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THE  
DANVILLE QUARTERLY  
REVIEW.

EDITED BY  
AN ASSOCIATION OF MINISTERS.

SEPTEMBER, 1861.

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Φωτισματος δε ζωνη και αφηαρσιαν δια του εναγγελιου.—2 TIM. I: 10

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DANVILLE, KY., AND CINCINNATI, OHIO:

PUBLISHED BY

RICHARD H. COLLINS, 25 WEST FOURTH STREET, CINCINNATI,

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CROSBY, NICHOLS & CO., BOSTON; ROBERT CARTER & BROTHERS, NEW  
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RICHARD H. COLLINS,

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.

Postage, to all parts of the U. S., when paid Quarterly in advance, 3½ cents on each number, or 14 cents for a year

1862, May 16.  
Gift of  
Rev. J. D. Shane  
of Cincinnati, Ohio.

## DANVILLE QUARTERLY REVIEW.

No. III.

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SEPTEMBER, 1861.

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### ART. I. — *The New Gospel of Rationalism.*

*Institutiones Theologiæ Christianæ Dogmaticæ*: Scripsit JUL. AUG.

LUD. WEGSCHEIDER. Editio Octava: Lipsiæ, 1844.

*Das Leben Jesu*. Kritisch bearbeitet von Dr. DAVID FRIEDERICH STRAUSS. 4te Auflage. Tübingen, 1840.

*Recent Inquiries in Theology*: By eminent English Churchmen; being "Essays and Reviews." Second American Edition. Edited, with an Introduction, by Rev. F. H. HEDGE, D. D. Boston, 1861.

The existence of the Kingdom of Christ upon earth involves a constant strife with the spirit and practice of this world. For it is only by encroachments of the former upon the domain of the latter that a Church can be founded; and hence the verification of our Lord's declaration, that he came not to bring peace, but a sword. The principles of holiness and sin being in direct antagonism, they can never exist in harmony side by side; but must work out their essential natures in open hostility to each other. This is equally true whether contemplated in the life of the believer or in the visible Church of the Redeemer; for there is no difference, except numerically, between the two, and the nature of the foes with which they have to contend. The Christian life is emphatically a warfare; continuous, unyielding and deadly, until, at the end of the probation, his captain enables

ART. II. — *Imputation.* \*

## PART I.

Nothing can be plainer even from the discussions to which we have referred in the margin, than that the interests of theology and religion require in this age a thorough reinvestigation of the whole subject of Imputation; for while the truth of the doctrine appears to be most cheerfully conceded, there seems to be but little agreement as to what the doctrine really is; or what are the principles involved in its maintenance. In the early ages of the Christian Church, and before any specific error on the subject had developed itself into form and efficiency, the simple and obvious facts involved in the doctrine were received and acknowledged by her members — just as all the other distinguishing doctrines of the Gospel had been — without any attempt at logical refinement, or scientific precision of statement. But when various forms of error had sought to obscure and even to ignore the truths asserted in the doctrine; and the attention of the Church of Christ was thus specifically called to the subject; it was not long ere the teachings of the Word of God in relation to this doctrine, as also in relation to the kindred doctrine of Justification by Faith alone, were fully evolved and received a clear and definite statement. In what we propose now to offer, our wish is, if possible, to prepare the way for a thorough reinvestigation of the subject; regarding the necessity which calls for it as imperative, from the fact that grave misapprehensions are still entertained concerning it. The facts connected with the history of the doctrine itself, or its development and maintenance as

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\* Published with some reference to the following tractates :

*Articles on Imputation and Original Sin*, in the *Biblical Repertory* and *Princeton Review* for 1830 and 1838. Republished in *Princeton Essays*, vol. 1. 1846.

*Articles on Imputation* in the *Quarterly Christian Spectator* (New Haven) for 1830, 1831.

*The Elohim Revealed*, by Rev. Samuel J. Baird, D. D. 1860.

*Reviews of the Elohim Revealed* in *Princeton Review* for April, 1860; and in the *Southern Presbyterian Review* for April, 1860.

*Dr. Baird's Rejoinder* to the *Princeton Review*. 1860.

*Rejoinder* of the *Princeton Review*, Oct. 1860.

presented in the theology of the Reformed or Calvinistic Church, are clearly not understood, even by many whose utterances on the subject are most dogmatic and decided.

The opening of the grand drama of the Reformation evinced that nearly all of its prominent actors on the side of the Protestants were not only imbued with the spirit of deep and earnest piety, but of learning likewise; and that they had evinced their high and just appreciation of its importance, by a thorough literary training.\* They studied with intense interest the original languages of the Holy Scriptures; were thoroughly conversant with the different schools of philosophy and theology which divided the Latin Church; and, of course, their views of mental philosophy and of ethics, and their modes of thought, of investigation, and of argument, had been, at least to a very considerable extent, directed and shaped by the masters of those schools. Aquinas, Dana Scotus, Hales, and other renowned doctors still retained all their honors and authority; and were often referred to as authoritative in Philosophy and Ethics, and (until Luther dissolved the charm,) even in matters of faith, as is evinced, more or less, even by the earlier writings of the Reformers themselves. They could not, and did not, nor was it to be expected that they should succeed at the outset to free themselves wholly from the shackles thus imposed. And their glory was not so much in defining and adjusting the principles of speculative theology (though even here they have borne away the palm from all competitors) as in unfolding and exhibiting the long-concealed treasures of the Word of God. Nor is any thing hazarded by the assertion that as interpreters of the heavenly oracles they

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\* The professed theologian who affects to speak slightly of the leading minds of the first generation of the Reformers, evinces only his own ignorance or incapacity. Among the men whom God then raised up (to speak only of the theologians,) may be named Luther, Capito, Melancthon, Jonas, Calvin, Carlostadt, Zuinglius, Farell, Bucer, Fagius or Reuchlin, Martyr, Bullinger, Hyperius, Musculus, Pellicanus, Stapulensis, Knox, Ridley, Beza, Bertram of Geneva, T. Bibliander, Borrhaus, Charpentier, A. Durer, Myconius, Œcolampadius, Stancarus, Viret, Xylænder, Grynæus, Brentius, the learned but abused Pistorius, the erratic Osiander, J. Agricola, &c., either of whom might have given character to a later age. Nor was the second age much inferior, including such men as Ursinus, Zanchius, F. Junius, Gomarus, Polanus, S. Grynæus, Keckerman, Kuehlin, Pareus, Piscator, and others.

were not only immeasurably in advance of all that preceded them, but that they have had few equals and no superiors since; as is now admitted in the intelligent schools of criticism. It was to the cultivation of this great province that their main attention was directed.

Such being the state of the case, it were unreasonable to expect that there should be no diversity or disagreement amongst them, in the terms wherein they expressed their views of those doctrines which from diverse stand-points they were called upon to assert and to defend. But they practically recognized the principle that substantial agreement may exist under diversity of statement: and we owe it to them and to ourselves to recognize the same principle in interpreting their writings. They, for example, agreed fully and entirely on the doctrine of *justification by faith alone*; that is, as distinct from all personal or subjective merit or desert on the part of the justified; and held that this justification was by, through, or on account of the imputation of the merits or righteousness of Christ: though there may be found slight and unimportant variations in the forms of their statement of this truth, (as in the celebrated passage in Bucer, over which Grotius and Rivetus had their foolish controversy.) But the great fact itself was avowed; and none doubted it of all the early reformed Church. But when the later among them, along with their successors, attempted in more peaceful times to define the exact import of some of the terms employed in stating the doctrine, they differed somewhat; and the result was, a multitude of questions were started in relation to them: as for example, Does faith pertain to the intellect or to the will? Is the passive or active righteousness of Christ, or both, imputed in justification? (a question started by Karg of Wittemberg, about 1564.) And in laboring after a punctilious exactness of definition, the influence of their early mental training was manifested. But the question, whether Adam's guilt was imputed for condemnation; and whether Christ's righteousness was imputed for justification; *was never litigated by them*. The man who would have denied or disputed either the one or the other, would have been regarded as an enemy to the reformed faith. In all their presentations of Christian doctrine these great truths are found in their length

and breadth and fullness; and nothing but ignorance would venture to call it in question. But with all their efforts to free themselves from the barbarous technicology of scholasticism, both in philosophy and theology, they could not change at once their modes of thought and forms of expression; as may be seen abundantly exemplified in all their attempted refinements on the great and admitted facts of their own recognized theology. The sovereignty of God in the whole matter of human salvation was asserted fully and universally, just as it had been asserted by Augustine; but when they attempted to refine thereon the diverse philosophies of the contending sects of Scholasticism were at length called in to assist. They indeed quoted Plato and Aristotle; but often reasoned and refined with Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Ockham, &c. *The Will of God* as the foundation of moral obligation, was made the key-note of some; while *the Immutable Justice of God* became the key-note of others: the former reasoning themselves into what has since been called *Supralapsarianism*; and the latter into *Infralapsarianism*.\* And hereupon an embittered controversy began; which continued until the speculations of the Socinian and Remonstrant schools apprized them of the fact that matters of direct practical importance demanded their attention. A large volume might be properly devoted to the consideration of several points here referred to.

The fact of Adam's headship of the human family; and that all the race were federally represented by him; to the extent, too, that had he obeyed the Divine mandate all his descendants would have been as a consequence or certain result made partakers with him of the happy effects of his obedience; as all have been made partakers of the unhappy effects of his disobedience; is a fact which was universally regarded by them as fundamental in theology; and the pretense of the Socinians, and of some of the earlier Remonstrants, that they also recognized the whole of the truth involved therein, by the admission that Adam represented his natural descendants as a parent represents his children; and that Christ is truly the head of his redeemed inasmuch as he prepared the way for their salvation and acceptance with God; was uni-

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\* *Sublapsarian* as the antithesis of *supralapsarian*, is inaccurate and contrary to the best usage.

versally denounced by the Reformed Church as an utter denial of the Headship both of Adam and of Christ. Their uniform doctrine on the subject is thus briefly and correctly stated by Wendeline :

Ut secundi *Adami*, hoc est *Christi*, justitia nobis imputatur ad vitam : sic primi *Adami* injustitia nobis imputata ad mortem est. Hinc Theologi monent, *Adamum* non peccasse ut personam singularem : sed genus humanum tanquam in stirpe et origine representasse : ideoque peccatum ejus imputari universo generi humano. \*

Assuming the truth of the great scriptural doctrine of Divine predestination, as all both Lutheran and reformed substantially did at the outset, the difficulty arose to Reconcile the doctrine with the equally admitted truth of the responsibility of the creature ; and of his conceded accountability to God for his thoughts, words and actions. And the grand nodus was (as in the time of Augustine,) how to explain the fall of our first parents, or the introduction of sin into the world, so as to maintain predestination without either making God the author of sin, or destroying the accountability of man. Luther, in his treatise *De Servo Arbitrio*, took the highest ground, denying utterly that the creature had freedom of will ; and Melancthon accepted and endorsed his statements hereon. Both, subsequently, modified their views ; though others who had become convinced by the argument still retained the doctrine which it defended. In the discussions on Election and Reprobation, the same question, so to speak, became intensified, (as we shall have occasion to remark more fully hereafter;) and it was boldly asserted that the reprobate were created in order that they might be damned, and to show forth the power and severity of God. By far the greater part of the Church discarded and denounced this doctrine as soon as a thorough discussion of the subject had evinced its true character. Others, however, retained it ; and some who admitted the premises sought to shelter themselves against the consequences of an open avowal of the conclusion, by taking refuge in the distinction between the revealed and secret purposes of God. And it was in immediate connection with these speculations on the accountability of man

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\* Christ. Theologia. p. 248. Anno 1683.

that the doctrine of imputation was brought forth again for a more particular consideration, as will be seen presently. And we need hardly add that in this connection we find no little confusion in the discussion itself. It was universally admitted that the race was condemned to death for Adam's transgression; but those who maintained that creation itself was only a means for the purpose of carrying out the decree of election; and who held that sin was not the ground upon which the lost were reprobated; \* excogitated in the same connection, and as an outgrowth and utterance of the same principle, the idea that the imputation of sin was what has since been technically called *antecedent and immediate, and not in consequence of inherited or participated guilt and depravity*. Moral corruption was not the ground of reprobation, said they; nor was it the ground but the result of imputation. The argument was used in both cases, and is equally applicable to both. And hence it has been alleged in our own day, by the impugnors of the doctrine of imputation and of the federal relation of Adam to his posterity, that the doctrine of imputation as originally received and taught by the Reformed Church involved a mysterious identity of the race with Adam, so that his act was their act; or, at least, a literal transfer from him to them of the moral turpitude of the sin by which he fell. But nothing can justify such a representation as this; for never did the Reformed Church entertain the idea of personal identification with Adam, or of the transfer of moral character, as in any way involved in the doctrine of federal headship and imputation.

As to the terms *impute* and *imputation*, the meaning attached to them by the Reformed Church from the very beginning until now is one and uniform, even though there has been a diversity in the statements in which the *doctrine* has been formally expressed. As to the term itself, Gomar, in his Analytical Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans, chap. iv, remarks that:

"Neither the Hebrew term אָשִׁיב nor the Greek λογίζεσθαι by which Paul interprets it; nor even the Latin *imputare*, (as is shown by the

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\* "Creatio est via electionis." Gomar. "Decreti reprobationis causa efficiens non est peccatum." "Neque eterna prævisio peccati est causa decreti reprobationis; ut argumenta sequentia evincunt." Polanus.



usage of good authors,) has by itself a special signification; but it means generally to *repute, esteem, adjudge, ascribe or attribute, whether it be done truly or otherwise*: nor has any place been cited either from the Sacred Scriptures or from approved authors of the languages which proves the contrary. \*

Turretin fully sustains this:

“ Verbum *imputandi* quod Heb. est **רָשָׁה**, Græcis λογίζεσθαι vel *ἐλογεῖν*, bifarium posse sumi, vel proprie vel improprie. *Improprie* imputari dicitur alicui, id quod fecit ipse, vel habet, quum nimirum propterea præmium vel pœna illi decernitur. Ut *peccatum imputari* dicitur impiis. 2 Sam. xix : 19, &c. *Proprie* est eum, qui aliquid non fecit, habere ac si fecisset; et vicissem non imputare, est eum qui aliquid fecit, habere ac si non fecisset; &c. †

Nothing is more false than the assertion that these terms in their scriptural usage never mean to *ascribe to an individual that which is not by his own personal act or demerit, his own*, as any intelligent examination would evince. And even Knapp † avers that theologians “for the most part will agree that the phrase, *God imputes the sin of our progenitors to their posterity*, means, that for the sin committed by our progenitors God punishes their descendants.”

The doctrine as held by the ancient Jews expressed merely the fact that all the descendants of Adam had sinned in his person, and that thus man was deprived of the immortal happiness for which he was created, and became the heir of death. (Compare Wisdom ii : 23, 24, and Sirach xxv : 32.) And this seems likewise to have been the earliest view of the Latin Church, and was asserted and defended by Tertullian, Ambrose, Augustine, &c. (See the texts to which they referred in support of it, in *Vossii Historia Pelagiana*, pp. 134–276.) But that this emphatic assertion of the natural headship of Adam did, in their estimation, exclude or was inconsistent with the doctrine of his federal headship, is an idle dream.

Since the Reformation different views have been entertained of the doctrine; to two of which it will be proper here to refer

\* Opera, I., p. 897.

† Opera, II., pp. 569, 570.

‡ Christian Theology. Sect. 76, p. 248.

before we proceed: the first of these we reject as unsupported and erroneous; while we regard the second as the view entertained by the Reformed Church, and as presented for our acceptance in the Word of God.

The former of these views is thus presented by Dr. Hodge, of Princeton:

“Some hold that in virtue of a covenant entered into by God with Adam, not only for himself but for all his posterity, he was constituted their head and representative. And in consequence of this relation, his act, (as every other of a public person acting as such,) was considered the act of all those whom he represented. When he sinned, therefore, they sinned, not actually but virtually; when he fell, they fell. Hence the penalty he incurred comes on them. God regards and treats them as covenant-breakers, withholds from them those communications which produced his image on the soul of Adam at his first creation; so that the result is destitution of righteousness and corruption of nature. *According to this view, hereditary depravity follows as a penal evil from Adam's sin, and is not the ground of its imputation to men. This, according to our understanding of it, is essentially the old Calvinistic doctrine. This is our doctrine, and the doctrine of the standards of our Church.*” \*

The other view to which we refer is described as follows by Dr. Hodge, though not accurately; and it is the main design of all his essays on imputation to refute this view of the doctrine and to establish the former. His words are:

“Others exclude the idea of imputation of Adam's sin, but admit that all men derive by ordinary generation from our first parents a corrupt nature, which is the ground, even prior to actual transgressions, of their exposure to condemnation. This is essentially the view of Placeæus, against which, as we endeavored to show, the Calvinistic world of his time protested. This is the view, in the main, of Stapfer, and in one place of Edwards. This is Dr. Dwight's doctrine, and that of many others. Most of the older advocates of this opinion retained at least the name of imputation, but made the inherent corruption of men the ground of it.” †

Without pausing here to point out the inaccuracies of this whole representation, (which will be sufficiently apparent in the

\* Princeton Essays, vol. I., pp. 167, 168.

† Idem, p. 168.

course of our discussion,) we shall presently offer a statement in the language of those who entertain it, of the doctrine here referred to. And the reader will be able from our subsequent citation of testimonies to determine which, of the two views here presented of the doctrine of imputation, has received the approval of the Calvinistic Church. The doctrine, as we hold it, and as will be seen, admits both the natural and federal headship of Adam, (the *caput naturale* and the *caput morale*;) and its supporters, instead of making the distinction between mediate and immediate imputation; and attempting to explicate the doctrine of original sin from either, (as Dr. Hodge so laboriously essays to do;) *conjoin the two and maintain them to be inseparable.*

As to Placæus — through whose name Dr. Hodge in all his essays above referred to, endeavors to throw the odium of heresy upon all who dissent from his doctrine of antecedent or immediate imputation,\* and of whom he apparently knows nothing except what is detailed respecting him in De Moor and Turretin — it may be proper here to observe, in passing, that “the protest of the Calvinistic world” against his views, however understood, is not to be regarded as an endorsement of the doctrine of *immediate imputation*. Dr. Hodge has strenuously labored to make the contrary impression; but why he has endeavored to do this is difficult to determine. Placæus invented the formal distinction between mediate and immediate imputation; and Dr. Hodge has adopted it, and endeavors to explicate the doctrine of original sin from the stand-point thus assumed; but “the protest of the Calvinistic world” *was against the distinction itself* as contrary to the approved theology of the Reformed. This Dr. Hodge could have learned even from the work of De Moor. A single instance, and all that we can here stop to adduce, will evince this to be so. The celebrated and learned Walch, as cited by De Moor, † after referring to Placæus and explaining the import of *immediate imputation*, adds:

“Illam rejecit Placæus; hanc verò, sive *mediatam*, admisit. *Ita*

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\* See Princeton Essays, vol. I., pp. 146, 147, 150, 168, 178, 182, 183, 195 and 196: and Princeton Repertory, for 1860, pp. 343, 345, 346.

† Tom. III. Cap. 16. Sect. 32. p. 282.

*nec ipsum Peccatum Originale, nec peccati Adamitici Imputationem in se spectatam; sed certum tantum hujus modum negavit; fuerunt tamen, qui ei se opposerent. . . Nos utramque Imputationem, quam dicunt, et immediatam et mediatam conjungendam et admittendam esse existimamus. Adamus considerandus est non tantum ut caput naturale; sed etiam ut caput morale sive fœderale. Hinc et posteri ejus duplicem cum eo nexum habent, et naturalem et moralem. Pro hoc duplici nexu duplicem quoque Imputationis rationem Adamus in se continet, quod et Paulus Roman. v: 12, 18, 19, confirmat. Quæ quum ita sint, hæud dicendum est Placæum graviter errasse, ac momentum controversiæ hujus fuisse magnum."*

Let this suffice for the present, so far as Placæus is concerned.

As to the view which Dr. Hodge assails as antagonistic to his immediate imputation scheme, and which he represents under the title of *mediate imputation*, we shall in order to do him full justice cite it as presented by both Stapfer and Edwards, to whom he has referred as inculcating it. Edwards, in Part IV, chap. iii, of his work on *Original Sin*, (the "one place" referred to by Dr. Hodge,) remarks as follows:

"The first being of an evil disposition in a child of Adam, whereby he is disposed to approve the sin of his first father, so far as to imply a full and perfect consent of heart to it, I think, is not to be looked upon as a consequence of the imputation of that first sin, any more than the full consent of Adam's own heart in the act of sinning; which was not consequent on the imputation, but rather prior to it in the order of nature. Indeed the derivation of the evil disposition to Adam's posterity, or rather the co-existence of the evil disposition implied in Adam's first rebellion, in the root and branches, is a consequence of the union that the wise Author of the world has established between Adam and his posterity; but not properly a consequence of the imputation of his sin; nay, is rather antecedent to it as it was in Adam himself. The first depravity of heart, and the imputation of that sin, are both the consequences of that established union; but yet, in such order, that the evil disposition is first, and the charge of guilt consequent, as it was in the case of Adam himself."

In immediate connection with this passage, and in illustration of its meaning, he quotes largely from the *Theologia Polemica* of Stapfer; and among other extracts the following is given

from Tom. iv., Sect. 78, and from the note appended thereto. The translation is that of Edwards :

“The imputation of Adam’s first sin consists in nothing else than this, that his posterity are viewed as in the same place with their father, and are like him. But seeing, agreeably to what we have already proved, God might, according to his own righteous judgment, which was founded on his most righteous law, give Adam a posterity that were *like himself*; and indeed it could not be otherwise, according to the very laws of nature; therefore he might also in righteous judgment impute Adam’s sin to them, inasmuch as to give Adam a posterity *like himself*, and to *impute* his sin to them, is one and the same thing. And therefore if the former be not contrary to the divine perfections, so neither is the latter.” . . . “Our *adversaries* contend with us chiefly on this account, that according to our doctrine of original sin, such an *imputation* of the first sin is maintained, whereby God, without any regard to universal native *corruption*, esteems all Adam’s posterity as *guilty*, and holds them as liable to condemnation, *purely* on account of that sinful act of their first parent; so that they without any respect had to *their own sin*, and so, as *innocent* in themselves, are destined to eternal punishment. . . . *I have therefore ever been careful to show, that they do INJURIOUSLY suppose these things to be separated in our doctrine which are by no means to be separated.* The whole of the controversy they have with us about this matter, evidently arises from this, that they suppose the *mediate* and the *immediate* imputation are distinguished one from the other, not only in the manner of conception, but in reality. And so indeed they consider *imputation* only as *immediate* and abstractedly from the *mediate*; *when yet our divines suppose, that neither ought to be considered separately from the other: (cum tamen Theologi nostri neutram ab altera separandam velint.) Therefore I chose not to use any such distinction, or to suppose any such thing, in what I have said on the subject; but only have endeavored to explain the thing itself, and to reconcile it with the divine attributes. And therefore I have every where conjoined both these conceptions concerning the imputation of the first sin as inseparable; and judged that one ought never to be considered without the other: [ ut licet et hic ab hac distinctione abstinerim, utramque tamen imputationem verbis meis involverim, nec reipsa à Theologorum nostrorum, vel ipsius etiam Apostoli Pauli, sententia discesserim. \* ]* While I have been writing

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\* The clause between the brackets renders the quotation continuous.

this note, *I consulted all the systems of divinity which I have by me, that I might see what was the true and genuine opinion of our chief divines in this affair; and I found they were of the same mind with me; namely, that these two kinds of imputation are by no means to be separated, or to be considered abstractedly one from the other, but that one does (necessarily) involve the other.*"

In support of this statement he then cites largely from both *Vitringa* and *Lampius*, who fully sustain the representation, though Dr. Hodge attempts to deny it in respect to *Lampius*.

If these things are so, (and that they are will be fully shown in the sequel,) then Dr. Hodge has committed several grievous errors in his treatment of the subject. 1. He errs with *Placæus* against the whole reformed theology, by allowing the distinction at all. For down to the time of *Placæus* it never had been formally made or allowed, except impliedly by the *Supralapsarians*; and when made by him it was almost universally disallowed by the Calvinistic Church. 2. He errs against the whole of the approved theology of the Reformed by endeavoring to complicate the doctrine of original sin, on the ground of that distinction, and from the stand-point of *immediate* imputation. And 3. He errs against the same true Calvinistic theology; and against plain matter of fact; and against his brethren of the present age; by maintaining that all who do not recognize this distinction, but refuse assent to the doctrine of immediate imputation as presented by himself, do not really hold the doctrine of imputation as it was entertained by the Reformed Church; but are mediate imputationists and followers of *Placæus*. But of these things more hereafter.

Before passing on, we ask attention in this connection, and as a matter of simple justice to a distinguished divine of the present time, whose doctrine on this subject has been arraigned as a departure from the approved theology of Calvinism, to the following passage. In speaking of the nature of original sin he remarks that:

"Its first element is the guilt of Adam's first sin. *By which is meant that on account of our natural and covenanted relations with Adam, we are considered and treated precisely as we would have been, if each of us*

*had personally done what Adam did.* The guilt of Adam's first sin is imputed to his posterity. There is doubtless a wide difference between imputed sin, and inherent sin. We, however, have both — and that naturally; and it tends only to error to attempt to explicate either of them in disregard of the other, or to separate what God has indissolubly united, namely, our double relation to Adam. It is infinitely certain, that God would never make a legal fiction a pretext to punish as sinners, dependent and helpless creatures who were actually innocent. The imputation of our sins to Christ, affords no pretext for such a statement; because that was done by the express consent of Christ, and was, in every respect, the most stupendous proof of divine grace. Nor is the righteousness of Christ ever imputed for justification, except to the elect: nor ever received except by faith, which is a grace of the Spirit peculiar to the renewed soul. *In like manner the sin of Adam is imputed to us, but never irrespective of our nature and its inherent sin. That is, we must not attempt to separate Adam's federal from his natural headship — by the union of which he is the ROOT of the human race; since we have not a particle of reason to believe that the former would ever have existed without the latter.* Nay, Christ to become our federal head, had to take our nature."\*

What any intelligent man can mean by denouncing such a representation of the subject as *Placæanism*; or as a departure from the approved theology of Calvinism; is truly hard to determine. And that our readers may perceive the precise nature of our difficulty herein, we shall now lay before them the decision of the National Synod of the French Reformed Churches, at Charenton, near Paris, in 1645, before which the doctrine of Placæus was arraigned; and which, after examining, condemned it in these words: †

“Whereas, a report has been made to the Synod of certain writings, (*i. e.* those of Placæus,) printed and manuscript, by which the nature of original sin is made to consist solely in the hereditary corruption, originally residing in all men, *but the imputation of the first sin of Adam is denied*; the Synod condemns the aforesaid doctrine, so

\* *The Knowledge of God Objectively considered*, by Dr. Breckinridge. pp. 498, 499.

† The decision is given in De Moor, *ut supra*. We cite it as presented by Dr. Hodge in *Princeton Essays*, vol. I., p. 195. The italics are our own here, and in all the other quotations.

far as it restricts the nature of original sin to the mere hereditary corruption of Adam's posterity, excluding the imputation of the first sin by which he fell; and, under the penalty of censures of all kinds, forbids all pastors, professors, and others, who may treat this subject, to depart from the common opinion of all Protestant churches, which, besides corruption, have always acknowledged the aforesaid imputation to the whole posterity of Adam. And [the National Synod] commands all synods and classes, in taking steps for the reception of students into the sacred ministry, to require of them subscription to this statute."

Here, then, is the condemnation of the doctrine which is attributed to Placæus; and we only ask of the intelligent reader to decide for himself whether there is the remotest connection between the doctrine thus condemned, and the doctrine presented above from Edwards, Stapfer and Breckinridge; and which Dr. Hodge has so studiously and so frequently represented as essentially the same with it. That Placæus was misunderstood, will, we presume, appear in the sequel. But between the doctrine here attributed to him, and the doctrine presented above, (and which Dr. Hodge has labored to confound with it,) there is as plain and radical a difference as that existing between the doctrine advocated by Dr. Hodge, and that which we have cited from the writers above referred to. For while he condemns Placæus, he adopts his distinction; but they, while they reject the doctrines of Placæus, reject also his distinction. \*

The claim of Dr. Hodge that our standards sustain the view which he advocates, must be taken *cum grano salis*. He is himself very far from being uniformly consistent in the statement of his views; and it can scarcely have escaped his observation

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\* And yet Dr. Hodge does not hesitate to affirm in the following most explicit terms, the identity of the two: "*The doctrine of Edwards is precisely that which was so formally rejected when presented by Placæus.*" P. Essays, I., p. 150. It certainly is amusing to consider this inaccurate and dogmatical asseveration alongside of the following statement, in which a Jonathan Edwards is represented as writing against the views of Placæus: "*Cum Dan. Whitbius, Anglus, an. 1711., in Tractatu quodam errorem Jonæ Placæi de peccato Adami, posteris ejus non imputato, recoqueret, Jonath. Edwardum, et ex Germanis Jac. Carpovium, nactus est adversarios.*" Joh. Alphons. Turretini, *Compend. Hist. Eccles., cum continuatione*, &c. p. 336. Halæ, 1750. The reference, of course, is not to the *treaties of Edwards on Original Sin*.



that our standards sustain as fully and as unequivocally the doctrine which he opposes, as they do the doctrine which he advocates; which can only be explained on the ground that the assembly of divines did not recognize, as he does, the distinction between mediate and immediate imputation, \* but took the view of the matter which the Church had ever taken, and which is illustrated by the extract from Walch on a preceding page. Yet Dr. Hodge, after carefully defining the view which he entertains, (and as exhibited by us on a previous page,) adds:

“This, according to our understanding of it, is essentially the old Calvinistic doctrine. *This is our doctrine, and the doctrine of the standards of our Church.* For they make original sin to consist, 1st, in the guilt of Adam’s first sin; 2ndly, the want of original righteousness; and 3dly, the corruption of our whole nature.”

And he repeats this asseveration substantially a number of times.

Now Dr. Hodge, in the effort to explicate the doctrine of original sin from the stand-point of immediate or antecedent imputation, declares (and he repeats it in every form of expression,) that “the want of original righteousness,” and “the corruption of our whole nature,” are *the punishment of imputed sin*. And, as we have seen, he utterly discards, as erroneous, the doctrine of those who refuse to recognize the distinction between mediate and immediate imputation, and who contend that the doctrine of original sin should be explained without reference to it. But where, within the whole compass of our standards, does he find anything to justify such a representation? In Chap. VI. of the Westminster Confession it is stated, that our first parents sinned and “fell from their original righteousness, and communion with God, and so became dead in sin, and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body,” and that “being the root of all mankind the guilt of this sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed [that is, through them as the root of all mankind,] to all their posterity descending from them by ordinary generation;” and that “from this original corruption [that is, not the mere imputed guilt, as Dr. Hodge’s theory would

\* At the time of its session (1643) Placcus had not invented this distinction.

assume, but the same death in sin and corrupted nature *thus conveyed,*] whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed all actual transgressions." The same truth is equally manifest from the concluding paragraph of the chapter :

"Every *sin, both original and actual,* being a transgression of the law of God and contrary thereunto, *doth in its own nature bring guilt upon the sinner,* whereby he is bound over to the wrath of God, and curse of the law, and so made subject to death, with all miseries, spiritual, temporal, and eternal."

Here, likewise, the aforesaid distinction of Dr. Hodge and Placæus is clearly ignored; and any attempt to illustrate and carry it out by a reference to this passage would result in indescribable confusion : for Dr. Hodge does concede that none of the descendants of Adam either will be, or could justly be, consigned to the eternal wrath of God, simply on account of Adam's first sin, though his logic sustains not the conclusion.

If we refer to the Catechism, we find the very same disregard of uniformity in the arrangement of the topics touching this subject. For instance, in the answer to question 18, we have the order to which Dr. Hodge refers above, to-wit : guilt of Adam's first sin ; want of original righteousness ; corruption of our whole nature. But the answers to questions 16, and 17, explicitly declare that all the natural descendants of Adam "*sinned in him, and fell with him in his first transgression ;*" and that "*the Fall brought mankind into an estate of sin and misery.*" Dr. Hodge may say that we sinned by *imputation,* and that the *guilt* thus imputed brought the race into its present condition as a penal consequence. But the Catechism says nothing of the kind. And the simple and obvious fact, which Dr. Hodge has failed to observe, and which yet is patent upon the whole statement of the doctrine as presented in our standards, *is that they attach no importance at all to the order observed in the statement of the topics ;* (that is, whether it be stated as 1. guilt, 2. depravity, 3. death ; or 1. depravity, 2. guilt, 3. death ; ) and are content if only the topics are clearly stated in the connection ; while, on the contrary, Dr. Hodge proposes to make every thing depend upon the order

in which the topics are stated. Since the time of Placcus more attention has been given to the order; and the highest importance is attached to it by theologians who sympathize with the peculiar views of Dr. Hodge. But any attempt to authenticate and verify such an idea by appealing to the earlier Calvinistic divines (except where they were Supralapsarian,) can result in nothing but confusion and perplexing disappointment—so far is it from being the fact that the Reformed Church has ever sanctioned the views of Dr. Hodge!

Before we pass on, it may gratify the reader to be presented with an illustration confirmatory of this representation; and we shall therefore here briefly advert to one or two plain and obvious instances, which can be easily verified. The Calvinistic soundness of the XXXIX. Articles of the Church of England has ever been admitted by the Reformed Church; and yet by referring to the IXth of those articles, we read that—

“Original sin is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil, so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the spirit; and therefore in every person born into this world, it deserveth God’s wrath and damnation.”

Here, then, all the topics are found clearly and most forcibly expressed; but the *order* of their statement (which, according to Dr. Hodge, is every thing,) is precisely the reverse of that given in *Shorter Catechism*, Quest. 18. (above quoted.) Instead of being as there, *guilt, depravity, death*; it is *depravity, guilt, death*.

Another instance easy of verification, is that of Calvin. In his *Instit.*, lib. II., cap. i., he says:

“This is that *hereditary corruption* which the fathers called *original sin*; meaning, by *sin*, the *depravation of a nature previously good and pure*.” Sect. 5. . . . “We shall not find the *origin of this pollution*, unless we ascend to the first parent of us all, as to the fountain which sends forth all the streams.” . . . “And therefore, between these two persons (Adam and Christ) there is this relation, that the one ruined us by involving us in his destruction, the other by his grace has restored us to salvation.” . . . . “Our nature is there (Ephes. ii: 3,) characterized, not as it was created by God, but as it was vitiated in

Adam ; because it would be unreasonable to make God the author of death. Adam therefore corrupted himself in such a manner, that the contagion has been communicated from him to all his offspring." Sect. 6. . . . . "To remove all uncertainty and misunderstanding on this subject, let us define original sin. It is not my intention to discuss all the definitions given by writers ; I shall only produce one which I think perfectly consistent with the truth. Original sin, therefore, appears to be a hereditary pravity and corruption of our nature, diffused through all the parts of the soul : *rendering us obnoxious to the Divine wrath, and producing in us those works which the Scripture calls 'works of the flesh.'*" Sect. 8.

Here, likewise, the order of Dr. Hodge is reversed ; and instead of it we have, 1. depravity, 2. guilt, 3. death. In other words, no such distinction as that which is made by both Placæus and Dr. Hodge is attempted ; and no attempt is made to explicate the doctrine of original sin from the stand-point of immediate imputation ; but, while a clear and wide distinction is observed between imputed sin and inherent corruption, the fact that we have both, and that naturally, is in the fullest manner recognized.

The importance which Dr. Hodge, and those who sympathize with him in his views, attach to the *order* of these topics which he has adopted, and about which the Reformed Church (except the Supralapsarians) was so utterly indifferent, may be learned from one of his latest discussions of the subject ; \* from which we offer the following citation :

"We cannot help agreeing with Dr. Thornwell in saying that this (*i. e.* Dr. Baird's mediate imputation theory,) is substituting absurdity for obscurity. Still there is no sin in absurdity. But the case is very different when we are told we must believe this doctrine, because otherwise God would be unjust ; or, when it is asserted in support of this theory, that the judgments of God must be founded on the personal merits or demerits of those whom they affect ; that it is a denial of his moral nature, and even atheistic, to say that he can pronounce the just unjust, or the unjust just ; *that the only legitimate ground of judgment are character and works* ; † and when still further it is asserted, that

\* See Princeton Review for 1860. pp. 763, 764 ; and also the views of Dr. Thornwell, in the Southern Presbyterian Review for 1860. pp. 198-202.

† See on this point an extract from Dr. Witherspoon's works, on our concluding page.

community in a propagated nature involves all those to whom that nature belongs in the criminality and pollution of their progenitor. *Then we say the whole gospel is destroyed, and every scriptural ground of salvation of sinners is renounced.*"

Then, after expatiating largely on these points, he adds :

"We hold, in common with our own standards and the faith of the Reformation, that Adam's sin as the sin of our head and representative, was the ground of the condemnation of his race, *and inherent personal corruption its penal consequence.*"

In like manner Dr. Thornwell, (as referred to above, p. 202,) says :

"We insisted then, and insist now, that the immediate formal ground of guilt is the covenant headship of Adam; *that our depravity of nature is the penal consequence of our guilt in him*, and that we are made parties to the covenant by the circumstance of birth, or the natural relation to Adam."

And he adds that after a thorough examination he is convinced that, on this subject, the doctrine of Calvin is the same as his own: though Calvin uses no such language, but, on the contrary, expressly avers that—

"We are not condemned by imputation alone [non per solam imputationem damnatur,] as though the punishment of the sin of another were exacted of us; [that is, as the sole ground of the condemnation;] *but we therefore endure its punishment because we also are guilty so far as this, that our nature having become vitiated in him is regarded as guilty of the iniquity before God;*" sed ideo pœnam ejus sustinemus, quia et culpæ sumus rei, quatenus scilicet natura nostra in ipso vitiatâ, iniquitatis reatu obstringitur apud Deum. Rom. v: 17.

To represent these views as the same, is, as it seems to us, to trifle with the meaning of language.

We have remarked that Dr. Hodge and those who now, along with him, make the distinction aforesaid, and insist that the doctrine of original sin should be explicated from the stand-point of immediate or antecedent imputation, making "natural corruption" *the penalty or penal consequences* \* of Adam's sin, are

\* Dr. Hodge in referring to this matter says distinctly, "We think the posi-

greatly inconsistent in their statements of the doctrine. For while they make native moral corruption the penalty of imputed sin, they insist that no one is ever condemned to hell for imputed sin alone; but that moral corruption is necessary in order to secure such condemnation; *which, in other words, means that no one is condemned to hell unless the penalty of imputed sin is first inflicted on him* — which to us seems to be a mere evasion of the point or issue raised; since, if moral corruption is the punishment of imputed sin, and the subject of moral corruption is condemned to hell for the punishment of imputed sin, it is plainly an evasion and absurd to say that he is not thus condemned for imputed sin. But passing this and other points in which the inconsistency of their statements is apparent; and in view of the high importance which, it appears from the foregoing extracts, they attach to their doctrine of immediate imputation; we purpose to enter into an investigation of the theory itself, and to subject it to a thorough criticism; after which we shall take up and consider the doctrine which they have assailed. And at the outset we affirm that this principle of immediate imputation is but a relic of *the old Supralapsarian scheme, which never received the sanction of the Reformed or Calvinistic Church*. We know not whether the statement will be controverted; but if it should be, any number of facts shall be given in its illustration and confirmation, in addition to the few which we here present, and which we claim do evince the inseparable connection of the two.

The origin and development of the Supralapsarian scheme we shall have occasion to consider hereafter; but its prominent principles were fully developed during the time of the second and third generation of the Reformed divines, in their discussion of predestination and reprobation. And here it was that the principles involved in the doctrine of immediate or antecedent imputation were evolved, and brought to apply in the treatment of the doctrine of original sin. The reader will judge of the identity of the two, first from such facts as the following: The celebrated Molinæus in his *Anatome Arminianismi*, cap. 13, thus announces

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*tion of Storr is perfectly correct, that the consequences of punishment are themselves punishment, in so far as they were taken into view by the judge in passing sentence, and came within the scope of his design.*" See Princeton Essays, vol. I., p. 158.

the real faith of the Reformed Church on the general subject; and the reader can see the bearing of the remark not only upon the point to which Molinæus directs it, but likewise on the point now before us :

“Deus non potuit integra justitia sua pœnis (*sc.* damnationis) afficere homines quos considerasset sine peccato. Deus enim non punit insontes. [That is, he could not *thus* punish the innocent.] *Estque damnatio actus divinæ justitiæ, quæ sibi constare non posset, si homo innocens et nullum ob culpam destinaretur ad desertionem, ex qua æterna perditio necessario consequeretur.*”

Thus far, Dr. Hodge may say, the statement is consistent with his own views; but how with the following?

“Quod si Deus insontem creaturam destinavit ad perditionem, *necesse est eandem destinaverit ad peccatum, sine quo non potest esse justa perditio, et sic Deus erit causa impulsiva peccati. Nec homo poterit juste puniri ob peccatum, ad quod est aut præcise destinatus, aut Dei voluntate compulsus.*”

In the following passage, the bearing of the remarks upon the general subject will be seen by substituting *imputation* for *reprobation*:

“Hac reprobatione creatura innocens non modo fit miserrima, sed etiam pessima. Nam quod Deus odit, necesse est Deum oderit aut odio habiturus sit. Negationem enim Spiritus Dei sequitur necessario aversio voluntatis creaturæ. Cumque juxta hoc dogma Deus prius oderit hominem à se factam, quam homo Deum oderit, fieri non potest, *quia Dei odium quo hominem odit, per idem dogma fiat causa odii quo homo Deum odit, et sic Deus peccati auctor.*”

And he adds —

“They cannot avoid this conclusion who should say that by reprobation men are not destined to damnation, but are only passed by or not elected: (as the Supralapsarians pleaded:) for this is only expressing the same thing in milder terms. *For it amounts to the same whether God should destine man to damnation, or should do that from which damnation necessarily follows.* \*

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\* Molinæus was born 1568, and died 1658. It is of him the Synod of Dort says that *pre accuratissimo judicio suo et consensu in doctrina gratias egerit. He expressly affirms nec reprobari adeo quemquam nisi ob peccatum.*

Here, then, is the great point which has ever been in litigation between the Supra and Infralapsarians. Its identity with the principle which underlies the doctrine of immediate imputation will hardly be questioned; and the arguments by which the Supralapsarians endeavor to sustain it, are precisely those employed to sustain the latter doctrine by Drs. Hodge, Thornwell, &c., as will be shown more fully hereafter.

Another illustration in point is the following: When Episcopius (as related by Hales,) had been declaiming in the Synod of Dort against the doctrine of Reprobation, that it made God the author of sin, Dr. Gomar (perhaps the most thoroughly consistent Supralapsarian that ever lived,) feeling himself aimed at by the remarks, said that —

Episcopius had slandered the doctrine of reprobation, by representing it as merely designed to exhibit the severity and power of God; since no man believed that God absolutely decreed to reprobate man without respect to sin. For as God decreed the end, so also did he decree the means to the end; as he predestinated men to death, so he predestinated them to sin as the only way to death."

Hales remarks that Gomar seemed greatly pleased with the idea that he had thus removed all ground of exception against the doctrine; but that for himself he thought he "was merely playing the part of a tinker, who in attempting to mend a kettle, makes it worse than it was before." And it was for merely denying this same principle in his tractate on "*the Prescience of God*" that Dr. John Howe was denounced by the Supralapsarians of his day as an Arminian. In fact, it has long been the fashion of the Supralapsarians to denounce the Infralapsarians as Arminians; as it is now the fashion of the immediate imputationists to represent those who reject their theory, as rejecting the true doctrine of imputation. But to conclude: Capellus frankly owns that the two parties, that is, the Supra and Infralapsarians, could not agree in defining the *object* of predestination and reprobation; for, while Molinæus and his friends maintain that they make God the author of sin who take the ground that the object was man in his *unfallen* state, Beza, and Zanchius, and Gomar, and others, affirm that they make God unwise *qui absolute electionis objectum*



*faciunt hominem lapsum*; which is, substantially, the very argument cited from Dr. Hodge above, in favor of the theory of immediate imputation.

If God can, as this theory claims, first impute moral corruption to an otherwise innocent creature — that is, if he can find such a creature guilty of moral corruption as the penalty of merely imputed sin — what is to hinder his punishing that creature with eternal death as the penalty of that moral corruption? Dr. Hodge has never answered this question, and we opine that he never will. On the view which he opposes, the difficulty has no existence; but on his own view it is insuperable. And here, too, we find the perfect identity between the schemes of immediate imputation and supralapsarianism. And hence the Supralapsarians have ever boldly advocated the doctrine of infant damnation, which as logically follows from the one scheme as from the other. Perkins, for instance, who had fallen somewhat into supralapsarianism, says, “There are many infants of pious parents, who, dying before they have the use of reason but are yet affected by the stain of original sin, will be damned.” *Arml.*, cap. 52. The same is repeated by Gomar, Polanus, Scharp, and other supralapsarians; and hence, ignorance or malignity, or both, have charged the doctrine upon Calvinism itself. But Supralapsarianism and Calvinism have ever been distinct systems, (as we shall show hereafter,) though *many Calvinists* adopted the supralapsarian scheme, even down to the time of the Synod of Dort and later, whose emphatic decisions on the subject, however, gave an effectual quietus to the system. And it certainly is high time for Calvinistic theology to disburden itself of the whole scheme; and to cease to recognize either the earlier or later advocates of Supralapsarianism as true representatives either of its spirit or of its teachings, so far as its distinctive principles are concerned.

Moral corruption of course deserves endless condemnation, and justly deserves it; and any thing that does not justly deserve it cannot be named moral corruption. If, therefore, moral corruption be the penalty of antecedently imputed sin, then all to whom such sin is imputed justly deserve eternal death. And it is well worthy of note that the method adopted by Dr. Hodge

for reconciling the immediate imputation scheme with the righteous administration of God, is precisely the method by which the Supralapsarians endeavor to reconcile therewith the doctrine of reprobation as held by themselves. As the result or consequence of imputation, says Dr. Hodge, we have, 1. desertion, 2. moral corruption, or sin, 3. the penalty of sin, or eternal death. As the result or consequence of reprobation, says Dr. Gomar, we have, 1. desertion, 2. sin, 3. the punishment of sin. *Reprobationem tria consequuntur, privatio gratiæ, peccata, pœnæ peccatorum. Disput. de Prædest.* Festus Hommius, also, in his *Thesaurus Catecheticus*, thus repeats the same creabiltarian notion; and if in the first sentence *imputatio* were substituted for *reprobatio*, the sentence might be regarded as taken from Dr. Hodge's tractates on immediate imputation:

“Impellens sive movens causa reprobationis nulla etiam alia est quam solum beneplacitum Dei et propositum.” . . . . “Fructus rejectionis, aut ea quæ ex rejectione consequuntur, sunt *primo, creatio reprobatorum. Secundo, Desertio, sive subductio gratiæ Dei et mediorum. Tertio, Excœcatio et induratio. Quarto, Perseverantia in peccatis.*”

And such was the uniform representation whenever the *will*, instead of the *immutable justice*, of God was adopted as the standpoint from which to explicate the fundamental principles of theology. Some who adopted the theory, as Beza, and Gomar, and Twisse, carried it out fearlessly and consistently. Many, however, only adopted it in part, and we may find the same inconsistency in their writings, as Dr. Hodge abundantly exhibits on the subject before us. Beza, for instance, in his book against Castalio, meets his exception in the following intrepid style:

“Quod subjicis Deum non tantum ad damnationem, sed etiam ad causas damnationis prædestinasse quoscunque libuit, *verum esse agnoscimus.*”

See also his annotations on Rom. ix : 21. But in a passage cited by De Moor, III., 266, and Turretin, I., 567, he states the doctrine of imputation in the usual language of the Reformed. Dr. Hodge quotes a single line of it (P. Essays, I., 183,) and misrepresents the whole by making it say that *corruption* is the *pun-*

ishment of Adam's sin; though Beza refers it directly to the fact that "*omnes peccavimus in Protoplasto.*" His words are as follows:

"Tria sunt, quæ hominem constituunt reum coram Deo; 1. Culpa promanans ex eo, quod omnes peccavimus in protoplasto, Rom. v : 12. 2. *Corruptio, quæ est pœna istius culpæ*, imposita tam Adamo quam posteris, Heb. ix : 27. 3. Peccata, quæ perpetrant homines adulti, *suntque fructus*" etc.

In respect to Turretin, however, it is in point here to remark, (and the remark is partly applicable to Pareus, and several other eminent and learned theologians,)\* that — though he professes to reject, and technically does reject, the principles of the supralapsarian system and to reason from infralapsarian ground — he is not unfrequently inconsistent with this his profession; and the reader can scarcely avoid the impression that the rejection is merely technical. The Synod of Dort (though some of its most learned members were Supralapsarians,) dealt without remorse and without compromise the death-blow to that system; † but yet Gomar and Twisse † and others regarded not this rejection as a refutation; and it was long ere the Reformed theology was entirely delivered from its entanglements, and the Justice of God, instead of his Will recognized as the true foundation of moral obligation. Beza, (†1605,) Ursinus, (†1583,) Zanchius, and Piscator, (†1625,) taught that "*peccandi necessitatem à prima causa pendere;*" and sought to justify the sentiment by a reference to the will of God. And when Arminius (†1609,) in his dispute with Gomar asserted the principle which was afterwards so fully recognized as true by the Synod of Dort, (to-wit,

\* Pareus, (David) was born in 1548, and died in 1623. Turretin, (Francis) born 1623, died 1687.

† To say nothing of its decision in the matter between Lubbertus and Maccovius, (to which we shall refer hereafter,) in which the same statements are reiterated; its decision in relation to the principle litigated between the Supra and Infralapsarian schools condemns, without stint, those who affirm that God *nudo puroque voluntatis arbitrio, absque omni ullius peccati respectu vel intuitu, maximam mundi partem ad æternam damnationem creasse et prædestinasse;*" and further that "*Ecclesias Reformatas hæc non solum non agnoscere, sed etiam toto pectore detestari.*" It is not surprising that the theological reputation of Gomar and of Maccovius could not survive this. They soon thereafter sank out of view, though Gomar lived till 1641, and Maccovius till 1644.

‡ Gomar was born in 1568, and Twisse in 1604.

that it was an error to suppose that the Divine Will may impinge upon the Divine Justice,) many regarded the sentiment as erroneous because Arminius had asserted it: though Calvin († 1564,) and multitudes of others of the Reformed had most fully and explicitly asserted it before. It is just here that Turretin appears to vacillate, sometimes assuming the one principle and sometimes the other; and hence on this one subject his work should not be, and cannot properly be, regarded as representing the theology of the Reformed Church. We cannot go into this matter fully here, but it must necessarily come up in the course of our argument in the way of illustration. But it is highly important, in order that the subject under discussion may be brought fully to view in all its bearings, to go into a thorough discussion of the leading principles of the supralapsarian scheme, which we shall attempt to do in another essay; after which we shall be prepared to consider the question as to the doctrine of imputation as entertained and taught by the Reformed Church. For to us the question as presented by Dr. Hodge — whether imputation be antecedent and immediate, and is itself through a penal infliction the procuring cause of the native moral corruption of the race — appears to be only the question, in another form, whether the system of Supralapsarianism is to be regarded as the true exponent of the Reformed or Calvinistic theology.

The Supralapsarians or Crebilitarians taught that God in the decree of reprobation contemplated man as yet unfallen; and that without any regard to his fall, or to his native corruption or actual transgression, he adjudged the reprobate to ignominy and eternal death. They perpetually deceived themselves with the sophism that if sin was the procuring cause of reprobation, then good works were the procuring cause of election.\* And in attempting to carry out their views they make a distinction between the decree of reprobation and the decree of condemnation; and assert that sin is the procuring cause of the latter but not of the former; since the *vera atque unica causa impellens propter quam*

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\* Thus, for example; "Si peccata essent causa efficiens reprobationis, tum bona opera essent causa efficiens electionis. At hoc non est: ergo nec illud." And they attribute the argument to Augustine. See Polanus' Syntagma Theol. lib. iv, cap. 10, p. 800.

*decretum reprobationis factum est æternum beneplacitum seu voluntas Dei libera*: precisely the reasoning of Dr. Thornwell in defence of the doctrine of immediate imputation, and which leads him to the conclusion that "if it were wrong to create man under guilt, it is wrong to permit him to be generated under guilt." \* and thus, along with the whole supralapsarian school who have always employed this language, affirms on this grand subject what he has no means either of knowing to be true or of making his assertion good. The distinction thus attempted to be made between the cause of reprobation and the cause of condemnation, though backed by the reiterated assertion that "eternal reprobation is not the cause of sin, for if so then God would be the cause of sin," (*tum et Deus erit causa peccati. Quod enim est causa causæ, est etiam causa causati,*) had no weight with the Infralapsarians, as may be seen by the extract above given from Molinæus. They denied the distinction, and the whole theory connected with it; and denied that it was any part of the Calvinistic system, so called. And as early as July 17, 1627, Antonius Walæus (professor in Leyden,) uttered the following decisive language on the subject, in a discussion of Arminianism: "They [the Reformed Churches,] agree also in this, that election is the work of divine grace: but that reprobation is the work of divine justice and power." † This is truly a remarkable declaration, all things considered, as evincing how the Supralapsarian element had dwindled into utter insignificance within nine years after the session of the Synod of Dort. And, to adduce a single illustration more, we find Jurieu, (in 1688,) in a work designed to present the leading points of agreement in the Reformed Church ‡ (and which so bitterly provoked the wrath of Bossuet, ||) expressing the same sentiment as follows:

"Neminem ergo Deus destinavit ad mortem æternam nisi prævisa vel ipsius impenitentia et incredulitate, vel in jus et leges nature

\* Southern Presbyterian Review for April, 1860. p. 181.

† "In eo quoque consensus est, electionem esse opus divinæ gratiæ: reprobationem vero esse opus justitiæ ac potestatis divinæ. *Disput. Theol., Thes. 5.* See also Theses 11 and 13, in which the same is repeated.

‡ *De Pace inter Protestantas ineunda consultatio.* p. 278. *Utrajecti, 1688.*

|| See his "Variations," B. 14, vol. II. pp. 336-347.

rebellione protervâ pervicaci et perpetuâ. *Neque etiam decrevit gloriam suam et gratiam denegare nisi indignis et justâ de causâ reprobandis. . . . . decreta inquam respectu boni verè operativa, respectu mali tantum permissiva.*"

Thus the whole principle which underlies the speculations on which the doctrine of immediate imputation is now sought to be justified, was utterly repudiated by the Reformed Church as a body; and found no advocacy except among the Supralapsarians. And the distinction made by Placæus (though we do not employ it in the explication of the doctrine of original sin,) merely placed the question where it should have been placed, so far as concerned the doctrine entertained on the subject by that class of divines. For if imputation be antecedent and immediate in the sense contended for by Gomar, a predecessor of Placæus in the chair of theology at Saumur, then it is obvious that sentence comes upon man not for sin, nor corruption, nor personal guilt; but that these, as Dr. Hodge avers, are the penal infliction which comes immediately and antecedently, and of the mere good pleasure of God, as the Supralapsarians so fully maintain. The question, therefore, is one relating not to a point of theology, but to a system. And we do most emphatically deny the identity of Calvinism with Supralapsarianism. It has never been anything but a mere theory — a philosophical theory, sought to be engrafted on that system; but repudiated by its best expounders ever since the true character of that theory has been developed and understood.

As to Placæus, it is of no importance to the question how he explained the distinction which he had made; or what were his views of imputation itself. At any rate, those who reject the doctrine of immediate imputation, are not required either to adopt or to defend his views. And we do neither, for we care nothing about them. Yet the objection of De Moor (in Marck,) so often repeated and insisted on by Dr. Hodge — that *imputation which is not antecedent and immediate is no imputation at all*, and that therefore, if God antecedently regards the posterity of Adam as guilty, he does not impute guilt to them — is a pure sophism; though Turretin himself, in utter inconsistency with his own repeated asseverations on the subject, has not scrupled to advance

it; and every creabibitarian imputationist since the days of De Moor has done the same. But in view of it we ask, what is the usual and literal import of **אָשָׁם** in the Old Testament, and of *λογίζομαι* and *ἐλλογέω* in the New? We have already defined their import, and have adduced the learned testimony of both Turretin and Gomar on the subject. The term, in general, as there shown, signifies *to reckon, ascribe or attribute to, charge upon, &c.*, without any reference to the question whether what is so charged, or reckoned, or ascribed, was or was not done *in propria persona* by him who is thus charged. If it be a crime, he may have been guilty thereof, or he may have been innocent, but this affects not the question. It may be imputed to him in either case; and in either case the word *impute* is properly and classically employed. This was acknowledged by Gomar and Turretin, and known to De Moor and to the Princeton Review. Then what is meant by the assertion *that if guilt be presupposed there is no imputation?* That the usual, and by far the most frequent, use of the term in the Scriptures is *to ascribe to a man that which is really and properly his*, will not be questioned; at least, we affirm, without fear of contradiction, that no candid and competent mind will ever think of calling it in question. What then is meant by this reiteration of the assertion of De Moor and Turretin? Is it that in the case supposed by them there can be no imputation, in the sense in which the Scriptures employ the word *impute*? This cannot be the meaning, for the simple reason that they knew this assertion to be utterly unfounded in fact. The expression, therefore, can only mean, that in the case of presupposed guilt and moral corruption, there can be *no antecedent or immediate imputation*; which would be to say in other words, and on the authority of De Moor and Turretin, and those who repeat after them, that Placæus' doctrine of imputation is really not the same as the doctrine which he rejected. But while we are duly grateful for this piece of singular information, it would be really gratifying to our curiosity to be informed of the reason why such an announcement was deemed important and needful. Placæus never claimed nor supposed that his view was the same with the view which he rejected; nor did the Synod which condemned his doctrine; nor did Rivetus; nor any one that we have heard of

since. And why, then, are we to be so dogmatically assured that mediate and immediate imputation are really not the same? And what is meant, moreover, by the ever repeated assertion that those who deny that imputation is antecedent and immediate, deny both the Calvinistic and the Bible doctrine of imputation? Are such charges to be tolerated in our day, and in view of all the facts referred to above; and of the multitude of others no less explicit to which reference will be made in the course of this discussion? Is the Supralapsarian scheme, with its philosophy, destructive as it is to the foundation of both religion and morality, to be revived and palmed off upon the Church of God as the exponent of true Calvinistic theology? and all our brethren to be hereticated who will not consent to adopt it? Such an idea was never claimed on its behalf even in its palmiest days. And now when it has been condemned by the Synod of Dort: and rejected by the Westminster Assembly; and by all the leading divines since, except Crisp and Gill and a few others; are we to be told that its fundamental principles are identical with those of the Reformed Church? and that all who receive them not are no true Calvinists? Time will determine whether this is to be so. \*

The manner in which the Princeton Review was led into this great error, is perfectly apparent to us, and may be made the subject of explication hereafter. But we repeat it, the Reformed

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\* In illustration of the really indefinite or unsettled views of Dr. Hodge, on the very point respecting which he is so dogmatic, we may refer to the fact that although he, as above stated, so emphatically reiterates the asseveration of De Moor and Turretin, *that imputation which is not antecedent and immediate is no imputation at all*; we yet find him in vol. I., p. 139, of "Princeton Essays," employing on the same subject the following language: "*Any man who holds that there is such an ascription of the sin of Adam to his posterity, as to be the ground of their bearing the punishment of that sin, holds the doctrine of imputation; whether he undertakes to justify this imputation merely on the ground that we are the children of Adam, or on the principle of representation, or of scientia media; or whether he chooses to philosophise on the nature of unity until he confounds all notions of personal identity as President Edwards appears to have done.*" And then, as if to make the matter still worse, he asserts in another place that "the doctrine of Edwards is *precisely* that which was so formally rejected when presented by Placcus." p. 150. If *precisely the same*, how comes it that Edwards "holds" the doctrine of imputation, while Placcus rejects it?



