying of the contribution to Jerusalem, for that act is not *essential* to deaconing, says our critic, and so say we. Not in actually collecting or distributing the money, for he did not perform those acts, he continues, and we agree. In what sense then did he "*deacon*" to the poor saints at Jerusalem? His own words are: "We have seen that there are two senses of the word deacon;" "Paul did not deacon in the narrow sense;" "Paul ministered to the poor saints by carrying the money to their elders in Jerusalem, but there is no proof that he deaconed to them by putting it into their hands." To this we reply, *first*, that his substitution of "ministered" for "deaconed" is unfair, unless he means to use it for "deaconed" in the *general* sense in which, according to his own definition, it is "the symbol of a general notion which collects under it all kinds of service, but specifies no particular sort of service." But he does not so use it here, for he specifies the particular service itself. He does not mean that Paul "performed all kinds of service, but no particular kind

of service, by carrying the money to the elders." What he means as the context shows, is, that Paul did not act in these matters as "deacon proper"—the lowest class of church officers; *and he is right*. Paul acted in this and in all official work as *apostle proper*. But the fact that "he deaconed" to the poor saints in any particular, shows that, as *apostle proper*, he was a *general deacon*, like evangelists and those who are "pastors and teachers." Now the notion of a general deacon is indeed that of deacon or servant of all work. But whenever that *general deacon* performs an act, it must be a special service. It may be that of the narrowed sense, or that of some other sense. Our opponent classifies all the special senses of the term as *preaching*, *ruling*, and *distributing*. Now we ask, Did Paul *preach* to the poor saints at Jerusalem? Of this there is not a particle of proof, but much to show that he did not preach at all in that city. Did he *rule* the poor saints in Jerusalem? There is no proof of it. Did he *distribute* to them? "There is no proof it." But these three senses exhaust the term. What, then, on our opponent's theory, did Paul do when he "deaconed" to the *poor* saints in Jerusalem? On our theory he "cared for them" and took charge of their interests as such. He thus deaconed to them tenderly and affectionately in many ways, both in Gentile lands and at Jerusalem. These were the only apostolic functions which he discharged in the holy city. This is the narrow meaning of the word: much wider, however, than distributing or collecting, or both together.

Each complete particular church had its *deacons proper* and the whole Church had its general deacons—its rulers proper—in whom resided official *capacity* and *energy* for the performance of every diaconal act. We now ask our readers to regard, in this additional light, the conclusion of the whole matter on this point, as it was stated in a former essay. "The first appointment of deacons as *officers* of the Church (Acts vi. 1-6) cannot be put later than A. D. 33, and the name must have been bestowed at the same time. The date of Paul's earliest epistles, those to the Thessalonians, was about A. D. 54; that of his latest epistle, Second Timothy, about A. D. 66, *thirty-three years*, at least, after the institution of the diaconal office. Is it pos-

sible, if Paul had this new theory of the office of deacon, that for these twelve years, at so great a distance from the origin of deacons, when their office and work were so well and universally known, that he could or would have regularly and officially spoken of himself, his fellow apostles, evangelists, pastors, preachers of every kind, as *deacons*; their status or office as a *diaconate*, and their work as a *deaconing*? It is plainly impossible. No one of the brethren who have invented the new doctrine, would for a moment, be guilty of speaking either of himself or his fellow-ministers in such misleading phrases.

## II.

The eminent brother whom we are opposing frequently represents diaconal functions as "incompatible" with and "improper" to the presbyterate. Assuming that it has been shown in the former essay and confirmed in the former part of this auxiliary paper, that, according to the Scriptures, the higher office does involve the nature of the lower, we might also assume that there cannot be any real inconsistency between the *facts* of Scripture, but that those *facts* stand together in the greatest harmony. But we are not left to this last refuge—"good and necessary inference." If there is no incompatibility between the scriptural *qualifications* for the two offices, then the inference is proved to be good and necessary. This we now proceed to do, italicising those which are peculiar to either list, and leaving out of the list of the bishop's, the two that are his peculiar characteristics, to wit, aptness to teach and ability to rule. (See 2 Tim. iii. 2-12, and Titus ii. 5-9.)