Church never acknowledged the distinctive principles upon which this doctrine is based; and Dr. Hodge never would have thought to the contrary, had he not been led to regard as representative men, several divines who never have been by the Church itself regarded as representative. But in our next essay we shall consider this subject fully, at least sufficiently so to make apparent its bearing on the whole question of imputation. And we shall now conclude with an additional remark or two on the theory advocated by Dr. Hodge.

If a creature free from sin and guilt becomes a subject of moral corruption by imputation, then, (and the assertion will not admit of doubt,) he makes him a sinner who is the author of the imputation; for, as already remarked, and the principle is admitted universally, *quid est causa causæ, est etiam causa causati*. If, for example, it could be supposed that Adam in his state of primitive rectitude, had become a sinner by antecedent imputation, and had in consequence been punished by an infliction of moral corruption; or that God should thus immediately impute sin to the holy angels who have never sinned; then he who would impute sin and punish it by an infliction of moral corruption in these cases, would, of course, make or constitute the creatures referred to sinners. The authorship of the sin in such a case would be his alone, and could in no sense of the term which is regarded as just and proper, be said to be theirs. The guilt and moral corruption itself may perhaps be said to be theirs putatively; but this would be a mere legal fiction, (for it came upon them antecedently or immediately;) but he made it theirs who imputed it to them. *In such a case*, God would be, beyond all question, the author of moral corruption. Now the old creabiltarian hypothesis, which was so decidedly asserted by Gomar, and so expressly rejected by the Synod of Dort, claims that as a means to secure the damnation of the reprobate, all men are born in inherent sin or moral corruption as a *punishment for imputed sin*; and that imputed sin thus becomes, and penally, the *causa causans* of inherent (sometimes vaguely called by them *original*) sin; and of all subsequent actual transgressions. Thus guilt is first charged irrespective of the moral status of those on whom it is charged; then follows moral corruption as the punish-

ment of this guilt; then follows, finally, exclusion from the holiness and happiness of heaven, as the punishment of this moral corruption. Or as Hommius and Gomar, as cited above, have, with all the old Supralapsarians, stated it: *First*, the decree of reprobation; then the creation of the reprobate; then their desertion and hardening; then their persistence in sin; and then, finally, their damnation: a regular chain of causation and consequences until the end is secured — Reprobation, creation, desertion, hardening, persistence in sin, damnation. Now set alongside of this the immediate imputation scheme as advocated by Dr. Hodge and others; and you have *first*, the guiltless creature; *then* the imputed guilt; *then* desertion; *then* moral corruption, and actual sin; *then* the punishment of that moral corruption and sin.

Surely it was to be rationally expected that sentiments such as these would be objected to by most men, (be their theological school what it may,) who had any adequate idea of the equity and righteousness of God as taught in the Scriptures. And for Dr. Baird's reviewers to resort to the *argumentum ad invidiam*, and to charge that he assails the notion with argument employed by Socinians and Arminians, is a course of procedure not likely to be referred to as evincing a very high degree of either candor or magnanimity. For the question is as to the conclusiveness or inconclusiveness of the arguments; and not as to who has employed them. The day when such argumentation would be regarded as forcible, is so far past, that any attempt to enkindle the *odium theologicum* on such grounds cannot fail to awaken the conviction in all intelligent readers, that resort would not be had to any such procedure except in the case of a conscious deficiency of strength and resources. If Dr. Baird assails a manifest absurdity as every other man assails it, are all the sins and errors of those who have employed or who do employ the arguments he uses, to be imputed to him; and he be thus constituted guilty of errors with which he has no more sympathy than his reviewers have; and then be punished for being guilty? We protest against any such attempt at a practical application of the doctrine of immediate imputation.

And then further: That the aforesaid inherent moral corruption in creatures no otherwise corrupt than by imputation, should be,

as Turretin avers, the penalty of imputed guilt or criminality, and yet be at the same time a just ground of their punishment, is certainly an idea which is at war alike with the dictates of Scripture and of right reason. How can moral corruption be both the punishment of imputed sin and at the same time the effect of that sin, in a creature otherwise innocent? Or how can a creature not otherwise guilty, deserve punishment simply for being punished? If inherent or moral corruption, therefore, be the punishment of imputed sin, then God has inflicted that punishment as the punishment of imputed sin: and it is, of course, a just and righteous punishment. And this being so, how, or on what grounds are we to suppose that he will likewise punish those whom he has already thus punished, simply because he has thus punished them? that is, that he should consign them to hell on account of that very punishment which he had already inflicted? If such a procedure can be established from the Word of God, or can be justified on any principles of Scripture or of reason, we should like to know what those principles are. It may be consistent with the Supralapsarian theory, but it is in utter antagonism to Calvinism. Punishment being in a certain sense compensatory though retributory, it is obvious that if sin, or moral corruption, may be the punishment of imputed sin, the compensation of sin may itself deserve a new compensation; and so on *in infinitum*.

It is no answer to this to reply that imputed guilt leaves the soul in that state, that it shall by its own act acquire personal guilt. For the guiltiness supposed in immediate imputation, is a guiltiness that without the grace of God must consign the soul to everlasting death, without any possible remedy. So that the mere punishment of sin according to this idea, may be of itself the ground for a further, and even an everlasting punishment. We only ask here, whether it can be possible in any intelligent sense to attribute such an arrangement to a just and holy God?

We are aware that efforts have been made in this connection to blunt the point of such enquiries, and we shall advert to them presently. And we ask the reader to observe that the question is not, whether the infliction of punishment *for sin* may lead to the perpetration of other sins; for no one will either doubt or

deny this. But the point is, whether the mere fact of punishment having been inflicted upon one who was only guilty by imputation can, by virtue of that punishment alone, furnish ground for regarding him as an object deserving of further punishment? Does the punishment of *itself* of his imputed guilt, impart to him of itself, a desert of eternal punishment? If it does, then our exceptions lie against the doctrine that it is subversive of both Scripture and reason; and if it does not, then the doctrine itself which asserts it is blasphemous and false.

There are admitted instances in which *sinner*s have been judicially punished in a way which has tended dreadfully to enhance their guilt. See 2 Thess. ii : 11; and likewise the instances alleged in De Moor, III., 332, 333; and in Turretin, I., 589-593., They present and ably discuss the question, *an peccatum possit esse pœna peccati?* but any attempt to apply their instances and their reasonings to the support of the doctrine before us would be sheer absurdity. None of them are applicable to the matter in hand, though often alleged to meet the case; for they all suppose the individuals referred to to be already morally corrupt *in propria persona*; and already under the just judgment of God on account of their guilt. But the case before us is not of this character. It supposes that the creature is first made guilty by imputation, and punished for this his guilt; and that then this punishment itself logically furnishes just ground for his further punishment, even for his endless condemnation in hell. And the question is whether Scripture or reason furnishes any ground to justify the assertion of such a principle? We emphatically deny that they do. And yet this principle underlies the whole scheme of immediate imputation, which, without it, must fall to the ground. It is substantially, as already remarked, the principle which underlies the whole creabibitarian hypothesis—that God created the reprobate to be damned, and predestinated the requisite means to secure their damnation.

Nothing is more common with all Calvinists, in defending the doctrine of imputation as taught in the Bible, and in the standards of the Reformed Church, than to claim that the principle involved is susceptible of illustration from the course of nature and providence; and that the proceeding itself is analogous to the pro-

ceedings of God in his government of the world. And this surely is so. The analogous illustrations, found both in Scripture and in the operations of God amongst men, are almost innumerable. But we ask, can a single instance be found in either, illustrating analogically the doctrine of immediate imputation?—the doctrine that God first imputes guilt to the innocent; then punishes it by imparting moral corruption; which moral corruption is afterwards punished with eternal death. For if moral corruption is the penalty of imputed guilt, then such is indeed the fact. And if it is, then we affirm that the procedure is without a solitary analogy in either the word or the works of God. If, on the contrary, it is not the penalty of imputed guilt, then the doctrine of immediate imputation is false.

The attempts to perplex this question by involving it with the work of our blessed Redeemer—which appear in the two reviews of Dr. Baird above referred to—do not really ascend to the dignity of argument. They are the merest sophisms. Christ voluntarily undertook the office of our legal substitute; and our sins in all their guilt and enormity were imputed to him. But is this analogous to an imputation of guilt which is not voluntarily accepted? Then, moreover, the punishment of the guilt imputed to the posterity of Adam, is, by the immediate imputationists, asserted to be moral corruption. Did then the imputation of our guilt to Christ bring with it moral corruption? Where then is the analogy? Then further: the punishment of imputed guilt in the scheme of immediate imputation, is the infliction, in some way or other, of moral corruption; but Christ fully bore the penalty of our imputed guilt; and was that penalty moral corruption, in any sense of the term? Then still further: the punishment, that is, the penal infliction upon us of moral corruption for imputed guilt, on the immediate imputation scheme, of itself involves the desert of eternal punishment, as above shown; that is, we, by being punished for imputed guilt, thereby acquire the desert of eternal punishment. But did the fact that Christ was punished for our guilt imputed to him, render him in like manner, still further guilty? and deserving of still further punishment? If not, why pretend, as these reviewers do, that there is any such parallel as they assert, between the divine proceed-

ings therein? There is no such parallel; and the attempt to reason from one to the other as they do, is therefore an absurdity.

The attempt to defend the doctrine of immediate imputation, by pleading, as its advocates do, that "our natural corruption does not precede but follows the imputation of the Adamic sin," \* is saying nothing to the purpose. No one known to us supposes that our natural corruption occurred, or had an existence before Adam fell; and no Calvinist denies that Adam was the federal head and representative of his posterity, or that his sin was imputed to his posterity. There is no controversy between the school of immediate imputationists and their antagonists on any of these points. The question is whether the posterity of Adam were accounted corrupt because they are corrupt; or whether they were made corrupt because they were accounted guilty by imputation, and as the penalty of this imputed guilt? Is moral corruption, however derived, the ground on which guilt is imputed to us; or is it the penalty of imputed guilt? This is the point. And it would furnish no proof in favor of immediate imputation to repeat, even a thousand times, that "our natural corruption does not precede but follows the imputation of Adam's sin." It may follow it, without being any thing more than the natural result of it, (as some have charged Placæus with maintaining,) under the righteous government of God. And at all events, its following the Adamic sin does not prove that it is a *penal infliction* on account of an antecedent imputation of that sin. And yet this is the point to be proved; and which must be proved before the doctrine of immediate imputation can be sustained.

But we have already extended this essay beyond our prescribed limits; and will conclude with the following citations from Dr. John Witherspoon, the true forerunner and father of Princeton Theology. The bearing of the quotations upon the issues raised in the course of this essay, will be sufficiently apparent without specification.

In the Fourth Volume of his works, pp. 81, 82, this great

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\* *Corruptio nostra naturalis non præcedet sed sequetur imputationem peccati Adamici.* See De Moor, *Comment. Perpetuus*, vol. III., p. 272.

divine, after speaking of the *order of the divine decrees*, remarks as follows :

“ There is certainly a difference between the ordination of things natural, and those which are sinful or holy. The very sinful disposition, considered as becoming a part of the general plan, is certainly as holy an ordination as any other, yet the Scripture teaches us to consider this as a thing quite different from God’s determining to send his Son into the world to save sinners. *It seems to be a matter insisted on in the strongest manner in Scripture, that THE EVIL OR GUILT OF EVERY CREATURE IS TO BE ASCRIBED TO THE CREATURE, AS TO ITS PROPER AND ADEQUATE CAUSE* ; at the same time it seems fully as plain that whatever connection there may be between one evil and another, the choice of the vessels of mercy is free and unconditional, and that the rejection of others is imputed to the sovereignty of God. Luke x : 21, John xii : 39. That the choice of the vessels of mercy is free and sovereign, appears from the words of Scripture ; from their universal state — dead in trespasses and sin ; from their visible character, and from the means of their recovery — I mean the omnipotence of divine grace.”

Then on page 96, after referring to Rom. v : 12–19 (in speaking of the effects and penalty of Adam’s sin upon his posterity,) he adds :

“ And indeed when we consider the universality of the effects of the fall, *it is not to be accounted for any other way, than from Adam’s being the federal head of the human race, and they sinning in him and falling with him in his first transgression.*”

Thus he utterly condemns the attempt to explain the doctrine before us except on the old Calvinistic ground of our *double relation* to Adam.

The following is from pp. 97, 98, of the same volume :

“ As to the *nature of original sin* and the transmission of it, I think a few remarks may suffice. We certainly discover in mankind, not only a disposition without restraint to commit errors of a gross nature, but in general an attachment to, and love of the creature, more than the Creator. It may not be improper here to consider the question, whether the whole nature is corrupt, ” &c. . . . “ As to the transmission of original sin, the question is to be sure difficult, and we ought to

be reserved upon the subject. St. Augustine said it was of more consequence to know how we are delivered from sin by Christ, than how we derive it from Adam. Yet we shall say a few words on this topic. It seems to be agreed by the greatest part that the soul is not derived from our parents by natural generation, and yet it seems not reasonable to suppose that the soul is created impure. Therefore it should follow that *a general corruption is communicated by the body*, and that there is so close a union between the soul and body that the impressions conveyed to us through the bodily organs, do tend to attach the affections of the soul to things earthly and sensual. *If it should be said, that the soul, on this supposition, must be united to the body, as an act of punishment or severity; I would answer, that the soul is united to the body, in consequence of an act of government, by which the Creator decreed, that men should be propagated by way of natural generation.*"

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### ART. III. — *The Conducting of Public and Social Prayer.*

The ordinary worship of Almighty God, under the New Testament dispensation, consists of prayer, praise, the reading and exposition of Scripture, the administration of the Sacraments, and alms-giving. The most solemn and comforting of these ordinances, and indeed that on which, in a great measure, the solemnity, impressiveness and profit, of all the others depend, is prayer. For it is in its believing use, we make our nearest approach unto God, by that new and living way, which is Christ; and bring up in remembrance, as it were by a memorial offering, that blessed work which He did on earth, vicariously for us, and through the boundless merits of which we sue for forgiveness and hope to obtain justification. It is fraught with rich blessings; for when rightly employed, with enlarged desires and an elevated faith, it is the appointed means of our securing those priceless benefits which we crave in our poorness of spirit; and which our Heavenly Father engages to bestow on his humble and contrite children, in copious abundance, when they devoutly ask Him. As this is



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THE  
DANVILLE QUARTERLY  
REVIEW.

EDITED BY  
AN ASSOCIATION OF MINISTERS.

DECEMBER, 1861.

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Φωτισαντος δε ζωην και αβραρισαν δια του ευαγγελιου.—2 TIM. 1: 10

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DANVILLE, KY., AND CINCINNATI, OHIO:  
PUBLISHED BY  
RICHARD H. COLLINS, 25 WEST FOURTH STREET, CINCINNATI,  
AND SOLD BY  
CROSBY, NICHOLS & CO., BOSTON; ROBERT CARTER & BROTHERS, NEW  
YORK; WM. S. & ALFRED MARTIEN, PHILADELPHIA; ROBERT S.  
DAVIS, PITTSBURGH; JOHN D. THORPE, ROBERT CLARKE & CO.,  
GEO. S. BLANCHARD, AND RICKEY & CARROLL, CINCIN-  
NATI; A. DAVIDSON, LOUISVILLE; KEITH & WOODS,  
ST. LOUIS; WM. G. HOLMES, CHICAGO.

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Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1861, by  
RICHARD H. COLLINS,

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.

Postage, to all parts of the U. S., when paid Quarterly in advance, 3½ cents on each number, or 14 cents for a year

# DANVILLE QUARTERLY REVIEW.

No. IV.

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DECEMBER, 1861.

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ART. I. — *Imputation.* \*

PART II.

*Antecedent Imputation, and Supralapsarianism.*

We cannot more appropriately commence our second article than by repeating from the truly devout and learned Pareus, the following remark :

“ I confidently affirm that the larger portion of ancient heresies, as well as of the present dissensions in the Church, have arisen principally from this cause, that Councils, and Bishops, and Doctors of the Church have, without any discrimination, put forth as articles of the Catholic faith whatever dogmas of the Schools and Universities they pleased ; and imposed the belief of them upon the conscience as equally necessary to salvation ; while they too readily denounced as heretical or schismatical every departure from the customary interpretation of the Scriptures.” †

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\* Published with some reference to the tractates enumerated in the note at the beginning of our former article. See *Danville Review*, Sept., 1861, p. 390.

† The original is here appended, for the force of the passage can scarcely be preserved in translation : “ Ausim enim confirmare, majorem tam veterum hæresium, quam præsentium dissidiorum partem, in Ecclesia, hinc præcipuè natam fuisse et esse, quod Concilia, Episcopi, Doctores Ecclesiæ nullo discrimine quævis Scholarum dogmata et Cathedrarum placita pro articulis Fidei Catholicæ venditarunt, parique ad salutem necessitate credenda conscientiis imposuerunt, ex quavis verò Scripturarum interpretationis discrepantia nimis faciliè hæreses vel schismata fecerunt.” *Trenici*, cap. IV.

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Similar asseverations have been frequently made by men of loose theology, to prepare the way for their rejection of fundamental truth or for the advocacy of the worst heresies; but such proceedings are a misapplication of the facts referred to. Those facts are unquestionable. And no one who has any knowledge of the venerable, and illustrious, and eminently conservative divine of the Palatinate, could entertain the supposition that he would have thus adverted to them without reason.

We have already stated, that during the early period of the Reformation, and before all the leading principles of the speculative theology of the Church had been definitely traced, (if we may so speak,) to the *terminus à quo*, and the *terminus ad quem*, the influence of philosophy was allowed to operate even in selecting the stand-points from which to combat the deadly errors with which the Church found herself every where environed. And as regards the subject now under discussion, (and its manifold relations to divine truth,) some assumed that the infinite and uncontrolled will of God was the point from which the whole should be explicated; and others, that God's immutable justice was the only proper stand-point; while a third class could see no propriety in attempting to follow out any such distinction, or in regarding those points of explication as in any way antagonistic; and they attempt to reason alike from both. There is, indeed, a most important sense in which this position may be pronounced the true one; for the will of God can never be in conflict with His justice: and *vice versa*. The principle, however, is not true as it was then made to apply, as will be shown presently. \* But

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\* The ground of this procedure was an insufficient appreciation of the difference between the principles involved in the question, Whether the objects of the decree of reprobation were to be considered as already created, fallen, and corrupt, or as uncreated and unfallen. The idea, involved as it was in the interminable fogs of the misty metaphysics of scholasticism, does not appear at the outset to have presented itself very clearly to the minds of some of the Reformers; and they finally began to philosophise upon it after the manner of the Schoolmen. The subsequent discussion, however, made the difference, as well as the vital importance of the distinction, perfectly clear. Reprobation viewed from the Supralapsarian stand-point, involves the creation of the Reprobate — that they may be damned in order to show forth the power and severity of God. And as this their creation, and such a disposal of them, could not of course be referred to the justice or moral nature of God, it was referred to his will.

this last class of divines assumed it in relation to the then existing discussion; and hence, upon a more full development of the two systems which were thus elaborated, and on a more rigid analysis of them in after years, it became somewhat difficult to assign to such theologians a definite position in relation thereto. Of this class were Calvin, Ursinus, Pareus, Danæus and others. And to illustrate by a single instance the position which they in general seem to occupy, we may refer to the fact that the Remonstrants in their *Confessio*, (anno 1618,) cap. 5. sect. 7, (see margin,) charge supralapsarianism upon Calvin: Whereupon the four Leyden Professors in their *Censura*, containing a reply to the Confession, pronounce the charge a calumny. But Episcopius in his *Apologia pro Confessione*, pp. 62-68, (written after his return from banishment, and published in 1630,) reiterates the charge; and after quoting somewhat from Calvin, proceeds to prove that Beza was a supralapsarian, which nobody ever denied. Here the matter would probably have ended. But Dr. Twisse, (subsequently Prolocutor of the Westminster Assembly,) being a strong supralapsarian and having too high an opinion of Calvin to doubt that he too ought to be one, brought all the resources of his learning and singularly subtle intellect to sustain the position assumed by Episcopius. These, however, were the exceptions; for the concurrent and settled conviction of the intelligent in the theological world has long been, that the matured views of Calvin were like those of Augustine, infralapsarian. \* And

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But the Infralapsarian stand-point contemplates man as fallen, corrupt and condemned; from which corrupt mass God, of his mere good pleasure and will and without any foresight of faith and good works, selects the objects of his mercy, and leaves the rest to perish as the just desert of their sin. And so, too, with respect to the doctrine of imputation. The Supralapsarians claim that it is only *immediate*; and refer the imputation of both sin and righteousness to the mere will and good pleasure of God. While the Infralapsarians claim that it is *subjective*, also, in relation to guilt or sin, and regards man as already fallen and corrupt; and hence, that while the imputation of righteousness is gratuitous, and the work of divine mercy, the imputation of sin is the work of divine justice for subjective desert, — the sin of our first parents and our sin in them, or participation therein, being both justly imputed to us for condemnation. They accept the facts in the case on the testimony of God; and, in general, ignore all philosophical speculation in relation to them.

\* In fact, the manner in which he strikes the great key note of the system can leave no ground for serious doubt on the subject. In his *Opuscula*, p. 785;

then, on the other hand, and as regards the doctrine of Original Sin, some of the earlier Reformers went so far in protesting against the antecedent imputation notions of those Papal theologues who followed Ockham, and whose views by clear implication denied to God the possession of moral perfections, that they proceeded to the opposite extreme. \* Zuingle, for example, says that Original Sin "is no sin, but a misfortune, a vice, a distemper;" and he adds that nothing is more weak or farther from the sense of the Scriptures, than to say that Original Sin is not only a distemper, but also a crime." Such is his language in the Declaration on Original Sin sent to Francis I. And the same utterances are found in the correspondence between him and Œcolampadius, published at Basle in 1536 :

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he says, "Quæ de absoluta potestate nugantur Scholastici, non solum repudio sed etiam detestor : quia justitiam ejus ab imperio separant." So too Pareus, on Ps. cii : 27. "Æterna Dei veritas, quæ non magis est mutationi obnoxia, quàm ipsa Dei æterna essentia seu natura." One great reason of the confusion in respect to the real views of Calvin is the very common error of attributing to him the Tractate against Castalio, entitled *Responsio ad Calumnias Nebulonis*. Castalio, on the merest presumption, attributes it to Calvin : and the Socinians and Arminians have simply reiterated the charge ; until even some Calvinists have believed it. See Turretin, Loc. IX, Quæst. IX, Sect. 41. The tract, however, was written by Beza ; which being taken into consideration, the very foundation of the argument proving Calvin a Supralapsarian is swept away.

\* Ockham, ( or Ochamus, ) in perfect consistency with these views, says that Original Sin is, "*Reatus alieni peccati sine aliquo vitio hærente in nobis.*" To this he was led by his supralapsarian notion of the WILL of God ; and the words express precisely Dr. Hodge's doctrine of antecedent imputation on the same subject. Bellarmine, too, opposes the doctrine of Calvin and the Reformed Church in these words : "*Itaque peccatum in priore significatione unum est dumtaxat omnium hominum, sed in Adamo actuale et personale in nobis originale dicitur. Solus enim ipse actuali voluntate illud commisit : nobis vero communicatur per generationem eo modo, quo communicari potest id quod transit, nimirum per imputationem.*" De Amiss. Gra., lib. 5, cap. 17. Opp., Tom. III. p. 332 ; Leyden, 1698. These views the Reformed Church, as a body, except the Supralapsarians, rejected from the first. Though Dr. Hodge refers to this very passage of Bellarmine, and most strangely affirms that Turretin "quotes it as containing a full admission of the doctrine of imputation." ( Princeton Essays, I., p. 181. ) Dr. Hodge, if the passage expresses his own views, has of course the right to say so ; but he had no right to say what he here does respecting Turretin. The whole matter, however, must come up again for a full examination in our next Essay. The passage in Turretin to which Dr Hodge refers may be found in Loco XVI. Quæst. III. Sect. 15., Tom. II. pp. 572, 573.

“ Quid brevius aut clarius dici potuit, quam originale peccatum non esse peccatum, sed morbum.” “ Sic ergo dicimus, originale contagionem morbum esse, non peccatum ; quod peccatum cum culpa conjunctum est, culpa vero ex commisso vel admissio ejus nascitur, qui facinus designavit.” And still farther on he says, nostra sententia est, “ vitium esse ac morbum, qui ceu mulcta primis parentibus inflictus est.” pp. 54, 55, 61.

And thus, as is usual, one extreme begot another.

We should greatly err, however, if we supposed that those of either the Scholastic or Reformed divines who adopted the fundamental principles of the system now known as supralapsarianism, and which by the clearest implication divests the Supreme Being of all moral attributes, were actuated herein by any other aim than to exalt and magnify the Sovereignty of God, and to inculcate thereby the most devout and implicit obedience to his will : for such is undoubtedly the fact. Morality, said they, is not founded on immutable justice, but on the will. And it may be observed as remarkable that, while the excellent John Gerson ( or Jarson ) — who was of the sect of the Nominalists of which Ockham was founder, and who was the oracle of the Council of Constance, and the great antagonist of the spiritual monarchy of the Pope — reasoning from this principle, *was led to place religion in devout feeling* ; Protagoras and Hobbes — who both took the ground that right and wrong were unreal and imaginary, and had no basis in the nature of things — endeavored *to explode and deride everything of religion but the form*. But in illustration of the readiness of the antagonists of the supralapsarians in the Reformed Church to concede to them piety and purity of intention, we shall adduce here the words of the infralapsarian Jurieu, ( already referred to, ) which, taking all the facts into consideration, assumes the aspect of the ludicrous, at least, if not of something far worse. The passage is of use, also, as containing a delineation of the system itself.

In his *Apology for the Reformed*, after having convicted Maimbourg of misrepresenting Calvin, he proceeds as follows :

“ Besides, I say that his conclusion is wrong, and that there is nothing more absurd and less theological than the consequence which M. Maimbourg draws from the doctrine of those divines, viz.: *That it des-*

*troys altogether the idea we ought to have of God, and leads directly to Atheism. There was never any thing said more inconsiderately. Let us take things in the worst sense ; if that doctrine destroys the idea we ought to have of God, it is because it represents God to us as being cruel, unjust, and punishing innocent creatures with everlasting torments ; and this is precisely what M. Maimbourg means, when he says that it destroys the idea of God, because the idea of God implies the attributes of mildness, justice, and equity. But how can a doctrine which gives us the idea of a severe and tyrannical God, who uses his authority with the utmost rigor, lead men to Atheism ?” . . . “ It is a foolish thing to say that a hypothesis leads to Atheism, when it brings God into every thing, makes him the cause of all things, and the only aim of all his own actions, and raises him so much above his creatures as to be able to dispose of them in such a manner as seems to be unjust to carnal reason.\* That opinion of the supralapsarians is so far from leading to Atheism, that on the contrary it places the Deity in the highest degree of elevation and grandeur that can be conceived. For it does so much debase the creatures before the Creator, that the Creator, according to this system, is bound by no laws to his creatures, but may dispose of them as he thinks fit, and make them subservient to his glory in such a method as he judges proper, and they have no right to contradict him. I confess that this opinion is liable to a great many inconveniences, and is so harsh that it cannot be easily relished. And therefore St. Augustine’s hypothesis is without doubt to be preferred to it.” Part I., cap. 19. pp. 245, 246.*

This, then, is the system. God is bound by no principles of eternal and immutable justice in the disposition he makes of his creatures ; and may of his mere will or pleasure consign the innocent to everlasting torments. And it claims to thus place God in the highest degree of elevation that can be conceived. And yet even this ardent apologist finds it too harsh to be easily relished ; and claims that *though it place God in the highest conceivable degree of elevation and grandeur*, there is another hypothesis (and one, of course, which does not thus elevate him,) which is,

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\* Cudworth, however, does not hesitate to class with Atheists that whole school of divines who maintain “that God may command what is contrary to moral rules ; that he has no inclination to the good of his creatures ; that he may justly doom an innocent being to eternal torments ; and that whatever God does will, for that reason is just because He wills it.” *Eternal and Immut. Morality*, Sect. 11.

*without doubt*, to be preferred to it, and is more easily relished! Is this nonsense, or is it blasphemy?

Now as this system has become extensively incorporated with the Reformed theology; and as some of its fundamental principles are, by many of the foes as well as by some of the professed friends of Calvinism, still identified therewith; and as the doctrine of antecedent imputation rests on those principles, as is evident from the arguments by which its advocates endeavor to defend it; it will be timely to devote a few pages to as thorough an analysis of the subject as we can present in so brief a compass.

The doctrines of grace as advanced by Augustine, and controverted by Pelagius\* and his followers, gradually lost their hold upon the Church, amidst its increasing corruptions, until they were well nigh lost sight of altogether; to such an extent, at least, that when Godeschalvus, in 847, gave them a fuller expression than was usual in his day, † he was at once condemned by Rabanus Maurus, the Moguntine Archbishop; and by the council of Moguntia in 848; as well as by bishops Hincmarus, Rhotadus, and others; (John Scotus Erigena also writing a book against him;) and finally, by another Council in 849, he was degraded from the priesthood, whipped with rods, and shut up in a monastery until released by death in 870. A very few ventured to apologize for him; but for the time his enemies triumphed, though it was only for a time; for in less than a century the great Anselm arose, ‡ through whom the doctrines taught by Augustine were revived, and again found favor in the Latin Church.

These doctrines were subsequently acknowledged and taught and commented upon in a very extraordinary manner by Thomas

\* Augustine was born in 353, and died in 429. Pelagius died in 420, aged 90.

† His language is thus quoted by Lampe: "Dari Prædestinationem duplicem, aliorum ad vitam æternam, aliorum ad æternam mortem; nolle Deum omnes homines salvos fieri, sed tantum eos, qui salvantur: Christum non pro totius mundi redemptione esse mortuum, sed tantum pro iis, qui salvantur; esse quidem in homine Liberum Arbitrium, perditum tamen in Adamo quoad bonum, hinc requiri Gratie adjutorium et præventum ad singulos actus, quæ Gratie non datur secundum merita." *Hist. Eccles.*, lib. II., cap. 8, p. 222. But a very full account of the whole affair relating to this eminent man, may be found in *Vossii Hist. Pelag.*, lib. VII., parte IV., pp. 776-829.

‡ Anselm was born in 1033, and died in 1109.



Aquinas, (nat. 1224, ob. 1274); who — while he maintained that “Predestination [which term he uses as a synonym with election] is the cause (causa) of grace and glory;” and that “nothing can be regarded as the reason for predestination which is the effect of predestination,” and also, plainly and directly, that the “*præscientia meritorum nullo modo est causa prædestinationis divinæ*,” — appeared, nevertheless, to be unsettled in his views of the immutable justice of God; and sometimes seemed to think that justice depended on the will — as for instance, when he makes the will of God the standard of right and wrong: And John Duns Scotus, (nat. circiter 1285, ob. 1307,) his great rival, and who divided with him the applause of the scholastic world, agreed with him here; and boldly and unambiguously taught that “morality is founded on will;” and thus effected an entrance into the church to that most pernicious of all heresies — that the distinction of right and wrong depends not on immutable justice, but on the mere will of God, who first establishes an order or constitution, and then acts upon it. And, as we shall see, the church of God has ever since suffered from the bitter fruits of these unhallowed speculations. For the revival of the same in the Reformed Church brought with it similar results, as we shall have occasion to show presently.

Ockham, († 1347,) to the similarity of whose views to those of Dr. Hodge on the subject of antecedent imputation we have already referred, was a disciple of Scotus, and carried out this doctrine to its logical and legitimate sequences; and plainly asserts that “moral evil is only evil because it is forbidden by God;” and that “God in strictness and propriety of speech (in *rigore et proprietate sermonis*) is the cause of sin:” and likewise that “if God had commanded his creatures to hate Him, the hatred of God would be the duty of man, and even praiseworthy;” a sentiment substantially adopted by some supralapsarian divines of the Reformation. He thus referred the very existence of morality to the mere pleasure and will of God.\*

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\* Cudworth remarks that, “certain it is that divers modern theologers do not only seriously but zealously contend, that there is nothing absolutely, intrinsically and naturally good and evil, just and unjust, antecedently to any positive command or prohibition of God, but that the arbitrary will and pleasure of

This doctrine — as Mackintosh, in his *Progress of Ethical Philosophy*, well remarks —

“By necessary implication refuses moral attributes to the Deity, and contradicts the existence of a moral government, and is practically equivalent to Atheism.” “It would, if men were consistent, extinguish piety, or, in other words, annihilate all religion. Yet so astonishing are the contradictions of human nature, that this most impious of all opinions probably originated in a pious solicitude to magnify the sovereignty of God, and to exalt his authority even above his own goodness.”

This is a charitable judgment, and we cannot but think it just; notwithstanding the difficulty of reconciling it with such sentiments as those of Rimini, (floruit 1350,) who taught that God may both lie and deceive; or with the sentiments of certain supralapsarian divines who maintained that some sinners are formally adjudged to hell because they would not believe a lie.

The School divines who followed Ockham, and, as already remarked, sought the aid of the ancient philosophy in support of their speculations, instead of adopting the philosophy of Plato, chose that of Aristotle; who, in his *Nicomachian Ethics* affirms that “things honest and just have so great a variety and uncertainty in them, that they seem to be only by law, and not by nature:” \* a sentiment decidedly condemned by Plato in his *de Legibus*, lib. 10, and also in his *Theatetus*, and in other of his tractates. † The Schoolmen did not all, however, adopt these sentiments; and Ockham and his followers met with much disappointment in their efforts to support them. In fact, when treating upon the subject formally, the great majority took ground directly in opposition thereto, and taught that the eternal and immutable idea of right and wrong, as existing in the Divine intellect, is

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God, (that is, an Omnipotent Being devoid of all essential and natural justice) by its commands and prohibitions, is the first and only rule and measure thereof.” Works, vol. II., p. 371.

\* Eth. Nicomach., lib. 1, cap. 1, and lib. 5, cap. 10.

† To save space, and render a fuller citation of testimonies unnecessary on this point, we beg leave to refer our readers to Book I, Chapter 1, of Cudworth's tract on *Immutable Morality*, in the second volume of his Works, where the subject is fully and satisfactorily presented.

the foundation of the immutable nature of morality. Aquinas himself had expressly affirmed that "though God wills what is just, yet nothing is just merely because he wills it." But we cannot here dwell longer upon the supralapsarianism of the Schoolmen: and shall now proceed to consider the results on theology of the adoption of these principles by sundry divines of the Reformed or Calvinistic Church.

Calvin in his Institution (see lib. III., cap. 21,) was the first to call the attention of the churches of the Reformation to the great *practical* importance of the doctrine of Divine predestination; and at first appeared, to some extent, to base not only election, but reprobation also, upon the mere will of God, without reference to the question whether man was regarded as fallen or unfallen; and at times seemed to lose sight of the obvious truth that, while election is the operation of Divine mercy which precludes desert on the part of those elected, reprobation is the operation of Divine justice, and proceeds upon the ground of the actual desert of the reprobate. His views subsequently, however, became more definite and accurate. But his ardent follower Zanchius, in 1561, took on this whole subject the highest supralapsarian ground, and maintained it with great strength of argument. Beza and Bucer did likewise; and soon all the churches, Swiss, Lutheran and Reformed, became engaged in the discussion. It is in point here, also, to refer to what may be called an incidental advantage which the supralapsarian divines had in the argument at the very outset; and which will explain why so many appeared at first to be favorable to that scheme, who yet abjured all connection with it on its fuller development. I allude to the manner in which, from the very beginning of the Reformation, the WILL of God was almost constantly referred to in both speculative and practical theology. For example: Luther in his *De Servo Arbitrio*, written against Erasmus (1525,) says:

"Hic est fidei summus gradus, credere illum esse clementem qui tam paucos salvat, tam multos damnat; credere justum qui sub voluntate nos necessario damnabiles facit, ut videatur, ut Erasmus refert, delectari cruciatibus miserorum, et odio potius quam amore dignus."

Such expressions in relation to the Divine WILL were very

current, and were regarded to a great extent, as conveying unquestionable truth. And even to intimate that the Divine Will should not, so to speak, absorb the Divine Goodness and Justice was a species of heresy, and not to be tolerated. The ideas became also deeply associated with the pietistic element, and were inculcated in manuals containing directions for a religious life.

In the discussions which thus arose in the churches, the first reference was, of course, to the word of God. But finding clearly announced therein that God worketh all things according to (*κατὰ*) the counsel of his own will; and also that Justice and Judgment are the habitation of his throne; each, but especially the former, was regarded as a starting point for philosophical speculation; which, as it proceeded, only widened the distance between the parties, until the points themselves were brought into apparent juxtaposition, and the schemes finally into irreconcilable antagonism. Many of the disputants, instead of conceding that, as both announcements were found in the Word of God, they must necessarily be reconcilable and consistent with each other, persisted thus to call in the aid of Philosophy. The former class reasoned, with some of the Stoics, that the Divine Will is the efficient cause of all things, even of human actions themselves; and affirmed that it were absurd to suppose that God would grant free-will to men, when he foresaw that they would abuse it so perniciously as they have done; for liberty, in such a case, said they, is not a blessing but a curse.\* The latter claimed that man is an accountable being, and therefore free; and that the Providence of God is administered, not on the basis of mere will, but on the principles of holiness, justice and truth; affirming, too, that the opposite sentiment made Him the author of sin. Their antagonists replied to this that God is made the author of sin by as fair an implication, by supposing him to permit when he could prevent the existence of moral evil — which shallow sophism was of course denied by the respondents; and they reinsisted on the moral

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\* Such ratiocination as that found in *Cicero*, *De Natura Deorum*, lib. III., near the end: and in the *De Officiis*, lib. I, cap. 14, was frequently resorted to. See also the argument in *Seneca*, *de Beneficiis*, lib. II., cap. 14, beginning with, "Sunt quedam nocitura impetrantibus, quæ non dare, sed negare beneficium est;" which was applied in a similar manner.

agency and accountability of man, even though fallen; and on the strict propriety and accuracy of the distinction between decrees which are simply *permissive* and those which are *effective*, which they illustrated abundantly; and finally claimed that in treating the whole subject of Predestination, Providence, and Grace, the Will of God and the Justice of God should never be supposed to be thus in antagonism.

“Non tenemur,” said they, “ad quæstionem hanc curiosam magis, quam fructuosam respondere. Sufficit nobis voluntas Dei, cujus decreta et decretorum causæ, licet nobis ignotæ, *semper tamen justæ sunt.*”

It was thus that the system of Supralapsarianism was ultimately developed in the Protestant church.

It was, moreover, with the view to destroy Pelagianism (which they found still existing in the Roman Church\*) more effectually than they supposed could be done on the basis of the infralapsarian theology of Augustine, that those of the Reformers above referred to adopted, from the Schoolmen (mainly,) the philosophy that the Will of God and not his justice is the foundation of moral obligation. Hence originated the early views of Luther and Melancthon, and also of Zanchius; destroying the freedom of the will, and wholly subverting the moral accountability of man. In fact, they went so far as even to deny that, in the strict sense, there ever had been free-will in either men or angels; though they endeavored to reconcile this idea with the doctrine of accountability, but with what success may be easily imagined. In the broad assertion of these views Beza was no whit behind even Luther himself. Adam fell, said they, because God had pre-terminated his fall; and whatever portion of the human race perish, perish because they were predestinated and created to be damned. In their view the Will of God settled the whole matter without reference to his moral perfections; for the idea of desert in the reprobate, any more than in the elect, was scouted as fundamentally at variance with the whole doctrine of the sovereignty of

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\* Bossuet, in his “*Variations*,” petulantly denies this well-known and indisputable fact.

God.\* We shall, in the sequel, offer a few remarks on this principle itself, after we shall have briefly referred to some of the results of its adoption—*first* as affecting Calvinistic theology, and *then* as affecting the peace and welfare of the Church itself.

The question (though it never, so far as we recollect, came up in this form for discussion,) which presents the real and practical issue on the subject, may be stated thus: *Is Redemption a remedial, or is it an original, institution?* For if it be remedial, then, of course, the whole supralapsarian scheme is false. If, on the contrary, it be the original institution, then the whole scheme is true; since, in that case, all things (even creation itself,) become subservient to God's eternal purpose or will to elect and to reprobate. For, having from eternity determined to elect to everlasting life and to reprobate to everlasting death (without reference to desert in either case) both angels and men, He proceeded at length to accomplish his purpose. They would need a dwelling place; and hence the heavens and earth were made: for, as Dr. Gomar taught, *creatio est via electionis et reprobationis*. A rule of life was required, and hence the law was enacted. Mankind, not to speak of angels, violated that law: (and how could they do otherwise? They could not be redeemed unless they had sinned; and they were created for the express purpose of being, in part, redeemed;) and then for the purpose of fulfilling the decree of election, God sent his Son to redeem the elect. Such is the scheme which would make the Gospel, instead of the Law, an original institution. And a narrower and more contracted view of the redeeming love and mercy of God, never entered a serious and intelligent mind. We cannot, however, examine this aspect of it in the present connection; but it is singular to observe how extremes meet in recognizing the principle which fundamentally underlies the scheme; for that principle is adopted as common ground on which to explicate their

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\* Precisely the same sophism runs through the speculations in which the doctrine of antecedent imputation is affirmed. The imputation of righteousness, says Dr. Hodge, is antecedent, and not in consequence of subjective desert; and *therefore* the imputation of Adam's first sin is also antecedent, and depends not on the subjective character of those to whom it is imputed. Thus, in like manner, ignoring the goodness and compassion, not less than the justice of God, and making his mere will the rule of his actions.

peculiar views, by the Supralapsarians and Socinians, and also by the Restorationists, and the still later type of Universalists; while we find it also thoughtlessly assented to in certain speculations by some evangelical divines, who entertain and express the utmost abhorrence of the system which the Supralapsarian school has erected upon it. \* Nor do they appear in the least degree conscious of the utterly irreconcilable nature of the principle to the theology which they regard as divine.

The extent to which the speculation was carried by the Supralapsarians can be satisfactorily illustrated only by adducing instances. Twisse, after stating his celebrated argument to demonstrate that sin is not the cause of the decree of damnation, (*peccata non sunt causa decreti damnationis*,) affirms that he does not believe the devil himself can answer it. Polanus, on Hos. xiii: 9, says, "those that God predestinated to eternal destruction, he created for eternal destruction." Beza, on Rom. ix: 21, asserts the same. So also does Perkins, † who likewise adds that "God by his absolute sovereignty makes the vessels of wrath, and does not find them already made." And even Musculus ‡ says, "The reprobate can neither obey God's call, nor repent, nor believe, nor be justified, nor be saved." Gomar sustains this, in the fullest manner, in the earlier issue (an. 1604) of his *Disputatio de Prædestinatione*. Ursinus || fully coincides therewith, and says, "Reprobationis effecta sunt, 1. Creatio Reprobatorum; 2, privatio gratiæ diviniæ seu desertio." And Zanchius also, "Deseri in peccatis perpetuo, excæcavi, indurari, ac denique damnari, effecta sunt reprobationis propria impiorum." § See, also, a full and clear exhibition of the whole idea on this topic, in Polani Syntag. Theol., lib. IV., cap. 10. The perfect identity of the principle underlying all this, with the principle

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\* See for example the Articles under the head of "Angels" in President Edwards' "Observations." Also Dwight's Theology, vol. I., pp. 331, 336, 345, compared with vol. II., p. 70; and Payson's Sermon on Col. i: 16. "All things were made by him and for him;" and Bushnell's "Nature and the Supernatural," chap. VII.

† De Prædest. et Gratiæ Dei, p. 16. Perkins died in 1602.

‡ Loc. Com. de Reprobatione. Musculus died in 1568.

|| Explic. Cat. Part II. de Prædestinatione, Quæst. 4.

§ Tractat. de Prædestinatione.

which underlies the doctrine of antecedent imputation, must be obvious to all.

Dr. Twisse carried his speculations so far in this direction as even to assert, substantially with Socinus, that "had not God appointed otherwise, he could forgive sin without a satisfaction" — thus making every thing depend upon the mere will of God irrespective of his moral attributes; while Szydlovius, his cotemporary, a learned and able divine, and an associate of Maccovius at Franeker, published in 1643 his *Vindiciæ Quæstionum aliquot difficilium et controversarum in Theologia*, in which he logically carries out the principle to its legitimate results — justifying all the enormities to which Ockham had previously conducted it, and to which we have already referred. We present a few specimens of his language — in his own words, for we cannot consent to offer them in translation. To begin with the Preface:

"Dico hic ingenuè," says he, "semper hactenus speciosè magis ad placitum intellectus et captus nostri, quàm verè et ad rei naturam, plerosque Theologos dum phrases quæ ipsis duriores videntur refugiant, Arminianismus si non promovisse, saltem confirmasse: *tergiversando cum Scriptura loqui, quidd SCILICET Deus et possit unius peccatum alteri imputatum morte æterna punire,\* et possit ad interitum ordinare, obligare*

\* Here immediate imputation is asserted to be an essential feature of the system, by this its leading advocate — who assumed its defence about the time when Twisse and Gomar died. And it is but an act of simple justice to Dr. Baird, in this same connection, to present the following passage from his "*Rejoinder*" to Dr. Hodge: "The Reviewer charges us with joining with Placæus, Remonstrants, Pelagians, and Socinians, in assailing the doctrine of immediate imputation. We pray the reader to compare the above with the following statement of Turretin: 'At first the Remonstrants spake ambiguously, so that it was uncertain what position they assumed. But afterward, in their *Apology*, chap. VII., they plainly show themselves to favor the Socinians; retaining, indeed the name of imputation, but taking away the thing itself, whilst they declare 'the sin of Adam to be imputed by God to his posterity; *not as though he held them to be guilty of the same sin and crime with Adam*, [non quasi revera censent reos ipsos ejusdem cum Adamo peccati et culpæ,] but as he willed them to be born subject to [obnoxios nasci voluit] the same evil to which Adam rendered himself obnoxious [obnoxium] by sin.' The designation of Adam's sin as, to us, *peccatum alienum*, originated with Pelagius; in reply to whom Augustine says, that 'it was indeed another's, when those, who when born were to bear it, did not yet exist; but now, by carnal generation, it belongs to those to whom it has not yet been forgiven through the spiritual regeneration.' The Pelagian phraseology was adopted by the Remonstrants (see their *Apology*, &c.) and repu-



hominem ad impossibile, et ob non præstitum hoc quod ei dare non decrevit eundem punire; quòd velit peccatum; quòd prohibendo aliquid contrarium ejus facere ipsemet possit; quòd quæ velit, idèd justa sint quia vult, non verò ideo velle quia justa sint, &c. Quæ omnia cum verissima sint, idèd tantò periculosius negare fuerant, quantò propius (ut sic dicam) Dei potestatem extenuabant et enervabant," &c.

Then, in the body of the work itself, we have the following from cap. 8:

"Quæritur, An detur aliquid antecedenter bonum ad voluntatem Dei; sive, An res sint idèd justæ et bonæ quia Deus eas vult, vel, an idèd eas velit quia justæ sint? Negatur dari aliquid antecedenter bonum ad voluntatem Dei, et affirmatur res idèd esse justas et bonas, quia eas Deus vult; non contrà, idèd eas velle Deum quia justæ et bonæ sint."

And then in answer to the objection, that according to this principle God can enjoin blasphemy, perjury, falsehood, &c., he says:

"Even in those things which pertain to God's worship, man is not otherwise obligated than by precept and law; and that if God so willed, he could enjoin any other mode upon his worshipers:" and he adds, "Certum igitur est Deum potuisse contrarium modum cultus sibi jubere præstari. Nam quæ semel liberè præcepit, ea potuit aliter præcepisse."

In the next chapter we have the following:

"Quæritur, An Deus possit præcipere contrarium ut omnibus præceptis Decalogi, ita potissimum primò, secundò et tertio? Quidam eximius Theologus rejicit affirmativam sententiam aliquot Scholasticorum, qui dicunt peccata contra Decalogum, idèd solum esse mala quia Deus ea prohibuit, adeoque posse Deum in omnibus Decalogi præceptis dispensare. Ego tamen fateor, non solum me nullam rationem firmam videre in Disputatione illa Clarissimi Viri, verum etiam in contrarium

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diated by the Reformed writers. According to the Westminster divines, the sin is not *peccatum alienum*, but *commune*. 'We sinned in him.'" pp. 24, 25. Dr. Baird is fully entitled to this retort. And our readers will notice that the clause of Turretin which we have taken the liberty to italicise, (subjoining likewise the original words,) expresses his own view as distinguished from the views which he is refuting.

*solidas rationes et principia posse produci, quibus sententia illius oppugnetur."*

One more extract will suffice. In cap. 10, he says:

"Fateor et ipse, quod ad communem sentiendi consuetudinem crudum nimis hoc videri; Deum posse blasphemiam, perjurium, mendacium, etc., imperare: item posse jubere ne colatur, ametur, honoretur, etc., quod tamen verissimum est in se, et ex questione nostra generali hoc speciale necessario sequitur, nec potest negari sine multorum absurdorum admissione."

Comment here would be useless; yet the whole is of a piece with the aforesaid logical sequences of the doctrine.\* Twisse might well maintain, according to it, that God could have dispens-

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\* It will be in place, however, to furnish in this connection an illustration of the manner in which Dr. Hodge, on this whole subject, trifles with the authorities of the Calvinistic Church. True to his instincts and to the scheme which he has adopted, he selects as the representative men of that Church, those who are either Supralapsarian, or largely tinctured with the leading principles of the system. For instance, in the Princeton Review for April, 1860, p. 362, he says, "The constant answer to the objection to the doctrine of creation derived from the transmission of sin, made by the Reformed (or Calvinistic) theologians, is that original sin is propagated NEQUE PER CORPUS, NEQUE PER ANIMAM, SED PER CULPAM." The same is repeated substantially on p. 367. The sentiment is purely supralapsarian; and Dr. Hodge should have known that Supralapsarianism never has been and never can be identical with Calvinism. In fact, the foregoing statement looks as though it might have been quoted from Szydlovius himself. But our readers shall judge of this for themselves. In cap. 7 of the above cited work Szydlovius says, "Peccatum originale ab Adamo non propagatur in nos per corpus; quia illud contradistinctè ad animam non est capax peccati: nec per animam; quia illa pura à Deo creatur, nulloque modo à corpore, utpote spiritus, infici potest. Ergo per imputationem." Dr. Hodge, moreover, should not have said that such is "the constant answer of the Reformed." Such language is never found amongst the Infralapsarians; and rarely indeed do the Supralapsarians fully employ it, from the apprehension that it may symbolize their doctrine too nearly with that of Bellarmine and the Nominalists of the Papal School. And we may here remark, once for all, that Dr. Hodge, almost throughout his whole discussion of the subject, (see e. g., Princeton Essays, I., pp. 128-217,) makes a most unwarrantable use of the term *imputation*; employing it as equivalent to *antecedent* or *immediate imputation*. This usage is unfair; and though courtesy has seemed to require that we should on several occasions conform to it, in considering his arguments, we protest against any such use of the term by our antagonists. It is, in fact, taking for granted the very point to be proved.

ed with a satisfaction for sin ; and it was on this ground that the doctrine did originate, that the sufferings of our blessed Redeemer for sin were only a penal example, and were accepted by God in lieu of a full satisfaction to the demands of justice ; since He could, by a mere act of the will, dispense with those demands. In fact, it was in reference to such unauthorized speculations that the excellent Dr. Meisner († 1630,) of Wittemberg remarked, that —

“ They gave occasion to Socinus to reject the merit and satisfaction of Christ.” And he adds, “ Si enim sola et absoluta Dei voluntate [that is, in the Supralapsarian sense of those terms,] homines sunt electi ad vitam æternam, non opus fuit merito et satisfactione Christi.”

Gomar and Beza, and others, gave just occasion for this remark by subordinating both creation and redemption to election.

Another illustration of the effect upon theology of the adoption of this principle, is the following: The aforesaid notion — that God created a large portion of the human race merely “ to display his glory in and through their damnation,” and that therefore, while he ordained the end, he likewise effectively ordained the means — the infralapsarians met by the objection, that it would then become necessary for us to believe that God in his offer of salvation to all men, and in his threatenings against those who refuse to believe, or to accept that offer, designs to condemn and punish them because they would not believe a lie. For the reprobate being through their creation appointed to eternal death for the glory of God, as fully and as truly as the elect are to eternal life ; and the merit of Christ being sufficient only for the elect ; it is plain that, if those who are damned for their unbelief had believed that they could have been saved by accepting the Gospel offer, they would have believed what was false. To punish them, therefore, for their unbelief, is to punish them for not believing a lie. The difficulty seemed truly formidable, but the Supralapsarians met it without finching. Piscator in his Reply to Vorstius, cap. 7, says, “ God orders all whom he addresses (in his word,) to believe that Christ died for them ; *quod ipsum tamen falsum est.*” Maccovius in his Loc. Com., cap. 71, says, “ We prove our position by these arguments : 1. Adam was required to believe that he should have

eternal life in a state of integrity ; *at hoc falsum : ergo tenebatur credere aliquid falsum.*" Maccovius, with his notion that Redemption was the original institution, could not, of course, believe that Adam could possibly have persisted in his state of integrity. Again, he says, " Abraham tenebatur credere Deum velle ut filium suum immolat : at hoc erat falsum ; *ergo tenebatur credere aliquid falsum.*" By such preposterous and unworthy means did they endeavor to save their scheme, by proving that God could require the reprobate to believe a falsehood, and then consign them to hell for not believing it, since, as they maintained, his mere will and good pleasure alone were concerned therein. And were it not for the necessity of exposing in its true colors the wretched and God-dishonoring philosophy which, upon the aforesaid baseless assumption, has sought to identify itself with the truth of God, I should most certainly have let these things pass in silence.

The points concerned in this whole scheme, therefore, relate not to matters of mere speculation, but to the very foundation of all morality and religion. For, if we claim that the will of God, without respect to his justice or other moral attributes, may dispose of his creatures ; and that his infinite power so elevates him above all laws and ordinances by which morality and virtue are known amongst his creatures, that he may utterly disregard them — then, it is infinitely certain that his justice does not engage him to punish evil at all, or to reward obedience ; and, on the contrary, that he may really be the author of sin in the creature, and yet punish it ; and, at the same time, do nothing herein that is at all inconsistent with the perfections of the Supreme being, even though what he does is contrary to all those ideas of virtue and morality and justice which he has announced as the rule for his creatures.\* But the Supralapsarians did not balk at this

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\* "While He manifests Himself clearly as a Moral Governor and Legislator, by the witness of the Moral Law which He has established in the hearts of men, we cannot help feeling, at the same time, that that Law, grand as it is, is no measure of His Grandeur, that He Himself is beyond it, though not opposed to it, distinct, though not alien from it. *We feel that He who planted in man's conscience that stern, unyielding Imperative of Duty, must Himself be true and righteous altogether ; that He from whom all holy desires, all good counsels, and all just works do proceed, must Himself be more holy, more good, more just than these.*" Mansell, *Limits of Religious Thought*, p. 202.

consequence, but admitted it; and we, too, must admit if we adopt their leading principle. This principle led Szydlovius legitimately to the aforesaid diabolical conclusions; and Twisse, as above remarked, to asseverate that if God had not appointed that an atonement should be made for sin, he could pardon and save the sinner without an expiation. It has led to the governmental notion of the Atonement, that the sufferings of our adorable Redeemer were not a satisfaction to Divine Justice, but merely a penal example accepted by God in lieu of such satisfaction. And it led to the open avowal (adopted by Tilletson and some others) that God may dispense with the execution of his absolute threatenings, and so rescue the finally impenitent, and even devils themselves, from the just desert of sin; and has sought to justify that infamously false maxim that *the theologically true may be philosophically false*:\* which, if admitted, must render it impossible to know truth in itself; since it would consist only in a mutable relation to the dispositions of our mind. But we cannot here dwell longer on this branch of the argument, for not only was the theology of the church perplexed and disgraced by these godless speculations, but her peace was repeatedly destroyed by persistent efforts made to enforce them in various ways upon her members. On this point we shall now offer a few brief remarks; and then proceed to a more full analysis and examination of the principle which fundamentally underlies the whole.

The conception that the Divine justice depends not upon *the nature of God*, but upon his mere will and good pleasure, was, as we have shown, adopted by Beza, Gomar, Maccovius, Szydlovius, and other Reformed divines; and that from it was developed the whole system of Supralapsarianism. It was tolerated, but never adopted by the church; although it came into great prominence under Gomar and Maccovius, who claimed that it was the true Calvinistic theology. And it was just here that the breach occurred between Gomar and Arminius, his associate Professor in Leyden University. † It has been, for some time past, the fashion

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\* "Multa in Theologia sunt vera, quæ in Philosophia sint falsa, et contra." Luther, at one time, actually maintained this.

† Grotius avers, as a simple matter of fact, that though Gomar (in a conver-

to attribute to Arminius all the errors subsequently inculcated by the Remonstrant school: which is in all respects as unrighteous a procedure as it would be to charge upon Calvin and Calvinism all the forementioned errors of the Supralapsarian school. Arminius found no difficulty in sustaining and teaching the doctrine of predestination, as really entertained by the Reformed Church; his difficulty was with the supralapsarian view of that doctrine, as taught by his colleague Gomar, and by Beza. In illustration of this fact, I will here present a single brief extract from his *Examen Thesium Gomari*, p. 74, showing the very language he employed while treating this doctrine in the University, but in which Gomar found great heresies, because it did not recognize the supralapsarian view. He says, in language which he often substantially repeats:

“Quod aliqua sit abjectio seu reprobatio Dei, secundum quam ab æterno nonnullos, à vita æterna rejiciendos, et morti æternæ et ignominie adjudicandos constituit, ‘ut notam faciat iram et potentiam suam, adversus vasa iræ præparata ad interitum,’ *verissimum ex Scripturis*: quodque hujus actus causa sit Dei voluntas liberrima et justissima eadem Scripturæ testantur abundè, ideoque de eo hic mihi nulla est cum thesium autore controversia.” \*

ation with himself,) chiefly insisted on the doctrine of Justification, as the important point in his controversy with Arminius, yet most of the members of the States of Holland (plurique ex Senatu,) had determined that the dispute between them on this point was little more than a mere dispute of words (*ἀρρομαχία*.) The obvious ground on which they so regarded it, was that Gomar's views, on this point, differed as widely from the admitted views of Calvin, Ursinus, Pareus, Tilenus and others, (as is shown in the American Biblical Repository for April, July and October, of 1838,) as they did from the views entertained by Arminius. Gomar insisted on the imputation of the active obedience of Christ for justification, as a touchstone of orthodoxy; while the others refused to admit the validity of any distinction between his active and passive obedience in the justification of a sinner. The distinction itself, though now generally recognized in Calvinistic theology, was new in the time of Gomar; Kargius, as already stated, having first suggested it.

\* The editors of the “Collected Works of Arminius,” both in this country and in England, have, for some reason, omitted to refer to this treatise, or to give it a place in their edition; though in that edition they profess to republish *all his recognized writings*. This is a matter of no little moment; and the public are entitled to some explanation of so remarkable a procedure. It should be furnished not only for the sake of the editors themselves, but for the sake of an impor-

Can any real Calvinist object to this as a statement of the doctrine of reprobation? We think not. And then, further, (and we solicit particular attention to this fact,) the very arguments, and almost the very words, by which Arminius in this *Examen* opposes the supralapsarian scheme of Gomar, are subsequently employed by Turretin as furnishing the grounds on which he himself professes to reject the same scheme. (See *Loc. 9, Quæst. 9, and Opp., Tom. I., pp. 555, seq.*) And yet mainly on the ground of these proffered reasons, Gomar denounced his colleague as a heretic, and destroyed the peace of the church. \*

It was just here, therefore, that the breach occurred between these two great and good men. Gomar insisted on the supralapsarian view of the doctrine in question; while Arminius denied that that scheme was either scriptural or Calvinistic. He died nine years before the Synod of Dort was convened; Gomar lived upwards of twenty years after that period; but neither his influence nor the influence of his favorite scheme, could survive its decision. "Even Mosheim allows that the triumph of the Synod

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tant portion of Divine truth which the professed followers of Arminius are now too much disposed to caricature and denounce.

\* In fact, Arminius evinces on other points a willingness to approximate some features of the Supralapsarian scheme rather more nearly than is now deemed advisable by Infralapsarians themselves. For though a portion of them formerly believed that infants might be damned, he appears to have had no doubt on the subject. For example, he says in his reply to Perkins, "But you present, as a proof that the foreseen neglect of grace is not the cause of rejection, the statement that 'infants, dying out of the covenant of the gospel, have not neglected this grace, and yet are reprobate and rejected of God.' *I affirm that they rejected the grace of the gospel in their parents, grand-parents, great-grand-parents, &c., by which act they deserved to be abandoned by God.* I should desire that some solid reason might be presented to me why, since all his posterity have sinned, in Adam, against the law, and, on that account, have merited punishment and rejection, *infants also, to whom, in their parents, the grace of the Gospel is offered, and by whom, in their parents, it is rejected, have not sinned against the grace of the Gospel. For the rule of the divine covenant is perpetual, that children are comprehended and judged in their parents.*" *Works, vol. III., p. 368. 1853.* Dr. Breckinridge, in the thorough and admirable criticism on John i: 29, presented in his *Theology*, has clearly shown that such a conclusion in relation to the future condition of those who have not attained to moral accountability, is wholly unsupported by the recognized principles of Infralapsarian doctrine. And in this he is most amply sustained by the Synod of Dort, as may be seen in our next marginal note.

was that of the Sublapsarians, not only over the Arminians, but over the Supralapsarians also." \* During the fifteen years previous, the Reformed church in the Seven Provinces had been divided into Gomarists and Anti-Gomarists; and Gomarist, Genevan or Calvinist, were claimed to be terms of equivalent import. But the mistake was thoroughly rectified by the Synod; though principles were specified, and not names, as with the Synod of Charenton, which condemned the errors attributed to Placæus. Yet it is somewhat remarkable, that the very feature of Supralapsarianism which involves and gives expression to all the others, should now—in our own church and country, and by professed infralapsarian divines also—be insisted on as the very touchstone of true Calvinism! But let us trace the history of this distinguished divine a little further.

Gomar continued at Leyden two years after the death of Arminius; and then, to avoid having Conrad Vorstius († 1622) for a colleague, resigned his professorship. Subsequently, in 1614, he accepted the theological chair in Saumur, where he continued till 1618, teaching his supralapsarian doctrines—to the great detriment of the peace and prosperity of the church. About the time he left Saumur, and while the reactionary influence against his scheme was in operation, Placæus became a student of theology there; and subsequently Professor; and the principles which had driven Arminius into antagonism to Gomar, on the question *An sit creatio via electionis et reprobationis?* subsequently drove Placæus into antagonism, when they were applied to the doctrine of Original Sin. In considering the position of Placæus, therefore, candor requires that we should ever regard it from this point of view. Gomar returned to Gröningen, where he died in 1641.

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\* Scott's "Synod of Dort," p. 3. The words employed by Mosheim are the following: "His judicibus Arminiani caussa ceciderunt, et germanæ religionis proditores judicati sunt: Genevensium vero illi, qui *Infralapsarii* nominantur, triumpharunt." Hist. Christ., Tom. II., p. 629. (an. 1741.) Wendeline more justly explains it as follows: "Constans nostra sententia hæc est: ut neminem in tempore damnat Deus, nisi propter peccatum: ita neminem quoque ab æterno decrevit damnare, nisi propter peccatum: quæ in Synodo Dordracena solemniter promulgata est." Christ. Theol., p. 177. See also the note on page 414 of our former Essay.



A single remark is all that need be here added. We have seen that Dr. Gomar's unreasonable course — in denying the theological soundness of those who could not endorse his supralapsarian views, and in denouncing them as heretics—led to incalculable trouble in the church; and yet, that the Synod of Dort rejected utterly the doctrine of Gomar, on the very point on which Arminius had refused it his assent; and that Turretin likewise rejects it on the same ground. *Hence we learn that, so far as heresy is concerned, Dr. Gomar himself was the heretic, and the actual troubler of the Church.* And this little item of history will, we trust, suggest a useful thought to our Princeton brother; who having, like Gomar, fallen into a theological mistake, has long been engaged in throwing out suspicions against all his brethren who reject his supralapsarian doctrine of antecedent imputation. We trust there may be no more of this; for the time and energies of Dr. Hodge can be much better employed than in proving brethren to be heretics, who have less claim to that title than he himself has; and when, if there be any actual heresy in the matter, he, according to all just rules, is himself the heretic.

The position of Camero\* ought to be referred to, in this same connection. He succeeded Gomar as theological Professor in Saumur, in 1618; and though his appointment was opposed by the Synod of Poictou, it was simply on the ground that he favored the views of Piscator of Herborn, respecting the imputation of the active obedience of Christ. The opposition, however, was annulled by the national Synod of Alez, in 1620. In the next year he left Saumur, because the government of the place was taken from Du Plessis. And it is a little remarkable that the controversies which now became associated with the name of Camero, may be mainly traced, as in the case of Arminius, to the attempt of Gomar to inculcate his peculiar views as Calvinism. Should any venture to charge that Camero was not at that time regarded as sound in his doctrine, it is sufficient to refer them to the fact that the exposition which he gave of Calvinistic theology — in his discussion with Tilenus (who had become an Arminian,) at L'Isle, near Orleans, in April, 1620, and which

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\* Born in Glasgow, Scotland, in 1579. Died while Divinity Professor at Montaubon, in 1626.

was reported for publication by Capellus and Milletiere — was highly approved and published at Leyden. He came to Saumur immediately after Gomar had left, and found it necessary to meet his supralapsarian notions respecting predestination and grace. He did so; and, as is usual in the excitement of controversy, went, in some respects, to the opposite extreme. He taught that the death of Christ opened the way for the offer of salvation, not only to the elect, but to all men, and that all would be saved if all would believe; *and hence, that it is not predestination that destroys or damns men, but their own sin and rejection of the Gospel offer.* He taught, too, that the grace of God could be resisted by the sinner, but that in the case of the elect it would not be; that the will follows the dictates or judgment of the understanding, and was depraved only in the absence of an enlightened judgment. Hence arose the notion of moral suasion in regeneration. Some of these ideas are not to be countenanced any more than the views of which they were designed by him as a refutation. One extreme begot the other; and both extremes were wrong. And yet this eminent man has often been harshly judged, as though he had deliberately set out to oppose the recognized theology of the Reformed church, when it was obviously his aim to arrest the progress of a grievous error, which, in the guise of that theology, was doing incalculable injury to the souls of men. While we shun his errors, we may remember his services with gratitude.

The same remarks apply substantially to Placæus, and the position which he occupied. He was no wanton troubler of the church, as Dr. Hodge seems to intimate; but was obviously actuated by a like desire to relieve the Reformed theology of the false position into which it had been brought by the supralapsarian doctrine on the subject of imputation. The Synod of Dort had condemned the leading principle of that scheme in its application to the doctrine of Reprobation; but it was now endeavoring to struggle into renewed life and vigor under the guise of a zeal for the doctrine of Original Sin; and Placæus sought to arrest its progress. He had commenced the study of theology at Saumur, about the time when Gomar resigned. Three years afterward the institution there was dispersed. But finally, upon

its full restoration in 1633, he was appointed Professor of theology, and was inaugurated on the same day with his colleagues, Lud. Capellus and Amyrald. After his views had been assailed in the National Synod in 1644, Amyrald appeared before that body at Charenton in order to plead the cause of his colleague, and argued that the doctrine *really held* by Placæus was not at all dangerous. (See our former Essay, pp. 398, 399.) The theological position of Amyrald in relation to the whole matter may be learned from Turretin, I., p. 568, (Loc. IX., Quæst. 9, Sect. 45,) and from Princeton Essays, I., p. 181; and from the fact that, during the preceding year, he had published a labored defence of Calvin on the doctrine of Reprobation, to which Curcellæus, († 1659,) afterwards the theological successor of Episcopius, († 1643,) attempted a reply. The defence of Calvin by Amyrald is contained in the 2d of his *Quatuor Dissertationes*, and is entitled *De Jure Dei in Creaturas*. Yet such was his deliberate judgment as to the doctrine really held by Placæus; which may be explained by the fact that he knew the real aim and intention of his colleague. There is no evidence, therefore, that Placæus wished to compromise the Reformed theology; his aim was to relieve it from the aspersions cast upon it by a false philosophy. We may honor his motives, while we sacredly avoid the errors which were attributed to him.

But it is time to proceed to the discussion of the leading principle upon which the whole scheme of Supralapsarianism is based; and we shall introduce it with the following illustration of the thorough method adopted by the Synod of Dort to put that scheme in its true position before the church. Maccovius, already referred to, was a member of the Synod of Dort from the University of Franeker, where he was professor of theology from 1615, until his death in June, 1644. Cocceius was his colleague during the latter part of the time. He had a dispute with Lubbertus, another colleague, which came before the Synod; and as Lubbertus had accused him of heresy, commissioners were appointed to examine into the matter; one of whom, it is worthy to note in the connection, was Ab. Scultetus, († 1625,) deputy of the Palatinate, and Associate Professor of theology with Pareus at Heidelberg. Nothing of great moment was found against

Maccovius; but as he had attempted to carry out his supralapsarian notions, the commissioners in their judgment of the case, while they free him from the imputation "of Paganism, Judaism, Pelagianism, Socinianism, and any other heresy," caution him against using the obscure and ambiguous phraseology of the schools, saying that he had offended in this matter; and,

"That he was to blame for saying that the distinction between the efficiency and sufficiency of the death of Christ was futile; for denying that fallen man was the object of predestination; (quod negaverit humanum genus lapsum esse objectum prædestinationis;) in saying that God wills and decrees sin; and in saying that God by no means wills the salvation of all men; (quod dixerit Deum nullo modo velle omnium hominum salutem,)" &c.

*This judgment of the commissioners the Synod approved:*\* and so once more gave the Supralapsarians to understand that their principles could obtain no indorsement from that body. And the fact that there was laid to the charge of Maccovius the whole category of heresies, including the *trivialities* of "Paganism, Judaism, Socinianism and Pelagianism" — taken in connection with some extracts from his writings given by us on a preceding page, and with the aforesaid lucubrations of the Franeker preacher, Szydlovius — may tend to illustrate how indefinitely and sublimely extensive in its application, is the leading principle which underlies the supralapsarian scheme. There is something about it, in the matter of suggesting heresies, which reminds us of geometrical progression. †

\* Mosheim's chronic hatred of the Synod, and his petulance every time he is obliged to refer to it, have led him to present a very garbled account of this whole proceeding. See *Instit. Historiæ Christianæ*, *Sec.* 16, § 3, cap. 2. Tom. II., pp. 254–256.

† Even our Princeton brother also occasionally furnishes an illustration of the baneful effects resulting from a connection with the scheme. For it has not only led him to the conclusion that we are subjectively as deserving (or *undeserving*; either way will do;) of justification through Christ, as of condemnation through Adam; and *vice versa*; but in his defence of antecedent imputation, he is actually driven (see *P. Essays*, I., 158, 159,) to the admission of that exploded but most pernicious heresy, *that the punishment of sin, even in hell, may be its natural effects or consequences*; on which point see Bellamy's *True Religion Delineated*, Disc. I., Sect. 6, and an Essay by the Rev. M. Cochran, in *Bibliotheca Sacra*, for April, 1854. But Dr. Hodge seems to have abandoned the idea, of late; for in

In his "Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy," (note O.,) Sir James Mackintosh refers to Supra and Infralapsarianism in the following judicious and discriminating manner :

"The writer of this dissertation was led, on a former occasion, by a generally prevalent notion, to confound the theological doctrine of Predestination with the philosophical opinion which supposes the determination of the Will to be, like other events, produced by adequate causes. † More careful reflection has corrected a confusion common to him with most writers on the subject. What is called 'Sublapsarian Calvinism,' which was the doctrine of the most eminent men, including Augustine and Calvin himself, ascribed to God, *and to man before the Fall*, what is called 'free-will,' which they even own still to exist in all the ordinary acts of life, though it be lost with respect to religious morality. The decree of election, on this scheme, arises from God's foreknowledge that man was to fall; *and that all men became thereby with justice liable to eternal punishment*. The election of some to salvation was an act of Divine goodness, and the predestination of the rest was an exercise of holiness and justice. The sublapsarian predestination is evidently irreconcilable with the doctrine of necessity, which considers free-will, or volitions not caused by motives, as absolutely inconsistent with the definition of an intelligent being — which is, that he acts from a motive, or, in other words, with a purpose. *The Supralapsarian scheme, which represents the Fall itself as foreordained, may indeed be built on necessitarian principles. But on that scheme Original Sin seems wholly to lose that importance which the former system gives it as a revolution in the state of the world, requiring an interposition of Divine power to remedy a part of its fatal effects. It becomes no more than the first link in the chain of predestined offenses.*"

1. According to the Supralapsarian scheme, God determines first to elect and to reprobate, and then to create; and that his power and severity may be glorified, the same effective decree

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the Princeton Review for 1860, p. 340, he censures Dr. Baird for advancing it. The *αἰτίου ψεύδος* of the error, however, is in allowing the distinction at all; or in attempting to separate the natural consequences from the supernatural visitation. *The Scriptural representation includes both*. The statements of Mansell, (Limits, &c., pp. 196–199,) from his not having sufficiently regarded this fact, are unsatisfactory. Compare also Butler's Analogy, Part II., ch. 5.

† See the Criticism on Mr. Stewart's Dissertation, Edinburgh Review, vol. 86, p. 225.

comprehends the means as well as the end, \* so that sin shall ensue as the necessary means to secure the damnation of the reprobate; sin being only the necessary means for effecting the accomplishment of the decree. † The distinction of *negative*, or the denial of grace, (or, as they name it, *preterition*,) and *affirmative*, or predamnation, (which is a destination to punishment,) amounts to nothing: for as Molinæus, in a passage already cited, remarks, “To reprobate and to will to condemn are the same, (reprobare ac velle damnare idem esse,) as to elect is the same as to will to save:” and he very properly adds that it is the same thing whether God destines a man to damnation, or effects that from which damnation necessarily results.

2. While, therefore, we may expect to find in some of the writings of the later Reformers, that diversity which these antagonistic principles could not but develop; the duty of the Calvinistic church in our day, and in view of the emphatic decisions of the Synods of Dort and Westminster, is, we think, not to be mistaken. It should regard those only as its true and proper representatives who taught those doctrines which it recognizes as the constituent elements of its system; *and so far alone as they did teach them*. But if, on the contrary, Supralapsarianism is to be claimed, either in whole or in part, as the doctrine of our church, let it be done openly and frankly, and by a fair endorsement: let it be done under its own flaunting banner. Nor let it, while aiming to entangle us again in the yoke of bondage, profess to bear with it the sacred and acknowledged Ark of the Liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free. It has its own well-defined and distinguishing principles: but let them not be insisted on as the compass and square for the admeasurement of orthodox doctrine, while the real issues involved in the question of their acceptance as such are disingenuously ignored. Those principles have their history; and no assumption of claims to superior soundness, and no threatened imputation of heresy against those who may venture to call them in question, shall hinder our dealing with them frankly and plainly. And we say, therefore, that if we are to regard those divines of the Reformed church,

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\* See Gomar, De Predestinatione, Thesis 23. (an. 1604.)

† Ibid Thesis 91; and see, also, his remark on p. 411 of our former Essay.

however learned and excellent in other matters, who have, either in whole or in part, adopted the Supralapsarian scheme, as the accredited expounders of the doctrinal views we entertain on the same subjects, let us do so openly and fearlessly. But let us not lapse into the preposterous absurdity of acting as though there is, in this essential matter, no important difference between the distinguishing views which they advocate, and the doctrines entertained by the Calvinistic church, (which, as a body, has always repudiated those views ;\*) and thus, while professing to be Infralapsarians, take the Supralapsarians as the true expounders of our philosophy and theology. Princeton during the last thirty years has not been as careful in this matter as she should have been ; and her procedure therein has tended too often to suggest the somewhat analogous course of the late New Haven School, which, while it existed, was famous for explaining Calvinistic theology by Arminian philosophy. But we here take and abide by our position, and most emphatically deny that, in any true sense of the term, Supralapsarianism is Calvinism ; and we affirm that its distinguishing feature is nothing less than an unsightly branch from Pagan philosophy, which philosophising theologues have endeavored to engraft upon the system. *We denounce it as utterly false in its philosophy ; false in its distinguishing theology ; and false in the exegesis by which it would support that theology ; and false in the claim alleged on its behalf that it is the true Reformed doctrine.* It is proper, however, to remark, in this same connection, that though it is necessary to speak in these terms of strong disapprobation of the distinguishing tenet of the Supralapsarian scheme, and of every attempted application of it for the elucidation of the doctrines of Calvinistic theology ; we yet yield to no man in sincere admiration of the eminent divines who have been regarded as more or less favoring that scheme. More learned and purer-minded men than Luther, Bucer, Ursinus, Beza, Polanus, Gomar, and Twisse, ( to speak of

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\* Turretin himself clearly announces this fact. Referring to Calvin as inculcating the received doctrine respecting election and reprobation from "*the corrupt mass,*" he adds, "In quo summi Theologi judicio, quod respondet Articulo XII. Confessionis Gallicanæ, ut et Synodi Dordracenæ decreto, *omnino acquiescimus, et omnibus quibus placet sapere sobrie, acquiescendum esse putamus.*" Loco IV., Quæst. IX., Sect. 80.

no others,) have scarcely ever been numbered among the sacramental host of God's elect, and their aim in adopting the speculation referred to was to exalt, in the estimation of man, the God whom they loved and adored. We reverence and deeply sympathize with them in the motive, while we deplore and denounce their error. And neither can nor ought their great and venerable names to either consecrate that error, or rescue it from the execration of the church of God.

3. If Supralapsarianism, therefore, be discarded as the exponent of the doctrines of grace, or the Calvinistic system, no words are needed to show that, on those points, at least, with which its peculiar philosophy and theology are most intimately concerned, its supporters cannot be regarded as representing, in any proper sense, the Calvinistic system. And it is also obvious that for any theological teacher of admitted ability and learning, now to plead the authority of such, and to claim on such authority that a doctrine which is a peculiar and distinctive feature of the scheme, (while the scheme itself, moreover, is formally disclaimed,) is a doctrine of Calvinism, is not to act ingenuously. Turretin, two centuries ago, and others, both before and since, may have fallen into this incongruity; but surely such examples can hardly be pleaded as deserving of imitation. But there will be occasion to refer to this topic more at large hereafter; and we only add, in the present connection, that a man may receive and acknowledge a principle, without formally recognizing its logical sequences;\* though it should never be forgotten that while we give our sanction to a principle, our authority must go to support it, and so to sustain others who, while they in like manner receive it, will carry it forward to its legitimate conclusions. To illustrate:—Twisse, Szydlovius, Tillotson, Edwards, Dwight, Payson, Hodge, Thornwell, Bushnell, along with Socinus, E. Winchester, T. Southwood Smith, Petitpierre, Ballou, Whittemore and others, all speculatively adopt the principle above referred to, by making the will, rather than the immutable justice or moral nature of God, the stand-point of certain theological explications. They, of course, arrive at infinitely divergent conclusions; but

\* De Moor (III., p. 264.) has handsomely said "*Neminem consequentiis gravare volo, quas ipse ex sua sententiâ profuere nec videt, nec agnoscit,*"



all reason alike, and thus far agree in relation to the principle itself. Now that principle may be applied so as to sustain the supralapsarian doctrines of Absolute Reprobation and Antecedent Imputation; and also to show, as Edwards, Payson and Bushnell do, that men were created to be in part redeemed; or it may be taken a step further, and be applied as Twisse applies it, to show that God could have dispensed with the demands of justice without a satisfaction for sin; or with Socinus and his school, to show that God did dispense with those demands, and accepted in lieu thereof a merely penal example; or still further, with Tillotson and Winchester and others, that he can or will repeal his absolute threatenings, and rescue the finally impenitent from hell; or with the later Universalists, who interpret the Divine will according to their crude conceptions of benevolence, and claim that there is no hell, and that all sinful creatures will be made partakers of everlasting happiness.\*

4. The Divine attributes are, of course, *impersonal*, and the contrary idea, though still apparently a favorite with some, is nothing short of absurd and ridiculous. Hence, to say that the moral and natural perfections of the Divine Nature should not be confounded with the Divine Essence, is not only allowable, but eminently proper; nor does it, in any true sense, involve the absurdity of attempting to conceive the Infinite and Absolute: but it involves simply the belief of what HE has declared respecting himself. The old notion of some of the Scholastics, that the De-

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\* Well has Le Blanc, Professor of theology at Sedan, and one of the clearest and most discriminating theologians of the 17th century, remarked that, "Et enim quemadmodum falsum ex falso sequitur, et absurdum unum ducit ad alterum, vix est in Religione error ullus tam levis, qui si consequentia nectatur non evertat tandem aliquem Fidei articulum et quoddam Religionis dogma." *Theses Theolog.*, Prefatione, p. 2. (*folio.*) London, 1675. Our Princeton brother, in *thesi* at least, endorses the same: "How far the assumption of the fundamental principles of a system has a tendency to lead to its thorough adoption, every man must judge for himself. *For ourselves, we fear the worst: because, we think consistency requires an advance, and because history informs us that when men have taken the first step, they or their followers soon take the second.*" P. *Essays*, I., p. 132. And we trust that we may in this connection, and without offence, commend to Dr. Hodge a reperusal of his own admirable remarks in the concluding paragraph of his article on Original Sin, published in the *Repertory* for 1830, and republished in P. *Essays*, I., pp. 109-127. They are both true and impressive, and should be deeply engraven upon the heart of every minister of Christ.

creed of God is God, and that the Will, &c., of God is God—a notion favored also by some supralapsarian divines—cannot be maintained, and is really blasphemous. Gomar, at first, favored it in part, in his controversy with Arminius; but in the later and complete edition of his works,\* we find that he has essentially modified his views on the subject. In his *Disputatio de æterno Dei decreto*, he refers to the question *an decretum Dei sit Deus?* as *gravis illa et ad veri Dei notitiam ac cultum pertinens controversia*, and refutes the affirmative assumption with very great ability, (See vol. II., pp. 25, 26, Theses 28–34,) and, without hesitation, adopts the view of the subject entertained by his ancient colleague; and which is repeated likewise by Curcellæus † and Limborch. ‡ The notion, and the unintelligible jargon by which its advocates have endeavored to sustain it, are now pretty generally abandoned. Neither the decrees of God, nor any of the attributes of God, are to be regarded as God; the language is no more intelligible as applied to God than it would be if applied to man himself. Nor can those attributes be regarded as in any intelligible sense of the term *personal*. God is personal, and not impersonal. He is the eternal source of all other personality, existence, life, and intelligence. But on what principle can his attributes also be regarded personal? And if his justice, goodness and truth are personal, what is meant by the Justice of God, the Truth of God, and the Goodness of God? But there can be no greater absurdity than to pretend to conceive of God as possessing personal attributes, or attributes which separately have a will, intelligence, &c. The idea is unintelligible respecting God, or any other rational or moral agent.

5. We therefore speak intelligibly when we speak of God's impersonal justice—a justice which depends not on the will, but which belongs to his nature; and which, like that nature, is, of course, immutable and eternal. To that nature is to be traced, and in that nature is to be found, the eternal and immutable basis for the distinction between right and wrong, good and evil.

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\* We use the second issue of this edition, published at Amsterdam in 1664, folio. The first was published in 1645.

† Instit. Relig. Christ., lib. III, cap. 3, sect. 7, p. 91.

‡ Theol. Christ., lib. II., cap. 18, sect. 4, p. 104.

And hence the falsity of the notion which would attribute any freedom to the Will that may impinge upon his truth, his goodness, or his justice : since these attributes are, in the nature of the case, prior to will, and must be its rule. The idea, therefore, that freedom of will in God consists in his being able to will any thing, without regard to his nature, is the most ineffable, and in every way the least supported, of all absurdities. The reasons for the exercise of his will are always consistent with his holiness, justice, goodness and truth ; or, in other words, with the demands of his moral nature. Hence of Law, it may be said with Hooker :

“ Her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world ; all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least as feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempted from her power : both angels, and men, and creatures, of what condition soever, though each in different sort and manner, yet all, with uniform consent, admitting her as the mother of their peace and joy.” \*

And if the law be but the expression of the Moral Nature of God, which is infinitely Holy and Just and True, on what principle can it be rationally claimed that he can will any thing inconsistent therewith ; and reverse the precepts of the decalogue ; or require his creatures to hate Him ? as supralapsarians have found it necessary to maintain in order to sustain their theory. If He possess a moral nature, that nature cannot be otherwise than the rule of his will.

6. When the question, therefore, is raised as to what God is able to do, it is a plain absurdity to pretend to decide it by a mere reference to the fact that he is omnipotent, unless the question refers only to that with which omnipotence alone may be concerned. And so with respect to any other of the divine attributes. While we concede that God may, and can, do any thing which is consistent with his moral attributes ; it is in no sense limiting him, but is, on the contrary, perfectly consistent with the highest freedom to admit, also, that he can neither will nor perform any thing inconsistent therewith. Whatever he may be supposed either to will or to do, must have respect alike to all his

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\* Works, vol. II. New York and Philadelphia, 1845.

moral attributes ; and must be consistent not only with his power to will or to do, but likewise with his holiness, justice, goodness and truth : and it is not limiting his wisdom and power to claim that he can do nothing which is not in perfect consistency therewith. Hence we say, with entire propriety, that he cannot forgive sin, unless in consistency with his holiness, justice and truth ; and that he cannot impute it, except on grounds which are in strict and perfect accordance with the principles of eternal and immutable justice. And it is the greatest inconceivable absurdity, and leads to the most pernicious of all errors, to claim that he can do either without a direct regard to the eternal and unchangeable principles of his moral nature.\*

7. To maintain that all things are the same to God—that is, that with him there is no distinction between vice and virtue, right and wrong, moral good and evil—is plainly to set our philosophy against the clearest dictates of the whole Bible, against the convictions of our moral nature, and against all the admitted dictates of right reason. We can conceive nothing, as Dr. Samuel Clarke somewhere truly remarks, without, at the same time, conceiving its relations to other things. God has established these relations in perfect consistency with the demands of his nature, and, of course, knows, and forever knew, of their existence ; and He alone can comprehend them in all their fullness. The whole of these relations constitute Truth. These eternally conceived, and now actually existing relations, involve, of necessity, an eternal fitness or unfitness, in the application of things one to another ; with regard to which the Will of God is always exercised ; and which, when announced by Him, ought to determine the choice of all his rational creatures ; not, however, of the

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\* “God did not *create* Absolute Morality: it is coeternal with Himself; and it were blasphemy to say that there ever was a time when God was and Goodness was not.” Mansell, *ubi supra*, p. 187. And while it is true that we cannot conceive absolute morality at all, either as dependent on or independent of the Divine Will; or the Divine Will itself, either as absolutely indifferent, or necessarily determined: we yet are competent to believe the Divine testimony that the creation of man’s moral nature was not identical with the creation of morality itself; and that the great principles of all that is holy and righteous existed in God before they assumed their finite form in the heart of any of his creatures. See *ibid*, pp. 189, 330.

fitness or unfitness of things supposed to be wholly antecedent to, independent of, and without reference to, His will—as the late Dr. James P. Wilson so strangely reasons in his attempt to repudiate the idea: \* but of that fitness or unfitness as existing in exact conformity to and consistent with his own will and nature, as all things of course did originally exist. His intelligent creatures, therefore, are bound to regard these differences, as recognized and announced by himself. And this being so, it is no more reasonable to maintain that God may disregard these differences in his treatment of his creatures, in respect to moral obligation and to their moral nature; than that he should disregard them in respect to their intellectual nature, by altering the relation of numbers, or the properties of mathematical figures; and require us to believe that six and ten are equal; or that twice two make nine; or that a circle and square are one and the same figure; and refer us to our intellectual faculties to verify the same, and punish us if we did not admit it. Surely this would be doing violence to the intellectual nature he has given us. And yet it would be doing no more violence to our intellectual convictions, than it would do to our conscience and moral nature to require us to believe that there is no essential difference between truth and falsehood, innocence and guilt, right and wrong, virtue and vice. For it will scarcely be denied that we perceive a distinction between Right and Wrong as clearly and as really as between a circle and a square. † And if God, therefore, cannot

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\* Essay on the Probation of Fallen Man, pp. 90, 91, Philadelphia, 1827. Dr. Wilson, though he had no sympathy with the Supralapsarian scheme, seemed, nevertheless, to have become entangled in the web of one or two of its sophisms, if we might judge from his language here referred to. A favorite argument with them is the following: “Si aliquid esset justum et bonum antecedenter ad Dei voluntatem, tum Deus ex obligatione et officio illud velle et facere teneretur.” And again: “Si ita res habet, tum sequeretur dari bonum et justum, quod à primo summo bono et justo non fueret: daretur enim effectus, qui in primam causam resolvi non posset.” In fact, Dr. W. employs some of these very terms. But the sophism, though subtle, consists in confounding the will of God with his nature. His nature is, of course, prior to his will, and is its rule. So that should we even affirm that justice and goodness, &c., were antecedent to the will of God, this would not be saying that they are prior to or distinct from his nature.

† “As principles in the abstract, the laws of morality are as unchangeable as the axioms of geometry.” Mansell, p. 186.

disregard these distinctions, then any theory which presupposes him to disregard them is necessarily false and absurd, and is entitled to no serious consideration whatever. But the antecedent or immediate imputation scheme does suppose him to disregard them, as really and as truly, and to all intents and purposes, as the creabiltarian notion of the supralapsarians. Indeed, the principle involved is, as we have shown, but one and the same, and the schemes must stand or fall together: since, if God confessedly cannot *create* man to be tormented in hell forever, "for the glory of his power and severity," then, of course, he cannot by the mere legal fiction of antecedent imputation constitute them morally guilty and corrupt, and so render them fit subjects for endless torment; for his moral nature is necessarily as much opposed to the one as to the other, the moral character of the act being in both cases the same. Condemnation cannot in any case produce guilt in the guiltless; for it is merely the utterance of a judgment based upon things as they are. And it is, moreover, contrary to the very nature of God to suppose the contrary, and it would be a reversion of the order of things established by him, and recognized and announced in his word. Actual guilt alone, either inherent or assumed, can bring condemnation under the righteous administration of God; and of course it must precede the condemnation in the order of nature no less than of time. And when God assures us that the posterity of Adam are guilty of his sin, and that the children of Achan and of the Amalekites were guilty of their parents' sin, we believe the fact; nor is it for us to say that the mere declaration produced the guilt, or that they were guilty by a mere arbitrary act of the Divine will. It is not for us to refuse to believe the fact because we are unable to explain it. We are not required to explain it, but simply to believe it on the testimony of God. Nor is it for us to say, as Dr. Thornwell does, that it makes no difference whether the guilt is supposed to precede the imputation and condemnation, or whether it flows from and is produced by the imputation. The assertion is false.\* It does make a difference; for God

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\* "A strictly moral theory requires . . . . an exactly graduated proportion between guilt and suffering, virtue and happiness. If, on the other hand, we maintain that there is no moral fitness in either case, we virtually deny the

acknowledges the former, but disowns and in every possible way disclaims the latter. We may not be able, in a given case, to define wherein precisely the difference may be traced; but this alters not the fact. We can see, however, that the difference involves the whole question as to the foundation of morality, as above shown — the question whether the justice of God is immutable and eternal, or whether it depends merely upon his will.

8. To maintain, therefore, that God has no reason, aside from mere will, for treating his creatures as guilty and condemned, rather than otherwise, is a grave and pernicious error; which, if conceded, would plainly imply the entire accuracy of the supralapsarian dogmas of absolute reprobation and antecedent imputation — since, in that case, immutable holiness, justice and truth, and all the moral perfections or attributes claimed to belong to the Divine nature, can be demonstrated to be the merest figments of the imagination. But, on the contrary, if God be by nature holy and just and true, then he is, of course, immutably so; and consequently he has regard to these attributes in every act of his will pertaining to the creature; and acts not as he does merely because he wills to do so, and not otherwise; but because it is holy and just and right that he should do so, and not otherwise.\* The idea, therefore, that without reference to the claims of his moral nature, he may, by mere arbitrary enactment, so constitute the guiltless guilty and morally corrupt as to bring them into antagonism to his law or retributive justice, and so abolish their innocence as to secure their condemnation and endless rejection from happiness and eternal life — is an idea that is worthy only of execration. It is a slander on his character, and at utter variance with the clearest announcements of his word. “Will the

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existence of a moral Deity at all; we make God indifferent to good and evil as such; we represent Him as rewarding and punishing arbitrarily and with respect of persons.” Mansell, p. 191.

\* This is true, also, in respect to the salvation of sinners. For though the objects of mercy, or the “seed” given to Christ in covenant, were selected from the corrupt mass according to the mere good pleasure and will of God, they are yet forgiven, or justified and saved, by the faithfulness and justice of God in view of the atonement effected by Christ. “If we confess our sins, *he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness.*”

Lord destroy the righteous with the wicked? that be far from thee. Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" And then, moreover, he does nothing without reason. In every act he has some end for which he acts; and this end is the reason why he wills or performs the act. This rule holds good, of course, in all his actions. When he elects one sinner to eternal life, and reprobates or adjudges another to ignominy and eternal death; though it be from his mere good pleasure, the exercise of that pleasure, if we may so speak, results not from indifference, but from the most just and holy reasons: for he worketh all things "according to the counsel of his own will" — that is, not simply according to his own will, as Hooker observes, but according to the counsel of his own will.\* And whatever is done with counsel, or wise resolution, has, of course, some reason why it should be done — even though that reason be so utterly incomprehensible as to lead us to exclaim, "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out!"

9. Should the question arise whether there can be any difference between creating a morally corrupt and sinful being, and constituting a sinless creature morally corrupt; what would the advocates of antecedent imputation reply? We are unable to find any ground of essential difference; and, so far as justice and holiness are concerned, we maintain that there is none, and that the two are morally the same. But we know, from the character of God as revealed to man, and from the express declarations of his word, that he could not directly create a rational and accountable being in a state of moral corruption and sin; and in this our antagonists profess to agree with us, and concede that he could not. How then can he, by the mere fiat of his will, constitute the guiltless guilty of moral corruption? He cannot. And the principle, therefore, upon which the whole notion is based — that God can, *by the mere fiat of his will*, change the nature of moral right and wrong, and make the right wrong and the wrong right, or the just unjust and the unjust just — is to be rejected as the most pernicious of all heresies. † In fact, it would likewise imply that

\* See Hooker's Works, vol. I., p. 158.

† And yet Dr. Hodge insists that — if the prerogative here referred to be de-



He could make the performance of the same act by his creatures both right and wrong, at one and the same time; so that it could be, in one and the same sense of it, both just and unjust, as having been both commanded and prohibited by God.\*

10. It would be difficult, indeed, to tell what absurdity, in a moral point of view, this principle might not be made to justify. Protagoras, the cotemporary of Socrates, and to whom we have already referred, maintained that right and wrong were unreal and imaginary, and had no basis in the nature of things; and his sophisms were not without effect, even upon the mind of Aristotle. Hence, too, certain Manichæan theologues in the fourth century, improving upon the idea, affirmed that it would argue imperfection in the power of God to suppose that he could not lie and deceive: and they maintained that he was able so to procure the non-existence of that which exists or which has existed, as to render certain that it never did exist. Augustine disputes against them, and shows that the argument involves also the conclusion that God could make the true false and the false true. †

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nied to God; and if it is, on the contrary, alleged that His judgments must be according to the subjective desert of those whom they affect; and that it is a denial of his moral nature, and even atheistic, (as Cudworth so pointedly declares it to be, see *ubi supra*,) to say that he can pronounce the just unjust and the unjust just; that the only legitimate ground of judgment are character and works; and, moreover, that community in a propagated nature involves all the partakers of it in the criminality and pollution of their progenitor—then “*the whole Gospel is destroyed, and every scriptural ground of salvation of sinners is renounced.*” (See the citation in our former Essay, pp. 407, 408.) Surely, then, no one in view of this can deny that the issue pending is both plain and palpable. For if God can thus by mere will constitute the just unjust, and the unjust just, the conclusion of Twisse (expressly repudiated even by Turretin, Loc. III., Quæst. 19, Sect. 9,) follows, of course, that had He not appointed otherwise He could save the sinner without a satisfaction to justice. Socinianism comes next, and with no halting pace.

\* Amyrald, in the work above mentioned, well observes: “*Et video nonnullos ab Anaxarcho non multum dissidere, cum Deo adscribunt, ut nullam actionum suarum causam habeat ipsius voluntatem antecedentem. Nam si legum à Deo nobis positarum nulla causa est in ipsa rerum natura, et in legibus ipsis: si, inquam, ex illius arbitrio mero pependerunt, et sunt (ut loquuntur) ex jure positivo; potuit ille certè alias non modo discrepantes, sed planè contrarias leges hominibus constituere.*”

† His words are: “*Quisquis ita dicit, si Omnipotens est Deus, faciat, ut quæ facta sunt, facta non fuerint; non videt se hoc dicere: Si Omnipotens est, faciat*

The connection is, indeed, sufficiently obvious either way ; for to attempt to extend thus indefinitely the power of God, is, in effect, to overturn the whole doctrine respecting it. And so, too, the attempt to extend the prerogatives of the Divine will indefinitely, and without regard to his moral perfections, must result in a like overthrow of the doctrine in its practical relations to man. The distinction between right and wrong ceases, and with it departs the certainty of his fulfillment either of his promises or threatenings ; and all manner of falsehoods and absurdities may become true. But how different from all this is the language of the Holy Ghost ? “ God, willing more abundantly to shew unto the heirs of promise the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it by an oath ; that by two immutable things, in which it was impossible for God to lie,” &c. (Heb. vi : 17–19,) Crellius, the celebrated champion of Socinianism, has, with great force, refuted these absurdities. \* Dr. Hodge reasons on the subject precisely as Crellius does ; or as Wendeline, (Christ. Theol., p. 107,) or as any sound and judicious mind, when unwarped by theory, must reason upon it.

“ *Guilt*,” says he, “ cannot be removed by power. If a man commits a crime, he is guilty, and even Omnipotence cannot undo the deed. If it is true that we apostatized in Adam, Omnipotence cannot make it untrue.” †

And this is certainly so. And it is equally true and obvious that by no exercise of his power, or fiat of his will, can God render truth falsehood, or falsehood truth ; or constitute guilt innocence, or innocence guilt, in a moral agent or accountable being ; nor attribute to any such being guilt which is not really and already his, on holy, righteous, and sufficient grounds, and according to the dictates of eternal and immutable justice. And to claim, therefore, on behalf of God, any power or prerogative

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ut ea, quæ vera sunt, eo ipso, quo vera sunt, falsa sint.” *Contra Faustum*, lib. 26, cap. 6.

\* See his *De Deo ejusque Attributis*, cap. 22, pp. 51, 52.

† See *Princeton Review* for April, 1860, p. 366. On pp. 763, 764, (referred to in a previous note,) Dr. Hodge appears, however, to have forgotten what he has here so truly averred.

involving the contrary, is to claim for him that which he not only does not claim for himself, but that which He utterly and most emphatically disclaims.

11. The question as to *where the ground is*, upon which God may attribute guilt in a specific case in which he does attribute it, is not to be raised in relation to any such matter of fact. We may not be able to discover the ground of the charge, or the relation asserted to exist between the individual and the guilt or offense itself; but all this proves nothing, where the fact of such a connection is established by the Divine averment. God affirms the fact in the case; and from this affirmation we know, not only that the fact exists, but that the reasons why he recognizes its existence, and so adopts it as a basis for the operation and administration of his Providence, are holy and just and true, and perfectly consistent with eternal and immutable righteousness. If God treats his creatures as sinners, as guilty and as corrupt, it is not from any supposed prerogative of mere will or pleasure; but because there is a holy and just and true sense in which they are to be so regarded and treated. And even in the case of our adorable Redeemer, who was no creature, but God manifest in the flesh, there is a just and holy and true sense in which he was regarded and treated as a transgressor, for thus alone could he have become a curse for us. Our guilt was justly imputed to him, because he voluntarily assumed the office of its expiation. It was an imputation, therefore, which was perfectly consistent with the eternal principles of immutable righteousness. And both the providing and acceptance of that substitution—though God was perfectly free either to do so or not, and was prompted therein solely by his love and compassion for our fallen race—were in no way incompatible with the same principles of his moral nature. And we have only to apply to this case (we trust that there is no irreverence in the allusion) the supralapsarian dogma of antecedent imputation, in order to see the enormity of the principle which underlies that whole scheme. We shall not attempt to draw out the illustration in form, but only suggest it for reflection. And in view of the whole matter we therefore affirm that this doctrine, teaching as it does that the antecedent declaration of a non-existing fact constitutes or produces the fact itself, or causes it to

exist where it had not existed — that is, that the antecedent imputation of guilt to the guiltless produces, (either penally or otherwise,) depravity and moral corruption, so as to constitute the sinless guilty and corrupt, and bring them under the displeasure of God — is at war with the whole revealed character of God, and with all the declarations of his word.

12. God, in establishing the constitution and course of nature as they originally existed, established on the basis of immutable righteousness the connection, moral and natural, between Adam and his posterity; and it is a connection, therefore, which is based not upon positive law, or a constitution established by mere will or arbitrary enactment, but upon the principles of eternal rectitude and justice. Consequently, the results of that connection, as exhibited in the effects of his transgression, arise not from mere arbitrary enactment which might as well have had it otherwise; but they arise in strict accordance with the principles of eternal and immutable holiness and justice. To represent this connection, therefore, as a mere arbitrary constitution or arrangement, depending upon or originating in the mere will or pleasure of God, without reference to his eternal and immutable justice; and to argue, as some of our own divines, along with Professor Park and many other New England theologues, do, that there was no reason for it, aside from his mere will, is, at least, to speak without reason and without knowledge.\* Nothing can jus-

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\* On this point Dr. Hodge seems cheerfully to concede that both he and Professor Park occupy the same ground: In illustration of which statement we present from the Princeton Repertory for 1851, p. 680, the following sufficiently explicit admission. The language is that of Dr. Hodge: "Professor Park himself says — '*Our calamities hang suspended on the sovereign purpose of heaven; we say directly; he [Dr. Hodge] says indirectly; we say, without any intervening links; he says, with the intervening links of imputation, guilt,*' &c. When we first read this sentence [continues Dr. Hodge] we could hardly believe that Professor Park had been given up to *speaking the truth thus simply and clearly. It is precisely as he states it.*" Both Professors, therefore, confessedly agree in explicating the matter from the mere will or sovereignty of God: for this sovereignty, according to the express and repeated declaration of Dr. Hodge, supplies the intervening links referred to. This supralapsarian principle makes strange bed-fellows. That Dr. Hodge, however, had, in the course of twenty-one years, made considerable progress in the development of the scheme, is apparent from his language in P. Essays, I., p. 159. "For ourselves, however, (says he,) we are free to confess that we instinctively shrink from the idea, that God in mere sove-

tify any such representation. Depravity, corruption and guilt are inherited in strict and exact accordance with the immutable principles of truth and righteousness, whether man can explain the matter or not. They come upon us not by the mere will and pleasure of God, as the supralapsarians and antecedent imputationists affirm, but in strict accordance with our subjective desert, according to his unalterable holiness and truth and justice. And consequently God could not have willed them otherwise in consistency with those attributes. And when Dr. Thornwell, therefore, speaking in a tone of very great assurance, and of triumph over the theory of traduction, which he is reviewing, and with which we have not a particle of sympathy, \* affirms that—

“No matter how called into being, he (man) is a separate, indivisible moral agent, and he is either mediately or immediately the creature of God. Generation is but the process through which God creates him, and whatever causes independently of himself, condition his being, are ultimately to be referred to God. *If it were wrong to create him under guilt it, is wrong to permit him to be generated under guilt.*” †

He, (as already stated,) in common with the whole supralapsarian school, who have always employed such language, affirms what he has no means of knowing to be true. And in opposition to it we aver that—while it is utterly irreconcilable with the holiness and justice of God to create man immediately under guilt, or under the antecedent and unavoidable penalty of moral corruption, (which would clearly infer that he could without injustice create him to be eternally damned,)—it may be perfectly consistent with His moral nature to permit him to be generated under guilt. The old *law maxim* (*qui facit per alium facit per se,*) which Dr. Thornwell strangely attempts to apply to the case

reignly inflicts the most tremendous evils upon his creatures, while we bow submissively at the thought of their being penal inflictions for a sin committed by our natural head and representative,” &c.

\* It might not, however, be amiss in this connection to apprise Dr. Baird's Reviewers of the fact (which will be apparent, also, from our citations hereafter,) that when the Reformed divines do attempt to philosophize on the subject, the philosophical theory of Dr. Baird finds incomparably more favor with them than the philosophical theory of antecedent imputation: which is logically subversive of the fundamental principles of their acknowledged theology.

† Southern Presbyterian Review, April, 1860, pp. 181, 188, 189.

has no bearing on the subject, and even if its application were admitted, it could in no way help his assumption. For while God is the author of the constitution and course of nature, and established it at the outset — according to the principles of his unalterable holiness and justice, and for reasons entirely in harmony therewith — its practical development, so far as his rational creatures are concerned, is not determined by his direct and positive agency or efficiency; for they were created free. And the development (so to speak) of their moral status is not, therefore, to be attributed to his direct and efficacious operation. Dr. Thornwell will certainly concede this, for he most emphatically denies that God is the author, or, in any true sense, the originator of sin or moral evil. Now the results or consequences of that development, either for good or for evil, as they relate to the rational and accountable creature, do not either depend upon or originate from the mere will of God; but are results which accrue to the creature in exact accordance with the principles of eternal justice and holiness. This, too, we presume will scarcely be questioned; for in whatever way the will of God may be supposed to be concerned in the production of those results, it is not only because God, of his own will and pleasure, would have them so, but because it was perfectly consistent with immutable Justice and Truth and Goodness that they should be so. The production of the sinful posterity of Adam “instrumentally,” therefore, is by no means to be considered as attributable to God’s positive agency, in the same sense as the creation of our first parents, or as the creation of angels. For example, and speaking hypothetically: God might or might not create them. But having called the race into being, the disposal of it depends not on the mere *will* of God, but is determined, also, by his eternal rectitude and holiness. And while, according to those principles, therefore, the sin of our natural and covenant head and representative could not but result as it has resulted; and could not but lead to the production of a polluted and guilty and doomed race under the instrumentally creative hand of God himself; those same principles forbid the direct creation of a polluted and guilty and doomed creature. We think Dr. Thornwell will hardly deny this. And if so, where is the force of his fervid declamation on the subject?

13. It is an admitted principle of sound philosophy that upholding in existence requires the exercise of the same power in continuance which first called into being the object created. Dr. Thornwell will doubtless recognize the soundness of the principle. And if so, we would ask him, whether he would regard it as equally consistent with the holiness, justice and goodness of God to have, by his own immediate fiat, created the world and its inhabitants as they now are, as to have created them in their original condition? He admits the validity of the distinction in this case; and why not in the other? But suppose an individual were to press him with his own argument; and affirm that upholding and creating are in all practical respects one and the same, and proceed alike from God; and that as there is, therefore, no practicable difference between creating and upholding, God is, consequently, as truly the efficient and direct author of the world as it now exists, and of its present fallen and sinful condition, as he was of its original and holy condition? and that it makes no difference whether it has been brought into its present state *mediately* by the creature, or *directly* and efficiently by God himself, he is as fully the author of it in the one case as in the other—would Dr. Thornwell assent to this conclusion? If he would, let him do it frankly and openly; and assume an appropriate position amongst the advocates of the rejected and heretical supralapsarian scheme; or if he would not, then let him cease to employ such argumentation. But we are assured that he never would assent to any such conclusion. And for the same reason that he would not assent thereto, we cannot assent to his own conclusion above stated. And in direct opposition to that conclusion, therefore, we affirm it to be untrue that “if it were wrong for God to *create* man under guilt, it is wrong to *permit* him to be generated under guilt.”\* So that this prop in support of antecedent imputation must be abandoned; or, if it be retained, it must be in connection with the whole supralapsarian scheme, of which it is an essential part.

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\* This whole speculation, as is obvious from the very terms themselves employed by Dr. Thornwell, is based upon an utter ignoring of the distinction recognized in all true Calvinistic theology, between the *effective* and *permissive* decrees of God. The Supralapsarians have always ignored the distinction.

14. The following remarks of Dr. John Dick \* are so in point in this connection that we must lay them before our readers. Speaking in reference to God he says :

“ Absolute justice is defined to be the rectitude of his nature, by which all his proceedings are regarded. All his acts are conformable to his infinite purity and perfection. Those who maintain that he may subject an innocent creature to the greatest sufferings, are chargeable, in the first place, with transmuting rectitude into mere power, which is not a moral attribute ; and in the second place, with forgetting that power is not His only perfection. In respect of power, God might do any thing, because he is omnipotent ; but there are other properties of his nature, by which the exercise of power is limited. I do not mean to insinuate that creatures have any claim upon their Creator, and hold it to be high presumption to make use of any expression which imports that he is bound to bestow any favor upon them, prior to his own voluntary engagement. But God, if I may speak so, is a debtor to himself ; that is, he will never do anything which does not become him, which is not agreeable to his infinite perfection. Now, in the case which we are considering, his power is limited by his wisdom and goodness. As a wise Being, he would not inflict everlasting sufferings upon an innocent creature, *because this would lead to the conclusion that righteousness was not more pleasing to him than unrighteousness, and that the punishment of the guilty was rather an effect of arbitrary will than justice.* As a good Being, he would not render his own offspring miserable without a cause ; and to suppose that he might subject them to misery, and still be good, is to confound the ideas of malevolence and benevolence, as the hypothesis we are combating confounds those of justice and power. It is strange that some men should take an unnatural pleasure in giving awful and forbidding representations of God, and should imagine that they do honor to him by exalting one attribute at the expense of another, and exhibiting him in the character of an Almighty Despot.”

15. Turretin, unless greatly misunderstood, has most absurdly confused the Reformed theology by commingling the supralapsarian scheme with infralapsarianism, † so much so, that notwith-

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\* Lectures on Theology, vol. I., p. 254. Philadelphia, 1841.

† Such commingling, though scarcely avoidable in the early discussion of the fundamental principle of that scheme in the Reformed church, (that is, during the first century of the Reformation,) is wholly inexcusable since its



standing his formal rejection of the former, he may be fairly cited in support of both. And the same confusion is apparent in the theological system of all who claim to receive him throughout as the accredited exponent of Calvinism. Absolute reprobation and antecedent imputation, as sometimes asserted by him, cannot, as integral parts, be associated with infralapsarian theology. And we do not hesitate to say that any such association is, both logically and on Scriptural grounds, utterly impossible. This antecedent imputation, if admitted, must be regarded as the procuring cause of sin and moral corruption in the subjects of it, as really as the creabibitarian or supralapsarian decree of election and reprobation was admitted to be the procuring cause of the sin and fall, and of the salvation and damnation of men. In fact, and as already shown, it is only the extension of the same principle to another point of the same system. For if the human race have become guilty and corrupt — not because they sinned in and inherited the fallen nature of their federal and natural Head; but because God so accounted or constituted them; and because his accounting them so was penally the procuring cause of their actually becoming so — then, this imputation is as really and veritably the procuring cause of their guilt and sin, as absolute reprobation was admitted to be by the supralapsarian school. And hence, if that dogma be admitted, we must admit that God may, by arbitrary enactment and without regard to the immutable principles of goodness and justice, treat the innocent as penally guilty, make them partakers of moral corruption, and punish them forever in hell; which at once leads us back to the supralapsarian notion that morality is founded not on immutable justice, but on will. To such conclusions does this speculation lead, by claiming that holiness and justice, and the distinction between right and wrong,

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full development, and the condemnation of supralapsarianism by the Synod of Dort; since which time every man in the Calvinistic church, who lays any claim to intelligence and consistency in theology, is bound to avoid it entirely. Any accurate analysis of the principles which give character to the respective systems, evinces them to be irreconcilable. And a full recognition of the revealed doctrine pertaining to the Divine Justice and the Divine Will, so far from admitting any such commingling, shows, on the contrary, that it is wholly inadmissible. Twisse and Szydlovius saw and acknowledged this, and acted consistently.

truth and falsehood, are not, as existing in the Divine Mind, eternal and immutable. And it thus becomes the most pernicious of all heresies; destructive alike of all morality and religion.

16. The plea that these things are mere speculation, and relate to the philosophy of the understanding rather than to the science of morality, we have refuted already. And if such principles become the settled convictions of the understandings of men, men will act from those convictions. The illustrative instance given by Plutarch, in his life of Alexander of Macedon, is quite in point. After that monarch had, in a drunken revel, murdered his friend Clitus, and through the horrors of remorse consequent thereupon, was about to destroy his own life, Anaxarchus applied this philosophy of Protagoras to console him, and assured him (as Hobbes since has likewise maintained,) that a ruler could do no wrong; that his will was the rule for his subjects, and was the supreme law; and that, consequently, every thing he saw proper to do was right, and fit to be done. The application was legitimate; but was there ever a more atrocious principle asserted by either men or devils!

It were easy to furnish other instances, not very dissimilar, evincing the practical operation of this same principle. And such illustrations may serve to show how unfounded is the plea that a speculative error respecting the foundation of morals is of no practical account. We may adopt, and inculcate it, simply as a speculation with which the intellect alone is concerned; but what should hinder others, who may receive it at our hands, from thus reducing it to practice?

17. In Rom. v : 19, the Apostle, summing up the argument in vs. 12-18, clearly announces that "by the disobedience of one the many were constituted sinners;" *ἁμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάνθησαν οἱ πολλοί.\** This he announces *as a fact*. In the statement of the argu-

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\* It would be amusing, were not the subject of so serious a nature, to observe Dr. Hodge citing this passage, and referring to the analogy therein presented between Adam and Christ, to prove that men become *sinners* by antecedent imputation *in the same mode* in which they become righteous through Christ; and then, in the same connection, asserting that "to be guilty of another's sin *constitutes no one a sinner*;" and citing both Owen and Turretin to sustain the asseveration: "To be *culpæ alienæ reus* makes no man a sinner." (*Owen*.) "Christus propter imputationem . . . . non potest dici peccator, quod importet corruptionem

ment itself, however, (that is, in giving the premises,) he states also the explanatory fact, that "so death passed upon all men, because all have sinned." \* That is, *the reason or ground of the imputation or condemnation is subjective also, and must, of course, exist antecedently to the imputation or condemnation itself.* How it may exist in the case, is a matter of no practical moment, since we are assured of the fact that it does exist. Thus, for illustration, the reason for reprobation, (which is the exercise of Divine justice,) must exist antecedently to the reprobation itself; and must be found in the creature reprobated and doomed to death, and not only in mere will, or in the power to dispose of creatures without regard to their actual character and subjective desert. Nor is it true, as above shown, that this would, by parity of reason, require that the ground for election must likewise be found in the creature elected. Election is the exercise of mercy, while reprobation is the exercise of justice, as all infralapsarians affirm. And for the same reason, moreover, it is equally obvious that the reason for imputing guilt (for we assume that, of course, God never acts without the best and holiest of reasons,) must also exist antecedently to the imputation itself, at least in the order of nature. This, we presume, no one will dispute. Nor can the reason be found in the supposed prerogatives of will alone, which

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*inhærentem.*" (Turretin.) Surely, then, antecedent imputation, as asserted by Dr. Hodge, can have little to do with the Apostle's argument here: *for even admitting such imputation, it cannot constitute men sinners,* according to Dr. Hodge's own explanation. And then, as a further illustration of the impossibility of uniting the distinctive principles of the supra and infralapsarian theology, let it be noted, that the Apostle maintains a constant antithesis between the *gift by grace, or free gift,* and the *judgment or condemnation.* But Dr. Hodge makes the *condemnation itself a free gift*—as free as the gift of righteousness, instead of an actual and subjective desert; as though the exercise of vindictive justice with God were equally irrespective of subjective desert as the exercise of mercy. There never was a more remarkable error fallen into, as we shall show in our next essay, than that of Dr. Hodge in claiming that the exposition which he has given of the analogy in this passage, is, or ever has been, fundamental to Calvinistic Theology.