"A bishop must be blameless, the husband of one wife, *vigilant, sober, of good behavior, given to hospitality*, not given to wine, *no striker*, not greedy of filthy lucre, but *patient, not a brawler, not covetous*, one that ruleth well his own house, having his children in subjection *with all gravity*, not a novice, *having a good report of them that are without, not self-willed, not soon angry, a lover of good men, just, holy, temperate*, holding fast the faithful word as he hath been taught."

"The deacons must be *grave, not double tongued*, not given to



much wine, not greedy of filthy lucre, holding the mystery of the faith in a pure conscience; let these also *first be proved*, being found blameless; let the deacons be the husbands of one wife, ruling their children and their houses well." If we compare these formal and complete lists we find only *three* items peculiar to that of the deacon proper, to wit, "grave," "not double tongued," and "first proven." Of these the first, (grave,) differs only in the manner of its appearance, *i. e.*, out of special connexion, from its presence in the list of the bishop's, *i. e.* in a special connexion under the form "with all gravity." The Greek words are like the English, cognates. Also the qualification, "not a novice," in the first list is manifestly of equal signification with "first proven" or *tested*, in the second. In this argument it is manifestly just to remove the italics and disregard the formal difference. There remains then, as peculiar to the deacon's list only one quality, "not double tongued," *διδωλος*, which means, as its composition suggests, *the conscious* saying of one thing and meaning another—want of consistency between the thought of the heart and the words of the mouth—which is the essence of a *lie*. It is equivalent to "no liar" or rather "no equivocator." True, there is no word or phrase in the first list with which we may parallel this word, but no man will deny that it is involved in more than one of the sixteen terms that are peculiar to the bishop's list—and the last italics vanish. Now here again we have a very pertinent case of *inclusion*. If the presbyter has a *general* deaconship, and all the peculiar characteristics of the deaconship proper—the whole capacity and all the peculiar qualities—what can or should hinder him from *generally* performing the special duties of the deacon? Evidently nothing. Where now is the bishop's want of compatibility or propriety or qualification in reference to diaconal acts of any and every kind?

### III.

But do not the twelve apostles at the first election of deacons in the church, (Acts vi. 2,) plainly say "that *we* should serve tables is not reason," or right, or *pleasing* to God and us? Such, indeed, is the *misinterpretation* which our opponent gives of the

passage, and then claims for himself agreement with the apostles, and charges us with making them do that very unreasonable thing. But this claim and this charge are founded in the violation of an *established rule* of interpretation, and only give point to a sarcasm. It confounds the *grammatical* subject with the subject of *discourse*, which is *not* the unmodified "we," but "we" *under the condition which makes it unreasonable or wrong* "to serve tables." We ask our brother to shut up his *grammatical primer* and take up his "higher" grammar and parse the sentence *logically*. We give a translation which reproduces the construction of the original sentence, though making rather rough English. "That we leaving the word of God should serve tables is not reason," is the exact construction of the Greek—"not reason" occupying the emphatic position, which can only be reproduced by saying: "It is not reason that we, leaving the word of God, should serve tables." *Who* are they that cannot reasonably be asked to serve tables? Is it the apostles *as such*? By no means; they are "*the apostles having left the word of God.*" Now, what it is unreasonable and wrong for the apostles to do as thus modified, or limited, or, as it would be most natural to say, *under these circumstances*, it might be very reasonable for them to do *generally*. This is common sense and common discourse. It is generally right and reasonable for a redeemed man to keep his right hand or right eye; and yet, under certain circumstances, it is his duty to himself and to God to cut it off or pluck it out. It is generally proper for a man to attend to his animal wants, but it is *unreasonable* to do so at the cost of his soul. Everywhere, in Scripture and out of it, we meet with applications of the *dictum* that the higher may not be sacrificed to the lower. So we find it here. The true and *good* sense of the passage was properly expressed when, in the former essay, it was said that "the apostles declared to the church that it was not right for them to deacon tables *at the cost* of neglecting the word of God." We did not suppose that the exigencies of argument could betray our brother into the painful mistake of taking the grammatical subject for the logical. He might as well deny that Paul (Acts ix. 18) was baptized *standing up*, or that the Sad-