\* If this fact is likewise admitted, on what principle is it that Dr. Hodge asserts that inherent corruption is the penal consequence of Adam's sin alone? The words are πάντες ἥμαρτον. And so essentially active is ἀμαρτάνω in its very nature, that it has neither a middle nor passive voice: though in Hebrew the words FOR SIN include not only acts, but habits and defects.

could indiscriminately assign either righteousness to the sinner, or moral corruption to the sinless; since moral corruption, or spiritual death, is, by the Apostle in the above passage, plainly and emphatically declared to be a *judgment*, or *condemnation*— which thus connects it with the justice or moral nature of God, on the one hand, and, on the other, with the subjective desert of those upon whom it comes. The ground for the imputation of guilt must, therefore, be found in the subject to whom the guilt is imputed; since it is God's moral relation to the subject, and his relation to God as an infinitely good and holy and righteous Sovereign, that are concerned in the whole procedure. This rule or principle is universal in its application. The reason for the imputation of guilt to our blessed Redeemer existed antecedently to the imputation, and was found solely in our Redeemer himself; otherwise, as all must concede, it would have been an act of infinite injustice to impute it to him. It was found in His voluntary assumption of our suretyship. And the reason for the imputation of Adam's sin or guilt to his posterity, is found in the fact that the guilt was common; or, in other words, that he was their natural and federal head, and that they all sinned in and fell with him. The imputation, therefore, resulted not from a mere arbitrary will, which was at liberty either to impute or not impute in such a case; but the circumstances by virtue of these existing facts were such, that the holiness and justice and goodness of God demanded the imputation. We are not authorized to go beyond, or around, or under the fact; but must receive it in its simple fullness as announced by God. All admit freely that to have imputed the offense of Adam, or even of Satan himself, to the holy angels; and to have inflicted moral corruption as the penalty of such imputation; would have been utterly irreconcilable with what God has proclaimed respecting his moral nature. But why irreconcilable? Simply because there was no natural or moral headship, and no participation in the offense; and the mere imputation of guilt could neither have constituted such a relation, nor have rendered them partakers of the offense. In other words, there existed no antecedent reason or subjective ground why it should be done; and hence it were unjust to have based the reason on mere arbitrary will, or in the imputation it-

self. Imputation can never, of course, thus furnish a reason for itself. There must be a reason for it; and that reason, when guilt is imputed for condemnation, is to be found, not in the supposed fact that God, without any reason save his mere good pleasure or will, saw proper to impute; but (as Dr. Witherspoon remarks in a passage cited from him on page 426 of our former essay,) it must be found in the subject to whom the guilt is imputed; and must, of course, exist antecedently to the imputation itself—for otherwise it were absurd to name it a reason. Nor can it of itself, as above remarked, furnish the reason: that is, it cannot allege guilt to the charge of an otherwise guiltless creature, and then make that alleged guilt a ground for punishing him by an infliction of spiritual death, and then of treating him as a miserably corrupt and hell-doomed creature; for this, as is evident from the supposed case aforesaid respecting the angels, would be wholly unjust. *How* the posterity of Adam partake of his guilt, (and sinned in him, or when he sinned,) it is folly for any man to pretend to say.\* The *fact* that it is really and subjectively theirs, is all that we either know or need now know on the subject; and God will, at the proper time, make all the rest sufficiently plain. The knowledge of the fact has satisfied the vast

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\* "Moral evil, in the only form in which we are conscious of it, appears as the direct transgression of a law whose obligation we feel within us; and thus manifested, it is an act as real and as positive as any performed in the most rigid compliance with that law. *And this is the utmost point to which human research can penetrate.* Whether, in some absolute mode of existence, out of all relation to human consciousness, the phenomenon of moral evil is ultimately dependent on the addition or the subtraction of some causative principle, is a question, the solution of which is beyond consciousness, and therefore beyond philosophy. To us, as moral agents, capable of right and wrong acts, evil is a reality, and its consequences are a reality. *What may be the nature of the cause which produces this unquestionably real fact of human consciousness, is a mystery which God has not revealed, and which man cannot discover.*" Mansell, p. 338. And the fact that we have by nature this consciousness of guilt, and a consciousness that our nature itself is alienated from holiness and from God; viewed along with the declaration of the Apostle that *all sinned*, may, while it exposes the folly of human philosophy in attempting to penetrate the veil, teach us that we have not yet learned all that eternity will disclose to us even respecting ourselves. God has announced what facts of the case it is important we should know; and has also taught the use which should be made of them. Let us be content to learn and to practice the lesson.

majority of the great and good amongst the followers of Christ in all ages ; and it should be sufficient for us. God speaks of things as they are, according to the eternal principles of rectitude and truth. It is in accordance with these principles that he justifies the believing but penitent soul. When justified, such a soul is really and truly just in His sight. Its sins are blotted out, it becomes the partaker of a new nature, and is received into everlasting favor. Nor is there any propriety in attempting to avoid the force of this great truth, by objecting that such a soul is only formally and not inherently just ; for it is legally and truly just in the sight of God, according to the principles of eternal truth and righteousness ; is received and treated as just, according to those same principles ; and is rescued from its inherent ungodliness, by regeneration and sanctification through the operation of the Holy Ghost ; and becomes truly a child of God, and a member of his own family. The law has no claim, and never can have any claim, against it on account of transgression ; and on the unalterable principles of eternal rectitude God recognizes such a soul as really just, and can never regard it in any other light. And so, too, in respect to the posterity of Adam. They are really depraved, guilty, polluted and condemned, and their guilt is imputed to them according to precisely the same principles of eternal truth and rectitude.

18. It is universally conceded that God does not approve of that moral corruption which leads to the formal perpetration of crime, whatever may be supposed to be the connection which he may have with it under the providential government of his creatures : as, for example, in the case of the brethren of Joseph selling him into Egypt ; or that of the Jews putting to death our blessed Lord. But if the imputation of sin be antecedent, then, as must be conceded, it depends for its production upon his will, in the same sense precisely as the Supralapsarians assert in respect to the efficient production of sin by the decree of reprobation. Thus Adam sinned, say they, because God willed that he should sin. And the execution or accomplishment of this will is seen in the effect produced ; showing it to be not permissive, but efficacious, positive and direct. This has been abundantly evinced by the citations which we have presented from their approved

writings. The antecedent imputation of sin, therefore, (which is a direct penal infliction of moral corruption upon a creature otherwise free from it,) must depend solely upon the will of God, as is conceded — for it is admitted that it is not according to the principles of justice in the sense of retribution for subjective ill-desert; for there is no ill-desert prior to said infliction, except a merely putative ill-desert, asserted to be based on the mere pleasure and will of God; and to admit any other would, of course, destroy the whole doctrine of antecedent imputation. In what sense, therefore, can it be claimed by the advocates of this scheme, that God does not approve the moral evil which he of his mere pleasure thus freely bestows upon creatures otherwise free from it and from all actual ill-desert? He gives it freely, and where it is not deserved, as Dr. Hodge admits; and thus, of his own mere will, causing it to exist where it had not existed; and why not approve his work in this instance as well as in any other instance? He approves of the mercy which he freely bestows; and why not, then, of the moral corruption which, according to our antagonists, he bestows with equal disregard of subjective desert? Will the advocates of antecedent imputation please to say? To *claim* that such a procedure is in accordance with the principles of justice announced in the word of God, and practically recognized by the moral nature of man, is to deny the whole theory of antecedent imputation, since that justice obviously is concerned with subjective or actually existing desert, and not in any sense with the antecedent and efficacious production of such desert: and to admit that it is not according to justice, is to concede that the principle is unjust and false.

19. But on what principle is it to be pleaded that God imputes to or inflicts upon the guiltless creature moral corruption? Such a principle is nowhere found in the Bible. Of course, we admit that He may and does inflict suffering and calamity upon the righteous, even in love: but in such a case He never forsakes nor forgets them; and His love and presence sustain them therein. But this is not to be confounded with the doctrine that He may so charge guilt upon guiltless creatures, as to bring upon them the penalty of moral corruption, and leave them forever to the fearful and unavoidable consequences of such imputation. On

what ground, then, is such a principle to be asserted? Is it to glorify his Justice? But this cannot be; for justice deals with subjective character and desert; and not in their antecedent production. Is it to glorify his severity? and to evince the illimitable prerogatives of his almighty and sovereign Will? But can glory be derivable from such a source—the exercise of endless severity against the guiltless? or from a prerogative to disregard all subjective character in His creatures? What might become of the holy angels themselves, and of the redeemed, under its exercise? The design of God in revealing himself to his creatures is to draw forth and retain their affections, and to influence and develop their moral nature. And can this design be accomplished by such means—by thus leading them to believe that he is indifferent to the exercise of their affections, and to their moral character and desert? and also to believe that he may, after all, disregard all the principles of holiness, truth, and righteousness, which he has enjoined for their observance? This cannot be. Does the imputation, then, proceed from indifference? If so, what becomes of the moral nature of God? A moral nature cannot be indifferent to moral character, so as to pay no regard to it, and treat innocence as guilt, unless where innocence has voluntarily assumed the legal responsibilities of guilt. If it proceed not, therefore, from indifference; and cannot proceed from justice, (which is forbidden by the very terms of the argument,) nor from a desire to glorify the severity of God; from what can it proceed? Surely not from love or compassion; for this can scarcely be pretended. Could it proceed from hate? The thought is horrible; but let them who are responsible for it explain how the conclusion is to be avoided. This antecedent imputation severs the creature from innocence and from God, and brings him into a condition in which he will unavoidably hate God and holiness, and rebel against him; and continue to do so forever, unless where Mercy interposes and saves. The mere will and good pleasure of God, therefore, according to this dogma, brings the creature into this condition without regard to his subjective character: and as this Will or Good Pleasure is not herein actuated by indifference, or by severity, or justice, or love, what is the actuating principle? The sinless creature is treated as an enemy;



and through a wasteless eternity his whole existence is thus made an insupportable burden; and why? Let our antagonists answer; and in their answer let them likewise show that, while it might be proper for God to do this, it would not be proper for him to create men in order that they might be damned. And if the two are morally equal, let not the advocates of antecedent imputation any longer deny their adherence to the Supralapsarian scheme.

20. The Scriptural view of imputation is of the plainest and simplest character. It is declared to be gratuitous, and without any personal or subjective desert of the creature in every instance where the mercy of God is concerned; and what is thus adjudged is a pure and gracious gift of God. But, on the contrary, it proceeds upon the creature's personal or subjective desert in every instance where the justice of God is concerned; that is, where that justice expresses itself in condemnation. The same thing also is true in the analogous case of predestination to life and death. Predestination to life is always gratuitous and immediate; that is, it is the bestowment of a gift, without any reference to subjective merit on the part of the elected: nay, it excludes all such merit or desert; while predestination to death is always mediate, and proceeds upon the subjective desert of the reprobate. The one is the operation of mercy, and the other of justice. The one is inconsistent with subjective desert; the other demands it. And this is alike true in the case both of imputation and predestination.

21. And (if I may be allowed a brief digression,) here is the appropriate stand-point from which to contemplate the different principles underlying the conflicting theologies of Supralapsarianism, Pelagianism, and Infralapsarianism or Calvinism. Supralapsarianism avers that, in regard to both mercy and judgment, or the salvation and damnation of men, God acts without regard to subjective desert. Neither election nor reprobation, neither the imputation of sin nor the imputation of righteousness, has reference to subjective or personal desert; but to the mere will and good pleasure of God alone.

In contrast with this, the Pelagian school, with its endless concatenation of Remonstrants, Semipelagians, Socinians, &c., assumes that election and reprobation, the imputation of sin and

of righteousness, are in neither case to be referred to God's sovereign will and pleasure, (except so far as he accepts the good and rejects the bad,) but simply to the subjective desert of the creature in both cases:—that election is not unto faith and good works, but on account of foreseen faith and good works: and that as reprobation is for sin and impenitence, so election is for obedience and penitence. In other words, that it depends upon the creature himself whether he shall become a subject of the converting and regenerating grace of God, or whether he shall be the subject of retributive justice. But the Infralapsarian or Calvinistic theology, in direct contrast with both, teaches that as election is the work of God's goodness and mercy, so reprobation is the work of his justice and holiness: and so also with respect to the imputation both of sin and righteousness. The one is without, and (in its very terms) contrary to subjective desert, for it depends upon the free mercy of God whom he will elect, or to whom he will impute the righteousness of Christ; and hence, it depends upon his mere good pleasure and will, without any foresight of faith or of good works. But reprobation, and the imputation of sin to condemnation, do not, in any such sense, depend upon his mere will; for in this case the subjective demerit or desert of the creature is taken into the account. In other words, no creature is reprobated, or has sin imputed for condemnation, unless he is subjectively guilty; and on account of that subjective guilt deserves such reprobation or imputation. The one is of mercy, the other is of justice. This is the Calvinistic system as distinguished from both the foregoing. And it will be observed, moreover, that—while both the Scriptures and the Reformed theology attach two distinct meanings to the word impute, (as we have shown in our former Essay, pp. 395, 396 and 418,) the one mediate and subjective, the other antecedent and immediate—the supralapsarian scheme admits of but one in its explication of the doctrine; and in the imputation of both sin and righteousness merges the two meanings into one, by making the imputation immediate alone. The Pelagian scheme in like manner merges the two meanings into one, by making the imputation in both cases purely mediate and subjective. And thus both schemes, by separating what God has joined together, not only

fail to meet the conditions of the meaning of the term as expressly given in the Scriptures, but are obliged to wrest and pervert the Scriptures themselves in their support. But Calvinism, on the contrary, recognizes both meanings in explicating the doctrine, as above shown; and so meets and fulfills the conditions required.

22. The repeated asseveration of Drs. Hodge and Thornwell, that no view of imputation can be accepted as true which will not apply to the elucidation of the three points—to-wit, the imputation of Adam's sin to us; of our sins to Christ; and of his righteousness to us—is without any foundation.\* The whole work of Christ in assuming our legal responsibilities, is, confessedly, supernatural, and unlike any thing that has ever occurred under the Divine administration. As to this point, therefore, there is no such analogy whatever, (as we have shown in Essay I., p. 424;) and there can be no ground for claiming such analogy to exist. On the other points, however, it may be conceded, if not *in modo* yet *in re*: that is, it must be received as a fact, that the sin of our natural and moral head is imputed for condemnation to all his natural seed, and the righteousness of Christ for justification to all his covenanted seed. But we are not constituted sinners by the imputation of Adam's sin alone, but by our sin in him; or, in other words, by that union with him which involves a participation of his guilt and corrupted nature. The two are inseparable. And we are not constituted righteous by the imputation alone of Christ's righteousness; but also by virtue of that union which constitutes us legally one with him. † In other words, no soul is ever condemned under the lasting displeasure and curse of God, merely on account of the disobedience of Adam; and no soul is ever saved merely on account of the obe-

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\* Our attention has been directed to this thought by a learned and valued friend, whom we should be gratified to be permitted to name in the connection.

† It is sad to contemplate the fact (though it is precisely what may be legitimately expected,) that this precious doctrine of the believer's union with Christ, is already beginning to be disparaged and set at naught by some of the loudest advocates of Dr. Hodge's exposition of Rom. v: 12-21. We know that *he* does not undervalue the doctrine, and why then should they? May not the solution be found in a passage (already referred to) in *Princeton Essays*, I., p. 127,

dience of Christ. Something more is, in each case, necessary. These points are, we believe, fully conceded by our brethren. So that the imputation of either the one or the other does not, in either case, save or damn without a vital union between the representative and the represented. The one must be a partaker of the fallen nature of his Representative, and so become a subject of condemnation before he is condemned; and the other must, by a vital union with his Representative, become a partaker of his unfallen nature by the power of the Holy Ghost, (comp. Luke i: 35,) before he can be saved: and he must thus become both legally entitled to salvation, and fitted for it through this union: which, in other words, involves not only justification, but regeneration as completed in sanctification. To confound justification with sanctification is an error; and to separate them so as to suppose that (in relation to fallen man) one may exist without the other is also an error. In the economy of redemption the existence of the one always supposes the existence of the other. So in regard to original sin. To separate imputation from moral corruption so as to make the first *causative* of the second is an error; for the one presupposes the other, and they ought always to be so regarded and treated.\* And the doctrine of Original Sin, therefore, can never be scripturally explicated except on the ground of a full recognition both of the federal and natural headship of Adam; or of both imputed and inherent sin. By ignoring the first we sink helplessly into Pelagianism, and, ultimately, into Socinianism; and by ignoring the second, we rush headlong into the Supralapsarian scheme.

23. Turretin, singularly enough, resorted to the scheme of antecedent imputation (when he does resort to it, which is not

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\* Dr. Hodge (Princeton Essays, I., p. 149,) endeavors to make much of the remark of the Leyden Professors, that "Imputation being denied, inherent corruption cannot be just:" and he adds, "So Turretin and Calvinists generally argue; of course imputation is antecedent to corruption." But Dr. Hodge should have likewise stated that those divines equally held that *inherent corruption being denied, imputation cannot be just: for such is the fact.* And if we should argue from this that they held that imputation was only mediate, we should treat them as unfairly as Dr. Hodge has done. He is equally unfair to "Turretin and Calvinists generally," as we shall fully show in our next Essay.

always,) in order to vindicate the justice of God; as the Schoolmen resorted to the notion that morality is founded on Will, to exalt and magnify the power and sovereignty of God. He was a man of deep and undoubted piety, and deeply imbued with the literature of his age. He regarded a native disposition to sin in the light of a penalty or punishment; and assuming that this could not be consequent upon subjective demerit or sin, he regarded it as the result of antecedently imputed sin; and thus he felt that the justice of God was vindicated.\* But it should have occurred to Turretin that, having admitted the immutable rectitude and justice of God as an element into his argument, he was bound so to respect it as to carry it consistently throughout the argument: for, assuredly, if it militate against Divine justice to cause mankind to inherit moral corruption without guilt, it militates against it equally to constitute them guilty in order that they may inherit such corruption, and so become obnoxious to retributive justice. If our own moral nature and convictions of right ought not, as Turretin concedes, to rest satisfied with the former hypothesis, the same, or equally valid, reasons evince that we should not be satisfied with the latter. The admission, therefore, that the justice of God should be vindicated in the view of rational creatures, (which is here taken for granted by Turretin, †) is as fatal to his own scheme as it could possibly be to any scheme to which he takes exception. In fact, he has attempted to vindicate it by a theory which, as it appears to us, is wholly at war with all that God has taught respecting his justice; and as utterly irreconcilable to all human jurisprudence, and to all the dictates of sound reason. And the only proper resort, therefore, is to leave the whole matter just where God has left it; and to accept the facts in the case on the Divine testimony. That testimony announces that mankind have become veritably polluted and guilty, both by the disobedience of Adam, and by their own participation therein; and that, therefore, God justly treats them

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\* His procedure herein strikingly resembles that of Gomar at the Synod of Dort, who sought to vindicate the justice of God in absolute reprobation by saying that he first predestinated men to sin, and then predestinated them to death in consequence of sin. See our former Essay, p. 411.

† See Instit. Theol., Loc. 9, Quæst. 9, Sec. 21. Works, vol. I, p. 562.

as polluted and guilty. It explains not how they participate, but only states the fact that *all sinned*, and there leaves the matter. We may believe the fact, or we may disbelieve it, if so disposed. But God has communicated to us all that he will communicate on the subject, in the present stage of our being.

24. Every attempt to philosophize on the subject—of which we have such signal instances and failures in the late work of Dr. Baird; and in the Reviews of it by Drs. Hodge and Thornwell—ought to be utterly and forever discountenanced by the Church of God. It is a fact with which Philosophy has nothing to do, for it is as far removed from her province and scrutiny, as any other mystery in the Providence of God. And to introduce now the philosophical dogmatisms which every where pervade the work of Dr. Baird on the subject; and also the speculations of his Reviewers; can lead only to the perplexing of the Church—for in every sense of the terms it is “a darkening of counsel by words without knowledge.” The Realists and the Nominalists have already had their day; and it was a long one. But it is past, and has long been passed: and in surveying the scenes of their boasted conquests, we find that they have settled nothing, except that it is absolute folly for human philosophy to attempt to obtrude herself with her vaunted dogmatisms into the sacred province of Revealed theology. This point they have settled, as we might reasonably have hoped, forever; until the discussion referred to awoke the apprehension that our most gifted men may, after all, be too wise to profit by the unhappy experience of the past: and that perishing souls may again have their attention called away from the contemplation of their own lost estate, and of the proffer of mercy through a crucified Saviour, to questions and strifes, which, while they edify not, exhaust the energies, and impair the piety and christian spirit of the Church of God. And as the only available preventive we have wished, by the present discussion, to place the whole question upon its legitimate basis, and to invite attention to the real issues involved.

In another Essay we shall conclude the argument, and lay before our readers the views entertained by the Reformed church on the subject of *Imputation and Original Sin*. L.

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# DANVILLE REVIEW.

CONDUCTED BY

An Association of Ministers.

MARCH, 1862.

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DANVILLE, KY.

PRINTED FOR THE ASSOCIATION AND SOLD BY

MOORE, WILSTACH, KEYS & CO.,

25 WEST FOURTH STREET,

CINCINNATI.

SOLD ALSO BY WM. S. & A. MARTIEN, PHILADELPHIA; ROBERT CARTER &  
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KEITH & WOODS, ST. LOUIS; BIBLE AND  
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# DANVILLE REVIEW.

No. I.

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MARCH, 1862.

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ART. I.—*Reason and Faith; or, the right use of Reason with regard to Revelation.*

ON no subject is there put forth more confused and crude thought joined to arrogant pretension, more ignorance and superficiality united with presumptuous claims to superior wisdom, than on that of Reason and Faith—their relation the one to the other, and the nature, limits and legitimate sphere and use of each. By a certain class of persons, not few in number, the independence and almost, or quite, divinity of reason is boastfully asserted, and set over against an unquestioning faith in the word of God. They set reason up above that Word, put it in the stead of the Spirit of God himself, and make it the supreme arbiter of truth—forgetting that its only legitimate province is to find out and deal with the facts that are, and as they are. To know the truth is to be free. John viii: 32. What a man may assert, however boldly, is nothing to me. I want—not his opinion, not what, in his judgment, ought to be—I want to know what is the fact. Fact, and not opinion, or the pretended oracular utterances of deified reason, is that which will stand. Notwithstanding some men may affect to despise it, and no matter though it may seem humble and unpretending, as did the Truth himself when he appeared the Word made flesh, fact,



ART. III.—*Imputation*.\*

## PART III.

## IMPUTATION AND ORIGINAL SIN.

IN our *first* Essay the following facts were affirmed: 1. That the Reformed or Calvinistic Church has never attached any importance to the order in which the topics *guilt* and *corruption* are stated, in their relation to the doctrine of original sin, and of course never entertained the dogma that inherent corruption is consequent upon immediate imputation; and 2. That it never, in any such sense, admitted the distinction made by Dr. Hodge and Placeus in treating the subject; and 3. That the dogma of immediate imputation, as presented by Dr. Hodge, never was entertained by the Calvinistic Church, but is, on the contrary, a relic of the old exploded and rejected Supralapsarian scheme. In our *second* Essay we have shown that this scheme is, in all its essential features, utterly irreconcilable with both the

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\* Published with some reference to the Tractates mentioned in the note at the beginning of Essay I, (see *Danville Review*, Sept., 1861, p. 390.) Through an oversight, we omitted to remark at an earlier stage of the discussion, that if we err in assuming the correctness of the universal impression that Dr. Hodge is the author of the three articles on Imputation, republished from the *Princeton Review* in vol. I of the *Princeton Essays*, and which he appears to us substantially to admit in the *Princeton Review* for April and October, 1860, (in his Remarks upon the views of Dr. Baird), we shall correct the error on being apprized of it. Those essays have greatly enhanced the reputation of Dr. Hodge as a theological writer, and though universally ascribed to his pen, he has never publicly disowned them. A general and very indefinite statement on the subject, like that in his controversy with Dr. Park, can not be thus construed in view of the facts which appear so clearly to indicate the contrary; and there appears to be something very like disingenuousness in that whole statement. Dr. Park had abundant reason to ascribe to Dr. Hodge the four essays which he does ascribe to him; but if he were mistaken, why could not Dr. Hodge have plainly said so? and if he were not mistaken, why attempt, by innuendo, to convey the contrary impression? See pp. 626-628 of Dr. Hodge's "Essays and Reviews," containing his three essays in reply to Dr. Park; and compare the statements in those pages with those contained in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for 1852, pp. 214-216.

spirit and the theology of Calvinism, and that consequently an intelligent and consistent reception of the Calvinistic system necessitates an utter repudiation of the fundamental principle of Supralapsarianism, not only in the abstract, but in its application likewise to the doctrines both of reprobation and imputation. But here we are met by the perpetually repeated asseveration of Dr. Hodge, that the doctrine of imputation, (that is, antecedent and immediate,) as explained and asserted by himself, is the doctrine of the Reformed Church, as announced in their acknowledged symbols of doctrine, and by the testimony of their leading divines. The issue raised by Dr. Hodge is, therefore, a very plain one, for the question involved therein is one of simple fact, and can be satisfactorily decided by adducing fairly and fully the testimony referred to. This we shall proceed to do, after a few preliminary remarks which are called for in the connection.

As to our own views of the subject, the rules of fair and honorable discussion require that they be stated, since neither Dr. Hodge, nor Dr. Thornwell, nor Dr. Baird, (with each of whom, it seems, the Reformed Church is so unfortunate as to disagree,) has shrunk from the free expression of the doctrine he entertains on the subject. The view we entertain has been elicited, though not fully, in the course of the discussion, and to prevent misapprehension it will be proper to express it more definitely; after which it will be in place to call attention to some of the specific statements of Dr. Hodge, in relation to the whole subject, so that our readers, in approaching the testimony we are about to adduce, and in contemplating the long array of witnesses adduced by Dr. Hodge, may be able to do it with a clear perception of the actual and specific and not merely the general issues involved.

While, therefore, we deny utterly that any antecedent or immediate imputation of the *culpæ alienæ reus* can so constitute the guiltless or innocent creature involuntarily guilty as to render him morally corrupt, and so entitle him justly

to the desert of moral corruption, we affirm that there is a plain and radical difference between the doctrine which teaches that the guilt or sin of Adam was imputed to his posterity, and that which teaches that Adam's posterity were merely involved along with him in the calamities or consequences of the Fall.\* The latter doctrine is wholly inconsistent with any just claim to Calvinistic soundness. And in order to place in their true light some of the unfounded imputations of Dr. Hodge against those who have ventured to dissent from his views, we further affirm that a person may be *justly punished* for sin of which he is personally not guilty, as in the case of our blessed Lord and Redeemer. In fact, the distinction observed in the typical sacrifices of the Old Testament between the *sin-offering* and the *guilt-offering*, (a fact very generally overlooked in the discussion of the subject,) clearly shadows forth the same idea. An offering was appointed for guilt, and another and different offering was appointed for sin.† The legal responsibility for sin may therefore rest where the moral corruption and guilt of the personal act do not rest; for otherwise such a distinction in these typical references to our Lord and Redeemer is inconceivable. And hence nothing can be more shallow than the common assumptions against the doctrine of imputation. Grotius, in relation to the satisfaction of Christ, truly says: "Non esse simpliciter injustum aut contra naturam pœnæ ut quis puniatur ab aliena peccata."‡ But these things are, on no account, to be associated with the aforesaid dogma, that an innocent or guiltless creature may be, by antecedent imputation, constituted morally corrupt, and so be made an heir of hell, as the punishment of another's sin, without any consent or concurrence of his own, and without any connection, by participation or otherwise, with that sin. And hence to adduce such considerations in support of that dogma is unfair and absurd.

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\* See this point illustrated by Weissmann, in his *Theologica Institutiones*, p. 425, and by Turretin, vol. I, pp. 561, 562.

† This point is well illustrated in vol. II, pp. 212-216 of Dr. Muller's late work on Sin.

‡ De Satisfactione Christi, cap. 4, opp. tom. IV, p. 312.

Adam of course *existed before God entered into covenant with him*. And, as this will not be denied, so it is equally certain, that he was the natural head of his posterity before he could possibly become their covenant head.\* His natural headship, therefore, in the order of both nature and time, takes precedence of his covenant headship. Dr. Hodge must, as a matter of course, admit this; for he technically admits the twofold relation of Adam to his posterity. We say technically, because his doctrine logically ignores the natural headship in its almost universally conceded relation to the doctrine of original sin. These relationships, moreover, are not to be confounded with each other, for they are essentially distinct and different. The moral headship, however, implies the existence of the natural, necessarily; but not *vice versa*; for the natural headship might, by hypothesis, be supposed to exist without the federal; for it did exist before the federal existed. To ignore the natural headship of Adam, therefore, as antecedent imputation logically does, in explicating the doctrine of original sin (for it makes its transmission to be *neque per corpus, neque per animam, sed per imputationem*), is plainly as much an inversion of the true order of things, to say the very least, as it would be to ignore the federal headship in explicating that doctrine. In fact it is without any reason, as the circumstances of the case themselves evince. For had there been no covenant with Adam, he would yet have been the natural head of his posterity; and by virtue of this connection all who, by natural descent, should become partakers of his nature, must be partakers of that condition thereof into which he would have brought it, either by persistence in his integrity, or by transgressing the legal precept. Gen. ii: 17. The law is not to be confounded with the covenant, nor the covenant with the law. When God entered into covenant with Adam he was already a

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\* See this point stated with great precision and clearness in the first volume of Dr. Breckinridge's *Theology*, pp. 461-482: and handsomely defended by Dr. Thornwell, in his very able review of that work, in *Southern Presbyterian Review* for 1860, pp. 192-205.

subject of law. And the covenant containing the promise of still higher blessings than he already possessed, found him in this condition; and thus his moral or federal headship was, so to speak, superadded to his natural headship. By his transgression of the law he forfeited not only the continuance of his present blessings, which the law would have secured to him on obedience, but he violated his covenant likewise, and forfeited also all its promised blessings. The forfeiture of the covenanted mercies, therefore, was entirely consequent upon his transgression of the law under which he stood when he, as the natural head of his posterity, entered into the covenant relation. On what principle is it, therefore, that we should regard the simple forfeiture of these covenanted blessings as the basis on which to explicate the whole doctrine, which includes in the fullest manner all his natural and legal relations, or headship? and so, in effect, at least, to ignore these altogether. The covenant relation may, so to speak, arise out of the natural relation; but the natural can not, even by hypothesis, arise out of the covenant relation, and when Adam's existence began, then, of course, began the natural headship of his posterity. It is obvious, therefore, that if the distinction adopted as the basis of their theological explications, by both Placæus and Dr. Hodge, is to be made; and, if the doctrine of original sin is to be explicated from the standpoint either of *mediate* or *immediate* imputation; instead of being explicated, as we insist it should be, on the ground of a full and equal recognition of both, it is incomparably more reasonable to explicate it from the natural and legal relationship of Adam to his posterity, than from that which is merely an adventitious arrangement; an arrangement which, whether made or not made, must, in the very nature of the case, leave the natural and legal relationship as it was, and wholly undisturbed. We hold, however, as already stated, that the distinction ought not to be made, as Dr. Hodge and Placæus make it, in treating the subject; that is, as representing Adam's personal sin alone as *causal* of the moral corruption of the race;

or this corruption as causal of the imputation of Adam's sin (neither of which expresses the doctrine of the apostle, or the views of the Reformed Church); but that the doctrine of original sin can be truly explicated only by recognizing the existence of both, and the influence of both in procuring the existing results to the race. In other words, the guilt was common; and therefore the imputation of the Adamic sin, and of our own subjective guilt, are to be viewed, not as cause and effect, as Dr. Hodge will have it, but that Adam's guilt, and our own guilt, are to be viewed as synchronically existing (as the principle of representation itself fully evinces, and as Paul most plainly declares); the imputation not being antecedent to, or causal of the guilt, but coetaneous therewith, and based upon the facts whose existence is clearly recognized and announced by God, Adam being both our natural and federal head, and we sinning in and falling with him. So that, to use the language of one of the most eminent of the Leyden divines, Walæus, who was appointed by the Synod of Dort to draw up its canons, the guilt of the first sin, and our own inherent guilt, are connected, and beget a common guilt.\*

We may illustrate this whole subject by adverting to the fact that Drs. Hodge and Placæus, though agreeing to make the distinction aforesaid, are not only in antagonism to each other, but are both equally in antagonism to the Reformed Theology. The fact, moreover, is an interesting one, and has a direct bearing upon our general subject. The antecedent imputation against which Placæus wrote, is defined by him to be "that imputation whereby the act of Adam in eating the forbidden fruit is truly and immediately charged upon his whole posterity, Christ alone being excepted; and on the ground that they are his posterity, this his act is,

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\* "Sed dicimus hæc duo esse connexa, et communem reatum gignere, qui peccatorem ad pœnam ejusdem generis obligat: quia reatus primi peccati ad condemnationem . . . . . non potest posteris imputari nisi mediante illâ peccati inhærentis vitiositate." p. 151 of his Reply to the Censure of Corvinus (the Arminian) on Molinæus' *Anatomy of Arminianism*.

antecedently to inherent corruption, imputed for a twofold punishment properly so called, to wit: the privation of original righteousness, and eternal death." This is the dogma against which he wrote; \* and, as remarked in our Second Essay, his aim was to resist the approach of Supralapsarianism which was seeking to regain its position in the theology of the Church under the guise of a superior zeal for the doctrine of original sin. Walch, already referred to, as quoted by De Moor, expressly says, "Placæus at first rejected the imputation of the Adamic sin; but after the Synod of Charenton, in 1645, condemned the sentiment, he, in 1655, *put forth a more distinct explication of his views*; and made a distinction between immediate and mediate imputation, *the former of which may depend from the will of God and*

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\* In referring to Placæus, Dr. Hodge remarks, (Princeton Essays, vol. I, p. 195,) that after the decision of the third Synod of Charenton against his views, he invented the distinction between immediate and mediate imputation. Now, the standing rule of the National Synods did not permit him to write again without leave; which having obtained some years afterward, he, in 1655, published the work in which he makes this distinction, and expressly declares that the decision aforesaid of the Synod did not conflict with the views he entertained and inculcated. And our readers will please to observe, that at the very next national Synod, that of Loudon, in 1659-1660, (of which the celebrated John Daille was moderator,) which was likewise the next national Synod after that of Charenton in 1644-1645, the matter of the aforesaid decision in respect to Placæus was reconsidered; whereupon the following act was passed: "On reading that article of the last national Synod concerning original sin, divers provinces *demanding with great importunity that the Assembly would be pleased to moderate it*; this decree was made: That for the future all Pastors and Proposans [Candidates] who should offer themselves to the holy ministry, *shall be only obliged to subscribe to the 10th and 11th articles of the Confession of Faith held by all the Reformed Churches of this kingdom*; and in the meanwhile all persons are forbidden to preach or print anything against the imputation mentioned by the said Synod in that article before named, nor shall anything more or less be changed in it." *To this article, as above stated, Placæus expressly declares that he does not object.* Neither Turretin nor De Moor make any allusion to this last action: though without it, as every one can see, the representations which they make of Placæus are partial and distorted, and of course unjust to the memory of a great and good man. The articles of the Confession (10th and 11th) referred to in this last action of the Synod, will be found in their place in our subsequent citations.

*arbitrary law," etc.* This last clause evinces that it was the direct aim of Placæus to oppose the encroachments of Supralapsarianism. Weissmann, however, in his History of the Church during the seventeenth century, explains precisely the *positive ground* which Placæus assumed, to wit: that though he recognized both the moral and natural headship of Adam, HE PLACED THE NATURAL HEADSHIP BEFORE THE MORAL. "*Ita ut non tam de re ipsa, quam de modo quæstio fuerit; hæcque tandem eo recidat, cum Adamus caput naturale et morale fuerit totius generis humani, quænam ex duobus his relationibus præcedat, atque alterius sit fundamentum? statuente Placæo, naturale præcedere morali, atque ideo imputari peccatum Adami posteris, quia in ipso quoad radicem et naturam fuerunt.*" Precisely here was the error of this truly great and learned divine; and precisely here, though in the opposite direction, is the error of Dr. Hodge; *for he*, in like manner, *places the moral relation before the natural.* The Reformed Theology, however, does not place either relation *before* the other; but regards both equally and synchronously in explicating the doctrine of original sin. The error of Placæus is that of the New England school; and if followed out must ignore the moral headship of Adam, and the imputation of his sin, and lead into Pelagianism; and the error of Dr. Hodge tends to a like ignoring of the natural headship of Adam, and of the great fact that we sinned in and fell with Adam in his first transgression; and to lead directly into Supralapsarianism. Hence it is not remarkable that the celebrated Arminian Professor, Le Clerc (†1736), who succeeded Limborch, applauded the position assumed by Placæus; and Dr. Hodge may well ponder, in relation to his own position and its results, the excellent observations to which we have referred in our former essay.\*

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\* Zuinglius also, in opposing the antecedent imputation dogma of the Papal divines, fell into the error similar to those attributed to Placæus, as may be seen by several citations from his writings in our First Essay, pp. 556, 557. And we may here remark, in passing, that the work of Rivetus (so often referred to by Dr. Hodge) on the Placæan controversy, and as Dr. Hodge's citations



Paul, in Rom. v: 12-21, as we have shown, makes a clear and definite distinction between the two great facts, which he announces respecting the first sin; to wit: the fact that Adam sinned, and the fact that all sinned—the fact that by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and the fact that because all sinned, death has passed upon all. The offense was *one*, in one sense, and in another sense it was many offenses. It was the sin of Adam, and yet every one of his naturally-begotten posterity sinned likewise.

The apostle merely announces these facts, and adopts them as the basis of his argument, without attempting to explain them on the philosophical principles of tradition, antecedent imputation, identity of personality, or anything else. The facts are, that Adam sinned, and that all sinned; and these facts are given as the reason why guilt was imputed to all, and why, as a consequence, the judgment and

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from it abundantly evince, was not written in defense of *antecedent* imputation, but solely to show that the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity was universally held by the Reformed Church. And, moreover, the error of Dr. Hodge, in averring that the view of Edwards (in the "one place" to which he excepts) is precisely that of Placæus, may now be seen by comparing the two. Placæus places the natural headship of Adam *before* the moral; but Edwards, while he justly remarks, that if either must be placed before the other, and that if either sin and imputation is to be viewed as *causal*, it would be more reasonable to regard sin as producing the imputation, rather than imputation as producing the sin; goes on to show, by adducing at great length the exposition of Stapfer, what is the position which he himself assumes, to wit: *that it is injurious to separate one from the other in any such way.* Edwards, therefore, did not separate the two, but regarded them as synchronously existing. But Placæus and Dr. Hodge do separate them, and therefore, while Edwards stands firmly upon the very center of Reformed doctrine, both Placæus and Dr. Hodge, though in opposite directions, have departed therefrom. At first Placæus was supposed to have denied imputation altogether, as is evident from the decision of the third Synod of Charenton in his case. (See our First Essay, pp. 402, 403.) And hence the treatise of Rivetus was written, as above stated, to show that the Reformed Church had ever admitted that doctrine. But after his explanation appeared, the succeeding Synod modified the decision, as above shown; yet insisting upon the doctrine of imputation as taught in their own standards, in which no distinction is attempted between *mediate* and *immediate* imputation.

death came upon all. This same statement runs through the whole theology of the Reformed Church, and is ignored only by some of the Supralapsarians, who persist, like Dr. Hodge (see Princeton Essays, I, pp. 186-189), in attempting, on the principles of their philosophy, to show that the sinful act of Adam, and our own sin and fall in Adam, are one and the same in the apostle's argument; and that the sin of Adam, irrespective of our own sin and fall, or subjective guilt, is antecedently imputed to us for condemnation. Their design in this procedure is obvious. They need the conclusion in order to be able to deduce the corollary that it is for the sin of Adam alone that pollution and death have come upon all his posterity. So that the doctrine of antecedent imputation was begotten by the Supralapsarian principle, after severing what God has joined together; and by ignoring just one-half of the statement of facts given by the apostle in Romans v.

The claim of Dr. Hodge, as asserted in the foregoing reference, that when the apostle says that *all sinned*, he means nothing more than that Adam sinned, and that his sin became the sin of his posterity by antecedent imputation, is without any real foundation. We will not contend with Dr. Hodge about a word; but a statement like this, based upon a clear ignoring of one of the great facts in the apostle's argument, demands something better to sustain it than mere assumption. We admit that he may plead the language of many divines, even of Walæus, Molinæus, or even of Placæus himself, when, in treating upon the subject in a popular style, the expressions are employed almost interchangeably. As illustrative of this popular mode of speaking, the sermon of President Davies, on Romans v: 12, may be referred to. But it is not to any such representation that a point like the one before us is to be referred, but to *strict theological usage*. And throughout Calvinistic theology, where the matter is carefully exhibited and expounded, it is always in this form; that the guilt of the first transgression was not Adam's alone, but common to him and his posterity,

all of whom participated in his guilt, and sinned and fell with him in his first transgression; and that hence all are treated as he was treated, as sinners, guilty and corrupt. His sin was their sin, in the clear and obvious sense that it was the expression of their own as well as of his guilt; and their sin, according to the representation of the apostle and of the Reformed Church, brought guilt and death upon themselves, as his sin brought guilt and death upon himself, and upon them. That is, they participated therein, the guilt was common; he sinned, and all sinned; and hence judgment and death passed upon all, the one offense being common to all. And as his act was confessedly not their act (as Dr. Hodge fully concedes), so his sin is not to be confounded with their sin, and *vice versa*; any further than the guilt of the Participator is to be confounded with the guilt of the Principal. It is, of course, common alike to both; but it is, at the same time, individual and distinct; for community of guilt does not destroy individual responsibility. Adam sinned, and was treated as a sinner. This is plainly affirmed. With equal plainness it is likewise affirmed that all sinned, and that all are treated as sinners. The fact is asserted, but it is not explained. And as God has left it unexplained, we have no right to insist on any explanation of our own as the only true one, and then that all are errorists who are unwilling to receive it at our hands. Hence, when Dr. Hodge assures us that the antecedent imputation of Adam's sin will explain the matter, we, while we are perfectly willing he should think so, object that he should insist upon the alternative that we, too, must think so, or be branded as errorists or heretics.

The idea of our really sinning in Adam, or when he sinned and fell, Dr. Hodge denounces, and attempts to hold up to ridicule (Princeton Essays, I, pp. 137-139, 172, etc.), simply because he insists on viewing the statement of this fact through his own vague and indefinite ideas of personality, insisting, that if we then sinned otherwise than imputatively, it must have been personally, and this he affirms to be utterly

impossible. Whether he means by this that all sin must consist in action, we shall leave him to say. But we can not here go into a discussion of personality, (nor is it needed, for the question is, What are the facts on the subject as announced in the word of God,) though we should be happy to discuss that matter with him on any suitable occasion; yet it may be well worth while for both Dr. Hodge and Dr. Thornwell to reflect seriously upon their dogmatical utterances in relation to this subject. The speculations of men who reject the doctrine of the Trinity in the Godhead, on the ground that they can attach no definite idea to a trifold personality in a unity of essence, may fairly be laid along side of the speculations which aver that the inconceivability of our sinning when Adam sinned is a just reason for either rejecting or explaining away the inspired announcement which asseverates the fact. See also Rom. iii: 9, 23; Gal. iii: 22, etc.

Dr. Hodge, by his philosophical theory of antecedent imputation, makes the sin of Adam really the sin of all men, averring as he does that the posterity of Adam, as such, inasmuch as they did not exist and sin personally, did not sin at all; and that therefore they did not as such, when Adam sinned, contract any subjective guilt whatever. For the personal sin of Adam was all the sin that was then committed; and that personal sin, says Dr. Hodge, became ours by antecedent imputation; and of course then, in the only sense which it seems possible to attach to the terms employed by Dr. Hodge, the posterity of Adam sinned not only when he did, but sinned the very sin that he did. For he alone sinned, and his sins were antecedently imputed to them for condemnation. And this is, of course, true of all his naturally begotten posterity, infants, idiots, and all, according to the argument of Dr. Hodge. Of whom then can it be said, with the apostle, that they sinned not after the similitude of Adam's transgression, and that yet the penalty of the law reigned over them because they were nevertheless guilty of the violation of law? verse 13. The reign of death over them

evinces that they had sinned and violated the law; and it is conceded that, in the sense in which Dr. Hodge employs the terms, they did not yet possess personality and moral agency; and yet they sinned, though not after the similitude of Adam's transgression. Of whom then is this true, according to the theory of Dr. Hodge? It is not true of any one of all the posterity of Adam; for they all sinned the sin that he did, (that is, in the only sense in which Dr. H. admits that they did sin,) and that sin brought the reign of death over all. The language, therefore, not only condemns utterly and directly the dogma of Dr. Hodge, but it is wholly inexplicable on the ground assumed by that dogma; while, on the contrary, it is perfectly intelligible on the principles asserted by the apostle, and recognized in the theology of the Reformed Church. We know not how the race sinned when Adam sinned. We know, however, upon the testimony of God, the fact that they did then sin; and that their sin was not after the similitude of his sin. *They* could not sin as a covenant head, though they participated in the guilt of violating the covenant: and more than these facts it is not necessary we should know on the subject.

It is, moreover, universally conceded that every rational individual of the human race, from the very beginning of the exercise of those powers which constitute moral agency, has a consciousness of subjective guilt, and of a positive alienation from holiness and from God. But it is perfectly apparent that the mere imputation of guilt could of itself bring no such consciousness. It did not bring it to Christ; and if Philemon had charged upon Paul the debt contracted by Onesimus, it could not have brought to Paul the consciousness that he himself had personally contracted the debt which Onesimus had contracted to Philemon. And neither does the imputation of the righteousness of Christ bring to the penitent and believing soul a consciousness that he had personally wrought out that righteousness. How then can the aforesaid consciousness of subjective guilt, which arises with the first dawn of our conscious moral agency, be

explained on the ground of an antecedent imputation of another's sin? Such imputation could bring with it no such consciousness; and the solution is to be found only in the fact asserted by the apostle, that *all sinned*. But to return.

The Calvinistic Church, therefore, without attempting to explain in any way *how* the human race sinned in their first father, acknowledge the fact, on the Divine testimony, that we did sin and fall in him; and also the other fact, that by the one offense death came upon all. And it is certainly remarkable that Dr. Hodge, in all his discussions of the subject, seems never to have really apprehended the issue actually involved in the question. In the doctrine of the Reformed Church, we find both facts fully and clearly recognized, that the sin of Adam, and our own sin in Adam, and the consequent moral corruption of our whole nature, are imputed to us for condemnation and death; and that this imputation, both immediate and subjective, is the ground upon which judgment has passed upon all. And thus both mediate and subjective imputation, (though with some variety of statement,) are fully recognized as inseparable; as Turretin himself frankly admits: "Nos vero cum orthodoxis *utrumque affirmamus*." \*

The same strange misapprehension, as it appears to us, runs through nearly all of Dr. Hodge's representations of the views of others on this subject. Hence he finds Edwards to be unin-

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\* Opp. Tom. I, p. 558, Loco. 9, Quæst. 9, Sec. 14, 15. The whole sentence is as follows: "Illi cum quibus hic agimus *vel negant absolute imputationem, vel mediatam tantum admittunt*: nos vero cum orthodoxis *utrumque affirmamus*, et dari imputationem, et eam esse immediatam et antecedentam." Dr. Hodge, in attempting to show that the doctrine of Edwards is precisely that which the third Synod of Charenton attributed to Placæus, (Princeton Essays, I, p. 150,) endeavors to justify the statement by the authority of Turretin; and, referring to the very passage from which we have just quoted, represents Turretin as saying: "The question is, whether his (Adam's) sin is imputed to his posterity with an imputation not mediate and consequent, but immediate and antecedent." And Dr. Hodge adds: "*It is of the LATTER he says, 'nos cum orthodoxis affirmamus.'*" Dr. Hodge has thus not only changed but *reversed* the statement of Turretin, by a direct assertion; and by the omission of a word, in order to sustain the assertion. Turretin says: "We, with the orthodox, affirm BOTH"

telligible and self-contradictory. Edwards makes the afore-said distinction clearly, and reasons from it as all the eminent divines of the Reformed Church have ever done. Like them, he speaks of *the sin* of Adam, and of *our sin* in Adam, and of the effects or consequences of both; and avers that the imputation of both by "the just judgment of God," brought the whole race under condemnation and sin. But Dr. Hodge, referring to his statements, represents him as saying that "depravity results from withholding special divine influences, and according to this passage, the withholding these influences is a just judgment FOR ADAM'S SIN," though Edwards, in the very passage cited by Dr. Hodge, expressly states that "All (men) are looked upon as sinning *in and with* their common root." Thus while Edwards asserts both facts, to wit: that Adam sinned, and that all sinned, and without any attempt here at philosophical explanation, proceeds to reason from both, Dr. Hodge represents him as acknowledging but one, and thus finds him so inconsistent with himself and contradictory, that he *is unable to reconcile his statement*. Because, as Dr. Hodge adds, "The one teaches immediate and antecedent imputation, which is the old doctrine; the other mediate and consequent, which the old writers considered as a virtual denial of that doctrine." And on the ground of this strange misapprehension, he would impair confidence in Edwards' great work, which for more than a century the whole Calvinistic Church has regarded as a most triumphant vindication of the doctrine of original sin.\*

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mediate and immediate imputation; Dr. Hodge, omitting the word *UTRUMQUE*, makes him say, and affirms that he does say, "We, with the orthodox, affirm immediate imputation." We have examined the earliest and the latest, as well as one or two intermediate editions of Turretin, and find the passage just as we have quoted it above. It would be doing great injustice to Dr. Hodge, however, to decide that either this, or any other of the repeated instances of a similar kind, to which we shall have occasion to refer in the course of this discussion, is not susceptible of an every way satisfactory solution, until he shall have had the opportunity of explanation, and has failed to furnish it.

\* See Princeton Essays, I, pp. 151, 152.

Another illustration of what would be regarded in most cases as incapacity or unwillingness to understand the truth, may be found in the Princeton Essays, I, p. 149, where Dr. Hodge repeats the asseveration that the Leyden divines aver that "Imputation being denied, inherent corruption can not be just." We have in our Second Essay, p. 611, briefly adverted to this. But Dr. Hodge so employs this statement as to make it refer to the imputation of Adam's sin exclusive of our own; whereas they refer the imputation just as Paul and the whole Reformed Church ever have done (except the Supralapsarian) to *Adam's sin, and our own sin in and fall with him*, making it immediate so far as relates to Adam's own sin, and mediate so far as it relates to our own. Hence though they held that "imputation being denied, inherent corruption can not be just," they also held that *inherent corruption being denied, imputation can not be just*, which is in direct antagonism to Dr. Hodge's whole view of the subject.\* And he thus makes those divines ignore one of the conditions of their own affirmation, and really say the very reverse of what they do say. For the imputation which they declare to be the just occasion and procuring cause of the present fallen condition of our race, it is the imputation of the sin of Adam and of our own sin in Adam; but with Dr. Hodge it is solely the antecedent imputation of Adam's own sin.

When the reformed divines speak of our being condemned for Adam's sin (not for his sin *alone*, as Dr. Hodge and the Supralapsarian school assert) the language is to be understood, as in the apostle's argument, as asserting that we are condemned because the guilt was common, and that our own guilt as well as his guilt was imputed to us for condemnation. In the Princeton Essays, I, p. 186-189, already referred to, Dr. Hodge has laboriously endeavored to show, in common with Supralapsarians, that the sin of Adam, and our own sin in Adam, are regarded as one and the same thing in

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\* Their own testimony will be adduced presently.



Reformed theology; but with what success will be apparent to our readers from the citations we shall present from their own testimony. The state of the case is just as we have presented it above. They admit both as facts, and explicate the doctrine of original sin from both, without any attempt (save in a very few instances) to philosophize thereupon. And, in fact, so clearly is this great truth announced in their theology, that even the Sulpralapsarians do not venture to depart from the common language respecting it; but endeavor as Dr. Hodge does, to reconcile it with their scheme, though on that scheme no definite idea can be attached to the language itself; since they make our guilt, that is, the guilt of Adam's posterity, not to be subjective, but the guilt of Adam's sin alone. In our First Essay, p. 414, an illustration of this is given in a passage cited from Beza, in which he traces our guilt to the fact that *we all sinned in our first parent*; and to the corruption which is the punishment of *this guilt*; and to the sins which *this root of corruption* brings forth. The same passage is likewise found word for word in Danæus, the colleague of Beza, who survived him nine years; and who was not a Supralapsarian, though strongly sympathizing with his colleague, in his views of theology. But Dr. Hodge, instead of being satisfied to receive the facts as they are divinely stated, endeavors to philosophize thereon, and to show that the two facts after all are but one, and so endeavors to make out his case by proving a point philosophically, which they would not recognize, and in the elucidation of which they, in general, regarded philosophy as of no account.

It certainly is strange that Dr. Hodge does not see that even on this very point his philosophy fails him, and leads to a conclusion the very reverse of his own. His favorite and reiterated illustration is the principle involved in the doctrine of representation; but it is wholly inconceivable that he should seriously endeavor to reconcile with that principle a denial of the aforesaid truth, to wit: that the guilt of the race is a common guilt, in which all alike are

involved by participation. He can not understand how we could have sinned *when* Adam sinned; neither can we understand the matter, though we are satisfied of its truth on the testimony of God. But this does not seem sufficient for Dr. Hodge, and hence he maintains, that as the testimony, literally taken, involves an absurdity, some other meaning must be attached to the terms in which it is presented; and hence he appeals, as above stated, in illustration of his view of the principle of representation as existing and recognized among men (see, for example, his *Essays and Reviews*, p. 68, note); asserting that, as on this principle, so in the case of Adam, the act of the representative is so far the act of the represented, that they are justly treated as responsible for it. But it never seems to have occurred to Dr. Hodge, to consider this illustration in its true bearing upon the case; for why, otherwise, could he have failed to see that (for example, where guilt is concerned or supposed) the guilt of the representative is imputed to the represented, *not antecedently*, and as *causal of their own guilt*, but simply because the guilt is regarded as *common*; and a common guilt, of course, involves participation. This is the real ground of the imputation, and of course it presupposes the existence of subjective guilt.

But Dr. Hodge, in order to tack about and break the center of the line of argument, of whose advance he seemed to have some conception, claims that if subjective desert be insisted on as the ground of condemnation, or of the imputation of guilt to condemnation, then it must be equally insisted on as the ground of justification, or of the imputation of righteousness to justification; and so adopts the Supralapsarian sophism already mentioned, that if sin be the ground of reprobation, faith and good works must be the ground of election. Nor is this all; for in his controversy with Dr. Park, as shown above, he acknowledges that both he and Dr. Park recognize alike the same principle in this matter, to wit: that "our calamities hang suspended on the sovereign purpose of Heaven;" the only difference being, that Dr. Hodge says, "indirectly, through the intervening

links of imputation, guilt," etc. (which also depend solely upon the sovereign will of God, according to Dr. Hodge), and Dr. Park says that they depend on his will "directly" (see Dr. Hodge's *Essays and Reviews*, pp. 618, 619). Both professors, therefore, clearly agree in explicating the matter from the mere will and sovereignty of God; and both alike recognize the fundamental error of the Supralapsarian school. The replication of Dr. Hodge, therefore, to the foregoing argument, and his insisting upon the sophism referred to, can have no weight in the minds of those whose Calvinism is not of the Supralapsarian type. And while we are on this point we may add, that it would be gratifying to know how Dr. Hodge would essay, on his principles, to escape from an open advocacy of the doctrine which the Supralapsarian school have based upon this principle, to wit: that God created a large proportion of mankind expressly to be damned; for if his principles lead to this, he is bound in all candor to abandon them, or else frankly to avow himself a Supralapsarian; and if they do not, he certainly should explain how the conclusion may be avoided. The imputation of Adam's guilt to his posterity is affirmed by Dr. Hodge to be solely antecedent and immediate, or "from without," and he claims that the posterity of Adam are as destitute of subjective desert as a ground for this imputation, as they are destitute of such desert as a ground for the imputation of the righteousness of Christ to justification; for they no more deserve subjectively the condemnation they receive for the sin of Adam, than the elect deserve, subjectively, the justification they receive for the obedience of Christ. And Dr. Hodge claims, moreover, that to deny this, is to invalidate the whole doctrine of salvation through the free grace of God. If this be so, it follows, therefore, in respect to those who are saved or rescued from this condemnation, that as it was always God's purpose to save or rescue them from it, (as Dr. Hodge will admit,) so, also, it was his eternal purpose to leave those to perish therein, who do perish. And, consequently, as the imputation of both guilt and righteousness is without sub-

jective desert, in either case, and depends solely upon the will of God in both cases, it follows, according to these principles, that it was God's eternal purpose that the reprobate should perish, without any regard to their subjective desert, as it was his eternal purpose that the elect should be saved, without any regard to their subjective desert. Hence God, of his own mere will and pleasure, created the reprobate, with the eternal purpose of consigning them, of his own mere will and pleasure, to everlasting death. This is the fair and logical conclusion from these principles, and thus the doctrine of antecedent imputation involves, necessarily, the adoption of the whole Supralapsarian scheme.

It is important, too, to notice in this connection, that Dr. Hodge, who, as we have shown in Essay II, p. 610, insists that no view of imputation is true that does not apply to the elucidation of the three points, to wit: the imputation of Adam's sin to us; of our sin to Christ; and of his righteousness to us; affirms, also, that as imputation makes no one a sinner, none of the race of Adam are ever condemned to endure the curse of the law, merely on account of the imputation of his sin. And yet he maintains, in opposition to the Grotian and Socinian schools, that Christ did really endure the curse of the law on account of the imputation of our sin to him.\* But Dr. Hodge should have seen that the two ideas can not be made to cohere; for if imputed sin, without subjective guilt, does not bring us under the proper penalty of the law, then on what principle can he aver, that Christ endured that penalty? And if it does bring us under that penalty, then, on what principle does he deny, that any one is condemned to suffer that penalty, on account of the imputation of Adam's sin? Dr. Hodge should frankly assume one or the other of these positions, for he can hardly maintain both. He must either concede, that Christ did not

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\* "The righteousness of Christ, therefore, *consisting in the obedience and death demanded by the law,*" etc. See Dr. Hodge's Review of Beman on the Atonement, in the *Repertory* for 1845, republished in *Princeton Essays*, I, pp. 308-351. A most admirable article.

endure the penalty of the law, and so fall in with the exploded governmental scheme of the atonement; or he must admit, that imputed sin, without subjective guilt, does, on his own principles, necessarily involve the penalty of the law; and if so, that infants perish, and, as above remarked, that the reprobate were created in order that they might be damned. Such are the logical results of his strange assertion, that because the exercise of grace and mercy are gratuitous, on the part of God, therefore condemnation, vengeance, and punishment are equally so, "or the whole foundation of the *Gospel* is undermined;" a sentiment which, if admitted, might impart a meaning to the utterance of the celebrated Dogberry: "O villain! thou wilt be *condemned into everlasting redemption* for this."

It is at all events, however, freely conceded by Dr. Hodge, and those who at the present time sympathize with him in his peculiar views, that no one of the posterity of Adam shall ever suffer the endless penalty of the law merely on account of the imputation of his sin. This, though denied by the earlier Supralapsarians, has long since, though subsequently to the Synod of Dort, been conceded by some who have entertained one or more of their distinctive principles. R. Vogelsangius, for example, as quoted largely by De Moor, (III, 274-276,) to disprove the *mediate* imputation scheme attributed to Placæus, exclaims, "Certe neminem sempiterna subire supplicia propter inobedientiam protoplasti, nisi *mediate cognata perversitate* verissima sententia est." Turretin, too, decidedly asserts the same; and when he comes to explain the view entertained by him, it is in perfect accordance with the doctrine as taught by Calvin, Stapfer, Edwards, and Breckinridge, as may be seen by the following passages: "*Pœna quam peccatum in nos accersit vel est privativa vel positiva. Prior est carentia et privatio justitiæ originalis. Posterior est mors tum temporalis, tum æterna, et in genere mala omnia, quæ peccatoribus, immittuntur. Etsi secunda necessario sequitur primam ex natura rei, nisi intercedat Dei misericordia, non debet tamen cum ea confundi. Quoad primam dicimus*

Adami peccatum nobis imputari immediate ad penam privativam, quia est causa privationis justiciæ originalis, et sic corruptionem antecedere debet, SALTEM ORDINE NATURÆ; sed quoad posteriorem potest dici IMPUTARI MEDIATE positivam, quia ISTI PENÆ obnoxii non sumus, NISI POSTQUAM nati et CORRUMPTI SUMUS.”\* So that moral corruption, which is according to Drs. Hodge and Thornwell, the penalty of antecedently imputed sin, though it deserve the punishment of eternal death, as all moral corruption must, (and of course deserves it, according to the just judgment of God, for *desert* here can mean nothing else,) yet, according to their own authorities, it never will receive that punishment except *mediately*, and on account of personally subjective desert. So that moral guilt or desert, though justly inflicted, (as Dr. Hodge maintains,) as the penalty of imputed sin, may exist, and exist universally, and from which nothing but the mercy of God can rescue any; and yet no man can reasonably believe that it ever will receive its proper award unless it becomes associated with new moral desert or guilt! for this is the obvious meaning of the language.† And if, therefore, no one is ever thus condemned for merely imputed sin; and if we are obnoxious to the “*positive penalty*” only *mediately*, or after we have become corrupt, then the attempt to explicate the doctrine of original sin on the ground of immediate or antecedent

\* See Opp. Tom. I, p. 558, Loco 9, Quæst. 9, Sec. 14. In Section 15, as above remarked, he likewise adds, “Nos vero cum Orthodoxis UTRUMQUE affirmamus.”

† In order to maintain this idea in consistency with the theory of immediate imputation, Dr. Hodge can have no alternative, logically, but to resort to the old papal distinction of *reatum culpæ* and *reatum pænæ*, originating in the Scheme of Ockham, and sought to be, by a monstrous perversion, associated (as employed by them) with the aforesaid typical institution in the Mosaic economy. Even Turretin condemns their distinction most decidedly in Loc. 9, Quæst. 3, Sec. 6. And Owen condemns it with equal decision, (Justification, chap. 8, p. 226.) Yet Turretin elsewhere, when pressed to expound his idea of sin and the fall, seems to justify it; and asserts the existence of a distinction between *anima pura, impura, et non pura*, which the Polish Socinians also asserted against the theology of Calvin. See in Turretin, Loc. 9, Quæst. 12, Sec. 9, this preposterous distinction.

imputation, and to the exclusion of subjective desert, must be conceded to be wholly unauthorized. And the only true position is that of Calvin and the Reformed Church, as illustrated in our First Essay, pp. 396-403, 406, 407.

Turretin and De Moor, as we have seen, maintain that the positive penalty of the law can not come upon us until we are subjectively guilty; (and even Dr. Hodge *in this* professes to agree with them herein;) and thus far they agree with Stapfer, etc. But in treating of subjective guilt itself, they, while they claim that the statement of the apostle, that Adam sinned, is to be understood according to its literal import, practically ignore his other statement that *we all sinned*, by making it substantially a mere figure of speech, which is to be understood in a philosophical sense, and insist that subjective guilt can not be predicated of his descendants, until they have the same manifested existence which he had, and thus existing, perpetuate actual sin; which actual sin is asserted by them to be the fruits of the moral corruption penally inflicted upon us on account of the antecedent imputation of Adam's sin. And herein they differ, *toto cælo*, from the theology of the Calvinistic Church; for it holds that our guilt in Adam being common, God finds us subjectively guilty, and that our moral corruption is the punishment of this subjective guilt, and not the punishment of Adam's sin *antecedently* imputed to us. The difference is obvious. And in this sense, therefore, so fully recognized by the Scriptures and the Reformed Church, the doctrine is to be understood. God finds us subjectively guilty, because our guilt is common with that of Adam. *He sinned, and we sinned*, though *how* we then sinned is left unexplained. And God finding us subjectively guilty, treats us as such; and imputes not only our own sin to us, but the sin of Adam also, for he could do no less, as the guilt was common. This is the Calvinistic doctrine, and is of course the very reverse of the doctrine of Dr. Hodge, that God, of his mere will and pleasure, constitutes us subjectively corrupt, merely on account of Adam's sin.

Should it be said, that if we sinned in Adam, or when he sinned, and if this our sin is imputed to us, there is no necessity for supposing that his sin is also imputed to us; since his own sin is not to be so confounded with our sin in him as to suppose them one and the same; the answer is plain: Adam being our natural and federal head, though his act is not our act, nor his sin our sin, yet our participation therein, or our sinning in and falling with him, renders us guilty of that sin, and hence it is justly imputed to us. Our sin was that of participation; (*how*, we know not, and need not know;) but participation begets common guilt, though we may not personally have committed the act in the guilt of which we participate. This is a principle well understood and fully recognized in ethics and in all jurisprudence. The guilt of the participator is not only charged upon or imputed to him, but he is held responsible for the act by which that common guilt found expression or manifested itself. And so in the matter before us. Hence, though we are justly regarded by God as subjectively guilty with Adam, his sin in which we participated is justly imputed to us. And then further: the imputation of Adam's sin to himself was not *immediate*, but *mediate* and *subjective*; but as his posterity had not the same manifested existence as he, his sin was imputed to them antecedently to such existence, and of course immediately. And as in another sense, unknown and unexplained to us, they did sin when he sinned, or sinned in and fell with him, (the guilt being common,) the imputation of this sin to them was, as in the case of Adam, mediate and in consequence of subjective desert. The punishment of course can not take effect upon them in the sense that it did upon Adam, until they have the same personally manifested existence that Adam had; but that punishment, to be just, as the Leyden divines, and Turretin, and all Calvinists admit, must be in consequence of imputed guilt or sin. To explicate the doctrine of original sin, therefore, on the ground of the antecedent *imputation of Adam's sin alone*, is a grievous error, and has no countenance either in the



word of God, or, as our readers will see, in the theology of the Reformed Church.

The doctrine of antecedent imputation, as held by the Supralapsarians, and asserted by Drs. Hodge and Thornwell, is, therefore, a very different doctrine from the imputation held by the Calvinistic Church, and different, likewise, from that antecedent imputation which was admitted by Heidegger and others of his day, and so on to our own times. For all, except the late Dr. Ashbel Green\* and a few others, who assert the federal headship of Adam, and by consequence the imputation of his sin to his posterity, admit that his sin was antecedent to the formal personal existence of his posterity, and, of course to their privation of original righteousness, moral corruption, or anything else which may depend upon such existence. But this view finds the posterity of Adam, in some way, inexplicable by us, guilty with him, and the imputation as consequent upon that guilt; or, in other words, as resulting from both his natural and moral headship. While, on the contrary, Dr. Hodge's view seems logically to ignore the natural headship, and to make the imputation of Adam's own sin, and of that sin alone, the procuring cause of their guilt and corruption, in the way of penal infliction. It results from the imputation of Adam's sin alone, and not from a common and subjective guilt, a view which Dr. Hodge not only can rarely find outside of the Supralapsarian school, but which, as he can easily learn, the Reformed divines regard as detestable. Even Whittaker with all his Supralapsarian proclivities, does not hesitate to pronounce it such.

The view entertained by us, and rejected by Dr. Hodge,

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\*This venerable patriarch of the Presbyterian Church entertained most fully the views of his illustrious preceptor, Witherspoon (see our Essay I, p. 426-7), in respect to the subjective guilt of all creatures who fall under the condemnation of God. Consequently he rejected utterly the doctrine of antecedent imputation; but supposed when God created Adam, he created also the souls of all his posterity; a view which originated in the ancient Jewish Church. See on this subject the Summæ of Thomas Aquinas, Part I, Quæst. 23, Art. 5, in which he treats it in his peculiar style.

and which we have presented (in Essay I) from Calvin, Edwards, Stapfer and Breckinridge, recognizes the necessity for explicating the doctrine of original sin from both the natural and moral headship of Adam; and emphatically denies that it can be explicated from either alone. It denies that the native headship alone is the ground upon which God treats the posterity of Adam as sinners, or that the moral headship alone is the ground. But as the Reformed Church has ever so emphatically maintained, it demands that both be taken into the account. Dr. Hodge, as we have shown, discards this view; asserts that it was the view of Placæus, and attempts so to explicate the doctrine on the ground of the federal headship, as to make our moral corruption the penalty of Adam's sin. We have named this the Supralapsarian view, for even though all the Supralapsarians do not assert it as strongly as Dr. Hodge, yet as their scheme makes the will of God the procuring cause of sin, so this doctrine makes his will the procuring cause of moral corruption.\*

And then further, in the Repertory for 1860, p. 341, Dr. Hodge asserts in exhibiting his views of antecedent imputation, "that as in the case of Christ, his righteousness as something neither done by us nor wrought in us, is the judicial ground of our justification, *with which inward holiness is*

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\*As a further illustration of the manner in which Dr. Hodge uses his authorities, we may here mention Dr. John Owen; who in referring to the imputation of righteousness, defines the doctrine thus: "To impute to us that which is not our own antecedently to that imputation, includes also in it two things. 1. A grant or donation of the thing itself to us to be ours, on some just ground or foundation. For a thing must be made ours, before we can justly be dealt with according to what is required on account of it. 2. A will of dealing with us, or an actual dealing with us according to that which is so made ours."—*Justification*, p. 188. This is strictly true as regards the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, to which Dr. Owen applies it; but it is a baseless assumption to say with Dr. Hodge, that it is also true as respects the unrighteousness of Adam. On the same page Dr. Owen objects to the definition of Vasquez, on the ground that it confounds *imputare* with *reputare*. Vasquez says, "To impute a thing to a person is to reckon it among those things which are his and belong to him." On which Owen remarks: "This is *reputare*; *imputare* includes an

connected as an invariable consequence ; so in the case of Adam, his offense as something out of ourselves, a *peccatum alienum* is the judicial ground of the condemnation of the race, of which condemnation, spiritual death, or inward corruption, is the expression and the consequence." This statement is necessary to Dr. Hodge's argument, and unless it can be sustained, his whole theory fails ; and yet the whole statement is utterly repugnant to Calvinistic theology, and directly at variance with the expression of it as contained in our standards. Where, in all Protestant theology, except in the Supralapsarian school, can Dr. Hodge find the doctrine that inward holiness is connected with justification as a consequence ? The penitent soul is justified by the righteousness of Christ imputed to it and received by faith, and hence it is said to be justified by faith. Is then the faith by which we are justified the exercise of a renewed, or of an unrenewed soul ? Does saving faith result from the saving operation of the Holy Spirit, or does it not ? No Calvinist can ever entertain a doubt upon this subject. How then can Dr. Hodge venture to assert in the very face of our standards, and of all Calvinistic theology, that "inward holiness is connected as an invariable consequence" with justification ? when the faith which justifies is the fruit of the renewal of the Holy Ghost ? To this subversion of one of the very fundamental principles of our theology he is led by attempting to carry out his Supralapsarian exposition of Rom. v., and he is thus brought to the alternative of either abandoning the doctrines of grace, or of giving up this exposition. And if it be not true (as it is not) that holiness is the consequence of justification, then it is confessedly, and on Dr. Hodge's own author-

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act antecedent to this, accounting or esteeming a thing to belong to any person." And what, pray, is this act ? The answer is given above, and is adopted by Dr. Hodge, not only in imputation of righteousness, but also of sin,—it is the act which makes the thing ours. This then is immediate imputation as avowed by Princeton ; God makes the sin of Adam ours, and then deals with us according to that sin. See a similar misuse and misapplication of Owen, in *Princeton Essays*, I, pp. 145, 146. How greatly he has been misrepresented here will appear in our citation of testimonies *infra*.

ity, not true according to this analogy, that corruption is the *consequence* of an antecedent imputation of Adam's sin. But on the contrary, as no one is justified without being renewed, (the two being absolutely inseparable in relation to fallen man,) so sin is never imputed unless in connection with moral corruption, the two being inseparable in their relation to fallen creatures, as fully illustrated in our Second Essay. And then, in regard to the sin of Adam being "something out of ourselves a *peccatum alienum*," Dr. Hodge assuredly should know that the Reformed Church never entertained that idea in the sense in which he asserts it. They always maintained that it was "out of ourselves" in no sense that could possibly exclude the fact that "*we* sinned in and fell with Adam;" and that had it been a *peccatum alienum*, in any other sense, it could have been of no more account to us than the sin of any other remote ancestors. Hence, as the Reformed theology always taught—our natural union with Adam, is the basis of the imputation of his sin to us, and not merely the federal. We sinned in and fell with him by virtue of this union; for without it God could no more have imputed his sin to us than he could have imputed to us the *peccatum alienum* of the angels themselves, which kept not their first estate. The same is true, as shown in our Essay II, in respect to the righteousness of Christ. It is imputed for justification to none but his "seed"—the seed given him in covenant, and of which he is the Head; and who become partakers of his nature by the power of the Holy Ghost, (Luke i: 35). True, justification *declares* them to be one in law with him, but they become one by being made partakers of this new nature. He represents them therefore, for by virtue of this union they and He are one, as Adam represents his seed, who by virtue of the natural union are one with him. Take away the oneness and you destroy the representation in both cases. Admit the oneness, and where is Dr. Hodge's *alienum peccatum*?\*

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\* Dr. Archibald Alexander, in his tract on Justification, is in utter antagonism to Dr. Hodge in reference to inward holiness being the consequence of

By virtue of the covenant made with Adam, he and his posterity were accounted one, connected as they were by this natural union. And by virtue of the covenant made with Christ, he and the "seed" given to him were one; for there was such a union established between them as constituted them his *seed*. They having been given to him, became his; and hence he redeemed, effectually called, justified and sanctified them; and he will eternally save them, none being able to pluck them out of his hand. And hence, too, in answer to Question 32, of the *Catechism*, "What benefits do they that are effectually called partake of in this life?" the answer is, "They that are effectually called do, in this life, partake of justification, adoption, sanctification," etc. Now, effectual calling being the renewal of our nature by the Holy Ghost, and justification, adoption, and sanctification being "benefits" resulting therefrom, what does Dr. Hodge mean by asserting, in direct opposition to this truth, that "inward holiness is the inseparable consequence of justification?" It is precisely the principle which underlies that most pernicious dogma "*eternal justification*."

And then further: Dr. Hodge, in several places attempts to incorporate with his doctrine of immediate imputation, the doctrine of a natural union between Adam and his posterity, which, while it would justify antecedent imputation in the case of his posterity, would not justify it in the case of any creature not thus connected with him. See for example, the *Princeton Review* for 1860, p. 339, where he says that the sin of Adam, as out of ourselves, is imputed to us

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justification. "The truth is," says he, "that the imputation of righteousness although it procures perfect justification *produces no change in the inherent character of the man*; but, as stated before, it merely changes his relation to the law, and therefore the idea of our being made as righteous as Christ, is without reason alleged against this doctrine," p. 36. If this be so, and what Calvinist will doubt it, inward holiness is in no sense the consequence of justification, as Dr. Hodge asserts. And on what ground, therefore, can it be inferred, as he infers, that inward corruption is the consequence of Adam's guilt alone, and not of our subjective guilt, "by sinning and falling with him in his first transgression?"

on the ground of *the union, representative and natural*, between him and his posterity. See also Princeton Essays, I, pp. 136, 138, 142. The importance of this natural union is fully asserted by all Calvinistic theologians in explicating the doctrine of original sin; but the attempt to connect it with this view of antecedent imputation is an astounding absurdity. For the natural union either connects the posterity of Adam with his guilt (as the Calvinistic Church has ever held), or it does not. If it does, then they are thus far *subjectively* guilty; and the imputation does not, as Dr. Hodge and the Supralapsarians affirm, depend on the mere will and pleasure of God. But if it does not connect them with his guilt, then to plead it as a reason for the antecedent imputation of his sin to them is sheer absurdity; for, in that case, a union which connects us with Adam, can furnish no reason for an imputation which depends solely upon the mere will of God; for it may be pleaded likewise, that a certain union existed between Adam and the angels, by virtue of the fact that they were all intelligent creatures of God; which, on the same principle, might be the basis of an antecedent imputation of the sin of the one to the other. The natural union between Adam and his posterity can in no proper sense, therefore, be pleaded as a ground for such an antecedent imputation of his sin to them, as is taught by Dr. Hodge, though in the Calvinistic theology it is recognized as furnishing the basis of the representation of the apostle, that "all sinned;" and so of connecting the imputation with the justice, instead of the mere will of God.

Before concluding, there is one point to which we must here specifically advert. Dr. Hodge, in his reply to the rejoinder of Dr. Baird (see Princeton Rev. for Oct., 1860), adverts to the fact that Dr. Archibald Alexander had read his Commentary on Romans, in manuscript, and approved of it. This is said in order to sustain, by Dr. Alexander's authority, the exposition given therein of Rom. v: 12-21, against which Dr. Baird takes exception. And yet Dr. Alexander regarded the *Theologia Polémica* of Stapfer as expressing his own

views, rather than the *Medulla of Marck*, with which he could not fully coincide on the points in which Marck differs from Stapfer. We regret that Dr. Hodge has adverted to this matter in the way he has, for otherwise the whole question before us could have been left to be adjudicated according to the testimony of the early Reformed Church. But we must now solicit attention to a few facts of a more practical character, and relating to more recent times. For it is certainly remarkable that Dr. Hodge should thus advert to the excellent Dr. Alexander to sustain the soundness of his exposition; when, as above remarked, Dr. Alexander expressed his full sympathy with Stapfer, whom Dr. Hodge repudiates; and not only this, but when Drs. Miller and Alexander, and the whole Calvinistic Church of modern times, have expressed their approbation of the very work of President Edwards, which Dr. Hodge repudiates as Placæan, and have ever regarded it, and justly, as the ablest defense ever written of the doctrine of original sin. Dr. Hodge's voice is almost the only voice which has been heard among all the most learned and eminent divines who have, either in this country or in Europe, spoken of Edwards, that has assailed his view as inconsistent with true Calvinism.

In illustration of this representation, we advert to the fact, that among all our eminent American theologians, from the time of Edwards, and even before, no one can be found, until about thirty years past, who sides with Dr. Hodge on those points respecting the doctrine before us, on which he disagrees with Edwards. Dickerson, Davies, (who endorsed his views most warmly,) Finley, Witherspoon, S. S. Smith, Dr. Ashbel Green, all reject the doctrine denied by Edwards, and asserted by Dr. Hodge, that imputation is only antecedent to and causative of moral corruption. And if we refer to our brethren of Scotland, we find them equally decided. The lectures of Dr. Dick, published in this country, with the high commendation of Drs. Alexander and Miller, and which have been even regarded as a text-book in Princeton Seminary, evince the same sympathy, (as may

be seen from our quotation therefrom in Essay II, p. 599.) And though he differs from Edwards on a philosophical speculation he does not hesitate to speak of him and his work in the following style of approval. Referring to the relation between the first and second Adam and their seed, he says: "I have endeavored to prove the fact, but I do not pretend fully to explain it. President Edwards, in his book on Original Sin, *which is an admirable work, and one of the ablest and most triumphant refutations of error which is to be found in our language*, in answering the objection, that to deal with Adam and his posterity as one, was to act contrary to truth," etc., etc. (See Lecture 45.)

In like manner the venerable Dr. GEORGE HILL, Professor of Divinity in St. Mary's College, St. Andrews, and whose Lectures have ever been regarded as truly Calvinistic in Scotland and in this country, at least by our own Church and by the Dutch Reformed, after stating the doctrine of original sin, as given in the Confession of Faith, chapter 6, and in the 9th article of the Church of England, as expressing the true Calvinistic view, proceeds to take Edwards as his guide in explicating the doctrine. His words are: "This opinion (the one expressed in the symbols aforesaid) is supported in all the Calvinistic systems of divinity by nearly the same arguments. *But in stating the grounds of it, I shall take as my principal guide, Mr. Edwards, formerly President of the College of New Jersey, in America, who has written able treatises upon the different branches of the Calvinistic system, and whose defense of the doctrine of original sin contains the fullest and acutest answers that I have seen to the objections commonly urged against that doctrine.*" (Carter's edition, New York, 1856.) Here, then, this learned divine, whose soundness can not be impugned, and whose work has ever held a high rank as a text-book in our schools, adopts as his guide on the subject the very author whose doctrine Dr. Hodge has undertaken to assail, and which he denounces as precisely the doctrine of Placeus.

If we advert to cotemporary Calvinistic literature, and



such as has been and still is regarded as truly sound by our Churches, as well as by those of Europe, the result will be still the same. We do not purpose to anticipate here any portion of the testimonies which we shall proceed to cite presently; but these references are important in the present connection, as showing the present recognized type of Calvinistic soundness (but which Dr. Hodge had seen proper to denounce as unsound and erroneous), that our readers may have it in view while consulting the testimony of the reformed divines, from the very beginning of the Reformation.

*Robert Haldane* in his *Exposition of Romans*, in which he defends the orthodox faith against Prof. Stuart, Dr. Mac-knight, etc., says, on Rom. v: 16, "Condemnation. Here it is expressly asserted, that condemnation has come by the one sin of the one man. If, then, all are condemned by that sin, all must be guilty by it, for the righteous judge would not condemn the innocent. To say that any are punished or condemned for Adam's sin, who are not guilty of it, is to accuse the righteous God of injustice. Can God impute to any man anything that is not true? If Adam's sin is not ours as truly as it was Adam's sin, could God impute it to us? Does God deal with men as sinners, while they are not truly such? If God deals with men as sinners on account of Adam's sin, then it is self-evident that they are sinners on that account. The just God could not deal with men as sinners on any account which did not make them truly sinners. The assertion, however, that Adam's sin is as truly ours as it was his, does not imply that it is his and ours in the same way. It was his personally; it is ours because we were in him. Adam's sin then, is as truly ours as it was his sin, though not in the same way." (Carter's ed., p. 217.) Then on verse 12 he says, "All have sinned; that is, all have really sinned, though not in their own persons. This does not mean, as some explain it, that infants become involved in the consequences of Adam's sin without his guilt. Adam stood as the head, the forefather and representative of all his posterity. They were all created in him, and in the guilt of his sin, as well as its conse-

quences, they became partakers." . . . "No man can well allege, that it is by a separate act of creative power that each of Adam's descendants come into this world. They were in the loins of Adam when he was created. Heb. vii: 10."

*Dr. Chalmers*, likewise, presents the same view. In his twenty-fifth lecture on Romans (chap. v: 12-21), he says, "The question, how far a native and original depravity exists among mankind, is one thing. The question, how far mankind are justly liable to be reckoned with, or to be dealt with as responsible and worthy of punishment for having such a tendency is another. . . . In as far as the doctrine of original sin affirms a native disposition to sin, and a disposition so strong in all as that all are sinners, then is the doctrine at one with experience. But in as far as the doctrine affirms, that there is a blame or a demerit rightly attachable to man for having such a disposition, or that he is to be held a guilty and condemned creature on account of it—this is a question referable not to the experience of man, but to the moral sense of man." "And if there be a guilt attachable to evil desires, as well as to evil doings; and if the evil desire which prompted Adam to his first transgression, enter into the nature of all his posterity, then are his posterity *the objects of moral blame and moral aversion, not on account of the transgression which Adam committed, but on account of such a wrong principle in their hearts as would lead every one of them to the very same transgression in the very same circumstances. It is thus that Adam has transmitted a guilt the same with his own, as well as a depravity the same as his own, among all the individuals and families of our species; if not that each of them is liable to a separate reckoning on account of the offense committed in the garden of Eden, at least that each of them is liable to a separate reckoning on account of his own separate and personal depravity—a depravity which had its rise in the offense that was then and there committed, and a depravity which would lead in every one instance to the same offense, in the same circumstances of temptation.* According to this explanation,

every man still reapeth, not what another soweth, but what he soweth himself. Every man eateth the fruit of his own doings. Every man beareth the burden of his own tainted and accursed nature. *Every man suffereth for his own guilt, and not for Adam's guilt; and if he is said to suffer for Adam's guilt, the meaning is, that from Adam he inherits a corruption which lands him in a guilt equal to that of Adam,*" pp. 124, 128, Carter's ed., 1850. In like manner he says, in Lec. iii, (Rom. xi: 22) "When He is severe, it is not because of his delight in the sufferings of his creatures, but because of his justice, and holiness, and truth. . . . And except it be to the injury of these high moral attributes, He ever rejoices in scattering the fruits of his beneficence over the wide extent of a grateful and rejoicing family. When he is vindictive, it is not because he desires a work of vengeance, but because the righteousness of his character, and the stability of a righteous government, demand it."

Such, then, are the views, among others, of the representative men of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland; men whose noble monuments of learning and piety have endeared their names to the Calvinistic Church in this land also; and thus are they in utter antagonism to the theory of Dr. Hodge.

To conclude, therefore, the question to be determined by the testimony we shall adduce, is, whether the views advanced by Dr. Hodge, or whether the opposite views are the recognized doctrine of the Calvinistic Church? Does the Reformed Church recognize the distinction adopted by him and Placæus, and entertain the theory, that the imputation of sin is antecedent, and causal of moral corruption? Dr. Hodge maintains that it does, and that the Reformed Church taught, that the imputation of sin, like the imputation of righteousness, is antecedent or immediate; and that the guilt and corruption of the human race is consequent upon that imputation.\* And the doctrine that God, in his treatment

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\* Dr. Hodge not only adopts the view of imputation which he attributes to Owen, as shown in a preceding note, but reiterates it in every form of expression, in *Princeton Essays*, I, pp. 171-174, 176, 177 (note), 182, 183. And then

of the posterity of Adam, has respect to the double relation existing between them, and to the facts, that he sinned and that they sinned, as so fully taught by the apostle, and by Calvin, Edwards, Stapfer, and Breckinridge, Dr. Hodge rejects, and denounces as *mediate* imputation, as is shown in our First Essay. Now, we claim that this doctrine, which Dr. Hodge thus repudiates, is the doctrine of the Calvinistic Church, and that, with the exception of some Supralapsarians, the testimony of that Church is uniform in support of it. And of the conclusiveness (or the contrary) of the testimony to which we appeal to sustain these averments, our readers must judge for themselves. We shall, moreover, fully adopt, and strictly follow out, the formula prescribed by Dr. Hodge in such matters, and which is thus set forth in Princeton Essays, I, p. 176: "The only proper standard by which to decide what Calvinism is, is the Confessions of the Reformed Churches, and the current writings of standard Calvinistic writers." We shall likewise adopt the greater portion of the testimonies which he has cited from Rivetus (and if our limits permitted would present them all), for, as we shall have occasion to show fully, hereafter, he not only has failed to sustain his position by those testimonies, but has wholly mistaken the very design of Rivetus, in citing them. Rivetus cites them to prove one thing, and Dr. Hodge to prove quite another.\*

In considering the subjoined testimony our readers will please to remember, that the marked and essential difference

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in Princeton Review for 1860, pp. 338-368, and 764, indorses and reiterates the whole representation; and even asserts, that the Lutheran and Reformed Churches adopt his dogma of antecedent imputation. We are willing to concede this in respect to some of the Lutheran divines, to whose testimony we shall have occasion to refer presently. And as to the Reformed Church, our readers shall soon have the opportunity of deciding for themselves.

\* Professor Park, instead of examining the matter for himself, as he professes to have done, has fallen into the same error with Dr. Hodge, and pronounces the citations of Rivetus "decisive" in support of Dr. Hodge's views. *Ut vacca vaccam, auctor autorem sequitur.* Will Dr. Hodge own him as an Expositor?

between the Supralapsarians and Calvinists (for we shall not separate their testimony) is, that the former explicate the doctrine of original sin from the standpoint of the will of God, and the latter from the standpoint of his justice. The Supralapsarians, as we have shown, to avoid the charge of having departed from the received doctrine of the Church, have endeavored, in their definitions of its doctrines, to conform, as nearly as possible, to the language of Augustine; and they have done so. It will likewise be seen, that the language of Calvinistic divines, in several instances, is such as a Supralapsarian might adopt; and *vice versa* also, as may be illustrated by a citation from Dr. Thornwell, in our First Essay, p. 408. But it is *in the interpretation of this language*, that the *toto celo* difference between them is brought to view. The case is, for example, similar to that of the Arminians, who, in their statements of doctrine, often employ language which is employed on the same subject by Calvinists; or, as with the Arians, who not unfrequently employ terms in speaking of Christ, to which a Trinitarian would scarcely object. But, in both cases, the meaning which they attach to the language is the very reverse of that which has ever been attached to it by the Church of God. So, also, in the instance before us. When the Supralapsarian explains the language of the Church respecting the doctrine of original sin, he refers the imputation of Adam's sin *to the mere will and pleasure of God*, from a standpoint antecedent to subjective desert, and making the imputation causal of moral corruption; but when the Calvinist explains it, he refers the imputation *to the immutable justice of God*, and of man's guilt and desert, as we have so fully illustrated in our Second Essay. The former is the view insisted on by Dr. Hodge, the latter is the view which he rejects,\* but which we affirm to be taught by the whole Reformed, or Calvinistic Church.

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\* The employment of the terms "justice" and "guilt," in this connection, by Dr. Hodge, and his attempt (as also that of Zanchius, and other Supralapsarians,) to attach to those terms such a meaning as to reconcile them with this conception, we had intended to make the subject of special remark. But to

And in citing its testimony, we shall first adduce the Confessions, and then the leading divines of the Church, from the commencement of the Reformation until the present time. We begin with

1. *The Augsburg, or Augustan Confession.*

This Confession is claimed without just reason by the Supralapsarians. As originally drawn up and laid before the Emperor Charles V, in July, 1530, the second article reads as follows :

“They teach also, that after the fall of Adam, all men naturally begotten, *are born with sin* (*nascantur cum peccato*), that is, without the fear of God, without trust in God, and with concupiscence ; and that this disease or original blot is truly sin (*quodque hic morbus, sen vitium originis vere sit peccatum*), condemning and bringing even now eternal death to those who are not renewed by baptism and the Holy Ghost.

“They condemn the Pelagians and others who deny that this original blot is sin ; and, that they may extenuate the glory of the merits and benefits of Christ, argue that man by his own powers of reason (*propriis viribus rationis*) is able to obtain justification before God.”

As subsequently revised and amended, this article reads as follows :

“They teach also, that after the fall of Adam, all men propagated in a natural way have original sin when they are born. (*Omnes homines naturali modo propagati nascentes habent peccatum originis.*) By *original sin*, as it is called by the holy fathers, and by all pious men of learning and sound judgment in the Church, we mean that guilt whereby all that come into the world are, through Adam's fall, exposed to the wrath of God and eternal death, and that very corruption of human nature derived from Adam, which *corruption* of

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expose the glaring unfairness and absurdity of the procedure in the way it deserves, would require too long a digression; and we have, moreover, supposed that the conception of the moral nature of God, necessarily involved therein, has been sufficiently exhibited in our Second Essay. Should the attempt be reiterated, however, we shall have a few words to offer more directly in relation to it.

man's nature includes, not only the defect of original righteousness, integrity or obedience, but concupiscence likewise," etc. .

How thoroughly Luther (+1546) and Melancthon (+1560) adopted at the very outset the fundamental principle of the Supralapsarian scheme, is shown in our Second Essay. And the doctrine of Imputation, as taught by Luther, may be learned from his very remarkable annotations on Gal. iii: 13, where, in perfect accordance with that doctrine as held by himself, he pronounces our blessed Lord "the greatest transgressor, murderer, adulterer, thief, rebel, and blasphemer that ever was or could be in the world," and asserts that whatever sins we have committed, or may hereafter commit, "are Christ's own sins as verily as if he himself had done them." And these views, moreover, his disciples continued to reiterate for more than a century and a half. Take a single instance from the zealous Jerome Kromayer, (+1670,) Primary Professor of Sacred Theology in Leipsic, who employs on the same subject the following language: "Christus, qui non noverat peccatum, per imputationem factus est peccatum, id est, *peccatorum atrocissimus*.\* This terrible blasphemy is the legitimate outgrowth of the principle which bases imputation on the mere will of God, to the ignoring of his moral perfection. Nor is it surprising that such views should have led to the conclusions to which Luther's disciple, J. Agricola, (+1556,) carried them, even during his professorship at Wittenberg. The well-known Dr. Crisp was his disciple, and only completed what Agricola begun. In his Sermons, Vol. I, p. 430, he says: "Christ is as really the transgressor as the man that did commit it (the sin) was;" and he insists that "iniquity," in Is. liii: 5, 6, is not "spoken figuratively, that is, the punishment of it," but

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\* See his *Scrutinium Religionum*, p. 208, thesis 42, (Second edition, Leipsic, 1673). On the title page he is said to be "Vir de Ecclesia multisque officiis meritissimus, nunc beatissimus;" though a grievous calumniator of the Reformed Church. He should not be confounded with his uncle, J. Kromayer, (1648).

in the sense that our iniquity became, by imputation, literally the iniquity of Christ. *And yet Dr. Hodge has labored to show that the doctrine of the Lutheran Church on this subject does not materially differ from that of the Reformed!* \*

Luther and Melancthon were, in the main, the authors of the Augsburg symbol. And in further illustration of their earlier views on original sin and imputation, we may refer also to the following: Luther says, "God works the evil in us as well as the good." "He pleases you when he crowns the unworthy; he ought not to displease you when he *condemns the innocent.*" "It is no more unworthy of God to *damn the innocent*, than to forgive, as he does, the guilty." And "that if any one should complain that he has been created to be damned, he is on that account worthy of damnation," (a sentiment in which Zanchius seems to concur.) And so on through a large part of his *De Servo Arbitrio*, from which work our readers may find in our Second Essay, p. 562, another extract, in which Luther affirms that it is the highest attainment of faith to believe that God *of his own will* makes us necessarily damnable, and appears to be delighted with the torments of the miserable, and to be worthy rather of hatred than of love. In fact we know of no treatise in existence which advances more decidedly than this, the principles of the Sulpralapsarian school. And now, in further illustration of our statement that some of the distinguishing dogmas of that school find favor in Princeton, we invite attention to the following extract from an article on original sin, first published in the Repertory for 1830, and subsequently republished in Princeton Essays, vol. I, on p. 115 of which is found the following high approval and laudation of this very treatise:

"The doctrine of total depravity, derived as an inheritance from our first father, is not inculcated more strongly by any writer than

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\* The doctrine of the Calvinistic Church is in direct contrast with the foregoing. Turretin expresses it thus: "Christus propter imputatum ipsi nostrum peccatum, non potest dici peccator, quod importat corruptionem inhaerentem." So, too, Owen: "To be *culpæ aliæ reus* makes no man a sinner."



by Luther, in his work entitled *De Servo Arbitrio*, written against the celebrated Erasmus. It was our first purpose to have given an abridgment of this treatise of the great Reformer, but Luther's style and manner are so peculiar, that his writings do not bear to be abridged without much loss," etc.

Dr. Hodge has enjoyed the reputation of the authorship of this Essay. And then in the *Repertory* for 1860, p. 338, he speaks as follows :

"The Lutheran and Reformed Church, the two great historical divisions of the Protestant world, happily are perfectly united on all points concerning our relation to Adam and Christ. They agree as to the whole class of doctrines connected with the fall and redemption of man, the covenant with Adam, the nature of the union between him and his posterity, the effect of his sin on his descendants, AND THEY CONSEQUENTLY ARE OF ONE MIND AS TO IMPUTATION, [the capitals are ours,] depravity and inability, and, on the other hand, as to the nature of our union with Christ, justification and sanctification. *Not only in the symbols of these Churches, but in the writings of all their leading theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there is this thorough agreement on the subjects above-mentioned.*"

Our readers, who compare these statements with the remarkable illustration of this "one mind on imputation," as evidenced by the fore-cited testimonies of Luther and Kromayer, as compared with Turretin and Owen, may regard these facts as sufficient. Yet we must, in the same connection, ask attention to the following brief extract from the first of Dr. Hodge's three Essays on Imputation, republished (from the *Repertory*) in the *Princeton Essays*, vol. I, on p. 137 of which he says :

"We have never been so unhappy as to have our hearts torn by being told that we believe and teach that the blessed Saviour was morally a sinner; that our 'moral character' was transferred to him. *If this is imputation, IF THIS 'TRANSFER OF MORAL CHARACTER,' is included in it, we have not words to express our deep abhorrence of the doctrine. We would hold no communion with the man who taught it. And if this is what our brethren [the New Haven divines] mean to charge us with, then is the golden cord of charity forever broken, for*

what fellowship can there be between parties where one accuses the other of blasphemy?

But, though the dogma of antecedent imputation is claimed to be taught in the foregoing article of the Augsburg Confession, it is not found there in the sense in which it is inculcated by Dr. Hodge, and it would be doubtful whether it is taught there in any sense, (that is, as being antecedent to instead of synchronical with corruption,) did not the well known Supralapsarian proclivities of its chief framers seem to render such a conclusion fairly deducible. But however this may be, we do find both Luther and his followers not at all disposed to regard this feature as at all essential, or to constitute it, as Dr. Hodge does, a breaking point of difference with his co-laborers in the cause of God; for at the colloquy held at Marburg, in October of the preceding year, (1529,) the following was agreed upon as expressing the views of the Churches represented by Luther, Zuinglius, and Bucer on original sin: "For the *fourth*, we believe that *original sin descends unto us from Adam by birth and inheritance*, and is such a sin that it damneth all men; and if that Christ had not come to relieve us with his death and life, then had we perished thereby everlastingly, and could never have come to the kingdom of God." These articles are subscribed by Luther, Melancthon, \* Jonas, Osiander, Brent, Agricola, Ecolampadius, Zuinglius, Bucer and Hedio, to the first three of whom, along with Bugenhgen, the Augsburg Confession is attributed. Here, then, the doctrine of original sin is clearly explicated, not from the ground of antecedent

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\* The views entertained by Melancthon were, as we have remarked, subsequently modified. In his *Locis Theol.* he thus expresses them: "*Peccatum originis est carentia justitiæ originalis . . . secuta lapsum Adæ, propter quam corruptionem nati sunt rei, et filii iræ . . . Si quis vult addere, natos etiam propter lapsum Adæ reos esse, non impedio. Revera autem perpetua Ecclesiæ sententia est. Prophetarum, Apostolorum et Scriptorum veterum: peccatum originale non tantum esse imputationem, sed in ipsa hominum natura caliginem et pravitatem.*" Precisely the sentiment which we insist upon. See also his *Apol. Confessionis*, Art. 1.

imputation, but from that of the natural and federal headship of Adam.

A similar illustration may be found likewise in either of the following symbols, which will be found in their proper places in the subjoined catalogue of testimonies: the Confession of Wittenberg, (1536,) the Articles of Smalcald, (1537,) and the Conference of Worms, (1541,) from all of which, not less than from the foregoing, although alleged to have been prepared mainly by those who were under the influence of the Supralapsarian scheme, two things are apparent: 1. That the Reformers, as we have shown in Essay I, attached very little importance to the logical precedence of either *guilt* or *depravity* in stating the doctrine of original sin, and of course on this essential point they differ *toto celo* from Dr. Hodge; and 2. That they explicated the doctrine, not from the single point of the federal headship or imputation, as Dr. Hodge insists should be done, but from both the federal and natural headship united, as Stapfer asserts that they do, that is, on the united basis of both imputed and inherent guilt. Our next witness is,

2. *The Former Confession of Basel.*

The exact time when this Confession was prepared is still a matter of uncertainty, though the evidence seems to preponderate in favor of assigning it to the year 1532, two years later than that of Augsburg. Its second article reads as follows: "We confess that MAN was made in the beginning, after the image of God, in righteousness and true holiness. But he fell into sin by his own will—(est autem sua sponte lapsus in peccatum)—*by which fall the whole human race, being corrupted, was made subject to damnation, (corruptum, damnationi obnoxium factum est.) Even thus was our nature vitiated, and arrived at so great a proneness to sin, that unless it is regenerated by the Holy Ghost, man of himself can neither do nor will anything good.*" Here, then, we are taught that man fell of his own accord; that the whole human race was corrupted by the fall; and that this corruption renders them guilty, and obnoxious to damnation.

3. *The Second Basel, or First Helvetic Confession.*

Great efforts were put forth in preparing this symbol, and great hopes were entertained as to the result. The work was committed chiefly to the two celebrated professors at Basel, Mycomius, († 1546,) Grynæus, († 1541,) along with Bullinger, († 1575) Capito, († 1542,) Bucer, († 1551,) with whom were several others; and when completed, the Confession was, in 1536, presented by Bucer and Capito to the Assembly of divines at Wittenberg. In the following year, likewise, Bucer presented it at Smalcald, where, as Luther declares, it received the approval of the whole assemblage of the Protestant princes. It was originally written in German, and then translated into Latin. Its language respecting original sin is the following:

“MAN being the most perfect image of God upon earth . . . . after he was made holy by God, *having fallen into sin*, by his own fault, *drew with himself into the same ruin the human race, and rendered them obnoxious to the same calamity*, (*sua culpa in vitium prolapsus, in eandem secum ruinam genus humanum totum traxit, accidem calamitati obnoxium reddidit.*) And this infection, (*lues*,) which they call *original*, has so pervaded the whole human race, that the child of wrath and enemy of God can be cured by no help, except by that which is divine through Christ.”—Art. 2.

This Confession was, however, not entirely satisfactory, being regarded as too brief; and it was rewritten and enlarged in 1566, (only two years after Calvin's death,) by the pastors of Zurich; and was approved and subscribed not only by their confederates of Berne and Schaffhausen, and Sangallia, Rhetia, Myllhausia, and Bienna, of the Grison league, but by the Churches of Geneva, Savoy, Poland, Hungary and Scotland. As thus rewritten we now present it in its connection here, though out of the chronological arrangement.

#### 4. *The Second, or Latter Helvetic Confession.*

“MAN was from the beginning created by God, after the image of God, in righteousness and true holiness, good and upright; but by the instigation of the serpent and his own fault, (*culpa*,) falling from goodness and rectitude, he *became subject to sin*, death, and various

calamities; *and such as he became by the fall, (à lapsu,) such are all who are propagated from him*, they being subject to sin, death, and various calamities. We understand that sin is that native corruption of man, derived or propagated to us all by those our parents, by which we, being sunk in depraved desires, and averse from good, but prone to all evil, filled with all wickedness, distrust, contempt and hatred of God, can of ourselves neither do nor even think that which is good. Nay, rather, as we increase in years, we bring forth corrupt fruit appropriate to the evil tree, *in thoughts, words, and depraved actions* committed against the law of God; by reason of which we, through our own desert, being exposed to the wrath of God, are subjected to just punishment (*iræ Dei obnoxii, pœnis subjeicimur justis,*) and therefore we should all have been rejected by God, had not Christ our deliverer brought us back again."—Chap. 8.\*

5. *The Confession of Wittenberg, 1536.*

"We believe and confess that MAN *was originally created* by God, *just and wise*, endowed with free will, and adorned with the Holy Spirit, and was happy; but that afterwards, for his disobedience, he was deprived of the Holy Spirit, and *made the bond-slave of Satan*, and subject to corporal and eternal damnation; *and that this evil did not remain with Adam alone, but was propagated to all his posterity,*" etc.—Chap. 4.

6. *The Articles of Smalcald, 1537.*

These articles, to which we have already referred, were written by Luther himself; and the first article of Part III reads as follows: "Here it must be confessed by us, that Paul, in Rom. v, affirms that sin sprang from one man, Adam, and entered into the world, (*ortum esse et introÿsse,*) *by whose disobedience all men were made sinners, subject to death and the devil.* This is named original, hereditary, principal and capital sin, (*die Erbsünde oder Heuptsünde.* See Hase, p. 317.)

7. *Conference at Worms, Jan., 1541.*

This colloquy was between Eccius, Mensing, Bucer, and

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\* Dr. Hodge, in his citation of testimonies, quotes the following two lines and a half as giving the sense of this important article: "Such as Adam became after the fall, such are all those descended from him; that is to say, they are equally obnoxious to sin, death, and all sorts of calamities;" thus leaving an opening for antecedent imputation. But fully quoted, it destroys his doctrine.

Melancthon; and they thus express their agreement on the topic before us: "We unanimously admit that *all who are propagated from Adam*, in accordance with the ordinary law, (of nature,) are born *with original sin, and so under the displeasure of God*; (cum peccato originali, et ita in ira Dei nasci.) *But original sin consists in a destitution of original righteousness with concupiscence.*"

#### 8. *Confession of Saxony, 1551.*

This Confession was written by Melancthon, to be presented to the Council of Trent. He wrote it on behalf of the Churches of Saxony, though the Meissen Churches, and very many others subscribed it. Dr. Hodge presents the sense of the second article in a brief extract, as follows:

"Original sin exists; and on account of the fall of our first parents, and in consequence of the depravation which followed their fall, they that are born are liable to the wrath of God, and deserving eternal damnation, unless remission be obtained through the Mediator."

The same is repeated in article first of the Repetitio Anhaltina, (1579):

"Ita peccatum originis est reatus non tantum propter lapsum primorum parentium sed etiam propter hanc ipsam depravationem, quæ lapsum illum sequita est, et nobiscum nascitur: omnesque homines, naturali ordine progenitos, facit obnoxios iræ Dei, et dignos æterna damnatione nisi fiat remissio propter mediatorem."

#### 9. *The French Confession.*

This Confession of the Faith of the Reformed Churches in France was adopted by the first National Synod, which was held at Paris, in May, 1559, (F. de Morell being the Moderator,) and was presented to Charles IX, at Poissy, in 1561, on behalf of all his Protestant subjects; and it continued to be their recognized symbol, always being read and re-adopted at every National Synod, until the revocation of the edict of Nantes. Winer supposes that it was prepared by Calvin; but this is mere conjecture, unsustained by any historical support. Its testimony is as follows:

"Art. 9. We believe that MAN being created pure and upright, and conformable (*Lat. conformem; Gal. conforme*) to the image of God,

by his own fault fell from the grace which he had received; and thereby so alienated himself from God, the fountain of all righteousness, and of all good, that his nature has become altogether corrupt, (*adeo ut ipsius natura sit prorsus corrupta; en sorte que sa nature est de tout corrompue;*) and being blinded in spirit, and depraved in heart, he has entirely lost all that integrity without any exception. For, although he has some discernment (*discretionem*) of good and evil, we nevertheless affirm, that whatever light he has becomes darkness immediately, when he argues of seeking God, so that he can in no way draw near to him by his own understanding and reason. Also, although he is endowed with will, by which he is moved to this or that, yet inasmuch as it is wholly a captive under sin, it has no liberty at all to desire good, unless what it may receive from grace, and by the gift of God.

“*Art. 10.* We believe that the entire offspring of Adam is *infected by this contagion*, (*est infectée de telle contagion*;) which we call *original sin*; that is, a stain, (*vitium, un vice héréditaire*, not “*fault*,” as Dr. Hodge translates it,) extending by propagation, and not only by imitation, as *Pelagians* think, all of whose errors we detest. Neither do we think it necessary to inquire how this sin can be propagated from one to another. For it suffices, that the things which God bestowed upon Adam, were given, not to him alone, but to his whole posterity; and therefore, we being in his person despoiled of all those gifts, have fallen into all this misery and curse.

“*Art. 11.* We believe that **THIS STAIN** is truly sin (*verè peccatum; vrayment péché;*) because it makes all and every man, not excepting unborn infants themselves, guilty of eternal death before God. We affirm, also, that *this stain, even after baptism, is truly sin*, as respects the fault, although they who are the children of God shall not on that account be condemned; because God, out of his goodness and mercy, does not impute it to them. We affirm, moreover, that this perverseness always brings forth some of the fruits of malice and rebellion, so that they even who excel in holiness, although they resist, are yet defiled by many infirmities and offenses, so long as they remain in this world.

“*Art. 12.* We believe that from this universal corruption and condemnation, in which all men are sunk by nature, God elects certain,” etc.

One might have reasonably supposed, that Dr. Hodge, since he has so much to say about *Placæus* and the French

Synod, would have been careful to present this testimony somewhat fully, at least, as it has such an important bearing on the subject. But he has presented a garbled and mistranslated extract, of *barely four lines and a half*, and there leaves the matter. See P. E., I, p. 197.

10. *The Ancient (or First) Scottish Confession.*

This Confession is attributed to John Knox, who prepared it by appointment of the Synod held at Edinburg, in 1560, and it was prepared during the session of that assembly. It was prepared first in the Scottish language, and afterward translated into Latin. The following is Art. III, as published in English, nearly a century ago, at Glasgow, Scotland, and in Hall's *Harmony of Confessions*, in 1842, and in the Latin *Collectio Confessionum*, (Leipsic, 1840,) by Niemeyer :

“By which transgression, commonly called original sin, was the image of God utterly defaced in man; and he and his posterity of nature, became enemies to God, (or, as the Latin gives it, ‘ipseque et ejus posteritatis natura facti sunt inimici Dei,’) slaves to Satan, and servants to sin. Eph. ii : 1–3. Inasmuch that death everlasting hath had; and shall have, power and dominion over all, Rom. v : 14, 21, that have not been, are not, or shall not be regenerate from above; which regeneration is wrought by the power of the Holy Ghost, John iii : 5, working in the hearts of the elect of God an assured faith in the promise of God revealed to us in his word; by which faith we apprehend Jesus Christ, with the graces and benefits promised in him. Rom. v : 1.”

In the Princeton Repertory, for 1839, and in Princeton Essays, (1846,) in the catalogue of testimonies on original sin, the above article is professedly given. Three lines and a half are faithfully taken from the Confession, to which the following three lines are added, as part of the article, but which neither are, nor ever have been, any part of it. The quotation, as far as the phrase *servants of sin*, is accurate; and all after that is spurious. It is as follows: “*servants of sin*; and so we, **IN HIS PERSON**, were despoiled of all those gifts, and fell into all this misery and curse. *These things can not be said without imputation. Hæc sine imputatione dici non possunt.*” (The italics and capitals are Dr. Hodge's.) Here, then, we have not only the *English*, thus set off by italics and capitals,



but the *Latin original* is likewise paraded before the reader; and yet both are fictitious. Whence were they obtained? The importance of this question will be seen in the citation we shall presently make from the works of Rivetus.\*

11. *The Confession of England*, 1562.

This Confession was inserted in his Apology, (in 1562,) by Bishop Jewell, on behalf of the English Churches. The 18th article reads as follows:

“We say, also, that every person is born in sin, and leadeth his life in sin; that nobody is able truly to say his heart is clean; Prov. xx: 9; that the most righteous person is but an unprofitable servant; Luke xvii: 10; that the law of God is perfect, and requireth of us perfect and full obedience; that we are able by no means to fulfill the law in this worldly life; that there is no mortal creature which can be justified by his own deserts, in God’s sight.”

12. *Articles of the Church of England*.

These articles were agreed upon by the Archbishop, Bishops, and Clergy of England and Ireland, (after having, it is said, received the approval of Calvin,) in the Convention held in London (an. 1562,) for avoiding diversities of opinion, and establishing unanimity of consent in matters of true religion. Their testimony (see Art. IX) is very important, and the reader will find it on p. 406 of our First Essay.

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\* Our readers will observe the remarkable unanimity with which these symbols all sustain the representation of Stapfer, respecting the true nature of imputation; to wit: “that it consists in nothing else than this, that his posterity are viewed as in the same place with their father, and are like him.” “Inasmuch as to give Adam a posterity like himself, and to impute his sin to them, is one and the same thing.” (See our First Essay, p. 400.) And, moreover, that there is no attempt to distinguish between Adam’s federal and natural headship; and not a syllable mentioned which sustains Dr. Hodge’s idea of antecedent imputation. The statement is, that all the race were in Adam, all sinned in and fell with him, and all consequently inherited the same moral corruption. Dr. Hodge must have greatly missed the word *imputation* here; and in citing the Confessions, he by some strange process, when he comes to the old Scottish, thinks he has found it; so he first gives the English *translation*, and then the *Latin original*, when neither had any existence in the Confession. We suppose that in rapid copying, his eye must have rested upon some commentary on the words, and that he mistook the one for the other—a mistake not without frequent precedents. But we respectfully suggest to Dr. Hodge, that even the word *imputatio*, in that connection, is not the same as *imputatio antecedens*.

13. *The Belgic Confession.*

This Confession appears to have been drawn up in 1559, (in the French language, originally,) and was first approved in 1561, and was finally ratified and adopted in Synod by all the Belgic Churches in 1579. The following is from Art. XV :

“ We believe that by the disobedience of Adam, the sin which is called original, is diffused into the whole human race. But original sin is a corruption of the whole nature, and a *hereditary blot* (*vitium hereditarium*,) *by which even infants, themselves, in their mother's womb, are polluted; and which, as some noisome root, produces every kind of sin in man; and is so foul and execrable before God, that it alone may suffice for the condemnation of the whole human race.* (Est-que tam fœdum, atque execrabile coram Deo, ut ad universi generis humani condemnationem sufficiat.)

This last clause, which is, moreover, the conclusion of the sentence, is wholly omitted by Dr. Hodge, and the sentence is given as complete without it. And why? Its testimony is overwhelming on the point that moral corruption is the ground of imputed guilt; while both the fact and the doctrine are denied by Dr. Hodge.

14. *The Heidelberg Catechism, or Catechism of the Reformed Churches, 1563.*

“ *Quest. 7.* Whence, then, arose this depravity of human nature?

“ *Ans.* From the fall and disobedience of our first parents, Adam and Eve. Hence, our nature is *so depraved that we are all conceived and born in sin.*” See also Quest. 9.

15. *Confession of the Bohemians, or Waldenses, 1573.*

After dwelling on the knowledge of man's own self, the Confession thus refers to his sin :

“ Wherefore the spring and principal author of all evil is that cruel and detestable Devil, the tempter, liar, and manslayer; and next, the free-will of man, which, notwithstanding being converted to evil, through lust and naughty desires, and perverse concupiscence, chooseth that which is evil. Hereby sins, according to these degrees, and after this order, may be considered and judged of. The first, and weightiest, and most grievous sin of all was, without doubt, after that sin of Adam, which the apostle calleth disobedience, for the which

death reigneth over all, even over those, also, which have not sinned with like transgression as did Adam. A second kind is original sin, naturally engendered in us and hereditary, wherein we are all conceived and born into the world. 'Behold,' saith David, Ps. li, 'I was born in iniquity, and in sin hath my mother conceived me.' And Paul, Eph. ii, 'We are by nature the children of wrath.' *Let the force of this hereditary destruction be acknowledged and judged of by the guilt and fault, by our proneness and declination, by our evil nature, and by the punishment which is laid upon it.* The third kind of sins are those which are called actual," etc. "Here, withal, this is also taught, that by reason of *that corruption and depravation*, common to all mankind, and for the sin, transgressions, and injustice, [unrighteousness,] *which ensued thereof*, all men ought to acknowledge, according to the Holy Scripture, their own just condemnation, and the horrible and severe vengeance of God; and, consequently, the most deserved punishment of death, and eternal torments in hell," etc.

Let our readers compare this most clear statement of the order of the topics *depravity, guilt, and death*, with Dr. Hodge's attempt to represent it as teaching the doctrine of immediate or antecedent imputation. The passage, as he presents it, is a clear perversion. See Princeton Essays, I, 196.

16. *Synod of Dort, 1618.*

"MAN, from the beginning, was created in the image of God, adorned in his mind with the true and saving knowledge of his Creator, and of spiritual things, with righteousness in his will and heart, and purity in all his affections, and thus was altogether holy; but, by the instigation of the devil *and his own free will*, (*libera sua voluntate*,) revolting from God, *he bereaved himself of these inestimable gifts; and, on the contrary, in their place, contracted in himself blindness, horrible darkness, and perversity of judgment in the mind; malice, rebellion, hardness in the will and heart; and finally, impurity in all his affections.* And such as man was after the fall, such children also he begat; namely, being corrupted, corrupt ones—*corruption having been derived from Adam to all his posterity*, (Christ only excepted,) not by imitation, as the Pelagians formerly would have it, *but by the propagation of a vicious nature through the just judgment of God; therefore, all men are conceived in sin, and born the children of wrath*, indisposed to all saving good, propense to evil, dead in sins, and the slaves of sin," etc.

This testimony Dr. Hodge has omitted to cite.

17. *The Westminster Confession, and Catechisms.*

This symbol was examined and approved by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, in 1647, and ratified and established by act of Parliament, in 1649. Having already cited its testimony in our First Essay, pp. 403, 405, from chap. vi, and from Shorter Catechism ii, 16-18, we need not repeat it here. It explicates the doctrine of original sin from both the natural and federal headship of Adam; and, like Calvin and the Reformed Church, bases the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity upon both equally.

18. *The Savoy Confession.*

This symbol, being a declaration of the faith and order of the Congregational Churches in England, was adopted by the representatives of their Churches in their meeting at the Savoy, (London,) in 1658. In 1680, it was approved by a Synod of the representatives of the Churches of Massachusetts, convened in Boston; and subsequently by those of Connecticut, assembled at Saybrook, in 1708:

"1. God having made a covenant of works and life theroupon, with our first parents, and all their posterity in them, they being seduced by the subtlety and temptation of Satan, did willfully transgress the law of their creation, and break the covenant by eating the forbidden fruit.

"2. *By this sin they, and we in them, fell from original righteousness and communion with God, and so became dead in sin, and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body.*

"3. *They being the root, and by God's appointment standing in the room and stead of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed, and corrupted nature conveyed, to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation.*

"4. *From this original corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed all actual transgressions.*

"5. *This corruption of nature during this life doth remain in those who are regenerated," etc.*

We omit the Confessions of the London Baptists, (1646,) Mennonists, (1632,) Moravians, Welch Calvinists, etc., for they merely reiterate the language of the above cited.

Here, then, we have, as expressed by the great body of the

Confessions of the Reformed Church, its testimony on the vital doctrine of original sin. And we look in vain therein for any such dogma on that subject as Dr. Hodge insists upon as essential to the right understanding and true reception of that doctrine. They refer imputation to the fact that we all sinned in Adam, which fact they state without attempting to explain it. They teach that our moral corruption is not the direct penal infliction for the imputed sin of Adam alone, but that it results also from our own sin in Adam. So that the imputation they teach is, as Turretin himself avers, both mediate and immediate,—an imputation of our own sin in and through Adam, rather than the imputation of his own sin alone, as we have already abundantly illustrated. And thus the natural and federal headship of Adam are both equally regarded as essential to the right statement and explanation of the doctrine. And thus, moreover, the statement of Stapfer (denounced by Dr. Hodge as Placæanism) stands forth fully vindicated—that it is the adversaries of the Reformed doctrine who assert that it teaches that God imputes the first sin of Adam without any regard to universal corruption, and esteems all Adam's posterity as guilty, and holds them as liable to condemnation, purely on account of that sinful act of their first parent; so that they, without any respect had to their own sin, and so as innocent in themselves, are destined to eternal punishment. And he adds, that those adversaries injuriously suppose those things to be separated in our doctrine which are by no means to be separated; for they consider imputation only as immediate, and abstractly from the mediate, when the Reformed divines suppose that neither ought to be considered separately from the other. Dr. Hodge assumes precisely the position of those adversaries, and maintains their very ground.

We shall now proceed to cite the separate testimonies of the eminent divines of the Reformed Church.

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ERRATA IN PART II, DEC. 1861.

Several errata in the article on Imputation, in our last number, and which had been placed in the publisher's hands more than two months anterior to its

publication, were not corrected by him; the most important of which are the following:

On p. 560, line 11, for 1285, read 1265; and for 1307, read 1308.

On p. 578, Maccovius is incorrectly declared to have been a member of the Synod of Dort. We were led into the error by Dr. Hodge; and our readers will please regard the statement as withdrawn.

On p. 589, l. 9, for *man* read *men*.

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ART. IV.—*The Secession Conspiracy in Kentucky, and its Overthrow: with the Relation of both to the General Revolt.*

*A Memoir of Civil and Political Events, public and private, in Kentucky: To serve as a History of the Secession Conspiracy, which had its Center in Kentucky: Commencing in 1859, and extending to the Overthrow of the Conspiracy, and the breaking out of the Civil War in that State in 1861.*

PART FIRST—Containing the History of the Conspiracy from the Triumph of the Democratic Party in August, 1859, till the Triumph of the Union Party in August, 1861.

I.—1. Kentucky: her Position and Character.—2. Triumph of the Democratic Party in 1859: Subsequent Division and Disorganization: Treason of the Part that adhered to Vice-President Breckinridge.—3. Popular Votes between Aug. 1859, and Aug. 1861: Loyalty of the People: Overthrow of the Vice-President and his Party.