ducees declared (Matt. xxii. 25) that each one of the unfortunate seven brothers died *married* and *childless*. Indeed, we have compiled a most portentous array of Scripture passages illustrating the sense of this construction. But we will be merciful, only referring to one more, (Rom. xv. 25,) where Paul says: "I go to Jerusalem," not *to* deacon, but "deaconing to the saints." The modification which the participial clause makes of the subject is always *all-pervading*, making it a particular aspect of the unmodified subject. In a few cases, as the first one quoted, it is perhaps chiefly graphic; but, in most cases, it constitutes the emphasis and point of the whole statement, as in the other two. The *point* of the statement of the Sadducees is, not that the first and the other six in succession *died*, but that he and they *died married and childless*. The *point* of the other passage is that Paul's journey to Jerusalem *was his deaconing* to the saints there, or rather that he made the journey simultaneously deaconing.

There is not a shadow of proof that the bare act of taking up a collection was ever performed by *any* deacon, or even that there ever was a collection "*taken up*" in the modern sense of the word. There is proof that the making of the collection was most probably by each contributor's bringing his own contribution and personally depositing it at the feet of the apostles, or of the presiding bishop. And again, there is no proof that *any* deacon ever performed the bare act of distribution; and there is a probability that the most of the poor came personally for their part of the relief to those who were the custodians of the fund, and that the more infirm beneficiaries were gathered together in "homes," and the supplies sent to them by the ordinary means of conveyance. And furthermore, there is *no proof* that the deacon proper was ever a treasurer or custodian of the funds, whilst there is direct proof that the general deacon did fill that office; for, what else can be meant by the solemn, formal, public act of laying the money at the apostles' feet?

Now look back at "the classic passage" and the previous history. Here is a church of many thousands of members, committing the amiable mistake of having a community of goods,

thus putting all in a condition of dependence on the common fund and creating extraordinary circumstances. "*The Twelve*" could have continued to attend to the daily deaconing, without leaving or slighting the more important functions of their ministry, but for this unauthorised increase of their labors; but now they cannot. What then? First, neglect of the widows of the Hellenists, who certainly were the least known, and probably the majority, of the large community. Then, wide-spread dissatisfaction and complaint throughout all the Hellenistic portion of the community, threatening the peace and unity of the mother Church. The apostles had done all they could, without sacrificing their highest and most sacred obligations, to meet the emergency, *and had failed*. They called an assembly of the whole multitude of the disciples. They defend themselves against the injurious complaints, and propose a remedy. That this is a fair statement of the spirit of the passage, is proven by the speech of the apostles. If *they* had not "deaconed tables" before, and the complaint had not been chiefly aimed at *them*, why did they say, "It is not reason for *us* to deacon tables at *such a cost*?" Why did they not rather "turn the tables," and say: "It is not reason for *you* to expect us to do, or complain of us for not doing, what is incompatible with our office and qualifications, and what we have never done before"?

If it was not a peculiar emergency, requiring the sacrifice of one thing to another, why did they give emphasis to the required sacrifice, and why did they call this deaconing of tables, in the words of Dr. J. A. Alexander, "their need or necessity, or necessary business, implying a present and particular emergency"? It is generally considered that the right key of a complicated lock is the one that fits into all its wards and throws back its bolt, with out the least forcing. The prevailing interpretation which we defend, without lugging in supposed facts that are not even hinted at in the narrative, and rejecting no word that is contained in it, explains it naturally, grammatically, logically, and psychologically too.

J. A. LEFEVRE.