1. The posture of the great border slave States, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri, has been every way peculiar in our great civil war. The posture of North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, lying immediately behind them, and both tiers of States stretching entirely across the somewhat densely-peopled region of the nation, was more nearly analogous to that of the four States first named, than to that of any other portion of the Union. Tennessee had been a portion of North Carolina, and had been originally peopled from that State; and the upper and most populous parts of Arkansas had been settled chiefly by the same class of persons. Kentucky had been a part of Virginia, and had been

POSTAGE, Paid in Advance, 4 Cts. per No. or 16 Cts. per Year.

# DANVILLE REVIEW.

CONDUCTED BY

*In Association of Ministers.*

JUNE, 1862.

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*Φωτίσαντος δὲ ζῶν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου.*

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DANVILLE, KY.

PRINTED FOR THE ASSOCIATION AND SOLD BY

MOORE, WILSTACH, KEYS & CO.,

25 WEST FOURTH STREET,

CINCINNATI.

SOLD ALSO BY WM. S. & A. MARTIN, PHILADELPHIA; ROBERT CARTER &  
BROTHERS, NEW YORK; LITTLE, BROWN & CO., BOSTON;  
KEITH & WOODS, ST. LOUIS; BIBLE AND  
TRACT HOUSE, BALTIMORE.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1862, by JACOB COOPER, for the Association,  
in the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.

# DANVILLE REVIEW.

No. II.

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JUNE, 1862.

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ART. I.—STUDIES ON THE BIBLE, No. I. *The Sins of the Patriarchs.\**

The term patriarch occurs four times in the New Testament. It invariably denotes the founder of a family or a race. It is applied once to Abraham, the progenitor of the chosen seed; Heb. vii : 4 ; twice to the sons of Jacob, from whom the twelve tribes took their origin and their designations; Acts vii : 8, 9 ; and once to David, the first in the royal line of Judah; Acts ii : 29. The corresponding term in the Hebrew text of the Old Testament is *Roshe Aboth*, describing the chief fathers of the tribes of Israel. Ex. vi : 14; Numb. xxxii : 28, etc. In popular language, however, they are styled patriarchs who stood in the line of men, beginning perhaps with Noah and ending with the sons of Jacob. The expression holy patriarchs is restricted to such of their number as are expressly declared to have been the servants of God, especially Noah, Abraham, Lot, Isaac and Jacob. The phrase, the sins of the holy patriarchs, stands for those flagrant immoralities into which they were betrayed, and brings us face to face with one of the well-known problems of sacred history.

The problem, when analyzed, resolves itself into three principal

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\* AUTHORITIES AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION. Hengstenberg's Pentateuch, vol. II, p. 482, seq.; Havernick's Pentateuch, p. 187; Princeton Review, 1855, p. 24, seq.; Poli Synopsis Criticorum; Calvin's Commentary on Genesis; Kurtz's Old Covenant, vol. I, p. 212; Smith's Dictionary of the Bible; North British Review, Feb. 1860, Art. 4, "Silence of Scripture."



ART. III.—*Imputation and Original Sin.*

## PART III.—(Continued.)

## THE TESTIMONY OF THE DIVINES OF THE REFORMED CHURCH.

WE shall present this testimony in chronological order, as nearly as we have been able to ascertain it. But no one, who has never made the attempt, can form any adequate conception of the difficulties to be encountered in such an effort, from the materials which are accessible in this country. The theology itself is enunciated with clearness, but the confusion and contradiction in dates is really appalling. The similarity of names is likewise a source of considerable perplexity. For example, there were two who bore the name of *Musculus*, both eminent writers on theology; two *Piscators*, both eminently learned, who were cotemporaries, and both professors of theology, and wrote upon the same themes; two of the name of *Campagius Vitringa*, (father and son,) associate professors of theology in the same university, both very eminent as theological writers, and they died within a few months of each other; two of the name of *Peter du Moulin*, (*Molinæus*), father and son; two of the name of *Sohunius*, both very highly esteemed as theologians; and, in one word, two of each of the following names, and all of them eminent: to wit, *Junius*, *Forbes*, *Rivetus*, *Spanheim*, *Polyander*, *Triglandius*, and three of the name of *Grynæus*, and three of the name of *Turretin*, and also of *Parcus* and *Vossius*, and all of them justly eminent. One writer of great authority, speaking of J. J. Grynæus, represents him to have died at two several times, and at an interval of nearly two years; and so on very frequently. D'Aubigne, in his *History of the Reformation*, has perpetrated some such blunders, which evince great heedlessness, (as, for instance, where he makes F. Duns Scotus, the subtle doctor, crack a joke with Charles the Bald, confounding him with J. Scotus Erigena.) Some very amusing instances may be accredited also to the late Professor Stuart, and to Dr. Hodge, and others in our own land. We have done our best to avoid following the example, though we perceive, from one or two recent publications, that we have the high honor

accorded us (which we beg leave most respectfully to decline, however,) of having discovered a *Targum on Daniel*. The only person who has ever seen such a thing is, we believe, Elias Levita, (vide *præfat. suam ad Methurgamim*,) and no one ought to deprive him of the honor of such a discovery. Our first citation is from

I. ZUINGLIUS. *Born 1484, died 1531.*

The theology of Zuingle exhibits less precision of statement, and less evidence of having been thoroughly digested into systematic form, than that of any of the early Reformers. In our Second Essay, pp. 556, 557, we have, from his own writings, shown that he inculcated on original sin the very errors which were afterward attributed to Placæus. In his discourse *De Providentia*, cap. 5 and 6, he appears to have gone to the full length of Zanchius himself, or of the late Dr. Samuel Hopkins, in respect to the Divine agency in the production of sin; as for example, "Unum igitur atque facimus," etc.:

"One and the same evil deed, for example, adultery or murder, is not a crime so far as it is the work of God as author, mover, instigator; yet it is both crime and wickedness, so far as it is the work of man. . . . HE therefore moves the robber to kill both the innocent and him that is unprepared for death."

His *Fidei Ratio*, however, affords evidence of having been drawn up with great care. It was prepared and sent to Charles V., at Augsburg, in 1530, and in it he appears to have modified his earlier views respecting *original sin*. In sect. 4, he says:

"Hence, I thus think concerning original sin. Anything which is done contrary to law is truly sin: for where there is no law there is no violation of duty, and where there is no violation of duty there is no sin properly understood, that is, so far as sin, wickedness, crime, offense, or guilt is concerned. I admit, therefore, that our father sinned a sin; that it was truly sin, that is, a wicked and criminal act, and contrary to law. But they who have descended from him did not sin in this way, for none of us ever partook of the forbidden fruit in Paradise. . . . Why does death devastate us, since we have not sinned in the way Adam did? *Because he died on account of sin: and being dead, that is, adjudged to death, begot us.* We therefore die likewise, but the blame is his, but our condition is one of disease, or if you please, of sin, though the word here is not properly used."

This is, in brief, his view; we subjoin the original more fully:

“Hic de Originali peccato sic sentio: Peccatum vero dicitur, cum contra legem itum est: etc. Velimus igitur nolimus, admittere cogimur, peccatum originale ut est in filiis Adæ non proprie peccatum esse, quomodo jam expositum est, non enim est facimus contra legem. Morbus igitur est proprie et conditio, morbus quia,” etc. “En nobis mortem etiamsi non peccaverimus quomodo Adam. *Quamobrem? Quia ille peccavit.* Nos autem cum non hoc modo peccaverimus, cur mors popularatur? Quia ille mortuus est propter peccatum, et mortuus, hoc est, morti adjudicatus, nos generavit. Morimur ergo et nos, sed illius culpa, nostra vero conditione et morbo, aut si *mavis peccato*, verum improprie capto. . . . Nati scelus non habent, sed pœnam ac mulctam sceleris, puta conditionem, servitutem, et ergastulum. *Ista si scelus libet adpellare, ideo quia pro scelere infliguntur, non veto.* Istud originale peccatum, per conditionem et contagionem agnasci omnibus qui ex adfectu maris et fœminæ gignuntur, agnosco: et nos esse natura filius iræ scio,” etc.

## II. PETER MARTYR. *Professor at Zurich, 1500–1561.*

We preface the testimony of this great divine with a few remarks. It is cited by Turretin (*Loco ix, 2, 9, sect. 43*) and by Dr. Hodge, (*P. Essays, I., 183.*) Turretin observes, that although Martyr, in his work against Pighius, says nothing on imputation, he yet announces it with sufficient clearness elsewhere, where he teaches that our original corruption is the *punishment of Adam's sin*. And in support of this statement, he quotes from his Commentary on Romans as follows: “Assuredly, there is no one who can doubt that original sin is inflicted on us *in revenge and punishment of the first fall.*” Dr. Hodge cites the same remark to prove the same thing, and adds to it the testimony of Beza.

I advert to this matter here, because it illustrates the mode in which all the advocates of antecedent imputation misunderstand and misapply the language of the Reformed divines. They ignore the explanation which those divines give of their own language: and then attaching to that language an altogether different meaning, deduce their inferences accordingly. For instance, Martyr in the foregoing clause, says that original sin is inflicted upon us as a punishment of the first fall. (*Nobis infligi in ultionem et pœnam primi lapsus.*) For he and all the Reformed divines, without attempting to explain the fact,

maintain that *we sinned and fell in Adam*, and that it was as truly *our sin and our fall*, as it was the sin and fall of Adam. And hence they use not only the word *pæna* in this connection, but the word *ultio*, as if to prevent the possibility of their meaning being misunderstood. The *revenge* and *punishment* of the fall, therefore, is the revenge and punishment of *our own fall*, and not merely a punishment inflicted in revenge upon us for the fall of another, as Dr. Hodge makes them say. They made no attempt to philosophise on the subject; but, confessing their inability to explain how we sinned in Adam, asserted the fact *as a fact* on the testimony of God. The imputation of guilt, therefore, was with them the imputation of our own subjective guilt as well as of Adam's guilt; and the penalty—the *ultio* and *pæna*—the *infliction of moral corruption*, (if we may again borrow the strange expression,) was the penalty of our own sin and fall, and not only of the sin and fall of another. Thus they reasoned with the Apostle in Rom. v. But Dr. Hodge utterly denies the existence of any subjective ground for this imputation, this *pæna* and *ultio*; and ignores the whole explanation, though constantly made by the Reformed; and asserts that the sin and fall referred to was simply the sin and fall of another; and that the punishment we suffer is simply the *ultio* and *pæna* of another's sin. And this is just the difference. And this mode of reasoning on the subject, and this treatment of the testimony of the Reformed divines, runs through all the lucubrations of Dr. Hodge touching this matter: who, instead of giving due weight to their own explanation of their views, suffers himself to be misled by their merely popular expressions, in which they attribute the *act, sin, fall*, to Adam personally. In illustration of the accuracy of this representation, we subjoin Martyr's own statement on the subject, together with his explanation:

"It, [the first sin and fall,] was equally the same as if we all had been [personally] present, and had sinned at the same time with him."  
 "Original sin is a depravation of the whole nature of man, *derived from our first parents to their posterity by generation*;"

and not by antecedent imputation, as Dr. Hodge avers.

"The efficient cause is the sinning will of Adam. *When, therefore, the the Apostle seems to assert that the sin for which we are condemned is not*

*another's but our own, he means that the sin of Adam was not so the sin of another, but that it was ours also.*" (Comm. in Rom. v.)

Thus, therefore, is the subjective ground of imputation fully recognized; and by consequence the doctrine of *antecedent* imputation disallowed.

### III. WOLFGANG MUSCULUS.

This eminent man was born at Lorraine, in September, 1497. The writings of Luther led him, in 1527, to embrace Protestantism; and his labors greatly promoted the Reformation. In 1531 he became pastor of the Church in Strasburg, where he remained eighteen years. He then went to Switzerland; and finally accepted the Chair of Theology in Berne, where he died, August 29, 1563. He was thoroughly conversant with the Greek, Hebrew, and Arabic languages; and his *Loci Communes* were in high esteem. Even Father Simon, who rarely praises anybody but himself, justly extols his commentaries on the Sacred Books; and says that he observes *une methode exacte* therein. He has been, not without reason, claimed as favoring Supralapsarianism.

In his Comment. in Rom. v : 12, he says :

"Some explain the word *ἡμαςτον* (they sinned) to mean, that we are condemned, or virtually constituted sinners, on account of sin; which is, indeed true; but there is no reason why you should not thereby understand the actual sin of Adam, in whom all that existed in his loins have sinned. For since we receive from Christ not only this benefit, that we should be virtually justified by his obedience; but also this, that by the very actual obedience of Christ, we obey the Father, as we are Christ's; so we are not only virtually made sinners in Adam, but are condemned for this very sin of Adam. Whence the Apostle declares that by the offense of one, or the one offense, judgment came upon all men to condemnation."

This is one of the earliest and strongest averments of what Dr. Hodge would wish to regard as the doctrine of *antecedent* imputation; and yet Musculus does not say, as Dr. Hodge does, that we are condemned *for the sin of Adam alone*. His modesty in hesitating to decide whether *δι' ἐνός παραπτώματος* means *the offense of one*, or *the one offense*, is remarkable, considering the views he was inclined to favor. But Calvin,

Stapfer, and Breckinridge, as well as President Edwards, all maintain, as above shown, that Adam's sin is imputed to his posterity; but that they are not condemned for his sin alone. And Musculus, so far from making the imputation of Adam's sin alone causal of the depravity and corruption of his posterity, makes his posterity "to have sinned *in the loins of Adam*;" and so recognizes their subjective guilt, which Dr. Hodge denies. This testimony, therefore, recognizing the fact that we sinned in the loins of Adam; and that we are condemned for the very sin of Adam; evinces that Musculus explicated the doctrine of original sin from the stand-point of both inherent and imputed guilt; and that he did not, as Dr. Hodge and Placeus do, separate them, and make the one causal of the other.

#### IV. CALVIN. 1509-1564.

The views of this prince of theologians have been, in part, presented in our First Essay, in citations from lib. ii, cap. 1, of his Institutes, and from his Exposition of Romans, ii: 17. A more full citation may, perhaps, be necessary, however, in order to place beyond doubt his views on the subject before us.

In referring to the general principle which underlies this whole discussion, Calvin remarks that God, in electing and reprobating *from the fallen and corrupt mass*, does it after the counsel of his own will. Inst., lib. iii, c. 23; adds in sec. 8:

"For if predestination is no other than a dispensation of Divine justice—mysterious indeed, but liable to no blame—*since it is certain that they were not unworthy of being predestinated to that fate*, it is equally certain, that the destruction they incur by predestination is consistent with the strictest justice. *Besides their perdition depends on the Divine predestination in such a manner, that the cause and matter of it are found in themselves.*" "In the next place we maintain, that they act preposterously, who, in seeking for the origin of their condemnation, *direct their views to the secret recesses of the Divine counsel, and overlook the corruption of nature, which is its real source.*" (Sec. 9.) And in sec. 11: "We confess the guilt to be common, but we say that some are relieved by Divine mercy."

See also the important admission of Turretin, respecting Calvin's views on this subject, in *Loco iv: quæst. 9, sec. 30*, which exposes the utter folly of the claim of Twisse, that he

was favorable to the Supralapsarian scheme; and the equally erroneous claim of Dr. Thornwell; who, while he maintains that his views on this whole subject are in harmony with those of Calvin, does not hesitate to say, in direct antagonism to him, *that it makes no difference whether the guilt is supposed to precede the imputation and condemnation, or whether it flows from and is produced by the imputation.* The former of these sentiments is that of Calvin and the Reformed Church; while the latter is that of the Supralapsarians. And it is rather odd, that a truly learned and intelligent divine should now claim that it makes no difference whether God is regarded from the Infralapsarian stand-point, or from that of the Supralapsarian school. This certainly would have been news to the Synod of Dort.

And then, speaking in reference to original sin, Calvin remarks (Inst., lib. iv : cap. 15, sec. 10) :

“ We have already proved\* that *original sin is the pravity and corruption of our nature which FIRST MAKES US GUILTY OF THE WRATH OF GOD* (quæ primum reos facit nos iræ Dei,) and then also brings forth in us those works which the Scriptures call the *works of the flesh.* (Gal. v : 19.) The two following things are therefore to be distinctly observed : *first, that our nature being so depraved and vitiated, we are on account of this very corruption deservedly condemned and convicted before God ; to whom nothing is acceptable, but righteousness, and innocence, and purity.* And therefore even infants themselves, bring their own condemnation with them into the world, who, even though they have not yet brought forth the fruits of their iniquity, have nevertheless the seed of it within themselves. Yea, their whole nature is, in a certain sense, a seed of sin ; and therefore can not be otherwise than odious and abominable to God.”

Again :

“ We have heard that the impurity of the parents is so transmitted to the children, that all, without a single exception, are polluted as soon as they exist. *But we shall not find the origin of this pollution, unless we ascend to the first parent of us all, as to the fountain which sends forth*

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\* The passage here referred to by Calvin, is lib. ii, cap. 1, in which he says, “ Videtur ergo peccatum originale hereditaria naturæ nostræ pravitas et corruptio, in omnes animæ partes diffusa : quæ primum facit reos iræ Dei, tum etiam opera in nobis profert, quæ Scriptura vocat opera carnis. Atque id est propriè quod à Paulo sæpius peccatum nominatur.” Sec. 8, ut supra. See a translation of this in our Essay I, p. 407.

*all the streams.* Thus it is certain that Adam was not only the progenitor, but as it were the root of mankind, and therefore that all the race were deservedly (*merito*) vitiated in his corruption. The Apostle explains this by a comparison between him and Christ: 'As,' says he, 'by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that (*quando*) all have sinned,' so, by the grace of Christ, righteousness and life have been restored to us. What cavil will the Pelagians raise here?" "There is no obscurity in the declaration that many are made righteous by the obedience of Christ, as they had been made sinners by the obedience of Adam. And therefore, between these two persons, there is this relation, that *the one ruined us by involving us in his destruction*, the other by his grace has restored us to salvation." "He who pronounces that we were all dead in Adam, now at the same time openly testifies also that we were implicated in the guilt of sin, (*peccati labe esse implicitis*, not 'of his sin.') For neither could condemnation reach to those who were touched with no blame of iniquity." (*Neque enim ad eos perveniret damnatio, qui nullæ iniquitatis culpa attingerentur.*) "No other explanation, therefore, can be given of our being said to be dead in Adam, than that his transgression not only procured misery and ruin for himself, but precipitated our nature also into a like destruction. AND THAT NOT BY HIS INDIVIDUAL GUILT, WHICH PERTAINS NOT TO US, (*neque id suo unius vitio, quod nihil ad nos pertineat,*) but because he infected all his descendants with the corruption into which he had fallen. Otherwise there would be no truth in the statement of Paul, that all are by nature the children of wrath, if they had not been already under the curse before they were born. Now, it is easily inferred that our nature is there characterized, not as it was created by God, but as it was vitiated in Adam; because it would be unreasonable to make God the author of death. Adam therefore so corrupted himself that from him the contagion has passed to his whole offspring."—*Lib. II: cap. 1, sect. 6.*

"These two things, therefore, should be distinctly observed: first, that our nature being so totally vitiated and depraved, we, on account of this very corruption, are regarded as deservedly (*merito*) condemned and convicted in the sight of God, to whom nothing is acceptable but righteousness, innocence, and purity. Nor is this an obligation [to punishment] arising out of another's offense; (*neque ista est alieni delicti obligatio:*) for when it is said that we by the sin of Adam are made obnoxious to the judgment of God, it is not to be so understood as if we, being innocent ourselves and undeserving, suffer the blame of his offense, but because we, through his transgression, are all entangled in the curse, he is said to have fettered us: (*sed quia per ejus transgressionem*



maledictione induti sumus omnes, dicitur ille nos obstrinxisse.) Yet not the punishment alone proceeds from him to us, but the pollution to which the punishment is justly due, being instilled from himself, resides in us."—Sect. 8.

This language needs no expositor: and it is impossible to express in stronger terms an utter antagonism to the Antecedent Imputation scheme of Dr. Hodge.

We conclude with the following from Calvin's note on Rom. v: 17:

"It is worthy of remark that there are two differences between Christ and Adam, concerning which the Apostle was silent, not because he thought they might be neglected, but because it did not belong to his present argument to enumerate them. The first is, *that by the sin of Adam we are not condemned by imputation alone, as though the punishment of another's sin is exacted of us; but we bear his punishment because we also are guilty of his fault;* for because our nature is vitiated in him, it is with God bound by the guilt of iniquity."

Dr. Hodge quotes this passage *just as we have done*, and adds the following as a continuous part of the quotation: "Here then we have the two things, *not only the imputation of the first sin; but also our own fault since our nature is corrupted;*" and refers it all to Calvin on Rom. v: 17. *But there is no such passage to be found in that connection.\** And it is hardly fair to manufacture authorities, however great may be our need of them.

#### V. ANDREAS G. HYPERIUS.

This eminent Theologian and Reformer was born at Ypres, in 1511, and after studying at Louvain, and other Universities, with success, he traveled into England, Germany, and Italy; and on his return to Flanders was made Professor in the University of Nimeguen, where he died, greatly lamented, February 1, 1564. He was thoroughly learned, and possessed of great capacity. And his theological and exegetical works were highly prized by the Reformed. His treatises on the study of theology, and on the composition and delivery of

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\* I use Tholuck's edition of Calvin on the New Testament. Berlin, 1831.

sermons; and on the necessity of reading and meditating on the Holy Scriptures; were so much esteemed that, as Du Pin (an impartial witness) declares, they were copied and published by a Spanish Augustinian (Laurence de Villa,) as his own, and under his own name. "There are few things," says Du Pin, "which one can find fault with in them; and they are at this time very useful to instruct divines in studying divinity, and in the art of preaching it. And one can not too much commend Hyperius for the pains he has taken in composing these useful works." In his commentary on Rom. v: 12-21, he speaks as follows respecting original sin:

"The Apostle confirms the assertion that sin and death have prevailed in those also who had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression. For the same reason he likewise frequently and strongly urges the universal particle, saying that *all* have sinned; that evil was propagated to *all*. But some one inquires, what is the formal cause or mode whereby the sin of Adam passes to all his posterity, so that even infants, who have committed no actual sins, are condemned? *I reply that the evil and contagion is derived to all the posterity of Adam by propagation itself alone, (ipsa sola propagatione.)\** For what Adam became, after his transgression, so all became who were afterward begotten of him. . . . After that he, by transgressing the law of God, had lost all honor and uprightness, and had become surrounded by and involved in all spiritual and corporeal miseries, he necessarily transmitted this contagion to all who should descend from him. . . . Rightly, therefore, and wisely the Apostle inculcates these words: that by one man sin gained entrance to all men, and death passed upon all  $\delta$  πάντες ἥμαρτον, (*ex quo, vel quoniam, ve quatenus*) by whom, or because, or so far as all have sinned. And again: Death reigned over those also who have not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression. And a little after he most appositely explains it: By the offense of one, evil was propagated (this word is not in the Greek,) to all men for condemnation, which formula of speaking concerning propagation the fathers freely used, and thereby refuted the obscure cavils of Pelagians and other heretics."

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\* Our readers will have very frequent occasion to call to mind the Supralapsarian formula of Dr. Hodge, respecting the transmission of sin: (*Neque per corpus, neque per animam, sed per culpam; id est, imputationem;*) in the way of antithesis.

## VI. PETER VIRET. 1511–1571.

This eminent luminary of the French Church, was a native of Berne. He studied at Paris, where he became intimate with Farell, with whom he went to Switzerland, and was for many years pastor of the Reformed Church in Lausanne. In 1541 Calvin invited him to Geneva; and he afterward settled at Lyons. He, and Calvin and Farell, were the founders of the Reformed religion in France; but in eloquence he was far their superior. In 1563 he was Moderator of the National Synod of Lyons. A single sentence from his Dial. I, will express his views, on the subject before us, with sufficient clearness:

“God permitted the fall and corruption of the whole human race, and of the whole nature of man, *in the man first formed.*”

VII. HENRY BULLINGER. *Pastor and Professor at Zurich,*  
1504–1575.

“Sin is called original, or the sin of our birth, because it comes from our first origin; *or is derived from our first parent upon all, by propagation or traduction.* It derived its origin from the first formed man, and hence it is termed, the hereditary depravity and corruption of our nature. Moreover, this evil *flowed from our first parents to all their posterity.*” “After men became obnoxious to punishment, so far were we from having any power by which we could deliver ourselves, that by reason of our native and inherent depravity, we rather increase the shame.”

## VIII. NEUSTADIAN DECLARATION. 1575.

This declaration was prepared by Ursinus, Zancheus, and other professors of the Palatinate, by order of the Palatine Elector, John Casimir.

“We acknowledge original sin *to be not only guilt, but the hereditary depravity of human nature,* which is repugnant to the law of God, and deserving eternal punishment.”

## IX. ZECHARIAH URSINUS. 1534–1583.

Ursinus was one of the greatest of the Reformed divines. While very young he went to Wittenburg to study, where Melancthon became very strongly attached to him. In 1557 he accompanied Melancthon to the Conference at Worms;

after which he went to Geneva and conferred with Calvin; and finally to Paris, where he continued awhile, in order to perfect his knowledge of the Hebrew, under the celebrated Mercier. He then, in 1558, rejoined Melancthon at Wittemberg; but being unable to adopt the Lutheran views of the sacrament, proceeded to Zurich. In 1561 he was invited to the Chair of Theology in Heidelberg; and in 1562, by request of the elector (Frederick III), composed the Heidelberg Catechism; and subsequently he adopted it as the basis for his theological lectures. On several points of doctrine (though not on all), which give character to the Supralapsarian scheme, his views were similar to those of his venerated colleague, Zanchius.

In his *Explication of the Catechism*,\* he says:

“Original sin is the guilt of the whole human race, on account of the fall of our first parents, and the privation of the knowledge of God. . . . Two things are included in it: 1. *The guilt of eternal damnation on account of the sin of our first parents.* 2. The depravation of our whole nature since the fall.”

Then, speaking of those who “allege that the concupiscence in which we are born is not of the nature of sin,” he says:

“*Against such it must be held, 1. That the whole human race is guilty of the eternal wrath of God, on account of the disobedience of our first parents, unless they are delivered from this guilt by the grace of the Mediator; 2. Besides this guilt there is in us a defect, and inclinations contrary to the law of God, as soon as we are born. These defects and evil inclinations are sins deserving the eternal wrath of God.*”

As Ursinus has been claimed by the Supralapsarians, and as an advocate of antecedent imputation, we shall here cite his views on the subject of the transmission of original sin. Dr. Hodge says, that the Reformed Church constantly declares that the transmission is *neque per corpus, neque per animam, sed per culpam*. Ursinus (Quæst. 7, pp. 40, 41,) gives the following explanation of the matter:

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\* A translation of this admirable Compendium of Theology, has been attempted in this country; but neither the translator nor Dr. Nevins, (who wrote an introduction to the work,) had sufficient knowledge of the matter to select the proper edition of the original for such a purpose. Their edition is not the one which Pareus requested might be used for republication; nor does it contain his latest revisions; revisions to which he attached great importance.

“The Pelagians object, that if original sin is transmitted from parent to child, it must pass either by the body or the soul. But it can not by the body, seeing that that is mere dull matter: nor by the soul, for that is not propagated *per traducem*, since it is a spiritual substance; nor is it created vicious by God, for God is not the author of sin. Therefore it can in no sense be transmitted by nature. *But I reply*, 1. That *the minor is denied*. Because, though the soul, created by God, is not vicious, it yet may contract corruption from the inert body in which it is placed, etc. 2. *The consequence is denied*, because there is not a sufficient enumeration in the minor. *For it passes neither by the body, nor by the soul*, but by the unclean generation of the whole man, on account of the guilt of our first parents; on account of which God, by a just judgment, while he creates the souls, deprives them at the same time of the original rectitude and gifts which he had bestowed upon our first parents, with this law, that they should either lose them for, or transmit them to, their posterity, if they themselves should either lose or retain them.”

“Transit (peccatum originis) enim neque per corpus, neque per animam, sed per totius hominis generationem immundam PROPTER CULPAM [not per culpam, as Dr. Hodge has made him say,] primorum parentum, propter quam Deus justo iudicio, animas dum creat, simul privat originali rectitudine et donis, quæ parentibus hac lege contulerat, ut et posteris ea conferrent vel perderent, si ipsi ea retinerent vel amitterent.”

Dr. Hodge, in the Princeton Review for 1860, p. 362, thus quotes the Supralapsarian dogma aforesaid:

“The constant answer to the objection to the doctrine of creation derived from the transmission of sin, made by Reformed theologians, is, that original sin is propagated NEQUE PER CORPUS, NEQUE PER ANIMAM, SED PER CULPAM:”\*

and on p. 367 he repeats the same affirmation: and on the same page adduces Ursinus as saying:

“Transit peccatum originis neque per corpus, neque per animam, sed per culpam parentum, propter quam Deus animas,” etc.,

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\* Even Turretin himself is so far from sustaining this representation that he says directly: “Licet modus propagationis peccati sit obscurus, et explicatu difficilis; non ideo ipsa propagatio, quam Scriptura tam clare asserit, et experientia confirmat, neganda est. Quid autem de modo propagationis sit sentiendum peculiari Questione excutietur.”—Loc. 9, quæst. 10, sec. 28. De Moor also says: “In genere tuto affirmare licet, quod *Corruptio propagetur per Generationem Naturalem*,” etc. And he devotes a whole section to the consideration of the subject. See Comment. Perpet. cap. 16, sec. 83. tom. iii, pp. 287-291.

accrediting the quotation to De Moor, cap. 15, sec. 32. The quotation is a part of what we have above given from Ursinus, and is obviously made to justify the assertions aforesaid respecting the adoption of this dogma by the church. Now we have cited the passage from the edition of the Explication, (p. 40,) containing the latest revisions of Pareus, (who was the favorite pupil of Ursinus, and received it from his own lips,) completed only one month before his death, and in which he emphatically declares that that edition is the only exemplar from which the work should be thereafter printed. And if our readers will compare the two passages, it will be seen that there never was a grosser falsification of any passage than of this as here presented. Ursinus, instead of saying, "neque per corpus, neque per animam, sed per culpam parentum," etc., says: "neque per corpus, neque per animam, sed per totius hominis generationem propter culpam," etc. The edition used by De Moor (to whom Dr. Hodge, instead of consulting the original work, accredits the quotation,) was published by Pareus; for he refers to the *Catechetical Miscellanies* as part of the volume. We have moreover carefully examined the edition of the Explication, issued at Geneva in 1584, (one year after the death of Ursinus,) and there is nothing of the kind therein. On the contrary, he therein speaks as follows: "Nam et infantes sunt peccato obnoxii: quia moriuntur. Non autem ex imitatione habent peccatum: ergo ex propagatione," p. 68; "Peccatum illud Originale appellatur, quod à prima venit origine, nempe à primo parente in omnes derivatum propagine vel traduce," p. 102.

#### X. M. CHEMNITZ (or Kemnitius.) 1522–1586.

This illustrious theologian was nominally a Lutheran. (He must not be confounded with his grand-nephew, C. Chemnitz, 1615–1666, who though very learned and celebrated, was a bigoted Lutheran.) His *Loci Communes* were highly valued by all the churches of the Reformation. His *Examen Concilii Tridentis*, gave the Papal theologues a vast deal of trouble: and his *Harmonia Evangelica*, is one of the ablest and richest commentaries on the Gospels which the age of the Reformation has bequeathed to the church of God.

In his *De Peccato Originis*, part I, p. 236, he thus remarks:

“Let it be sufficient that we are able to know that what our first parents were after the fall, in body and soul, such were all who were procreated afterward. But as to how the soul contracts that evil, we may be safely ignorant: (Quomodo autem malum illud contrahat anima, salvâ fide potest ignorari.) Because the Holy Spirit has not attempted to make this known by sure and perspicuous testimonies.”\*

XI. D. G. SOHNNIUS. Professor at Heidelberg, 1551–1589.

The Seminary at Herborn, in Central Germany, was founded in 1584, and the celebrated J. Piscator was its first professor of theology; in which office he continued during forty-one years. The Professorship had been, however, previously offered to Sohnnius, but he declined it, in order to accept the overture from Heidelberg, to fill the vacancy occasioned by the death of Ursinus; and he was inaugurated in July of the same year. In P. Essays I, 216, he is called “the colleague of Ursinus,” who died, however, in 1583. Sohnnius was a man of deep piety; and though he died young, was very eminent for his learning and profound acquaintance with theological science. On the subject before us he speaks as follows:

“Original sin, as well in Adam as in his posterity, includes three deadly evils, the demerit, the guilt or liableness to punishment, and the depravity or corruption of nature. All these concur in the parent and in his posterity in relation to the first sin, with this difference only, that Adam sinning was the principal agent committing the fault, deserving the guilt, and casting off the image of God, and rendering himself depraved. Of all these do his posterity partake by imputation and by generation from a corrupted parent. Then it is vainly disputed by the sophists, whether the demerit, the guilt, or the depravity, is contracted by the fall, for all these do actually exist; so that taking the words in a

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\* Augustine has a beautiful passage of like import, wherein he likens the sinner to one who has fallen into a well where the water is deep, and he just on the eve of perishing; upon which a man who finds him in this condition begins to ask him, “Quomodo huc cecidisti? At ille, obsecro, inquit, cogita; quomodo hinc me liberaes, non quomodo huc ceciderim, quæras.” And he adds: “Let us rather endeavor to save men from sin and wrath, than to occupy our time and energies with inquiries which can do them no good.”

wide sense, you may say that the fall and disobedience of our first parents, and in them of the whole human race, was that by which all of them in like manner lost the image of God, depraved their nature, became the enemies of God, and contracted the guilt of temporal and eternal death; unless deliverance and reconciliation should take place by the Son of God, the Mediator."

"Again, 'all are dead by the offense of one man'—therefore his offense was the offense of all, *but theirs by participation and imputation*, otherwise they could not be said to be dead by the offense of one, but by many offenses."

"Although it is truly said that the first sin was committed by Adam, yet not as a single person, but as the father of the whole human race. It is not correct, however, to say that original sin existed in Adam, or that Adam had original sin, for then the cause and effect, actual and original sin, would be manifestly confounded. The first sin of Adam, therefore, as we said before, must be viewed in a double aspect. In one respect it was the sin of Adam, and was not original sin, but actual, *originating*, that is, giving origin to the original sin of his posterity; in another respect it was the sin of his posterity, who were in his loins; *so that in mass THEY COMMITTED the same sin, AND HENCE IT WAS IMPUTED TO THEM ALL.* Thus this one fall pertains to original sin."

And again; after referring to various expressions from Rom. v: 12–18, which Pighius had adduced, he adds:

"In all these texts, says Pighius, the Apostle attributes condemnation to the sin of Adam, and nothing else. To which it may be replied, that when the Apostle declares that *sin had entered into the world*, he does not mean, merely, that Adam had become a sinner, but that it had come upon all his descendants, that is, upon all men in the world; *for he does not say in this place that guilt had entered, but that sin had entered into the world.* And this is not left to be inferred, but is expressly asserted in the same verse: '*in whom ALL have sinned;*' or, '*for that ALL have sinned.*' Moreover, when he declares that all are subject to death and condemnation by the sin of one, *it is a just inference that they are all partakers of his sin*, and are born in a state of moral pollution. In the 19th verse it is said: '*By the disobedience of one many are constituted sinners;*' *now, to be constituted sinners, includes the idea not only of being made subject to the penalty, but partaking of the nature of sin; for they who are entirely free from the stain of sin, can not with propriety be called sinners.* Again: the Apostle in this chapter teaches, that '*while we were yet sinners Christ died for us, to deliver us from death and reconcile us to God;*' *certainly he died for none but sinners: but if infants are not*



*sinner, then Christ did not die for them, nor do they belong to him as their Saviour; which is most absurd."*

Such was the doctrine taught at Heidelberg, immediately after the death of Ursinus, and during the *Emeritus* Professorship of the great Supralapsarian, Zanchius.

## XII. JEROME ZANCHIUS. 1516–1590.

Zanchius, who, like Peter Martyr, was an Italian, (born at Alzane,) left the Roman Church some years after he did, and proceeded to Strasburg, where he succeeded Hedio, who died in 1552. While here, he prepared many of his ablest works for publication. He left Strasburg in 1563, and in 1568 accepted the Theological Chair at Heidelberg. *President De Thou* praises him for the moderation which, says he, "is observable in all his writings."

In relation to the matter before us, he speaks as follows :

"Because the whole human race, which is propagated by natural generation from Adam, were in his loins, *hence the precept, WITH ITS PENALTY, WAS NOT ADDRESSED TO THE PERSON OF ADAM ALONE, but also pertained to the whole human race.* Therefore, we believe and confess with the Apostle, *that in Adam sinning all men sinned; so that that disobedience WAS NOT PECULIAR TO ADAM, but was the common (disobedience) of the whole human race; since his guilt has involved all men naturally descended from his loins,*" etc. "We therefore say that the disobedience of Adam, which was not ours in act, *yet as to the fault and guilt, became ours by imputation; since God most justly imputes that sin of Adam, as being the head to us the members.*" "For this is the reason why all men have sinned in Adam, *that is, were made guilty, because Adam first sinned by his own actual disobedience; so we also in him as in our origin are made guilty; and his sin becomes ours by imputation.*" De Peccato, (in his De Natura Dei.)

## XIII. WILLIAM WHITTAKER.

Bellarmino said of Whittaker: "He is the most learned heretic I have ever read:" and indeed his erudition and subtlety were almost unequalled even in the age in which he lived. He was born in 1547, and at the age of eighteen was admitted to Trinity College, Cambridge. In 1582, he was admitted Doctor Theologiæ by the faculty there, and in 1586 he became Principal. He died, aged 48, in 1595. He was

says an old writer, regarded as "l'Oracle de l'Université." He says:

"Original sin is inherent and native depravity, but the actual free transgression of Adam is imputed to us. For we should neither be held under the guilt or depravity thence contracted, unless that act by which Adam violated the divine precept was ascribed to us by imputation. *But in regard that some scholastic theologians place original sin in imputation alone; in this they basely and nefariously err.*"

The testimony of this learned divine shows how the Church in his time regarded the attempt to explicate the doctrine of original sin from the stand-point of imputation alone.

#### XIV. L. DANÆUS. *Professor in Geneva and Leyden, 1530-1596.*

"There are three things which constitute a man guilty before God: 1. *The sin flowing from this, that we have all sinned in the first man, Rom. v: 12.* 2. *Corruption, which is the punishment of this sin, which fell upon Adam and all his posterity. Heb. ix: 27.* 3. *The (actual) sins which adult men commit, and which are fruits which this root of corruption brings forth, of which we are guilty before the judgment of God."*

"That first sin rendered them, (our first parents,) guilty before God, then the corruption (which followed guilt in Adam) was transferred unto us; *on the account of this inhering in us we are now guilty, as infected with our own depravity—vile, and spotted, and hateful to God, not only in Adam, or as we are viewed as the fountain and root of the human race, BUT AS WE ARE CONSIDERED IN OURSELVES, AND FROM OURSELVES CORRUPTED.*" "All men, the posterity of Adam, *are by nature guilty before God, involved in that sin, and are children of wrath.* Hence, both in mind and body we bear the punishment which we before described: *for the opinion is false that punishment alone flowed to us on account of this sin, and not the guilt and fault, for in that case we should be undeserving, but first the sin, then the punishment passes over and is laid upon us. Therefore, by one man sin entered into the world, that is guilt, and that indeed first in order, and by sin death, and so the penalty, both in soul and body, afterward pervaded all men also. For in one, Adam, they sinned and are constituted guilty before God. But why was this? Because Adam not only was the propagator, but also the fountain and root of the whole human race, from which the pollution and vitiosity descended, as into the branches propagated from this root, not only by imitation, but by the actual communication of the first sin, first of the fault (culpæ,) then of the corruption and vitiosity both in mind and body."*

"Original sin, then, does not consist merely in imitation, nor solely in imputation, but in inhesion, propagation, communication, and installation of that corruption and depravity which Adam himself had contracted, and the same descends to us, and dwells in us. Therefore, when he sinned, ADAM INSTILLED HIS POLLUTION INTO US ALL

This lengthy citation from this truly great divine, shows that though he sympathizes so closely in some respects with the theological views of his colleague, Beza, he yet does not attempt to explicate the doctrine of original sin except on the ground of the twofold relation of Adam to his posterity. And in expounding the doctrine, he does not separate what God has joined together, by making imputation causal of moral corruption, as Dr. Hodge does, but brings both into the account. And he urges that we are not only guilty of Adam's sin, *but of sinning in Adam*, which, as the great Chamier remarks, is a very different thing.

#### XV. FRANCIS JUNIUS, of Leyden. 1543-1602.

The elder Scaliger, who was rather more inclined to sneer at and ridicule everybody than to praise anybody, regarded Junius with high admiration, and without qualification pronounced him the greatest theologian of that age of illustrious divines. His influence was very great throughout the whole Reformed Church. He was the associate of Tremellius in translating the Bible. In his tractate in reply to Arminius, he evinces a modified Supralapsarianism. In his *De Peccato Originis*, Thesis 4, etc., he says:

"In the first Adam the whole species was, by God, naturally deposited; in whom all sinned, and became guilty, and the children of wrath, and of an eternal malediction." Again: "God, as in the order of his creation, placed the whole human race in Adam by nature; so, in the dispensation of his righteousness, he said to the whole human race in Adam, in whom we have sinned: 'In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt die.'" Thesis 7. Again: "Hence it comes to pass, (namely, by the transgression of Adam,) that all of us who are born bear the stigma and brand of our rebellion; so that before we enjoy the light we partake of the injury of our origin. For indeed we all sinned in him in whom we all were one man." "The personal sin of Adam has passed upon all, who according to nature are personally propagated from him."

## XVI. THEODORE BEZA. 1519–1605.

We have already sufficiently adverted to the theological position of Beza. In our First Essay, pp. 414, 415, we have cited a passage from his *Apology for Justification*, which our readers will find, word for word, in the beginning of the foregoing citations from Danæus. On Rom. v: 12, etc., he also says:

“Two things should be taken into consideration in regard to original sin, *guilt and corruption*, (reatus et corruptio), WHICH, *although THEY CAN NOT BE SEPARATED* (quæ ut non possent separari) yet ought to be accurately distinguished. For as Adam, by the commission of sin, first was made guilty of the wrath of God, then, as being guilty, underwent as the punishment of his sin the corruption of soul and body, *so also he transmitted to posterity a nature in the first place guilty, next, corrupted.*”

Here, too, the imputation is based by Beza upon the fact, *that we all sinned and corrupted ourselves in Adam*: “omnes peccavimus in Protoplasto:” and therefore, corruption, which is the punishment of this sin, becomes the portion both of Adam and his posterity. And then, further, how lightly he regards the order of topics in stating the doctrine of original sin, and on which Dr. Hodge bases everything, so far as a right understanding of the matter is concerned, may be seen by his note on Rom. v: 12.

“Duo sunt in peccato originis: 1. *Corruptio*, quæ tollitur sanctificatione, etc. 2. *Reatus*: de quo hic propriè agitur cui opponitur imputatio obedientiæ Christi.”

XVII. J. ARMINIUS. *Professor in Leyden*, 1560–1609.

“*This whole sin is not peculiar to our first parents, but is common to the whole race of their posterity*; who, at the time when they sinned, were in their loins, and afterward descended by natural generation from them. *For all sinned in Adam.* Rom. v. Whatever punishment, therefore, was inflicted on our first parents, has gone down through, and still rests on all their posterity; so that all are children of wrath by nature, being obnoxious to condemnation, to death temporal and eternal, and to a destitution of righteousness and true holiness.” “Hence it comes, that all men who are their natural descendants, have become obnoxious to eternal and temporal death, and are destitute of original righteousness; which penalty is usually called, a loss of the divine image, and original sin.”

Dr. Hodge likewise quotes a passage from the same writer, which concludes as follows :

“From these things the imputation of the sin of our first parents is necessarily inferred ; for wherever there is the punishment of sin there is the imputation of the same.”

Observe the manner in which Arminius states the order of the topics in these passages.

XVIII. AMANDUS POLANUS. *Professor at Basel.*

This eminent Supralapsarian divine was born at Polansdorf, Dec. 16, 1561, and was colleague of the celebrated J. J. Grinnæus, in the University of Basel. He died July 18, 1610. We present in the original the subjoined paragraph from his *Syntagma Theol. Christianæ*, (p. 1072.) the first sentence of which may be found reasserted by Turretin, in loco ix: quæst. 10, sec. 22.

“*Primum persona infecit naturam, sed post natura infecit personam. Peccatum Adami naturæ ipsius peccatum fuit, cæterorum peccata personalia sunt; ideo illius cum natura transfusum est, non aliorum. Sed quare Adamus peccando non personam modò, sed naturam perdiderit, quum alii homines, personas suas lædant, naturam non faciant pejorem, causa assignari non potest alia quam Dei justissima voluntas. Quam Adamus infelicitatem volens accersivit sibi, eam ejus posteris universis jure Deus infixit. Sed quare? QUIA SIC FERT VOLUNTAS EJUS, QUÆ EST JURIS ET JUSTITIÆ NORMA. Nunquam aliter intelliges, justum fuisse, nos omnes nasci miseros propter hominis peccatum. Nam quòd illius (hominis) voluntas fuit nostra, et nos in illo voluimus, VERUM EST, SED RATIO HUIUS VERITATIS NULLA EST, PRÆTERQUAM VOLUNTAS CREATORIS. Proinde et peccato primorum parentum omnes homines facti sunt obnoxii morti æternæ, NON NATURALITER, SED VOLUNTATE DEI. Naturaliter enim hoc factum non est, ut nimirum ob culpam unius hominis tot hominum millia à salute excluderentur. Voluntate igitur Dei, de qua Christus Matth. xi: 29.”\**

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\* In opposition to this whole Supralapsarian speculation let our readers compare the following passage from the best and most thoroughly elaborated system of true Calvinistic theology which has appeared since the days of Calvin: “To us, no doubt all that God wills is right; but in God himself there is a very wide difference between saying, he wills anything because it is right—that is, because it accords with all his Perfections; and saying anything is right, that is, accords with all his Perfections—merely because he wills it. A distinction which draws after it—remote and subtle it may be supposed to be—the whole

Such was, and still is, the Supralapsarian method of applying its leading principle to the attempted elucidation of this doctrine. See also pp. 1075–1077. On page 1076 he uses the following language, in which he likewise teaches, that we are guilty and corrupt, because *we sinned and corrupted ourselves in Adam*:

“The parts of original sin are two: the crime of disobedience, or defection from God, while in the loins of Adam; and the corruption, consequent upon the lapse of Adam, in the whole of human nature. The fault of disobedience or defection from God, while in the loins of Adam, is the first part of original sin, which is iniquity, or a stain and blot, contracted from that first sin,\* namely, a privation of the due honor which should be present, (*privatio nimirum decoris debitè in esse,*) of a nature of a bond obliging to punishment, and binding us to punishment. So that the sin was not that of Adam alone, but also ours; (*ita culpa non tantùm Adami est, sed etiam nostra;*) because not only did Adam sin, but we also, as in Adam the root of the whole human race sinned and transgressed the law. Rom. v: 12, 19. *The first fall of Adam was not only the sin of Adam, but also ours.* For the transgression of Adam is imputed to us; otherwise we could be held neither by iniquity thence contracted, nor by any guilt, (*neque iniquitate inde contracta, neque reatu ullo*). The fall of our first parents should be distinguished from original sin, *which is in us as cause from effect,*” etc. Syntag. Theol., lib. vi: cap. 3.

nature of moral good and evil, and the whole economy of salvation. For the necessary and immutable distinction between good and evil; and the foundation of all religion, both in God and human nature; and the rule of God's infinite justice; and the need of a Saviour; are all subverted, and every logical foundation taken away from them—as soon as the mere will of God is substituted for the perfection of all his attributes and the holiness of his adorable nature—as the ultimate ground of moral distinctions, and the fundamental basis of right actions. Good and evil depend on law, not on nature. (*Τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ,*) was an apothegm of the ancient atheists—who only substituted nature for God in the proposition. *The number is not small among Christian teachers, who, under the guise of evangelical contempt for human reason, and extraordinary devotion to the honor of God's revealed will, still retain in a somewhat different logical form, and perhaps in a somewhat mitigated degree, the essential poison of the detestable paradox.*—The Knowledge of God Objectively Considered, p. 293, by Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge.

\*The original here is “*quæ est iniquitas seu labes ET macula ex peccato illo primo contracta.*” In the copy used by Dr. Hodge, the *et* must have been misprinted *ex*; for he renders the phrase, “a stain *from* a blot contracted from that first sin.” See *Princeton Essays*, vol. i: p. 199.

XIX. ANT. FAIUS. *Professor in Geneva, 1615.*

This excellent man was also of the school of Beza, and survived him about as long as Beza survived Danæus. He remarks that,

*"All sinned in Adam, and by the sin of Adam death passed upon all men, because that sin had passed unto all."* "We believe that the sin of Adam, while it was the act of an individual, *was common to the whole species*, inasmuch as Adam was not made a private person, *but was constituted by God the fountain of the whole race*. For the human race lying hid in the loins of Adam, was adorned by God with original righteousness and grace; but by the sin of Adam was despoiled of both.

"A double *disease* pervaded the whole human race by the sin of Adam. The first is guilt, by which all men are subjected to eternal death; the other is the corruption of the whole man and of all his faculties of mind and body:" etc.

J. DIODATI. *A highly venerated colleague of the foregoing.*

Pictet speaks of him as *Magnus ille Theologus*. He was a member of the Synod of Dort, and among the learned men in that body no one stood higher than he. He also strongly sympathized with Beza in his views, as the following passage will show, and which is quoted likewise by Dr. Hodge. In referring to Rom. v: 12, Diodati says:

"This is the general conclusion of the preceding treatise concerning justification by faith, in which the Apostle, after briefly repeating what had been said, at the same time declares their foundation, namely, that God out of his own good pleasure had constituted Christ the head of grace and fountain of righteousness and life to all his elect, by the imputation of whose righteousness they return into favor with God, and consequently are sanctified and glorified. For as Adam was constituted the *head and root* of the whole human race, *so that by the imputation of his sin to all his posterity they became obnoxious to the divine curse, are deprived of original righteousness, corrupted in their whole nature, and liable to death.*"

XXI. DANIEL CHAMIER. *Professor of Theology at Montauban.*

This truly great French divine was the son of a highly esteemed clergyman who was drowned while riding to a Provincial Synod. Daniel still bears, as he has ever done, the

name of "*the great Chamier*" in all their references to him by the French ministers. He was a man of great prudence, indefatigable industry, and of vast learning. He was chosen scribe of the National Synod of Gergeau, (1601,) and moderator of that of the Gap, (1603,) and also of that of Privas, (1612;) a fair illustration of the esteem in which he was held. The National Synod of Rochelle (1607,) appointed him to prepare "a complete answer to the works of Bellarmine." He entered upon the work with great zeal, and success; but it was left unfinished at his death. This was his celebrated *Corpus Controversiarum*, which was edited at Geneva, by B. Turretin in 1626. The French church, and in fact the whole Protestant world, became extremely desirous to have this work completed in an equally able style; and the subject having been brought before the Third National Synod at Charenton (1644-1645,) the task was, after full deliberation, and near the close of the session, committed to *Garrisolius* (moderator) *Placcus*, *Arnyzald*, and *Charles*; who completed it. During the siege of Montauban, (1622,) Chamier was slain by a cannon ball from the enemy's works; and the writers of that time frequently mention the circumstance that the ball being just the one hundredth which had been fired into the town, had the letter C marked upon it to indicate that fact.

To this eminent and learned divine the credit has been attributed of drawing up the Edict of Nantes, on which he is said to have spent continuously a number of months: and there seems to be but little ground for doubting that De Thou and De Calignon availed themselves of his assistance, to say the very least. In disputing with Bellarmine, († 1621,) he speaks on the subject before us as follows:

"We grant that by the disobedience of Adam, *all were truly and in fact rendered unrighteous by inherent depravity; but that the unrighteousness of Adam was not imputed we declare to be false.* On the contrary, we deny that we could be made inherently unrighteous by one man, unless the unrighteousness of this one man were imputed to us. Wherefore it is false that the disobedience of Adam was not imputed to us."

Then, after dwelling on this point, and stating that the disobedience of Adam and the obedience of Christ were personal acts, he adds:



“ But for personal acts to be common to others, is absurd and contradictory. Therefore it behooves that they should be imputed. For this kind of communication is no how inconsistent with the proper personality of acts; it proceeds on an entirely different principle. Therefore the very sin of Adam, I say his own personal disobedience, must be imputed to his posterity. And so also in regard to the obedience of Christ: *because the whole human race was considered as in Adam by nature; and because the whole multitude of believers were in Christ, by grace.* Hence it comes to pass that we are not only made sinners by Adam, but are declared to have sinned in him, which is a very different thing. *I say then that it is certain that all men are really constituted unrighteous by Adam, and that all believers are really constituted righteous by Christ. But I deny that that is the point which the Apostle (in Rom. 5: 12-19) had under consideration; for his inquiry here is into the grounds of our condemnation and justification; for although he considers  $\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\lambda\epsilon\iota\mu\alpha$  as in Adam, yet not peculiar to him, but pertaining to the whole human race; for the meaning is, then, when Adam sinned, the whole human race was condemned, or made guilty of disobedience to God; whence also this by Augustine was called original sin, the punishment of the first sin; but how could it be punishment, unless that very first sin was imputed?”*

Strong as this language is, and widely as it, in form, differs from that of most of the preceding citations, it yet sustains our fundamental position, (from which Dr. Hodge professes so thoroughly to dissent,) *that though the sin of Adam is imputed to us, it is never irrespective of our nature and its inherent sin; and that the Calvinistic doctrine of imputation does not require that we attempt to separate Adam's federal from his natural headship. It recognizes a wide difference between imputed and inherent sin; but admits that we have both; and that both alike are the ground on which we are treated as sinners. The reader will note his exposition of the analogy in Rom. v: 12-19.*

#### XXII. D. PAREUS. *Professor at Heidelberg, 1548-1622.*

Pareus has sometimes been classed with Supralapsarians; but he occupies about the position of Danæus in regard to that scheme. He never adopted it, though some of his language has been supposed to point in that direction. But his dispute with Socinus, (which may be found in his Commentary on the first three chapters of Genesis, and on the Epistle of Paul to

the Romans,) thoroughly unsettled the whole scheme. In Eph. ii, he says:

“*When ye were dead in sins.* Being dead in sins, 1. On account of the guilt of death. 2. On account of corruption, and inaptitude to all good. But the cause of death is sin. He speaks also of spiritual death, in which all the unrenewed lie even while naturally they are alive.”

Then in Rom. v: 12, he says:

“I have said that the first fall brought upon Adam immediately two pestiferous evils. Yet three would FLOW TOGETHER THEREIN: *culpa actualis, reatus legalis, pravitas naturalis*; or, in other words, transgression of the command, punishment of death, and corruption of nature, which is the loss of the image of God, and deformity and *τραγία* succeeding in its place. From none of these does his posterity remain free, but all at the same time come upon his posterity, not in one way, but in a threefold manner: to wit, *By a participation of the fault, by the imputation of guilt, and by the propagation of natural depravity,* (PARTICIPATIONE CULPÆ, *imputatione reatus, propagatione naturalis pravitatis.*) *By the participation of blame,* because all his posterity were seminally in the loins of Adam. *They therefore all sinned in Adam when he sinned.*” Again: “In our first parent we have all sinned, either by imitation, as the Pelagians think, or by participation of the fault. Not by imitation, for this can not be said of infants. *Therefore it was by a participation of the fault.*” “Original sin is properly defined, *the corruption of the whole human race, from the fall of our first parents, naturally propagated to all; making guilty of temporal and eternal punishment, unless there should be forgiveness on account of Christ.*” “Greatly this nodus perplexed the fathers, especially Augustine, nor could they find any other method of solving the problem, except the traduction of souls, and which, great as is the absurdity, finds advocates even in our day. But this is to move from Charybdis upon Scylla.” “But they err who make the soul alone the seat of sin: since the whole man is flesh—that is, a carnal nature. . . . Then the soul, although it is not imparted from Adam materially, yet it is imparted from thence originally: because every human soul, as it is a part of the man himself, is imparted from the parents by reason of the whole: since, indeed, soul is not begotten from soul, nor body from body, but the whole man from the whole man.”

XXIII. P. MORNÆUS. *Professor at Sanmur, 1549–1623.*

“We know whence proceeded the corruption of the human race; namely, *from our grievous sin and the punishment which followed it. We were all in the first man when he sinned.*”

XXIV. J. PISCATOR. *Professor at Herborn, 1569–1625.*

After Calvin, and perhaps Gomar, Piscator was doubtless the most perfect master of analysis that the Reformed Church has produced; and though reckoned with Supralapsarians he occupied on that question nearly the same position as that of his intimate friend Pareus. Twisse greatly admired him, and said that he held "the first place among the theologians of his day; and shows as far superior to the rest as the moon does to the stars;" though he at the same time wrote against him. Owen, referring to the points of difference between the two, says: "We are in general inclined to give our voice in favor of the sentiments of Piscator." In his *Questiones in Pentat.*, pp. 27, 28, (Herborn, 1624,) he treats the subject of the transduction of souls with great acuteness: and in his Commentary on Rom. v: 12, says:

"The Apostle properly speaks of that first sin, which our first parents committed in Paradise, *and we together with them*, (et nos unâ cum illis,) as those who were in their loins, which sin is the fountain and origin of all other sins, to wit, of the corruption of nature, or the sin dwelling in us, and of other sins which are named actual; or what we by thinking, speaking, or by other actions commit." "*It entered into the world by imputation, and that by hereditary law, to wit, propagated by the succession of natural generation.*" "*And so death passed upon all men, to wit, by sin, or on account of sin.*"

Then, in his "Observations" on chap. vii: 7, and comparing the passage with Rom. v: 12, he says:

"From a collation of these two places, we may obtain a full description of original sin, *even that it is the defection of all the natural heirs of Adam, who, being in his loins, revolted from God to the Devil; and the corruption or vitiosity of nature inflicted on man by the just judgment of God on account of that defection:*" which both render man miserable and obnoxious to the anger of God and to eternal damnation, until he is delivered from that misery by Christ."

## XXV. SIB. LUBBERTUS. 1556–1625.

The following remark is with just reason attributed to him: "We can not be guilty of the sin of another unless that sin is imputed to us." (See *Princeton Essays*, vol. I, p. 212,) and in

his reply to the *De Servatore* of Socinus,\* he uses the following language:

“It is agreed between us and our opponents, that we are constituted sinners by the disobedience of Adam, and are constituted righteous by the obedience of Christ; the only question is respecting the mode in which this takes place. How are we constituted sinners by the disobedience of Adam? And how are we constituted righteous by the obedience of Christ? *We say that in both cases the effect takes place by imputation. For by the sin of Adam imputed to us we are constituted guilty.* When the Apostle says that all have sinned in Adam, *he means that the sin of Adam, as our head, was imputed to us when we were yet in his loins, and on that account we are reckoned guilty;* and at the same time *it is the will of God that, as Adam by his transgression was rendered averse to God, that is, corrupt and depraved, so we by the same transgression imputed to us, as I said, are born averse to God, corrupt and depraved.* Therefore the sin of Adam is imputed to us, and that corruption and depravity in which we are born, we call original sin. When Adam, by his total apostasy from God, became guilty of death, *all his posterity were implicated in the same guilt; no otherwise than if they had all sinned against God, by perpetrating the crime of murder.* It is manifest, therefore, that the same guilt is imputed; or which is the same thing, the same crime by which guilt was contracted.”

We have adduced this blundering testimony, simply because it is one of those Supralapsarian announcements with which Dr. Hodge has sprinkled over (with the view of imparting a seasoning to) the mass of testimonies adduced from the Reformed divines. See Princeton Essays I, pp. 128–217.

XXVI. JOHN SHARP. *A cotemporary, and Professor in the University of Die, in the Dauphiny.*

In his Theol. Comm., loc. xi, *De Peccato*, he says:

“Original sin is two-fold, imputed and inherent. Imputed sin is the defection of Adam, which is imputed to all his posterity that were in his loins; *which sin was actually in Adam, as in our root and stalk.*”

\* Lubbertus sadly mistook his province when he attempted to refute that singularly acute work of Socinus, (which, however, Pareus and Dr. Owen have most effectually demolished). But he was very fair about it, and published it chapter after chapter with his own work, replying to each chapter *seriatim*. But the Reply was very unsatisfactory, and had the effect of leading many persons to embrace the soul-destroying delusions of Socinianism; for, on comparing the

XXVII. BENEDICT TURRETTIN, of Zurich. *Professor at Geneva, 1588-1631.*

"Our confessions include, under original sin, **THE COMMUNION WHICH WE HAVE IN THE FIRST SIN**, and the loss of original righteousness and purity which we have sustained, and the inherent corruption of the soul." (On Rom. v: 12.)

Here we have, substantially, a reiteration of the statement of Pareus, above quoted:

"*Participatio culpæ, imputatio reatus, propagatio naturalis pravitatis.*"

That is, the guilt of the first sin is imputed to us because we too participated therein, and it is ours.

XXVIII. DANIEL TILENUS. *Professor at Sedan, 1563-1633.*

"Original sin is that hereditary corruption of human nature, by which all who by natural generation are propagated from Adam, are infected; and so, *in the loins of this first parent, they both SINNED TOGETHER WITH HIM, AND INCURRED THE GUILT* of both temporal and eternal punishment;" unâ cum ipso et peccarunt, et pœnæ tum temporariæ, tum sempiternæ reatum contraxerunt. *Syntag.* p. 1037.

XXIX. GERARD JOHN VOSSIUS. *Professor at Leyden, 1577-1649.*

Vossius was born at Heidelberg, and became Professor of Eloquence and Chronology at Leyden, where he remained until 1633, when he accepted the Chair of History at Amsterdam, where he died. His learning was literally prodigious. He has been often thoughtlessly confounded with his son Isaac, (born in Leyden 1618, and died at Windsor Castle in 1688). He, too, was very learned, but very credulous. He came into England in 1670, and Charles II, who was very fond of him, used to say: "Vossius refuses to believe nothing but the Bible."

Soon after the appearance of the *Historia Pelagiana* of G. J. Vossius, exceptions were taken by his colleagues in Leyden,

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arguments of Socinus with the Reply of Lubbertus, they saw that Socinus had the better of the argument. Hence, Lubbertus used to be named ironically, "*Magnus ille Socini Confutator.*" Yet he was an excellent man, greatly esteemed and beloved by Pareus, who dedicated to him (by the hand of his son Philip Pareus) his excellent but now unaccountably neglected and forgotten Commentary on Paul's Epistle to the Romans.

and other Calvinistic divines to some statements in lib. vi, especially *The*. 9, (which not only misstates the views of the Church before Augustine, but really conflicts with *Theses* 8, 10, 11 and 13 of the same work). The excellent John Forbes, of Scotland, (1593–1648,) in his *Instruct. Historico-Theol.*, (a work of great merit, and which the celebrated Maresius, of Groningen, styles "*aureum opus*,") exposed the mistake of Vossius, (see lib. vi, cap. 28, 29,) but before publishing it, he being in Holland, laid the *Mss.* before Vossius. He read the two chapters over with very great attention, and evinced considerable agitation. And then, not only admitted his mistake to Forbes personally, but magnanimously united with Rivetus, Spanheim, Polyander, Hoornbeck, Maresius, and others, in commending it to the public favor, as a work of the greatest value. Men, whose claims to knowledge might reasonably lead to the belief that they knew better, have continued till now to charge upon Vossius, (in the passages alluded to,) the design to favor Arminianism. We have thought it proper, therefore, to state these facts.

In his *History of Pelagianism*, lib. ii, part 1, thesis 1, referring to the subject before us, he says :

"Seeing that two inquiries are here propounded, *Whether the sin of our first parents is imputed to all their posterity?* and, *How far it is imputed?* the Catholic Church has always thus decided, that that first sin is imputed to all; that is, that its effects are, according to the just judgment of God, transmitted to all the children of Adam: but it was believed that its effects are, that on account thereof we are born without original righteousness, subject to the necessity of death, and liable to eternal separation from God."

It is difficult to tell why Dr. Hodge has translated this testimony in the way he has done; for example, rendering "*sic SEMPER judicavit*," by "*has ONCE judged*," and inserting "*all*" before the word "*effects*;" but we subjoin the original, that our readers may decide for themselves :

"*Cum duo quærantur; An primorum parentum peccatum imputetur omni posteritati, et quatenus imputetur? Ecclesia Catholica sic semper judicavit. Primum illud peccatum omnibus imputari, hoc est justo Dei judicio secundum effectus suos in omnes Adæ filios transmitti:*

effectus vero ejus esse credebat, quod propterea nascimur expertes justitiæ originalis, necessitati mortis subjecti, et æternæ à Deo separationi obnoxii."

Then in *Thesis* 6, in the same connection, Vossius adds, that

"Augustine proves this dogma from the writings of the earlier fathers, from which he adduces such clear testimonies (though not less explicit are many which he omits to cite,) that it is greatly to be wondered that there should have been any found in former times, or any at the present time, who should esteem this doctrine to be an invention of Augustine, and should desire furthermore so to persuade others."

From such a source this testimony is invaluable.

### XXX. FRANCIS GOMAR. 1563-1641.

The following is the testimony of this Prince of Supralapsarian divines. In his statement he does not quite come up to the standard of Dr. Hodge, who has improved upon, but not cited him. On p. 405 of his *Commentary on Romans* he says:

"The sin which entered the world through Adam, commonly called original, some say consists of two parts, the guilt of the sin of Adam, (*reatum peccati Adami*,) and the corruption of nature: but less accurately: because original sin is that which we have from the origin of our conception and nativity: it also is twofold; the primary, and that which is raised from thence. The primary is transient and actual, even the sin of Adam, *which is ours by a just imputation*, because as he stood at the time both for himself and for us; so he sinned. *The other is permanent and habitual, proceeding from the defect of the former and from the natural tradition of corrupted nature, and the inherent moral corruption of our nature*: for which reason these may be as divers species of original sin; but not at all as parts. And guilt is the effect of sin; but not sin itself; even though by metonymy it is often understood by the name of sin."

Again, on p. 118:

"They are said to be dead in trespasses and sins on account of *original sin, which, as we have said, is the privation of spiritual life or original righteousness*, and as the hydra and congeries of all habitual sins and offenses; and at the same time the fountain of actual sins." See also p. 166, and *Thesis* 49, of his *Disput.* xv.

XXXI. NICH. VEDELIUS. *Professor at Franeker.*

Few men were more successful in exposing the errors of the early Arminians, than Vedelius, the keenness of whose pen bitterly excited their wrath. He was born in the Palatinate, and during fourteen years was Professor of Philosophy and Minister at Geneva. In 1630 he was called to the chair of Theology and Hebrew at Deventer, and in June of that year took his degree of Doctor of Theology at Basel. About 1638 he was invited to Franeker, where he died in 1642. He published his *De Arcanis Arminianismi*, in 1631, which greatly provoked the ire of that sect, and Episcopus attempted a Reply, the great ornament of which is a continuous strain of low scurrility. A single extract from the work of Vedelius is sufficient :

“The reason,” says he, “why God imputes the sin of Adam to his posterity, is his justice, and not mere will, as the Arminians teach. The imputation of the first sin is such, that in fact the whole posterity of Adam is made liable to eternal condemnation, contrary to what the Arminians hold.”

XXXII. M. F. WENDELIN. *Professor at Anhalt.*

Dr. Hodge speaks of this admirable theologian as “a strict Calvinistic Hollander.” P. Essays I, p. 188. He was indeed a strict Calvinist, but why he should be called a Hollander I can not imagine. He was educated at Heidelberg under Pareus; and then settled at Anhalt, a principality of Upper Saxony, where he became Rector of the Gymnasium, and Professor both of Theology and Philosophy. His System of Christian Theology was published in 1623, some time after his *Exercitationes*, but I have forgotten how long, and have them not now at hand. His excellent System of Theology is well worthy of republication. In lib. i, cap. 10, thes. 2-6, he says:

“Sin is either original or actual. Original sin is the blot, (labes,) which man draws with him from the maternal womb from his first origin or nativity. It is either imputed or inherent. Original sin, imputed, is the disobedience of our first parents, which is imputed to all their posterity, not otherwise than as if they themselves had also by their own act violated the divine law respecting the forbidden fruit.” “Original



sin, inherent, is the hereditary corruption from the fall of our first parents, *naturally propagated to us*; making guilty of temporal and eternal punishment." pp. 242-266.

And then on p. 592, he utters the following clear announcement, that inherent corruption *is not the penalty of imputed guilt*, but results from our natural connection with Adam, and in this only gives utterance to the universally acknowledged sentiment of the Reformed Church. He is answering a cavil in which it is said that, "sin is not imputed to us by the disobedience of Adam, but truly impressed upon our nature:" and he does this by showing that it is both impressed and imputed. We give his own language:

"*Assumptio simpliciter vera non est. Nam inobedientia Adami non tantum imprimit nobis peccatum quod vocatur originale inherens; sed ipsa etiam illa Adami inobedientia singularis nobis imputatur, seu imputative naturam reatu involvit: quod vocatur peccatum originale imputatum.*"

### XXXIII. JOHN MACCOVIUS, of Francker. 1588-1644.

Maccovius, (or Makkowski,) was a native of Poland, and studied Philosophy at Dantzic, and Theology at Heidelberg. He spent considerable time at the most flourishing academies of Germany: Prague, Marburg, Leipsic, Wittemberg, etc., and was very fond of mingling Philosophy with his Theology; and wrote many works on Philosophy; and besides his *Loci Communes*, he wrote a defence of Perkins against Arminius, and the *Πρώτων Ψεύδος Arminianorum*, etc., etc. He and Lubbertus both became very uneasy on account of the admission of their fellow Supralapsarian, Dr. Twisse, that God could have dispensed with a satisfaction for sin, and labors to save their scheme from its consequences. He was *not* a member of the Synod of Dort, though Dr. Hodge asserts the contrary. In his *Loc. Com.*, Dissert. xiv, he says:

"It is called original sin, because man derives it from his first origin, and it is imputed or inherent. The imputed sin of our origin, is the defection or first transgression of Adam and Eve, committed by eating the forbidden fruit; and afterwards imputed to the whole human race, naturally propagated from these two persons."

XXXIV. JOHN SZYDLOVIUS. *A Cotemporary of Maccovius.*

In a passage already quoted in our Second Essay, he says:

“Original sin is not propagated to us from Adam by the body: because that, in contradistinction to the soul, is incapable of sin; nor is it propagated by the soul, because that is created pure by God, and can in no sense be infected by the body, as it is a spirit. Therefore it is propagated by imputation.”

A remark seems called for here in relation to the use which Dr. Hodge has made of the Supralapsarian testimonies which he has cited in his catalogue of witnesses, occupying pp. 195–217, (P. Essays, vol. i.) He has presented in all fifty-four citations, and among them ten of the preceding who are Supralapsarian. And these are scattered over, without any regard to chronology, in the following order: Augsburg Confession, pp. 197, 198; Musculus, 198, 199; Polanus, 199; Beza, 203; Junius, 205; Scharp, 208; Lubbertus, 212, 213; Maccovius, 213; Zanchius, 214; Ursinus, 215, 216—thus making them cover nearly the whole ground, and in a manner speak for all; as he does not give the slightest intimation that there is any difference between the Supralapsarians and Infralapsarians. Nor is this the only thing to be regretted here. It is true that Gomar’s testimony is not cited by him, though he is certainly well acquainted with his writings; but he introduces the testimony of two others in the following style: “S. Lubbertus, S. Theology, Dr. and Professor at Franequer, and a member of the Synod of Dort.” “John Maccovius, Professor in the University of Franequer, and also a member of the Synod of Dort.” We have not in our possession the treatise of Rivetus, from which Dr. Hodge has collected his citations, (our own edition of his works was issued in 1644, before that work had been prepared,) and we therefore do not know whether these sentences were taken from Rivetus. But whether they were or not is immaterial; for Dr. Hodge certainly knows that Supralapsarianism was condemned by the Synod of Dort. And yet, in quoting these two Supralapsarians, he, in order to add weight to their view of imputation, states that they were members of the Synod of Dort! *that is, of a Synod which condemned their distinctive doctrine.* And this, too, while one of them (Maccovius) not only was not a member of that Synod, but was, as shown in our Second Essay, specifically arraigned

and condemned for teaching some of the distinguishing tenets of the Supralapsarian school. What would Dr. Hodge think of an attempt to add weight to the testimony of Arius (against the Godhead of Christ) by alleging that he was a member of the Council of Nice? or of Episcopius, that he was a member of the Synod of Dort, when he was only cited there to be tried? The whole procedure is wrong, and tends only to mislead.

L.

(To be continued.)



#### ART. IV.—*The Immortality of Man.*

THE mortality of man and the frailty of the tenure by which we cling to this life, together with the immortality of the soul and its indiscernible nature, are frequent subjects of disquisition and reflection. Pious homilies on the uncertainty of human life, with cogent reflections on the future life of the soul and the certainty of the judgment, are as frequent as they are solemn and well-timed. Two great facts continually force themselves upon mankind; one of them—the instinct of immortality—upon all ingenuous minds that give themselves to reflection; and the other—the inevitable occurrence of death—upon all classes and conditions of men. In order to reconcile these two incontrovertible facts, it is not uncommon to place out of view the only explication, God's revelation, and to so trim and pervert the doctrine concerning both of them, as that they may be adjusted to each other in the restricted horizon of reason. Death, which is before the observation of all, is explained to be only the dissolution of the body: while immortality is explained to be nothing more than the continued existence of the soul after its separation from the body. Hence the depreciation of the body, and the glorification of the immortal mind, is the theme of much crude philosophizing, and the subject-matter of much bad poetry. In order to arrive at correct notions upon the subject, it is well enough to inquire into the origin of our mortality, and see if

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# DANVILLE REVIEW.

CONDUCTED BY

In Association of Ministers.

SEPTEMBER, 1862.

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DANVILLE, KY.

PRINTED FOR THE ASSOCIATION AND SOLD BY

MOORE, WILSTACH, KEYS & CO.,

25 WEST FOURTH STREET,

CINCINNATI.

SOLD ALSO BY WM. S. & A. MARTIEN, PHILADELPHIA; ROBERT CARTER &  
BROTHERS, NEW YORK; LITTLE, BROWN & CO., BOSTON;  
KEITH & WOODS, ST. LOUIS; BIBLE AND  
TRACT HOUSE, BALTIMORE.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1862, by JACOB COOPER, for the Association,  
in the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.

# DANVILLE REVIEW.

No. III.

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SEPTEMBER, 1862.

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**ART. I.**—*The Secession Conspiracy in Kentucky, and its Overthrow: with the Relations of both to the General Revolt.*

*A Memoir of Civil and Political Events, public and private, in Kentucky; To serve as a History of the Secession Conspiracy which had its center in Kentucky: Commencing in 1859, and extending to the overthrow of the Conspiracy, and the breaking out of the Civil War in that State in 1861.*

**PART THIRD.**—The final struggle of Parties: Complete success of the Counter Revolution against the Conspirators: The Legislature declares for armed support of the National Cause: The Civil War breaks out in Kentucky.

**I.**—1. Conference of loyal citizens at General Nelson's Camp at Dick Robinson, on the 29th of August, 1861: The effective Loyal Force: The Stake and the Risk.—2. Preliminary Considerations and Decisions, in the Conference.—3. Detailed statement of the Plan of Defense agreed on, and executed.—4. Invasion of Kentucky by Polk and Zollicoffer, simultaneous with the Rebel Demonstration in Owen, and the Loyal Conference at Nelson's Camp: Alarming Hesitation of the Legislature.—5. Alarm and Hesitation of the Rebel Leaders: Indignation of the people at the Invasion of the State, and the apparent stupor of the Legislature: Recoil of the Owen Meeting, from its war policy: It procrastinates—changes its Strategy—is a Failure.

1. Six clear days—August 29th, September 5th—were all that remained after the Conference at Camp Dick Robinson met, until the great Owen demonstration of the Secessionists.

ART. VII.—*Imputation and Original Sin.*

PART III.—(Continued.)

(TESTIMONIES CONTINUED.)

XXXV. JOHN FORBES, *Professor of Theology, in Aberdeen, 1593—1648.*

We have sufficiently referred to this learned and holy man in No. XXIX, in connection with Vossius. In his *Theologia Moralis*, lib. 10, cap. 6, sect. 9, he thus refers to the principle on which antecedent imputation is based:

“For as it is impossible that God should be the author of sin, so, also, it is impossible that he did create or should have created man in the beginning, possessed of a fleshy concupiscence contrary to reason. \* \* \* \* \* For such concupiscence is morally evil of itself, and naturally hateful to God; and, therefore, as he is the revenger (ultor) of it he can not be its author. Man is the cause of the whole of this evil to himself, by the voluntary transgression of the Divine precept.”

XXXVI. J. CLOPPENBURG, *Professor at Franeker, 1597—1652.*

In his *Altera Tomus*, pp. 150, 151, he says:

“In the ancient covenant of works before the fall, the first man (being conjoined with Eve and they being made one flesh) was bound not only for himself, but for all his natural posterity, as the root of the human race propagated from these two. This appears from the calamitous result, because our first parents have not only themselves fallen, but so as that they have drawn with them the ruin of the whole human race.”

“There is, therefore, plainly, according to the mind of the Apostle, a two-fold original sin in all the natural descendants of Adam. 1. The first sin of man imputed. 2. Then that hereditary spiritual poverty, by which all who are propagated from Adam are spiritually dead in sins.”

XXXVII. J. MESTREZATIUS, 1592—1657.

This great and good man has ever ranked among the first theologians of the Reformed Church of France. His family were of Verona, in Italy, and were very eminent; and on account of their religion, emigrated to Geneva, where he was born. When but eighteen years of age he was offered a Professorship of Philosophy, but declined to accept it. He studied

at Saumur, and then settled as pastor of the church in Paris, where he served them faithfully during forty-two years, and died in charge. He was moderator of the Second Synod of Charenton (1631), which directed Placæus to accept the chair of Theology at Saumur, in view of the full restoration of the Seminary there. Mestrezatius had a nephew, who was likewise celebrated, but who should not be confounded with him. In his treatise on communion with Christ, he says:

*"The righteousness of God could not impute to us the sin of Adam, unless we had been in Adam (Justitia Dei non potuisset nobis imputare peccatum Adami nisi in Adamo fuisset), and as if in his loins, that is, by considering him as the head of his posterity."*

And in a work against Millitiere (who was condemned by the Synod of Charenton, 1645), he says:

*"A certain corruption of Adam (corruptio quaedam Adami), passes into us really, and inheres in us; but I say that the act of the imputation of his disobedience precedes, AND THAT, THEREFORE, CORRUPTION IS TRANSMITTED INTO US BY GENERATION, BECAUSE WE HAVE SINNED IN ADAM AS IN OUR HEAD."* See also the extracts by Dr. Hodge, P. E. I, p. 208.

As we are now among the continental cotemporaries of the Westminster divines, it may be well here to notice also their testimony on the subject.\*

XXXVIII. A. BURGESS, *one of the leading members of the Assembly.*

In his "Original Sin," he says:

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\* Did not our limits forbid, it would give us great pleasure here to quote from the following named divines, all of whom wrote before the middle of this century. They express their views of the doctrine precisely as Wendeline, Mestrezatius, and most of the forementioned writers have done, as our readers may see by referring to the citations from them by Rivetus, translated and published in *Princeton Essays*, I, p. 201-214. They are the following: S. Fabritius, J. Wollebius, J. C. Occitanus, J. Chenet, J. Dartesius, A. Collignon, P. Ferrius, G. S. Frisius, J. Junius, J. Lorentius, J. C. Emdan, and J. Strackius. *Their united testimony is, that the doctrine of Original Sin should not be explicated on the ground of imputation, to the exclusion of our own demerit or depravity. They attempt no solution of the question as to the ground on which Adam and his descendants are one; but, with the Apostle, assert the fact and there leave it. Adam sinned, and we sinned in Adam, and therefore God now treats us as sinful and corrupt. This is their doctrine.*

“By Adam we have imputed sin with the guilt of it, and inherent sin the effect of it.” “The Apostle distinguisheth *Adam's imputed sin and inherent sin*, as two sins. *By imputed sin we are said to sin in him actually, as it were, because his will was our will* (jure repræsentationis), *but by inherent sin we are made sinners by intrinsical pollution,*” pp. 32, 35.

### XXXIX. T. GOODWIN.

He was another leading member, President of Magdalen College, and called, by Dr. Owen, “*my very learned colleague, a very eminent man.*” He says:

“So, then, in this first man, the whole nature of man being reposed as a common receptacle or cistern of it, from whence it was to flow to others; therefore, what befalls this nature in him by any action of his, that nature is so to be propagated from him? God's ordinance, in the law of nature, being, that all should be made of *one blood*, which could not have been said of any other man than of him. If he stood and obeyed, then the image of holiness had been conveyed as it was at first created. If he fell by sin, then, seeing that he should thereby corrupt that nature, and that that corruption of nature was also to be his sin in relation to, and as the consequent of, that act of sin that caused it; therefore, if the law of nature were ever fulfilled so as to convey his own image as sinful (suppose he should sin), so as it should be reckoned sin in his children, as it was in himself, *this could not take place, but they must be guilty of that act that caused it*, so far as it *caus\** it, as well as himself.” Works, vol. III.

### XL. JOHN LIGHTFOOT, another member.

“The fall of *Adam* was the death of himself, the death of us, and the death of Christ.”—*Miscellanies*, chap. 47.

### XLI. S. RUTHERFORD, another member, Professor at St. Andrews.

“The guilt of sin, and sin itself, are not one and the same thing, but far different things. That I may prove the point let the terms be considered. There be two things in sin very considerable. 1. *The blot*, defilement, and blackness of sin, which I conceive is nothing but the absence and privation of that moral rectitude, etc. 2. *There is THE GUILT of sin, that is somewhat which issueth from this blot and blackness of sin, according to which the person is liable and obnoxious to eternal punishment.*”—*Trial and Triumph of Faith*.

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\* A misprint for *caused*.



We return to the Continental divines.

**XLII.** ANDREAS RIVETUS, *Professor at Leyden, 1572—1651, and moderator of the Second National Synod of Vitré, in 1617.*

In his *Summæ Controv, Tract. IV: Quæst. 2*, p. 156, after refuting the Popish objection against the imputation of Christ's righteousness, on the ground that he is to restore what we have lost in Adam, Rivetus, in sec. 18, thus proceeds:

"Perhaps it might be more to the purpose to consider *what others object from Paul* (Rom. v: 17, 18), *that we are rendered righteous in Christ as we are rendered sinners in Adam. But in Adam we have become sinners, not only by imputation, but also inherently, therefore we thus become righteous in Christ. But I reply*, that it is not true that we have both in Christ, and by Christ. For we become righteous by the imputation of his righteousness, and every day we are rendered just in ourselves (in nobis justi reddimus), both in habit and in holy actions, proceeding from the renewal of the Spirit. The first we possess perfectly, the second incipiently, but we look for its completion at the end of our present life. But if our adversaries would acquiesce in this comparison (between Adam and Christ), as they propound it, they would necessarily lapse into an admission of the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, which they so strenuously reject and regard as absurd. For Bellarmine (De Amiss, Grat. et Statu Peccati, lib. 5, cap. 17), in reference to the actual sin of Adam, speaks as follows: '*The actual sin of Adam is communicated to us by generation, in that mode in which it is possible for that which hath passed to be communicated, to wit: by imputation (nimirum per imputationem). For it is imputed to all who descend from Adam.*'\* Why, therefore, can not the righteousness of Christ be imputed to us, or be communicated by imputation? Yet, there is nothing in this argument which forbids that we acknowledge the necessity of inherent qualities. For it can only be proved that we have righteousness in Christ, as we have unrighteousness in Adam. *But there is a comparison of the causes, and not of the mode, in which the thing is communicated to us. For the sin of Adam is communicated to us by generation, but the righteousness of Christ by imputation. Therefore the Apostle does not compare the modes in which righteousness is received, but the causes, effects, and subjects of each.* The cause of salvation is the obedience of the second Adam, as the cause of condem-

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\* In this quotation, as given in my edition, of Rivetus, the word *transit* is erroneously printed for *transiit*, which Bellarmine wrote. We, therefore, translate it accordingly.

nation was the disobedience of the first. *The effects are, that the one constitutes us unrighteous and the other righteous.* (Id enim probari tandem potest, nos in Christo justitiam habere, quemadmodum in Adamo injustitiam. *Erit autem comparatio causarum, NON MODI QUO NOBIS RES COMMUNICATUR. NAM PECCATUM ADAMI NOBIS COMMUNICATUR PER GENERATIONEM, JUSTITIA AUTEM CHRISTI PER IMPUTATIONEM.* Itaque non comparat Apostolus modos quibus justitia recipitur, sed causas, effectus, et subjecta utriusque. Causa salutis est obedientia secundi Adami, ut causa condemnationis fuit inobedientia primi. *Effecta sunt, quod una nos injustos constituit altera justos*). The subjects are, many rendered just by the one, unjust by the other. Therefore, Bishop Bitontinus, explaining these words of the same chapter, 'but not as the offense, so also the gift,' thus concludes from the whole of the preceding similitude: 'The similitude is as to the point between the two, but not as to the mode' (*quoad rem inter hæc, sed non quoad modum*). Since this is so it puts an end to the argument of our adversaries, because they can not well argue from the thing to the mode of the thing (*à re ad modum rei*)."

This one testimony, all things being considered, sweeps away every prop by which Dr. Hodge has endeavored to sustain his position, that antecedent imputation, as taught by himself, has ever been the approved doctrine of the Reformed or Calvinistic Church. Our readers must, therefore, indulge us with a few remarks upon it, that we may point out its direct bearing upon the question.

We first solicit attention to Dr. Hodge's statement of the matter. The following is from Princeton Essays, vol. I, p. 173:

"*This analogy is asserted by almost every old Calvinist that ever wrote.* 'We are constituted sinners in Adam, in the same way that we are constituted righteous in Christ; but in Christ we are constituted righteous by imputation of righteousness; therefore we are made sinners in Adam by the imputation of his sin. Otherwise the comparison fails.'—Turretin. 'We are accounted righteous through Christ, in the same manner that we are accounted guilty through Adam.'—Tuckney. 'As we are made guilty of Adam's sin, which is not inherent in us, but only imputed to us; so are we made righteous by the righteousness of Christ, which is not inherent in us, but only imputed to us.'—Owen. We might go on for a month making such quotations. Nothing can be plainer than that these men considered these cases as perfectly parallel as to the point in hand, viz.: the nature of imputation."

Then in the *Princeton Review*, for 1860, p. 338, he asserts

most gratuitously that the Lutheran and Reformed Churches receive his view of antecedent imputation; and with equal inaccuracy he repeats it on p. 339, with the following baseless assertion respecting the early Calvinistic view: "The fact that men are born under condemnation was sometimes specially referred to the imputation of Adam's sin as something out of themselves; at others, to the corruption of nature derived from him. *What finally modified and harmonized these representations was the acknowledged analogy between our relation to Adam and our relation to Christ. It was soon seen that what the Bible plainly teaches, viz.: that the ground of our justification is nothing subjective, nothing done by us or wrought in us, but the righteousness of Christ as something out of ourselves, could not be held fast in its integrity without admitting that the primary ground of the condemnation of the race was in like manner something neither done by us nor infused into us, but the sin of Adam as out of ourselves, and imputed to us on the ground of the union, representative and natural, between him and his posterity.*"\* This he repeats substantially on p. 340, and on p. 341, employs the following extraordinary language: "The main point in the analogy between Christ and Adam, as presented in the theology of the Protestant Church, and as exhibited by the Apostle is, that as in the case of Christ, his righteousness as something neither done by us nor wrought in us, is the judicial ground of our justification, with which inward holiness is connected as an invariable consequence; so in the case of Adam, his offense as something out of ourselves, a *peccatum alienum*, is the judicial ground of the condemnation of the race, of which condemnation, spiritual death, or inward corruption, is the expression and the consequence. It is this principle WHICH IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE PROTESTANT THEOLOGY, and to the evangelical system, in the form in which it is presented in the Bible, which is strenuously denied by Dr. Baird, and also by the advocates of the doctrine of mediate imputation." And finally, on pages 368, 763, 764, he reasserts the same idea in a style equally remarkable, thus indorsing at the present time, and reiterating all his earlier representations in the Princeton Essays, respecting that doc-

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\* We have already adverted to this extraordinary language on a preceding page.

trine. See also pp. 373, 374, and *Princeton Essays*, I, pp. 171-174, 176, 177.

Now, in the very face of these most confident and pointed asseverations, we directly affirm that the representations which they set forth, in relation to the point of inquiry before us, are wholly unsustained by the facts in the case; and our readers shall judge for themselves in view of those facts. We maintain, therefore, that the assertion made and so often repeated by Dr. Hodge respecting the aforesaid Pauline analogy, between the imputation of sin and righteousness, and the recognition and adoption of it by the Calvinistic Church, was never held by that Church as he holds it: and that the opposite view as presented by Rivetus, in the forecited passage from his works, and in which he refutes the very view insisted on by Dr. Hodge; has ever been the view of the Reformed Church, and that that Church has ever held (except where Supralapsarian principles bore sway) that Rom. v: 12-21, teaches simply the fact of the headship both of Adam and of Christ; and that death came by the one, and life by the other; and, moreover, that they never denied or asserted that anything is therein taught as to any mode of transfer in respect to sin. Adam sinned; we, as the guilt was common, participated therein, and consequently partake in his guilt, corruption, and punishment. Christ obeyed; and his obedience is imputed to us for justification. This is their doctrine.

Before we proceed to the facts, and to remark on the testimony of Rivetus, we must again hear Dr. Hodge, who, in the *Princeton Review* for 1860, pp. 344, 345, thus comes into direct collision with Rivetus himself, whom, in P. E., I, p. 196, he denominates "the greatest theologian of the age." Rivetus, in speaking of the analogy in Rom. v: 12-21, expressly asserts that "there is a comparison of the causes, and not of the mode" in which sin and righteousness are communicated to us; while Dr. Hodge says "the design of the Apostle is to illustrate the mode or way in which the righteousness of Christ avails to our justification;" and then still further on, "It is to illustrate this great fundamental doctrine of his gospel that he refers to the parallel case of Adam, and shows that antecedently to any act of our own, before any corruption of nature the sentence of condemnation passed upon all men for the offense of one.

*To deny this, and to assert that our own subjective character is the ground of the sentence, is not only to deny the very thing which the Apostle asserts, but to overturn his whole argument. It is to take sides with the Jews against the Apostle." And then a little further on, he says: "The Leyden Professors, in their recommendation of the work which their colleague Rivetus had written against Placæus, declare the doctrine in question to be a *dogma contrarium communi omnium fermè Christianorum consensui*, and pronounce the doctrine of immediate imputation (that is, that doctrine as Dr. Hodge holds it, for such alone can be the meaning of his language here), to be a *dogma verè Catholicum*." Our readers will note here, that though Dr. Hodge differs with Rivetus, *toto cælo*, on the point before us, he, here and elsewhere, cites him in support of his own views! There is, however, a thought in this connection which would bear to be enlarged upon, but our space forbids. It is this: our edition of Rivetus, from which the citation above given from him was made, was issued in 1644, and, of course, after the controversy with Placæus had begun. His views on the point here before us, are the very reverse of those of Dr. Hodge (in support of which he has adduced Turretin and Tuckney), as the extract itself shows. If, therefore, Dr. Hodge's views are right, those of Rivetus are wrong. And yet, as is evident, from Princeton Essays, I, pp. 147, 196-217, Dr. Hodge adduces Rivetus and his testimonies, to prove that his own views of imputation are correct! Which, if true, Rivetus must have set out by this labored treatise to prove that a view of imputation directly opposite to his own, is the true view, and, of course, that he himself was a heretic! a subverter of the Gospel, etc., Dr. Hodge being judge. But the whole representation of Dr. Hodge on this subject is built upon his own rash and utterly unfounded assertion that the work which Rivetus wrote against Placæus, and which was so highly extolled by the Leyden divines, was written after Placæus had sought (as Dr. Hodge avers), to evade the sentence of the Synod by making the distinction between mediate and immediate imputation; whereas, the facts are as follows: This work of Rivetus was written in 1644-1645, while the work of Placæus, in which he makes the distinction, was not issued till 1655, ten years later, and four years after the death of Rivetus; Placæus having been, in the meantime, and by appoint-*

ment of the same Synod, assisting to complete the great work of Chamier in answer to Bellarmine. So far, therefore, is it from being true that Rivetus wrote in reply to the work or distinction of Placæus, or in defense of the dogma of antecedent imputation! By such inconsiderate representations, Dr. Hodge has, in instances almost innumerable, raised false issues, misrepresented the facts concerned, and greatly perplexed the whole subject under discussion. We shall patiently await his solution of these extraordinary proceedings.

As to Rivetus, the praise bestowed upon him by Dr. Hodge, though indiscriminating and based upon an obviously imperfect acquaintance with the facts, may be, in the main, deserved; for if not "the greatest controvertist of the age," which produced Daniel Chamier, and James Usher, and Molinæus, and Scioppius, and F. Spanheim, and Selden, there certainly were not many who were his superiors. His colleagues in the University were Walæus and the elder Polyander, Spanheim, and Frigland—men not a little distinguished in their day; and they unite in highly extolling both him and his writings, in which applause both Turretin and De Moor join most heartily. He was, moreover, an intimate friend of the great Molinæus, whose writings (and especially his *Anatome Arminianismi*) he styles "*eruditissimæ et acutissimæ lucubrationes*;" and whose value in defense of the truth appears by their success in silencing the cavils of its enemies. Few, indeed, who encountered Rivetus in dispute, ever had anything to boast of as the result. The controversial renown of Grotius withered and died in his iron grasp; and his reply to the boasted *Catechism of Controversies*, and *Veronian Method*, put the finishing stroke to the long-existing controversy between the Jesuits and Protestants on the Continent. This work proved to be, to their theology, what the *Letters of Pascal* were to their ethics, and they paid it the respect of long-continued silence.

As to the forecited testimony of this eminent man, with which the views and statements of Dr. Hodge are so directly in conflict, we shall now proceed to consider its bearing on the subject under discussion. And, in the first place, our readers will be pleased to observe that the views therein expressed, in respect to the parable between Adam and Christ, and which are the direct reverse of the views asserted by Dr. Hodge, and

which he claims to be "fundamental to Protestant theology," were not adopted by Rivetus in a moment of excitement during controversy, but were the deliberately-formed and settled convictions of his life. This is shown by the fact that at the end of the chapter which contains the section which we have quoted, he adds an extensive *appendix* containing a defense of the arguments of Calvin from Rom. v: 12-21, etc., against Bellarmine, and against his assertions, that the sin of Adam descended by imputation, as expressed in the quotation given above. This *appendix* is simply a tractate, which Rivetus had written a number of years before, and which he now adds, as sustaining by a more extensive line of argument, the views advanced by him in the chapter itself, and because Calvin had asserted the same views with himself respecting the analogy between Adam and Christ (as advanced by Paul in Rom. v:), and which Bellarmine had attempted to refute; and the views of Calvin thereupon, being the accredited views of the Reformed Church, he appends to the chapter this specific defense of them. Such is the character of this appendix. And let our readers note that in this appendix, sec. 31, pp. 164, 165, he reiterates precisely the sentiments on this subject which are expressed by him in the extract above given, and adds that it is by virtue of *our natural union with Adam* that his sin becomes ours by the just imputation of God. These views he affirms to be the views of Calvin; and now in his seventy-third year, and up to the very time of preparing the work against Placæus, he republishes them as his own views, and the accredited views of the Calvinistic Church. His collected works, as we have said, were issued in 1644, and in 1645 he issued the aforesaid book against Placæus, containing the testimonies of the Reformed Church on Imputation and Original Sin; which work Dr. Hodge, Dr. Thornwell,\* and others, would have us believe was written to establish that "*fundamental principle of Protestant theology*," asserted by Bellarmine, but which was denied by Rivetus, and Calvin, and the whole Reformed Church.

That the views of Rivetus above given respecting the analogy of Paul and the *modus* of the transmission of sin, and not the views asserted by Dr. Hodge, were the views of the Reformed Church, may be clearly seen by the testimonies

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\* See Southern Presbyterian Review for 1860, pp. 198, 199.

adduced in this essay. Let our readers advert particularly to the citations from the French Confession, and to the articles of the Synod of Dort, and to all the other testimonies (except some of the Supralapsarian divines), where the matter is specifically referred to. For instance, to those of P. Martyr, Calvin, Hyperius, Bullinger, Chemnitz, Sohnnius, Danæus, Chamier, Paræus, Piscator, B. Turretin, Tilenus, Mestrezatius, Molinæus, Walæus (a colleague of Rivetus), Drelincourt, Essenius, Vitringa, and Lampé. They had no conception that the dogma of antecedent imputation, as presented and insisted on by Dr. Hodge, ever had been or ever could be, an integral part of Calvinistic theology.\*

And then further: as respects the Pauline *analogy* between Adam and Christ, of which Dr. Hodge affirms that, in the sense in which he has presented it, it "*is asserted by almost every old Calvinist that ever wrote,*" and that he "*might go on for a month making quotations,*" to prove what he here says. We request our readers to note that the dogma was not only not received by the Protestant Church, but was pointedly denied by not only the Infralapsarian divines, but even by many Supralapsarians themselves. We have seen how Rivetus and Chamier regard it. CALVIN treats it in the same manner, on Rom. v: 17 (a part of which we have already quoted). See also URSINUS, pp. 68, 69. BEZA expressly reiterates the same view in his notes on Rom. v: 14, 15: "*Duos enim Adamos facit Paulus, quorum prior fuit posterioris typus; typus, inquam,*

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\* As to the mere question whether the *mode is* referred to Rom. v: 12-19, our readers will perceive that, in this connection, it is purely historical; that is, do the Reformed divines sustain the statement of Dr. Hodge? The foregoing references, and which are but a portion of what we can adduce, show that they do not, and that they never did. And yet, so far as the question is one of theology and exegesis, we are willing, for the sake of the argument, to admit the assumption of Dr. Hodge and the Supralapsarians in the matter, and to concede that the *mode is* referred to. In the first section of this third part of our discussion, we have briefly adverted to this fact in remarking upon a quotation from Dr. Hodge, in which he makes inward holiness the *consequence* of justification, and did not our limits forbid, we should follow it out more fully here. But the case stands thus: that while the assumption on which Dr. Hodge rests his argument is historically false, the argument itself, if admitted to be sound, destroys his doctrine. So that were the victory which he so strongly claims on the historical basis admitted, and the field given up, he would find occasion to say, with the king of Epirus, after the Romans had abandoned the field: "Another such victory and we are undone."



*non quia ad imitandum propositus sit uterque, sed propter vim utriusque similem; in illo, perniciem in posteros propagandi, in hoc, suos justificandi.*” “In hoc versu (15), confertur Adamus cum Christo, et illius offensa cum istius obedientia, ut quæ sit vis utriusque sese in suos derivandi intelligatur. In v. 16, vis utriusque, *id est, lapsus Adami PROPAGATI PER NATURAM, ET CHRISTI OBEDIENTIÆ PER GRATIAM IMPUTATÆ, COMPARATUR.* In v. 17, fines istorum inter se conferuntur. In v. 18, tres istæ collationes unâ connectuntur, quarum basis ac communis ratio v. 19, explicatur.” Beza and all these distinguished men admitted the imputation of Adam’s sin, but utterly denied, with Rivetus, the point in Dr. Hodge’s *analogy* which he claims to be fundamental in Protestant theology. PAREUS affirms the same view. In Romans v: 12, he says: “Nisi etiam (apostolus) diceret, in Adamo omnes naturaliter corruptos, et reos esse, quomodo in Christo omnibus remedium culpæ et reatus ostenderet, quod faciet versu 18, 19. MANIFESTUM est igitur, apostolum, ista ratione inserta, cur omnes moriantur, quia omnes peccaverunt, peccatum originis evidenter adstruere in omnibus hominibus, Christo solo excepto, quippe ex Adamo non naturaliter prognato; quodque sit verè peccatum, quia omnes verè peccaverunt in Adamo.” The same is repeated on v. 18, and on v. 19 he says: “Verbo καταστῆσαν ἁμαρτολοὶ vim inobedientiæ exauget, quod non modò reatu, sed et pravitate omnes inquinavit: nec modò naturaliter praros, sed et habitualiter peccatores fecerit. Dixerat in Adamo semel omnes peccasse v. 12, et hinc omnes reos factos, v. 15, 16. Nunc addit, etiam PECCATORES CONSTITUTOS, HOC EST, NON SOLUM NATURA POLLUTOS, SED ET TOTO VITÆ HABITU VITIATOS, UT NIHIL NISI PECCARE VALEANT. Plus igitur hic dicit, quam ver. 12. In quo omnes peccaverunt.” PISCATOR is equally explicit: “PLENA AUTEM COMPARATIO SIC HABET. Quemadmodum per Adamum peccatum introiit in omnes homines, et per peccatum mors, ed quòd in Adamo omnes peccarunt: sic per Christum justitia introiit in omnes credentes, et per justitiam vita: ed quòd in Christo omnes credentes pro peccatis satisfecerunt.”

The very learned L. DE DIEU (1590–1642) expresses the same view: “Confert (in v. 15) cum peccato hominis gratiam Dei, etc. Deinde, effectus etiam peccati Adami æ gratiæ Christi confert: quòd inde mors, hinc salus, ad illos manaverit,” etc. HYPERIUS also, on v. 12, “Si autem Antithetorum habere vol-

unus rationem, sic perfici sententia potest: *Quemadmodum* per unum hominem Adamum peccatum in mundum introiit, et per peccatum mors, et sic in omnes homines mors pervasit, quatenus omnes peccavimus: *ita* per unum hominem Christum justitia in mundum allata est, ac per justitiam vita, et sic ad omnes homines vita pervenit, quatenus omnes credidimus." TILLENUS reiterates the same: "Igitur ipsa generatio, et *σπερματισμός*, modus est, quo in homines promanat hoc malum; qui et uno hoc modo ab Adamo pendent." Syntag. Theol., Part. I, loc. 56, thes. 31. GOMAR too sustains precisely the same view. In his analytical explication of Romans (Opp. I, p. 405), he presents a clear analysis of Rom. v: 12, etc., and speaking of the similitude and dissimilitude in the analogy between Adam and Christ he says: "Prior comparatio continetur, v. 12, 13, 14, similitudo autem si rem intereamur, consistit in natura effectis duobus." Then, after illustrating this, he thus concludes: "Adamus peccati et mortis, in hominibus fons est: Christus verò justitiæ et vitæ author. *Adamus peccatum suum omnibus et solis natis suis, vi naturæ*; Christus verò justitiam suam et vitam omnibus et solis renatis suis communicat." He gives not the slightest intimation of Dr. Hodge's *fundamental* and *harmonizing* principle of Calvinistic theology. And in his vol. II, pp. 44-46, he institutes in 58 theses, a discussion *De Adami primi et secundi collatione*; throughout which he presents the same exposition as the aforesaid of Rivetus (see particularly Thes. 41-57), and says nothing of the *imputation* of Adam's guilt, but maintains that his posterity are guilty for having sinned in him. If Dr. Hodge's fundamental principle could be found insisted on as essential to the Reformed theology, we might well expect to find it here. But this is not all, for in Princeton Essays, I, p. 173, in a passage which we have quoted above, he cites the authority of TURRETTIN in support of this exposition of the analogy drawn by the Apostle between Adam and Christ; and, on p. 181, he moreover represents him as quoting from Bellarmine the passage *which Rivetus, in the aforesaid quotation, cites and refutes*, and as conceding that it contains "a full admission of the doctrine of imputation;" but by turning to the place in Turretin, we find the representation wholly unauthorized. The passage may be found in vol. II, pp. 572-573, (Loc. 16, Quæst. III, Sect. 15), and instead of

approving the sentiment of Bellarmine, he merely introduces it with the remark, "Deinde ipse Bellarminus contrarium testatur." And, after citing it, with another passage from the same work, he adds the following words, which are in perfect accordance with the aforesaid exposition of Rivetus, and directly at war with the representation of Dr. Hodge: "Nec si injusti et rei constituimur per peccatum ab Adamo propagatum, statim justificari debemus per justitiam inhærentem nobis per regenerationem à Christo communicatam, QUIA DIVERSISSIMA EST UTRISQUE RATIO. ET PAULUS HIC COLLATIONEM INSTITUIT INTER ADAMUM PRIMUM ET SECUNDUM IN RE, SED NON IN MODO REI."\* See also pp. 566, 567.

We confess that we are surprised at the representation of facts thus made by Dr. Hodge; and the worst of it is, that this representation is often made and insisted on. For instance, in Princeton Essays, I, pp. 166, 177, he utters the averment, which we request our readers to compare with the foregoing citations, that Turretin and others (that is, the Reformed divines) "*uniformly maintain that we are constituted sinners in Adam (eodem modo, eodem ratione), in the same manner that we are constituted righteous in Christ;*" and to sustain this, he quotes from Turretin a passage which is in perfect agreement with that just cited from vol. II, pp. 572, 573, and in which he pointedly denies it. We shall leave Dr. Hodge to explain his intention in this extraordinary procedure. We are at an utter loss to account for it.

Thus, then, it appears that not the slightest ground can be pleaded in support of the representations made by Dr. Hodge

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\* Let our readers compare this citation from Turretin with the following passage from Dr. Hodge (P. E., I, p. 181), in which he professes to give the meaning of Turretin therein, and if they know of a more remarkable instance of unmitigated perversion of a plain matter of important fact, they know of that of which we confess ourselves ignorant. The following are his words: "To this passage from the Catholic Cardinal, Turretin subjoins the remark that it can not be inferred from the fact that we are also rendered sinners and liable to condemnation by the corrupt nature which we inherit from Adam. We are also justified by our inherent righteousness, communicated by Christ in regeneration; because the Apostle did not mean to teach that the cases are parallel throughout, THOUGH THEY ARE SO FAR AS IMPUTATION IS CONCERNED." Turretin, so far from saying that *ratio est eadem*, says that it is *diversissima*, and that there is no *collatio in modo rei*. And yet, in direct contradiction to this, Dr. Hodge represents him as here saying that *eadem est ratio*.

respecting the view entertained by the Reformed divines of the analogy between Adam and Christ, which he has so constantly pleaded in support of his doctrine of antecedent imputation. They not only never entertained his view, but, on the contrary, pointedly reject and refute it. But we must draw these remarks to a close, though before doing so we shall request the attention of our readers to a matter or two connected with the subject, which still calls for notice.

Dr. Hodge is perpetually repeating, in all his lucubrations on imputation and original sin (as may be seen by the passages above referred to and many others), that the views of the earlier Calvinists were very much confused on these subjects until they hit upon and adopted *the idea which he entertains and insists upon*, respecting the Pauline similitude or analogy between Adam and Christ; and as precisely expressing his own view he quotes the forecited passage from Bellarmine, the great Papal theologian, in which he assails the doctrine taught by Calvin. Rivetus, as above shown, refutes this view and defends Calvin; and the Reformed divines sustain him in doing so. But Dr. Hodge finds the passage to contain "a full admission of the doctrine of imputation," as held by himself. It presents the exact idea as entertained by him, of the *point* in the analogy between Adam and Christ, and gives the *true idea* of the *mode* of communicating both sin and righteousness; a principle *fundamental* to Protestantism, and the *harmonizing* principle of Calvinistic theology. Bellarmine asserted it in his attempted refutation of the Reformed theology, and the Church continued to repudiate and refute it for a century or two; but has, at length, through Dr. Hodge, harmonized her theology by adopting it. If all this be so, then surely our progress is only lately begun, and we may adopt as our appropriate motto,

Per varios casus, per tot discrimina rerum,  
Tendimus in Latium; sedes ubi fata quietas  
Ostendunt illic fas regna resurgere Romæ.

Then further: since Dr. Hodge asserts so emphatically that the recognition of the point referred to, as the point in the analogy instituted by Paul in Rom. v, became the harmonizing principle of Protestant theology, the question is an interesting one *whose theology did it harmonize?* Not that of the Infra-

lapsarians, as is above shown, for they always rejected it. But it did become the "harmonizing" and "fundamental" principle of the Supralapsarians. A single instance will evince this.\* Polanus, the great Supralapsarian theologian of Basel, and who published his *Syntagma* (pp. 2260, in quarto) in 1609, asserts most pointedly the very view of Dr. Hodge on this subject. And on page 518, in defending his view, he speaks as follows: "Quin ipsemet *Bellarminus*, tom. III, de *Amissione gratiæ* lib. 5, c. 17, id fateri cogitur, quum ait. Solus ipse (*Adamus*) actuali voluntate illud (peccatum primum) commisit; nobis verò communicatur per generationem eo modo," etc.; thus making the same quotation which Rivetus makes, and acknowledging, as Dr. Hodge does, that it expresses the true view.† Thus the Supralapsarians, from the first, receive and acknowledge it as a fundamental principle, and the Infralapsarians reject and refute it. It is fundamental, therefore, only to the Supralapsarian theology, and not to the Reformed or Calvinistic. And we are quite willing that the Supralapsarians should retain it if they see proper to do so, but let them not insist that we too must either receive it, or forfeit our claim to Calvinistic soundness of doctrine. And it is worthy of note in the same connection, that De Moor (III, p. 260) refers to this very treatise of Bellarmine, lib. 5, to evince that he, along with Pighius and Catharinus, teach that "totam Peccati Originalis naturam solâ imputatione primi Peccati definiabant, nullam inhærente corruptionem agnoscentes," and he adds, "Rectius hæc duo junguntur a Tridentinis, Sess. V. Decr. I."

But we think it high time that there should be no more of such proceedings in our midst, and that the Church should be permitted to retain peaceable possession of her own acknowledged doctrine in its purity and simplicity and integrity, and without being longer troubled by persistent efforts to engraft upon that doctrine the pernicious and long-since exploded errors of the Supralapsarian school. It is not now true, and never has been true, and never can be true, that the Popish

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\*Our readers may find a similar instance also in the citation above given (No. 25) from the Supralapsarian Lubbertus.

† "Turretin quotes him (Bellarmine) as stating the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin, to his entire satisfaction." *Princeton Essays*, I, p. 198.

Cardinal Bellarmine has, in his antithesis or analogy, suggested, as Dr. Hodge asserts (see Princeton Essays, I, p. 181, and Princeton Review for 1860, pp. 339-341), the true ground on which Calvinistic theology is to be understood and explained, and by which it has become harmonized; or that the principle he thus inculcates ever has been or ever can be a fundamental principle of that theology. It belongs to Ockham and his followers, from whom Bellarmine and Pighius, and a few Protestant Supralapsarian divines have adopted it; but, true to herself and to the Divine Word, the Calvinistic Church has, as a body, ever rejected it. Let her do so still. Nor let any portion of her sons in this day lay the flattering unction to their soul, that they have, by embracing a pestiferous error which she has ever repudiated, acquired a soundness of doctrine above their brethren.

#### XLIII. MARROW OF MODERN DIVINITY.

This remarkable book was first published in 1645-1648. The edition issued by our Board of Publication is decidedly the best ever published. We present the subjoined passage, which, though it serves the purpose for which we cite it, evinces that Mr. Fisher's mind was somewhat perplexed by the speculations of the Supralapsarians of his time. For he confounds the two ideas, which certainly are very different, to wit: *a surety paying a debt for us*, and *we paying a debt in our surety*; an error which has been followed out to its legitimate consequences, so as to be made to countenance the antinomian notion of eternal justification. And it is certainly absurd to say that *we obeyed in Christ*, in the same sense and manner in which *we sinned and disobeyed in Adam*. For in what sense can it be even imagined that a fallen, corrupt, and rebellious creature should, while in a state of impenitence and rebellion, perform obedience in Christ? and so secure his own renewal and salvation in another with whom he could have, while in this state of sin, no possible sympathy. It is, therefore, the *obedience of Christ* (and not *our obedience in Christ*), that results in the formation of our new nature, whereby alone any true obedience is practicable. Eternal life is the *gift* of God; and in no sense has it been wrought out *by us*, either in our surety or otherwise; but it has been wrought out *by our surety for us*,

and is thus the gift of God to us; while, on the contrary, death is the *wages*, the actual *desert* of sin; and in no sense, therefore, is it the *gift* of God, either by antecedent imputation or otherwise. We, by our own intrinsic demerit, deserve the *first*; the *second*, we never can in any sense be said to *deserve*; and if God, in his infinite mercy, shall bring us to glory, we shall never cease to sing, "Not unto us, but to Thee be the glory; for *thou hast redeemed us.*"

The following passage is from pp. 106–108 of the edition above referred to:

"But yet for the further proof and confirmation of this point, we are to consider that, as Jesus Christ, the second Adam, entered into the same covenant that the first Adam did; so by him was done whatever the first Adam had undone. So the case stands thus—that as whatsoever the first Adam did, or befel him, was reckoned as done by all mankind, and to have befallen them, even so, whatsoever Christ did, or befel him, is to be reckoned as to have been done by all believers, and to have befallen them. So that as sin cometh from Adam alone to all mankind, *as he in whom all have sinned*; so from Jesus Christ alone cometh righteousness unto all that are in him, *as he in whom THEY all have satisfied the justice of God*; for as being in Adam, and one with him, all did, in him and with him, transgress the commandment of God; even so in respect of faith, whereby believers are engrafted into Christ, and spiritually made one with him, *they did all, in him and with him, satisfy the justice of God* in his death and sufferings. And whosoever reckons thus, reckons according to the Scripture; for in Rom. v, 12, all are said to have sinned in Adam's sin; in whom all have sinned, says the text, namely in Adam, as in a public person; all men's acts were included in his, because their persons were included in his."

The foregoing exception to this incautious phraseology, is not intended to undervalue the excellent work from which it is taken, for all our ministers should possess that work. But as the passage contains a very clear statement of a commonly-received fallacy in relation to our subject, and also evinces the inevitable consequences resulting from all attempts to confound the personal *sin of Adam*, with *our sin in Adam*, it is deserving of very serious consideration in this connection.

#### XLIV. P. MOLINÆUS, PROFESSOR AT SEDAN.

We have already referred to Molinæus. He was born in October, 1568, and studied both in Paris and England with

great success. Grotius was subsequently one of his pupils. He finally settled as pastor of the Church in Paris. In 1619, the Curators of Leyden University invited both him and Rivetus to the Professorships of Theology in that institution. Rivetus accepted the overture, but Molinæus declined. He and Rivetus had been chosen as deputies to attend the Synod of Dort, but after they had started on their journey thither the King of France refused to allow them to proceed. He, moreover, having become exasperated against Molinæus for writing to James I, to aid the Elector of Palatine, and to use his influence on behalf of the Protestant Church in France, Molinæus could not return to Paris, but was soon after called to the University of Sedan (over which little principality the Duke of Bouillon was sovereign), where he continued till his death in 1658, aged 90 years. In the beginning of the year 1618, he sent to the press his *Anatomy of Arminianism*, but in consequence of a decree of the Provincial Synod of Charenton it was not published until the conclusion of the sessions of the Synod of Dort, to which he had transmitted it, as he was not allowed to proceed thither.

The dispute between him and Tilenus (in the settlement of which James I took so much interest) was simply in relation to the effects of the hypostatical union, and no otherwise affected any point of Calvinistic theology. The treatises of Molinæus number seventy-five. And Twisse, though so utterly opposed to him in his views of the doctrine respecting *the will of God*, refers to him in the following beautiful and magnanimous style: "I do admire him upon the Eucharist and on Purgatory. He hath my heart when I read his consolations to his brethren of the Church of France, as also in treating of the love of God. I would willingly learn French to understand him only, and have a long time desired, and still do get anything he hath written." I omitted to state that Molinæus was moderator of the National Synod of Alez (1620), which adopted into the Confession of Faith of the French Churches, the Articles of the Synod of Dort, with its "Rejection of Errors," which proceeding greatly exasperated the French monarch. In relation to the subject before us, Molinæus employs the following language:



“In this argument (Rom. v: 12–19), the declaration of the Apostle is most express, where he says: *By one man*, etc. Yea, infants he subjects in a peculiar manner to this necessity, saying, ‘death reigned over those who had not sinned after the similitude of Adam’s transgression,’ that is, who had not sinned actually, but only originally. AND LEST ANY SHOULD REFER THIS TO IMPUTATION ALONE, he, in the seventh chapter, confesses his own proclivity to sinning. ‘We,’ says he, ‘sinned in Adam, and in him willed this depravation.’” “NOB, INDEED, WOULD GOD IMPUTE THE SIN OF ADAM TO HIS POSTERITY, UNLESS THEY HAD IN THEMSELVES SOMETHING WHICH WAS TRULY OF THE NATURE OF SIN, AND UNLESS THEY WERE EVIL BY NATURE.”

Nothing could be more utterly subversive of the doctrine of antecedent imputation, than this language. And can Dr. Hodge really believe that Rivetus (from whom he himself has cited the same passage, but disfigured by a mistranslation) could have adduced this testimony of Molinæus, to say nothing of the multitude of similar ones which he has cited, to prove that he held the doctrine of antecedent imputation? Why could not such instances have suggested to Dr. Hodge, the only obvious conclusion, that the design of Rivetus in adducing these testimonies, must, in the necessity of the case, have differed *toto cælo* from his own design in adducing them? And, therefore, that he has misapprehended the design of Rivetus, and utterly misapplied his argument. And, then, further, in our first Essay, pp. 409–411, we have quoted from Molinæus’ *Anatomy of Arminianism*, on the subject of Reprobation and the Will of God, and have mentioned how highly he was esteemed by the Synod of Dort (who had at that time this very treatise of his before them, printed, though not published), on account of his writings. And we have now cited his statement on Imputation and Original Sin; and in which statement he speaks of the doctrine of antecedent imputation (that is, of imputation alone without regard to subjective desert), just as he has spoken on the subject of Reprobation in the citations aforesaid. Now it will be borne in mind (as we have stated in No. XLII, of these testimonies), that this very *Anatomy of Arminianism* is spoken of in the highest terms by Rivetus, whom Dr. Hodge represents as denying and refuting the very doctrine which it asserts; and, moreover, while Rivetus himself has made the foregoing quotation from

Molinæus, in order to show what were really the views of imputation, as entertained by the Reformed Church. Rivetus cites him as saying, that "assuredly God would not impute the sin of Adam to his posterity, unless they had in themselves something which was truly of the nature of sin, and unless they were evil by nature;" and this very view Dr. Hodge has again and again repudiated, and denounced as Placæanism, while Rivetus quotes the passage to prove that the doctrine of the Reformed Church was directly opposed to Placæanism.

XLV. A. WALÆUS (*Antoine de Wael*), 1573—1639.

In our first Essay, p. 416, we have referred to this justly celebrated Leyden divine. Rivetus, J. Polyander, Thysius, and Jac. Triglandius, were colleagues of his in that University. *He drew up the canons of the Synod of Dort*, and soon after the conclusion of its sessions became Professor of Theology in Leyden. We shall cite his testimony to show what he understood to be the doctrine of the Reformed Church respecting imputation and original sin; and, perhaps, it would not be a very unfair inference to conclude that he probably knew what was contained in the canons of the Dordrecht Synod.

He was born in Ghent, and studied under Junius and Gomar; and while he was yet a student, the States of Zealand learning that their younger students at the University were becoming demoralized, appointed him to oversee them, and commanded that they should be guided in their studies by his direction. The piety of Walæus, though most firm and decided, was pre-eminently of a lovely type, and he possessed the missionary spirit in a very remarkable degree for the time in which he lived. His interest was much awakened on behalf of India, then so recently opened to extensive intercourse with Europe, and he established a seminary for the purpose of preparing youth to go thither as missionaries. He never sought the favor of the great, except so far as to secure some desirable benefits for the Church of God; and if, during his intercourse with such, anything were said prejudicial to religion, he never hesitated to rebuke it promptly.

In his reply to the attack of Corvinus (a celebrated Arminian Theologue), upon the Anatomy of Arminianism of Molinæus,

he thus most decidedly expresses his views on the subject before us:

“Nor yet do we so judge, as you appear to think, that the guilt of the first sin, and the guilt of the sin inhering in his posterity, are different kinds of desert or guilt which may be mutually divided from each other, as the guilt of two depraved actions may be divided; but we affirm that the two are connected and beget a common guilt (sed dicimus hæc duo esse connexa, et communem reatum gignere), which obligates the sinner to one and the same punishment, because the guilt of the first sin to condemnation (and as the Apostle speaks, Rom. v: 16, *χρῆμα εἰς κατάκριμα*), CAN NOT BE IMPUTED TO POSTERITY UNLESS THAT VITIORITY OF INHERENT SIN INTERVENE (non potest posteris imputari nisi mediante illâ peccati inhærentis vitiositate): SEEING THE JUSTICE OF GOD WILL NOT PERMIT THAT THE FIRST SIN SHOULD BE IMPUTED TO CONDEMNATION TO A POSTERITY HAVING NO SIN IN THEMSELVES.” “The Scriptures testify, also, that corporeal death is the fruit of original sin, not only mediately from imputation, which we do not deny, but also immediately from the internal contagion of sin, which you deny.”

We have already referred to Dr. Hodge's attempt to prove antecedent imputation by quoting an expression from the Leyden divines, and have shown its unfairness and want of accuracy. Our readers can now decide that matter for themselves, by comparing the representation of Dr. Hodge, with the aforesaid testimonies of Rivetus, Molinæus, and Walæus.

#### XLVI. ARCHBISHOP USHER, 1580—1655.

Few men, more richly endowed with both natural and spiritual gifts, have ever adorned the Church of the Living God in this world. In his “*Sum and Substance of the Christian Religion*,” London, 1702 (a work collected from his writings, but of which he decidedly expressed his approval: a work, too, of singular merit, but now most unaccountably neglected), he says:

“Our first parents were by God's appointment to *stand or fall* in that trial, not as singular persons only, but also as the head and root of all mankind, representing the persons of all that should descend from them by natural generation. And, therefore, for the understanding of the *ground of our participation with Adam's fall*, two things must be considered. First, that *Adam* was not a private man in this business, but

sustained the person of all mankind, as he who had received strength for himself and all his posterity, and so lost the same for all. For Adam received the promise of life for himself and us, with this condition, if he had stood; but seeing he stood not, he lost the promise of life both from himself and from us. And as his felicity should have been ours, if he had stood in it, so was his transgression and misery ours. So that, as in the second covenant, the righteousness of the second Adam (Christ Jesus the Mediator) is reckoned to those that are begotten of him by spiritual regeneration (even those that believe on his name), although they never did it; so in the covenant the sin of the first Adam (who herein sustained a common person) is reckoned to all the posterity that descend from him by carnal generation, because they were in him, and of him, and one with him. Rom. v: 15-19. Secondly, that we all who are descended from Adam by natural generation, *were in his loins, and a part of him when he fell, and so by the law of propagation and generation sinned in him, and in him deserved eternal condemnation therefrom.* \* \* \* \* \* *Then it appeareth, that by propagation from our last parents we are become partakers of the transgression of our first parents.* Even so; and for the same transgression of our first parents, by the most righteous judgment of God, we are conceived in sin, and born in iniquity, and unto misery. Ps. li: 5," pp. 125, 126.

XLVII. J. HOORNBECK, *Professor at Utrecht and Leyden, 1617—1666.*

This is another great and venerable name in the Church of God. He was born at Haerlem, and studied at Utrecht and Leyden; and in 1644 became Professor of Theology in the former University, and ten years later in the latter. He was a very earnest and successful minister of the Word, and also in training youth for the ministry, and his *Ratio Concionandi* has great merit. He never deviated from the most rigid orthodoxy. In his *Confut.*, Socin., lib. iii: cap. 3, he says:

"You ask whence is the sin which is within us? the response is ready—from that first *common sin* of Adam, imputed to all men from Adam. To understand this it is proper to know what person or condition Adam sustained, and how, in him, the whole nature of man should have been considered as so accounted, represented, and confederated. that what he thus far had been, possessed, or did, *should be reckoned as belonging to all men, and therefore to the whole of human nature in him.* \* \* \* \* \* He stood as the root, origin, head, beginning of all

our nature; and this, indeed, with a two-fold title, *the natural head*, from whom the whole of our nature was to be disseminated, and *the moral head* by whose obedience or disobedience, our whole nature must either stand or fall. From the first headship it comes to pass that we are men; from the second that we are either good or evil."

XLVIII. C. DRELINCOURT, *Pastor at Paris*, 1595—1669.

"As the sin of Adam is imputed to us because we all sinned in Adam, so in like manner the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us, since in the person of Christ, our head, we have fulfilled all righteousness." (On Rom. v: 19.)

In the conclusion of this passage, we have the same incautious phraseology referred to in No. XLIII above.

XLIX. J. COCCEIUS, *Professor at Franeker*, 1603—1669.

We cite this divine, the companion of Maccovius and Szydlowius, to show the influence of the Supralapsarian scheme in modifying the views of the Reformed theology. Cocceius says:

"To impute, in the style of Scripture, is to judge that he has done a thing, who has not done it; not to impute is to judge that he has not done a thing, who has done it. To impute is either to condemn or absolve many individuals by one sentence, on account of the conjunction." (Sum. Theol., cap. 30; see also his Lexicon, sub voce *בצדקה*.)

Dr. Thornwell, after quoting the above, says:

"This is exactly our doctrine, *the doctrine of the Westminster Standards, and of the whole Reformed Church.*"

Dr. T. can speak for himself in the matter. But while we may assent to the entire truth of the first clause of this sentence, we pronounce all the rest of it unfounded. (See Southern Presbyterian Review, for April, 1860, page 201.) And yet, if we are able to understand language, Dr. Thornwell has repudiated this very idea of Cocceius, and in the same connection, for he says:

"We also agree with Dr. Baird, that *the imputation of guilt is simply the declaration of the fact. To condemn a man is to find or pronounce him guilty, and not to make him so. It is a verdict upon the case as it is,*

and introduces no new element. But the question arises, upon what ground is a man pronounced deserving of punishment? \* \* \* \* \* All that we maintain is, that a sin may be ours, really and truly ours, and therefore chargeable upon us, when we have not, in our own proper persons, committed it; when we have, in fact, sustained no causal relation to it whatever. This is the point upon which we differ," etc.

"They (Dr. Baird's authorities) only prove that guilt is inseparable from crime; no one denies that. They prove, further, that a man can not be punished for a crime which is in no sense his own; no one denies that." (Ibid, pp. 188, 200.)

#### L. AND. ESSENIUS, *Professor at Utrecht, 1618—1672.*

Essenius, the associate of Hoornbeck, and subsequently of Leusden, possessed a very lovely and highly evangelical character. Among other works of approved merit, he, in 1649, published the *Triumphus Crucis, sive Fides Catholica*, and in 1659 his *Systema Theologicum*, in two volumes, which he afterward abridged. The abridgment passed through several editions. We quote from the second, issued in 1682:

"The effects of the first sin came alike upon our first parents, and were: 1. The loss of original righteousness, and the deformity contrary thereto, etc. 2. Guilt before God (*Reatus coram Deo*). 3. Terror of conscience," etc.

"Original and actual sin, arising from this first sin, follows. Original sin is the fault from that first fall, making guilty, and miserably staining the whole nature of the human race as it was reckoned in Adam. (*Originale est culpa ex primo illo lapsu universam Generis humani naturam, prout ea in Adamo censica, ream faciens, atque inficiens miserrime.*) Rom. v: 12, Eph. ii: 3. (He quotes these texts.) It is either imputed or inherent. Imputed is the fruit itself of the first sin (*Fructus ille primi peccati*), by which it, according to the constitution of the legal covenant, is esteemed natural; so that it truly involves that whole nature in the same guilt with our first parents."

"They are implicated in the same guilt, who do not, like Adam, sin in propria personæ; but only in their head (in capite illo), as the faithful are justified in Christ, whose type he was."

"The proximate effect of this imputed sin (*peccati*), is the guilt (*reatus*) of all the Adamic race: that is, of all who were federally reckoned in him. Whence follow the more remote effects, calamities, pains, miseries," etc.

"Original sin inherent, is a habitual congenital vitiosity, arising from

*that first sin*, through which our nature is rendered wholly inapt to all spiritual saving good, and prone to the opposite evils."—Cap. X, sec. 24–29.

LI. S. MARESIUS, *Professor of Groningen and Leyden*,  
1599—1673.

Maresius, or Des-Marets, ranked among the very ablest divines of his age. He studied theology under Gomar at Saumur, for three years, and completed his course of study at Geneva. In his *Enodatio Gravissimarum Quæstionum*, etc., Tract. 5 (De Peccato Originis), he speaks as follows :

"Since the guilt of Adam and his posterity is a common guilt, it is not foreign from the mercy of God that he should have remitted it to Adam and to many others ; or from his justice, that to many others to whom God was not bound to remit it, it should be imputed for punishment."

"The place in Ezekiel (ch. xviii : 20) here objected, *should be understood of the iniquity of a personal parent, and of a son who is free from all blame. But this in no sense forbids that the common and natural iniquity of the first man should be justly imputed for actual punishment to all his posterity who have sinned in him, and who, besides the blame (noxa) contracted in him, are by generation inhesively and subjectively corrupted, guilty, and sinful.*"

"And properly there was a tything of Levi in the loins of Abraham, although he did not yet exist by act and personally, as the apostolical expression proves ; and properly we have all sinned in Adam, in whom we existed seminally. Nor does the *ὡς ἔπος εἰπέτω* (ut ita loquar) indicate that Paul spoke figuratively and tropically ; but that he wished by one word, subtle and new, to remove the whole difficulty."

"Wrongfully are these two things set in contrast, *to sin against express law and against the law of nature* ; for in whatever way one sins actually, he sins after the similitude of Adam's transgression, *who violated both*. Then I grant that in neither way infants are able to sin actually and personally ; *but they violated in Adam originally each law, the positive and natural.*"

"None can be treated as sinners by a God of equity, who have neither personal nor actual sin ; unless some sin has by right (jure) been imputed to them."

LII. LUD. LE BLANC, *of Sedan*, 1614—1675.

"But that it may be more distinctly understood how Christ takes away the sins of men (referring to John i : 29), let it be observed that

there are two things in sin : one is a certain depravity and filthiness, which spots and defiles the sinner, and renders him odious to God, and opposed to reason and the Divine law. *The other is an obligation and appointment to the punishment which Divine justice exacts, and the law threatens.* Each is taken away by the grace of Christ."

Then, after enlarging upon these points, he adds :

"From all of which it truly and evidently appears that sin in the believer is taken away by the grace of Christ, not only as to guilt or obligation to punishment, but also as to the stain and depravity itself which defile the soul." (Theses Theolog., pp. 279-281.)

#### LIII. JOHN CHARNOCK, 1628—1680

The rank held by this great Puritan divine, is sufficiently known. Dr. Hodge justly reckons him with the old Calvinists, and often quotes him as a Calvinistic authority ; and our Board of Publication have issued some of the best of his works. In his work on the Attributes (Discourse 10), he thus exposes the Supralapsarian sophism which confounds the power with the justice of God—the principle underlying the doctrine of antecedent imputation :

"Power does not always suppose an object, but constitutes an object. It supposes an object in the act of preservation, but it makes an object in the act of creation ; but mercy supposes an object miserable, yet does not make it so. *Justice supposes an object criminal, but does not constitute it so ; mercy supposes him miserable to relieve him ; justice supposes him criminal to punish him ; but power supposes not a thing in real existence, but as possible ; or, rather, it is from power that anything has a possibility, if there be no repugnancy in the nature of the thing.*"

"*A creature, as a creature, is neither the object of mercy nor justice, nor of rewarding goodness ; a creature, as innocent, is the object of rewarding goodness ; a creature, as miserable, is an object of compassionate mercy ; a creature, as criminal, is the object of revenging justice ; but all of them the objects of power, in conjunction with those attributes of goodness, mercy, and justice, to which they belong. \* \* \* \* \* It is power that frames a creature in a capacity of nature for mercy or justice, though it does not give an immediate qualification for the exercise of either. Power makes man a rational creature, and so confers upon him a nature mutable, which may be miserable by its own fault, and punishable by God's justice ; or pitiable by God's compassion, and retrievable by God's*



mercy; but it does not make him sinful, whereby he becomes miserable and punishable."

"God can not pollute any undefiled creature by virtue of that sovereign power which he has to do what he will with it, because such an act would be contrary to the foundation and right of his dominion," etc.

(To be continued.)

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## E R R A T A .

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THE reader will please correct the following errata in our article on Imputation, in the June Number :

- On page 248, line 18 from bottom, read *Sohnnius* for *Sohnius*.
- P. 248, l. 7 from bottom, read *I.* for *F.*
- P. 249, last word of second paragraph, for *facimus* read *facinus*.
- P. 250, l. 20, for *Loco IX. 2. 9.* read *Loco IX. Q. 9.*
- P. 250, l. 24, for *where* read *when*.
- P. 251, last line, omit the first *the*.
- P. 252, l. 21. for *ἡμαςτον* read *ἡμαρτον*.
- P. 252, l. 3 from bottom, for *παραπτώματος* read *παραπτώματος*.
- P. 253, l. 18 for *Romans ii* read *Romans v*.
- P. 253, l. 24, after *will*, for . read : ; and after 23, insert *and*.
- P. 255, l. 10, for *obedience* read *disobedience*.
- P. 258, l. 11 from bottom, for *Zancheus* read *Zanchius*.
- P. 268, l. 10, for *Grin-* read *Gry-*.
- P. 269, note, l. 8, after *nature* omit . and insert ,
- P. 269, note, l. 9, for *αἰσχρὸν* read *αἰσχρον*.
- P. 271, l. 18, for *Arnyzald* read *Amyrald*.
- P. 272, l. 16, for *κατάκριμα* read *κατάκριμα*.
- P. 278, l. 4 from bottom, for *Sanmur* read *Saumur*.
- P. 274, l. 1, for 1569 read 1549.
- P. 274, l. 25, for "*Observations*" read "*Observationes*."
- P. 274, l. 31, omit the quotation marks after *defection*.
- P. 277, l. 9, for *Mss.* read *Ms*.
- P. 280, l. 9 from bottom, for *labors* read *labor*.

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# DANVILLE REVIEW.

CONDUCTED BY

*In Association of Ministers.*

DECEMBER, 1862.

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DANVILLE, KY.

PRINTED FOR THE ASSOCIATION AND SOLD BY

MOORE, WILSTACH, KEYS & CO.,

25 WEST FOURTH STREET,

CINCINNATI.

SOLD ALSO BY WM. S. & A. MARTIN, PHILADELPHIA; ROBERT CARTER  
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# DANVILLE REVIEW.

No. IV.

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DECEMBER, 1862.

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ART. I.—*Imputation and Original Sin.*

PART III.—(Continued.)

(TESTIMONIES CONTINUED.)

LIV. Dr. JOHN OWEN, 1616—1683.

IN his "Display of Arminianism," this noble old standard-bearer of God's sacramental host, whose views Dr. Hodge has so often misapprehended and misapplied, speaks as follows:

Original sin "is an inherent sin and pollution of nature, having a proper guilt of its own, making us responsible to the wrath of God, and not a bare imputation of another's fault to us, his posterity, which, because it would reflect upon us all with a charge of native imbecility and insufficiency to do good, is by these self-idolizers quite exploded. The opposition which is made between the righteousness of Christ and the sin of Adam, Rom. v, which is the proper seat of the doctrine, showeth that there is in our nature an inbred sinful corruption; for the sin of Adam holds such relation unto sinners, proceeding from him by natural propagation, as the righteousness of Christ doth unto them who are born again of him by spiritual regeneration; but we are truly, intrinsically, and inherently sanctified by the spirit and grace of Christ; and, therefore, there is no reason why, being so often in this chapter called sinners, because of this original sin, we should cast it off as if we were concerned only by an external denomination, for the right institution of the comparison and its analogy quite overthrows the solitary imputation."

\* \* \* \* \* "It is not a bare imputation of another's fault, but an

intrinsic adjacent corruption of our nature itself, that we call by this name of original sin." "The Arminians deny all such imputation, as too heavy a charge for the pure, unblamable condition wherein they are brought into this world; *they deny, I say, that they are guilty of Adam's sin, as sinning in him, or that his sin is any way imputed to us.*" "In respect to our wills, we are not thus innocent neither, for we all sinned in Adam, as the apostle affirmeth."

Then referring to the Arminian notion of the imputation of Adam's sin, he adds:

"Now be this punishment what it will, never so small, yet if we have no demerit of our own, nor interest in Adam's sin, it is such an act of injustice as we must reject from the Most Holy, with a God forbid! Far be it from the Judge of all the world to punish the righteous with the ungodly: if God should impute the sin of Adam unto us, and thereon pronounce us obnoxious to the curse derived by it; if we have a pure, sinless, unspotted nature, even this could scarce be reconciled with that rule of his proceeding in justice with the sons of men, 'the soul that sinneth shall die,' which clearly granteth an immunity to all not tainted with sin. Sin and punishment, though they are sometimes separated by his mercy, pardoning the one, and so not inflicting the other, yet never by his justice inflicting the latter when the former is not: SIN IMPUTED BY ITSELF ALONE, WITHOUT AN INHERENT GUILT, WAS NEVER PUNISHED IN ANY BUT CHRIST."

#### LV. FRANCIS TURRETTIN, of Geneva, 1623—1687.

This illustrious theologian, to whom we have already so often referred, and whom Dr. Hodge (*Essays and Reviews*, 366-67) strangely informs us was the cotemporary of Beza (who died eighteen years before he was born), in early youth commenced his studies at Saumur, while Placæus was Professor, and then went to complete his course at Montauban, where Garrisolius was Professor. Montauban was a rival institution, and no faculty in any institution in France stood so high in public favor as that of Saumur. Richlieu and Mazarin were powerfully impressed with the great abilities and learning of Amyrald, and had a high personal esteem for him. It was perhaps expecting too much from fallen humanity, that Garrisolius, though a good and great man, should not be influenced by such considerations. And when the opportunity arose (as it did

when Placæus was accused of erroneous views on the subject before us), he embraced it, and wrote a bulky prosy volume against him. It was under such influences, that the still youthful Turretin completed his theological course; and the hold which Garrisolius still retained upon him may be seen by his occasional references to his writings, which are but seldom quoted elsewhere. Garrisolius was Moderator of the Synod which condemned Placæus, 1644-1645.

Turretin is frequently inconsistent with himself, as for example, when he treats of the Divine agency in the production of sin; or of the Will and Justice of God; or of imputation, as above shown. In the following paragraphs, however, he sustains the position which we, with Stapfer, and all the Reformed Church, maintain respecting the explication of the doctrine of original sin, from the two-fold stand-point of depravity and imputation, and does not make the one causal of the other, as Dr. Hodge does:

“The question is not whether the sin of Adam is said to be imputed to us, but whether the actual sin of Adam is by itself so imputed to all, that, *on account of it*, all are reckoned guilty, and either given over to punishment, or at least are esteemed deserving of punishment.”

“Imputation is either of something foreign to us, or of that which is our own. *Sometimes that is imputed to us which is personally ours*, in which sense God imputes to sinners their transgressions, whom he punishes on account of their own crimes; and in a good sense it is said that the zeal of Phineas was imputed to him for righteousness. Ps. cvi: 31. *Sometimes that is imputed which is without us, and not performed by us, as the righteousness of Christ is said to be imputed to us, and our sins to him*, although he has no sin in himself and we no righteousness in ourselves. But *here* we are speaking of this latter imputation, not of the former: and the question relates to a sin committed by Adam, not by us.

“But when the sin of another is said to be imputed to any one, it is not to be understood of a sin which simply and in every way may be foreign, *but that it by some reason pertains to him to whom it is said to be imputed*; if not properly, singly, and personally, *yet commonly* on account of a communion which unites him with the proper author of it (at *communiter propter communionem quæ illi intercedit cum proprio ejus auctore*). *For it is not possible that the imputation of another's sin should be made to any one, unless on some ground of a special oneness with him by conjunction*. That communion also may be three-fold: 1. *Natural*, as between a father and his children · 2. *Moral* and *political*, as between

a king and his subjects; 3. *Voluntary*, as between friends, and between the guilty and his substitute (sponsorem). And hence appears the basis of the two-fold imputation between Christ and us, by which our sins are imputed to him, and on the contrary, his righteousness is imputed to us. 2 Cor. v: 21. We speak not here of this last communion, in which we admit that previous consent is necessary, but only of the two former, in which it is not necessary in order that the imputation may be just: As he who may sustain the punishment of another's sin may either then assent thereto, or may have assented previously. For Adam is joined with us by this double bond: 1. *Natural*, seeing that he is the father and we his children; 2. *Political* and *forensic*, seeing that he was the prince and representative of the whole human race. The basis of imputation, therefore, is not only the *natural* communion, which connects us with Adam, otherwise all his sins might be imputed to us; but it is emphatically a *moral* and *federal*, by which it came to pass that God established a covenant with him as with our head. Whence Adam in that sin stood not as a private person, but as a public and representative person, who, in that action, represented all his posterity, and for that cause his demerit pertains to all."

"The question, then, returns to these terms: Whether the sin of Adam,—not any one, but the first; not the habitual, but the actual,—is imputed to all his posterity naturally descending from him, with an imputation, not mediate and consequent, but immediate and antecedent. They with whom we here contend either deny absolute imputation, or admit only the mediate. BUT WE, WITH THE ORTHODOX, AFFIRM BOTH, and that imputation should be admitted, and that it is immediate and antecedent."

And then in his *De Satisfactione*, Parte I., sect. 33, and after quoting Rom. v: 12, he adds:

"For from this it appears that the sin of Adam was not peculiar to himself, BUT COMMON to the whole nature (*sed toti naturæ commune*), since on account of it punishment has passed to all."

Turretin, therefore, explicates the doctrine of original sin from the stand-point of both imputed and inherent guilt; or on the ground of both immediate and mediate imputation. If the foregoing language does not convey this idea, it conveys no idea. On what principle, therefore, is it that Dr. Hodge represents him as constantly teaching that imputation is immediate or antecedent alone?

LVI. J. G. BAJERUS, *Professor at Jena, and cotemporary with Turretin.*

This writer has ever been of high repute, not only in the Lutheran, but in the Reformed Church, both as a critic and a theologian. In his *Compend. Theol. Positivæ*, Part II. Cap. ii, Sect. 15, he says:

“Original sin may be described as the want of original righteousness, propagated through the fall of Adam, to all men by carnal generation, deeply corrupting the nature of man itself and all the faculties of the soul, rendering them inapt to the pursuit of spiritual good, prone to evil, and subjecting mankind to Divine anger and eternal death, unless saved therefrom by the remission of sin on account of the merit of Christ, apprehended by faith.”

LVII. H. WITSIUS, *Professor at Francke, Utrecht, and Leyden.*  
1636—1708.

Referring to Rom. v : 12–19, he says :

“To illustrate the apostle’s meaning, we must observe these things :  
1. It is very clear to any not under the power of prejudice, that when the apostle affirms that all *have sinned*, he speaks of an act of sinning, or of an actual sin, the very term, *to sin*, denoting an action. It is one thing to sin, another to be sinful, if I may so speak. 2. When he affirms *all* to have sinned, he, under that universality, likewise includes those who have no actual, proper and personal sin, and who, as he himself says, ‘*have not sinned after the similitude of Adam’s transgression.*’ v. 14. Consequently, these are also guilty of some actual sin, as appears from their death ; but that, not being their own *proper and personal sin*, must be the sin of Adam, imputed to them by the just judgment of God. 3. *By these words, ἐφ’ ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον* for *that all have sinned*, he gives the reason why he had asserted that, by the sin of one man death passed upon all. *This, says he, ought not to astonish us, for all have sinned.*”

“It can not be explained consistent with Divine justice, how, without a crime, death should have passed upon Adam’s posterity. *Prosper* reasoned solidly and elegantly against *Collator*, Chap. 20: ‘Unless, perhaps, it can be said, that the punishment and not the guilt passed on the posterity of Adam ; but to say this is in every respect false. For it is too impious to judge so of the justice of God ; as if he would, contrary to his own law, condemn the innocent with the guilty. *The guilt, therefore,*

is evident where the punishment is so ; and a partaking in punishment shows a partaking in guilt ; that human misery is not the appointment of the Creator, but the retribution of the judge.' If, therefore, through Adam all are obnoxious to punishment, all too must have sinned in Adam."—*Economy*, etc., B. I, Chap. 8, Sect. 31 and 34.

LVIII. P. JURIEU, *Professor at Sedan*, 1637—1713.

In his "*De Ineunda Pace*," etc., Cap. xiv. Sect. 5, he says :

"Adam being corrupted, procreated children like himself, begotten after his own image, evil, corrupt, subjects of Divine wrath, prone to all evil, and on that account justly damnable, nor from that native blot has any ever been delivered except by Christ."

LIX. CAMPEGIUS VITRINGA, 1659—1722. \*

In his *Doct. Relig. Christianæ, per Aphorismos*, etc., Cap. xi, Sect. 3—8, he thus speaks :

"But this sin, with its effects, by a judicial sentence from the righteous law of God the Rector, passes to all the posterity of Adam, as many as are born from him by virtue of that command, *increase and multiply*. This is called *original sin*. Rom. v : 12 ; 1 Cor. xv : 21, 22.

"God, even as the Rector of the universe, established this law, that man, in whatever condition he might be brought, should procreate children after his own image, that is, like himself, and a sinner ; also an offspring polluted by the same habitual vices whereby he had become defiled, and therefore lying under the same guilt with himself, and bringing forth also the same evidences (argumenta) of a common guilt,—death and the preludes of death, the labors and sorrows of this life ; to the extent that unless grace and repentance should intervene, they should be alienated forever from a happy communion with God. Gen. v : 3, Rom. v : 12.

"In which appointment (constitutio) of God there is nothing wrong, because by the law of nature and according to its order, the matter can not be otherwise than that like produces like ; and moreover, because it would be unseemly in God to grant a holy seed to a sinner not seeking such a seed, or to have the seed of the sinner accepted, while he rejects the sinner himself.

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\* It may be in place here to remark that the *De Natura Peccati*, so often and so injuriously attributed to this eminent man, was written by his son, who bore the same name ; was his theological colleague in the University, and died in less than a year after him.



“According to this law of nature, therefore, it comes to pass that our first parents produced children after their own likeness; that is, slaves, not of reason but of lust, carnal, and savoring of carnal things; their countenance deprived of the beauty of God’s image, aliens from virtue and prone to vice and vanity, haughty and puffed up with an absurd and inordinate love of self; and therefore unworthy to live in the communion and friendship of God; which corruption, ruling through all the faculties of man, and greatly displaying itself in vicious and inordinate affections, is commonly called *original sin inherent*. That same sin, or same habitual vitiosity (*quod idem peccatum, que eadem vitiositas habitualis*), draws with it the guilt not only of the evils of this life and of temporal death, but also of eternal death, unless the grace of God prevent; which guilt, whether it may depend from the first sin of Adam *mediately or immediately, is disputed in the schools more subtilely than usefully, since the same thing may be asserted and maintained on both sides against the Pelagians.\** This much is certain, that the judgment of God has here intervened; and that therefore this consequence of the sin of our first parents in their posterity, may, in this sense, be called *original sin imputed.*” Gen. iii: 15–17.

LX. F. A. LAMPÉ, *Professor in Utrecht, 1683—1729.*

In his remarkably exhaustive commentary on John, Tom. 1, p. 572, this great divine, pronounced by Stapfer the “*ingens ecclesiae nostrae decus*,” thus speaks (in explanation of John iii: 6):

“In respect to the quality having this carnal origin, he now pronounces that it is *flesh*: that is, that it also had been corrupted by sin and bound to the same carnal law, and therefore lying also under its guilt. The former follows from the law of our birth fixed by the Creator, by which every thing produces that which is like itself (the Divine judgment intervening), by which both the guilt and stain *are derived from Adam to his posterity*. For instance, as man consists of two parts, body and soul, he owes the former to his parents as the means, and the latter to God producing it immediately. The body corrupted by inordinate and perverse emotions through sin (*corpus per peccatum motibus inordinatis ac perversis corruptum*), can not, in the nature of the case produce otherwise than that which has the like inordinate emotions.

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\* Both the mediate and immediate imputation as *then* discussed in the schools may be learned from the statements of Weissmann, in No. 61 *infra*. The scheme of immediate or antecedent imputation had not then attained to the fullness of its present perfection, though the principle underlying it has ever been the same.

In the body is the soul, which being produced by the will of God, is so connected with it from the first moment of its existence, that it is now held captive by these emotions; which we suppose to be a just procedure on the part of God by virtue of the covenant agreement with the first man."

If anything could be doubtful in these clear expressions of Lampé, the doubt will be removed by referring to his *Gülden Kleinod der Lehre der Wahrheit*, p. 57 (Stapfer iv, 565, 566, quotes the original German in full), where in the form of question and answer he thus speaks:

"In how many ways can Original Sin be defined? *Ans.* In two ways: either as *imputed* (*zurechnet*), whereby the guilt of Adam has descended to his posterity; or as *inherent* (*ankle bend*), whereby they become partakers of his corruption (*wordurch sie seiner Verdorbenheit sind theilhaftig worden*). *Quest.* What thinkest thou of this distinction? *Ans.* That Christian theologians from the very beginning have not agreed respecting it, and that therefore we should bear with one another in charity on the subject; especially since these controversies are so subtile that it requires that the mind should be thoroughly disciplined in order to make a decision, etc. *Quest.* But what, then, deserves herein to be taken particularly into consideration? *Ans.* That we can make a difference between original sin imputed and original sin inherent; *though in their essence they are united, and are not to be separated* (*aber dass sie indessen in der sache selbst unzertrennlich vereinigt sind*). There could be no inherent original sin if there were no imputed sin; for God would not have permitted the descendants of Adam to be born in sin if his guilt (*schuld*) had not passed over to them. *But on the other side the inherent corruption had to be conjoined to the imputed, that every mouth might be stopped, and all flesh be made guilty before God. And by such an association* (*or joining together, verknüpfung*), *we shall avoid the forenamed difficulty*; and the comparison of the first with the second Adam will be clearly apparent."

#### LXI. DR. T. RIDGELEY, of London, 1667—1734.

We quote from the edition of his *Divinity* by Carter and Brothers, New York, 1855. In vol. I, pp. 413, 414, he says:

"That we may account for the matter in the most unexceptionable way, and in one which does not in the least infer God to be the author of sin, or overthrow the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin to his

posterity, we must consider men's propensity of nature or the inclination of their souls to sin, as a corrupt habit, and consequently as what is not infused by God. Hence, though the soul in its first creation is guilty, that is, liable to suffer the punishment due to it for Adam's sin imputed, yet it does not come defiled out of the hands of God; or, as one well expresses it, 'We are not to think that God put original sin into men's souls, for how should he punish those souls which he himself had corrupted?' He adds, that 'it is a great wickedness to believe that God put into the soul an inclination to sin; though it is true God creates the souls of men destitute of heavenly gifts, and supernatural light, and that justly, because Adam lost those gifts for himself and his posterity.'

(Dr. R. cites these passages from the *Anatome Arminianismi* of Molinæus, Cap. 10, Sect. 3, 15, 17, and quotes Turretin as teaching that though the soul is created spotless, yet as a punishment of Adam's sin it is destitute of original righteousness. Loc. IX, Quæst. 12, Sect. 8, 9, and then adds:)

"Now, if it be inquired how this corrupt habit or inclination to sin is contracted, we reply that the corruption of nature necessarily ensues on the privation of original righteousness. Some have illustrated this by an apt similitude, taken from the traveler's wandering out of his way, or taking a wrong path, in consequence of the darkness of the night. Here his want of light is the occasion, though not properly the cause of his wandering. So, as the consequence of man's being destitute of original righteousness, or of those habits of supernatural grace which are implanted in regeneration, his actions, as soon as he is capable of doing good or evil, must contain nothing less than a sin of commission, or a defect of, and disinclination to what is good. By this means the soul becomes defiled or inclined to sin. We suppose that it is indisposed to what is good, and that this arises from its being destitute of supernatural grace which is lost by Adam's fall."

LXII. C. E. WEISSMANN, *Professor at Tuebingen*, †1747.

As a matter of some interest we may in the present connection refer to the words of this learned and pious church historian; from whose *Hist. Eccles. Sac.* XVII, see a long quotation in De Moor, III, 282, 283, respecting Placæus. The doctrine of immediate imputation in the form taught by Heidegger, was extensively received in his day, though he can not subscribe to it without modification: and in his *Instit. Theol. Exegetico-Dogmaticæ*, loc. VII, he thus expresses his views:

" We have said decidedly, also, that in a certain sense the first sin was imputed to posterity, and to the whole human race, *but by an imputation rather mediate than immediate* (sed imputazione magis mediata, quam immediata). We do not say, that the sin or moral corruption was propagated to the posterity of Adam *only* by way of natural and physical generation, *but we also acknowledge that this sin existing by nature in all men, as in the children of sinners, brings them under the judgment of God, and excludes them from communion with God and his grace, so long as they remain such.* And this is what theologians are accustomed to call *mediate* imputation, since IMMEDIATE IMPUTATION GOES BEFORE IN RESPECT TO SIN, or propagating, or being propagated; *and is the imputation of the personal act itself of the sin of our first parents in this sense* (et sit imputatio ipsius actus personalis peccati Protoplastorum eo sensu): *that because Adam represented the whole human race, all men WERE MADE GUILTY of his actual sin, not otherwise, than if they had sinned in propria persona.* This is that *immediate imputation*, which produced so much controversy in the Reformed Churches, by occasion of the sharp opposition which Joshua Placæus, a theologian of Saumur, made to this form of teaching; and strenuously defended his views against the prolix objections of Antony Garrisolius.

" We say still further, that that which we call original sin is not a *mere calamity* or infirmity like the physical or civil; for example, as is the case in hereditary diseases, or in the forfeiture of the honors and dignities of parents (who are convicted for a civil offense), by their children; *but that it is truly such a state or condition as is judicially subjected to the Divine anger, and which subjects man to spiritual evils, although he had not contracted it by his own sins.* This part of the thesis is a stone of offense, and the particular stumbling-block of those who ferociously assail the doctrine of original sin in the common theology. Or if they should admit somewhat of this guilt, as sometimes the manifest truth extorts the like from them, they yet quickly stop up both ears *as soon as they hear that this moral vice of man is to be called sin, obnoxious to the Divine anger and to spiritual deprivations.* Curcellæus says summarily, in his fashion, 'There is nothing in us, when we are born, truly and properly called sin, for which God is angry, and purposes to inflict any punishment,' Opp. p. 136. But we establish our thesis by these and other arguments. 1. Because the condition is such that he who continues therein can not enter the kingdom of heaven, John iii. 2. Because by nature both Jews and Gentiles, converted and unconverted, are children of wrath, Eph. ii. 3. Because Divine judgment and condemnation afflict this evil inheritance received from Adam, Rom. v. 4. Because all the saints, in other respects studiously abstaining from voluntary sin, earnestly deprecate the evils of this root (radix) and

condition before the Lord. See the *examples of Job and David*. 5. Because the root of all sins can not itself be innocent before God," etc

"To conclude; that which pertains to things alleged as similar, concerning the participation of physical disease, and civil ignominy, and poverty, those things thus far differ from our fall (*casu*). One is able to remain morally good and innocent, whom these physical and civil evils overtakes. *But man, in this fallen condition, is esteemed MORALLY CORRUPT; in the style of Scripture; a sinner, nor can goodness and moral innocence, or spiritual, at the same time remain in him.*"

The attempt of this learned divine thus to place the *natural* relation of Adam to his posterity before the *federal* relation, is, as we have already shown, merely a reiteration of the erroneous views of Placæus. We have therefore presented his views thus fully in order that the whole subject may be clearly before the minds of our readers. The view which he opposed, and which was an advance upon the views of Heidegger, and which may be found asserted both in Marek and in De Moor, *was, not that the posterity of Adam were really implicated in his guilt by participation* (which is the Calvinistic doctrine), but that they *were made guilty of that sin by an immediate imputation of it, which depended upon the will of God alone*. This is the Supralapsarian view, which Dr. Hodge has perfected by taking another step, making the imputation of Adam's sin alone *causal of the moral corruption of his posterity*. Our next witness is

### LXIII. JAMES HERVEY, 1713—1758.

In his *Theron and Aspasia* (published in 1755), which has been ever since its first appearance so great a favorite with our own, as with all evangelical churches, the pious author speaks as follows in relation to the subject before us :

"These are the words of the Ninth Article: 'Original sin is the *fault and corruption* of every man that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam.' It is the *fault*, says the pious Bishop Beveridge, and therefore we are guilty of it. It is the *corruption*, also, and therefore we are defiled with it. Our Homilies have recourse to no such palliations, and qualifying interpretations, as my *Theron's* Expositor uses. One of them affirms point-blank that 'in *Adam* all men sinned universally.'"  
\* \* \* \* \* "For my own part, I must confess that, if the transmission

of original depravity be granted, I know not how the imputation of Adam's destructive apostasy can be denied. *If we had no concern in the one, how could we be justly punished with the other?*"

LXIV. J. F. STAPFER, *Profcssor at Zurich, 1708—1775.*

"The whole human race is to be considered as a single moral person, (ceu unica aliqua Persona moralis,) which person in Adam its head (*not a natural head only, but also a federal head*) entered into covenant with God: and yielded consent, therefore, in all those things which Adam as a public person did and stipulated for himself and for all his posterity. But where there is consent, there also liberty and will have place; and where these are, there also the transgression of the law is sin. If man is born corrupt, and is such from the first moment of his existence, he also sins freely (sponte). But while he is a voluntary transgressor of the law, he consents also to that corruption, and therefore that also is his sin."

Then, to the objection that the sin of Adam can not be ours, simply because imputed, unless we would be willing to say that God by imputation makes them sinners whom he does not find such, Stapfer replies:

"This objection likewise may be answered from the previous reply; for, provided that this whole moral person Adam, with the whole human race, or the entire body and mass, in a moral estimation and by consent should commit the same sin, as well in number as in form, it would follow that the sin should also be imputed to the whole mass; and that, therefore, God imputing this sin finds already the whole moral person a sinner, *and does not only make him such.* (Neque demum eam talem facit.) And since corruption having entered by the sin of Adam could not but pervade the whole mass through natural generation, God regarding the whole human race as only a single body, and representing for itself all in a single act, could not otherwise represent the whole human race to himself than as also corrupt; and, therefore, finding man already corrupted, he imputes the sin both as to its first origin and progress."\*

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\* We have rarely met with a more flagrant instance of what appears to be deliberate and intentional misrepresentation, than that which occurs respecting Stapfer in Princeton Essays, I, p. 148-149. The whole representation of his "*apologizing* for his statements," etc., is deceptive and unfounded, as our readers may see from the passage itself, the whole of which we have presented in our Essay I. The effort by such means to blast the reputation of this admirable theologian merely because he rejects the Supralapsarian figment of antecedent

LXV. D. WYTTENBACH, *Professor at Marburg*, † 1779.

Tholuck, in his *History of Rationalism*, speaks of this writer (father of the philologist of the same name) as “a rigidly orthodox and Calvinistic theologian.” In his *Compend. Theol. Dogmaticæ et Moralæ*, Cap. 7, Sect. 326 seq., he thus speaks :

“Because Adam in the covenant of works acted in the name of his posterity, it follows also that when he transgressed the covenant he transgressed it also in the name of his posterity. As to the consequence, therefore, it is the same thing as if his posterity themselves should break the covenant, and sin. Because if it is the same, and if any one should properly and physically complete something, even if he himself commenced it not, and that by virtue of his completing it, it becomes morally his own; it must follow that the transgression of the covenant has become morally the transgression of all Adam’s posterity.

“If, therefore, it is the same thing as to consequence (that is, as respects either the reward or punishment of the action), and if he who did the deed should have the action *imputed* to him (which is, to be pronounced the author of the deed, at least actually and morally where the consequence is concerned), it must, therefore, follow that that sin of Adam can be imputed to his posterity. Rom. v: 19.

“But that all the posterity of Adam are born destitute of the gifts of the Divine image, and can not be born otherwise (*nec aliter possint nasci*), is evident; because from a bepoisoned root and stem nothing out a poisoned growth can proceed, especially where the evil receives strength by advancing, as where increase is found by propagation, etc. Ps. li: 17; Job xiv: 4; John iii. 6. And hence this very destitution of the Divine image is inseparably accompanied by an inclination to evil. \* \* \* \* \* This very inclination to evil, because it is transferred (*transfunditur*) from the root with our birth (*à stirpa cum nativitate*), comes not only extrinsically, nor is it contracted through inclination and example, but is inwardly concealed, implanted, and begotten together with our nature itself.

“The privation of the Divine image, and also the contrary propensity to evil, begotten within us, and through birth propagated to all men, is called *original corruption, original sin.*”

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imputation, is simply an outrage. Stapfer, as our readers can now see for themselves, expresses precisely the views of the Reformed Church on Original Sin; his only fault being that, like Edwards, he endeavors to sustain that view by an appeal to his philosophy.

LXVI. JOHN WITHERSPOON, *President of Nassau Hall,*  
1722-1794.

We have already, in our first Essay, pp. 425-427, referred to the views of this great divine. As true a Presbyterian and Calvinist as his great ancestor, John Knox himself, no man ever had a more just or more intelligent appreciation of the doctrines of our Church than he, or less of a disposition to compromise any portion of them whatever. What his views were, respecting the subjective desert of any and of every creature, against whom the justice of God utters the voice of condemnation, can be learned from the citations from his writings referred to above. And having surveyed in all its logical, doctrinal and practical bearings the theme now before us, he, referring directly to the doctrine of the imputation of Christ's righteousness as the sole foundation of our justification, says:

"The intelligent reader will probably perceive that I have expressed the above doctrine in such general terms, as not distinctly to take a part in the differences that are to be found among some authors, as to the way of explaining it, and particularly as to the nature of faith. The reason of my doing so is, that I would willingly rather reconcile than voiden these differences; and because it is my firm persuasion, that however some think it justest, or wisest, or safest, to express themselves one way, and some another, yet all who have a deep and real conviction, that they are by nature in a lost state, and under the wrath of God, and that there is no salvation in any other but in Christ, are, if they understood one another at bottom, or at least in all things any way material, entirely of the same opinion. Accordingly the reader will, I hope, find that the reasoning in the following pages may easily be applied by them all without exception." *Tract on Justification, p. 32, note.*

In the first part of this third Essay, we have adverted sufficiently to the testimony of eminent theologians who were the cotemporaries of Dr. Witherspoon, and who have flourished subsequently. And if our readers will turn back and refer again to the testimony there adduced from Dr. DICK, Dr. HILL, and the great and venerable Dr. CHALMERS, the entire coincidence of their testimony with that of the great body of the Reformed Church on this subject, will be perceived. We conclude this catalogue of great and venerable names with that of the late



LXVII. ARCHIBALD ALEXANDER, *Professor in Princeton Seminary.*

In his "*Treatise on Justification*," issued by our Board of Publication, this venerated teacher speaks as follows respecting the leading principle which underlies the Supralapsarian scheme; and so far is he from admitting the principle so strenuously contended for by Dr. Hodge, that God may of his mere will constitute his creatures either guilty or innocent, that he says:

"If we were innocent, then might we willingly and boldly appear in the presence of our Judge; for no one of his creatures need ever fear that he will treat them with injustice. But if we are all transgressors, the more holy God is, the more reason have we to expect punishment." "As justification is the sentence of a judge *declaring the true condition of a person, in relation to the law*, it becomes necessary to inquire, what law it is which is the rule of judgment in pronouncing a creature just; or in condemning him for want of obedience," \* \* \* \* \*. "So, when God pronounces sentence upon any one, it will be strictly according to his own righteous law." \* \* \* \* \*. "God, who can not lie, never can pronounce him to be free from guilt and liable to no charge who has, in a single instance disobeyed. Man fell under the curse by one transgression," \* \* \* \* \*. "All theories which suppose that grace is exercised at the expense of justice, or that in order to the manifestation of grace, law and justice must be suspended, *labor under a radical mistake in theology*, which can not but introduce darkness and perplexity into their whole system. *Indeed if law and justice could have been set aside or suspended, there had been no occasion for the plan of redemption.* The only reason why sinners could not be saved was, that the law and justice of God stood in the way."

We here conclude our catalogue of testimonies. It is neither as full nor as complete as I should probably have had it, had not access to my library been greatly interrupted, during its preparation, by the war which has been so fearfully raging in Kentucky: still it is sufficient to settle the question, for the decision of which these testimonies have been adduced. Yet it has not been my aim or wish (as our readers may see) to select witnesses to establish a point; but to present the testimony of the Church of God on the subject just as it exists, and with whatever variations it may contain. For in no other way can the subject be intelligently understood. A large por-

tion of the testimonies, moreover, as given in the work of Rivetus, are cited by Dr. Hodge in the Princeton Essays; and we have frequently cited the same, either more or less fully, as the case seemed to require (as a reference to Dr. Hodge's Essay will show), and we have likewise frequently not only followed the translations which he has given, but have adopted his quotations. We have already remarked, moreover, that the design of Rivetus in adducing this testimony, and the design of Dr. Hodge in making his selection therefrom, are altogether different. Rivetus, as the title of his treatise indicates,\* merely aimed to show that the decree of the Synod of Charenton, respecting the imputation of Adam's sin to all his posterity, was in perfect accordance with the recognized teaching of the Reformed Church: while Dr. Hodge has fallen into the unaccountable misapprehension of supposing that Rivetus cited them in support of the dogma of *antecedent* imputation, in the sense in which Dr. Hodge himself entertains that doctrine; but which, as we have seen, Rivetus never did entertain; while, on the contrary, as has been shown, many of the citations themselves evince that such a design could never have entered the mind of Rivetus, unless it could be supposed that he seriously set out to establish the truth of a theory by testimony which pronounced the theory to be false; and not only this, but which would consequently prove that he himself was in error. Of course, this is inadmissible; though Dr. Hodge's use of him can not be justified except on the assumption that this must have been his intention.

It is really surprising that Dr. Hodge could have fallen into this error. He is well acquainted with the work of De Moor (the *Comment. Perpet. in Marckii Compendium*), and that writer expressly says: "*πρωτον ψεῦδος suum Placæus sæpe prodit, negatur Fædus Operum cum Adamo initum.*" Vol. III, p. 264. And on p. 281, he quotes Jæguerius with approbation, as saying that Placæus taught that "*Peccatum Originale TANTUM IN HABITUALI, subjectivâ et inhærente corruptione consistere; quæ ad singulos per generationem ordinarium propagetur; IMPUTATIONEM FIGMENTUM, ESSE,*" etc. If all this be so, *then these are the views which the Synod condemned*; and it was to sustain this

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\* The title is given in De Moor, III, 271, and in Princeton Essays, I, 195.

sentence that Rivetus wrote his book. Hence, in refuting those views, he could adduce the testimony of the whole Reformed Church; for all alike, Supralapsarian and Infralapsarian, united in their condemnation. And with all their differences of views, therefore, those witnesses answered the purpose of Rivetus; while the vast majority of them testify directly against Dr. Hodge; and against the distinction which he, in common with Placeus, has adopted; and against his idea of antecedent imputation, as appears not only from the foregoing catalogue, but also from the number of others given in the Princeton Essays, and to which we have referred in a note at the end of citation No. XXXVII above. He adduces them against those who rigidly hold, and ever have held, the federal headship of Adam, and so departs from the design of Rivetus; and, therefore, they not only do not yield him support, but they can be turned directly against him. And we may also add that even De Moor, with all his Supralapsarian proclivities (inherited from his teacher Marck), sustains the representation which they make respecting the transmission of corruption, that it is by generation, and in consequence of a participation therein, on account of which the sin of Adam and also our own sin in Adam, are imputed to us all. What, then, becomes of the reiterated asseveration of Dr. Hodge, that the constant statement of the Reformed Church on this subject is that corruption is propagated *neque per corpus, neque per animam, sed per culpam*? We request that he produce his authority for the statement, for we take direct issue with him here, and deny *in toto* the accuracy of the averment. De Moor himself, in Cap. xv., Sect. 33, wherein he specifically treats of the "*Modus quo corruptio naturalis propagatur*" (see p. 287), makes no mention of any such canon; but goes on to say: "In genere tutò affirmare licet, quod corruptio propagatur per generationem naturalem: ita a. præit Scriptura, Job xiv: 4, Ps. li: 7, Job iii: 6, quæ loca," etc. And even the celebrated J. H. HEIDEGGER, of Zurich (1633—1698), though a strong assertor of that phase of immediate imputation against which Placeus had written, could not abandon this same idea. In his *Corpus Theol.*, Loco X., after mentioning that Hunnius (the Lutheran divine, who had flourished a century before), had suggested, though in a different sense, the distinction made by Placeus,

goes on to say: "But the true imputation of the Adamic sin does not *follow*, but *precedes* inherent corruption as the meritorious cause of it (*tanquam causa hujus meritoria*). *For the first sin is not imputed to us because we are born corrupt, but we are born corrupt because the first sin is imputed to us for corruption and condemnation.*" This is very plain, and from the stand-point assumed by Dr. Hodge, that the phrase "*the first sin,*" as thus employed, is *Adam's personal sin alone*, and in no sense ours, except by a figure of speech or a mere legal fiction, the inference is unavoidable: that divines, who thus employ this language, sustain the doctrine of immediate imputation. But if, on the contrary, they employ the phrase "first sin" to mean, not Adam's personal sin alone, but *our sin*, as the apostle expresses it: that is, *our sin* in and fall with Adam in that first transgression, their authority can not, without great and manifest injustice, be pleaded in support of the *antecedent* imputation of Dr. Hodge. We are born corrupt, says Heidegger (and his brethren who take his ground), because *the first sin* is imputed to us. But what *first sin?* is the question. Let us hear his answer, for he gives it in the same passage, which continues thus: "FOR IMPUTATION CONSISTS IN THIS: *That God has adjudged sinning Adam AND HIS POSTERITY AS BEING IMPLICATED IN THE SAME SIN, to be unworthy of the Divine image, but rather (worthy) of the whole punishment by which he punished sinning Adam, and therefore to be punished with spiritual death.*" (The whole passage is cited by De Moor, III, 277-278.) Here, then, we have the *highest type of immediate imputation* ever held by the advocates of the *Formula Consensus of Helvetia*, so often referred to by Dr. Hodge, as settling the whole question. Among the great and noble body of divines who either framed or supported it, there is not one of mightier intellect or more deeply learned than Heidegger: nor one whose name is to this hour dearer to the Church of Switzerland. In this language of his, we have presented and asserted the highest type of immediate imputation ever entertained in the Reformed Church, by men who were not open and avowed Supralapsarians; and so far from finding in their teaching the least vestige of Dr. Hodge's theory of *antecedent* imputation, the very definition of imputation itself, as given by the strongest advocates of the school which Dr. Hodge emphatically claims as support-

ing his views, makes, in direct antagonism to his view, the imputation to be a judgment pronounced upon the facts as they are, and not a judgment which produces the facts, as Dr. Hodge maintains. Hence, the sin of Adam, and his posterity's implication or participation therein, constituting "*the first sin*," are imputed for punishment, and moral, spiritual, and eternal death. It is hardly necessary to adduce any other statement from Heidegger, in further explanation of his views: yet the following may be added from his Dissert. I. De Concord. Protest., Sect. 51: "*Omnis perditionis causa vel culpa, non in Deo, sed in hominibus ipsis quærenda sit.*" "*The cause of blame of perdition in every case is to be sought, not in God, but in men themselves:*" precisely the sentiment reiterated by our own illustrious Witherspoon. See our first Essay, p. 426.

So far as relates to the main point of the discussion, therefore, our readers can see from the foregoing summary, that the Reformed divines, almost without exception, explicate the doctrine of original sin just as Stapfer avers that they do; that is, from the stand-point of both imputed and inherent guilt: or, in other words, both *mediately* and *immediately*, and from both the natural and federal headship of Adam; and that in not a single instance, save among the Supralapsarians, do they attempt, as Dr. Hodge does, to explicate it solely on the ground of imputation; that is, making the imputed guilt of Adam's sin alone causal of the inherent moral corruption of his posterity. They held that his sin and fall were also our sin and fall; and that God, therefore, finding us subjectively guilty, treats us as having sinned and fallen in our first parents. *Such is their view.* Dr. Hodge denounces it as *Placæan*, and professes to reject it utterly. *We, on the contrary, receive it as the truth of God.* Let the Church herself decide, therefore, which doctrine is the fair exponent of the faith attested by the long line of her gifted sons, and sealed by her faithful martyrs' blood. The question, as stated by Princeton, is very far from being one of trivial import. Dr. Hodge announces it to be fundamental; and in his mode of discussing it has, by virtue of his commanding position, more than once imperilled the peace and harmony of the Church.

If we may adopt the language above quoted from Doctor Witherspoon, "we would willingly rather reconcile than

widen the differences" already existing in the family of Christ on this subject: though fealty to the Great Head of the Church is not compatible with an unwillingness to speak the truth in love in any case where the interests of his truth and the welfare of his kingdom are imperilled by the insidious approaches of error, whether made from the high or from the low places in Israel. Bellarmine somewhere cites from Hilary the expression that *Bellum hæreticorum pax est Ecclesiæ*. But we should remember that the converse, too, is true: *Bellum Ecclesiæ pax est Hæreticorum*. The responsibility in this case, however, must rest with those who persist in the effort to establish a test of Calvinistic soundness, which, though never recognized save by a small and erroneous fraction of the Church, has always been repudiated by the Church herself in her councils, as well as by the great mass of her leading divines. We say, therefore, emphatically, that Dr. Hodge has not a particle of right to insist on making his views of the topic under discussion the touchstone of Calvinistic soundness in doctrine. He may entertain for himself his own views on this subject if he chooses to do so, and he will not be molested by his brethren. But let this suffice. For if he shall still persist in the effort to fasten the charge of heresy upon them because of their refusal to accept his views, and if he shall do this either by reiterating his former assertions in the matter, or even by unfair attempts to evade the manifest issues involved, we say it with the kindest feelings of personal regard for one from whose labors we have derived many and great advantages, that Dr. Hodge may reasonably expect the charge to recoil upon himself with a force which he will be scarcely able to withstand. In regard to this utterly baseless accusation of error and heresy, and of departing from recognized truth, and what not, we have borne fully as much as we intend to bear, unless better reasons can be offered to sustain the accusation than Dr. Hodge has yet alleged.

Turretin, as is abundantly manifest from the references which we have made to his works throughout this discussion, is not a safe guide in theology on any doctrine upon which the Supralapsarian scheme comes into collision with the recognized theology of the Calvinistic Church: and the propriety of placing his works (even though among the proudest monuments of theological literature) into the hands of those who are but

beginning the study of theology, may be reasonably questioned. His rejection of the Supralapsarian scheme (to which we have referred already), though formal and real, so far as he knew his own heart, was yet not thorough and fundamental, as may be seen by a careful analysis by his discussions on absolute Reprobation, the introduction of sin into the world, and other points of antagonism between the two systems. Hence, his perpetual vacillation in relation to the subject of this present discussion. It was mainly a technical repudiation of the system *as such*, while his sympathies are mostly with Beza and the school of theology founded by him in Geneva after the death of Calvin. And, in fact, the intelligent reader may easily perceive, from the preceding testimonies themselves, how the Supralapsarian element, when once recognized and formally inaugurated in a theological school, has descended, more or less extensively, from Professor to Professor, imparting either a faint tinge, or a dye of deeper hue, to their theological system. In Geneva, for example, where, during the forty-one years subsequent to Calvin's death, Beza lived and taught, and where his influence bore undisputed sway, nearly every leading divine, though evidently struggling against the pestiferous error, is found to be more or less entangled in its coils, even down to Pictet († 1724). And so, too, with regard to the school at Franeker, where the scheme was inaugurated under Maccovius and his coadjutors, we find it appearing every now and then, even down to the time of Witsius, and later. At Heidelberg, under Ursinus and Zanchius, it started into life with considerable vigor, which remained to it until the lamented Sohnius dealt his mighty stroke upon it; after which the little vitality which survived was crushed out by the iron grasp of the Synod of Dort. At Basel, under Polanus (an ardent disciple of Zanchius), and at Leyden and Saumur, under Gomar, it flourished but a brief season, for the Dordrecht decisions nipped its buds of promise like the untimely frost; and after a long struggle with disappointment, Gomar died, apparently heart-broken, at Groningen. Neither his imperial intellect, nor his prodigious and unsurpassed learning could rescue him from neglect and obscurity.

We must not, however, omit to refer here to a method of argumentation pursued by all the modern advocates of ante-

cedent imputation, without exception; and which, though designed to sustain a very modified form of that doctrine, if compared with the views of Dr. Hodge, he has adopted; but which, from its glaring unfairness, deserves not so much a refutation as a censure. An instance of it may be cited from De Moor, III, 203 (copied by him, without acknowledgment, from Turretin, Loco. IX, Quæst. X, Sect. 3), in which he says:

“When the term original sin is extended to the imputation of the Adamic sin (which is called original sin *imputed*, as distinguished from *inherent*), that imputation is the basis of native corruption, in which sense it is employed by Ursinus, Zanchius, and others; but otherwise it is restricted to inherent corruption, imputed sin not being excluded, *but supposed as the cause and basis of the inherent*, in which sense Bucer, Calvin, Bullinger, more often speak concerning it, and who especially take this view of it.”\*

Dr. Hodge very often uses similar language, employing the term *imputation* as equivalent to *antecedent imputation*. But let our readers note the representation aforesaid, and let them decide for themselves whether a more glaring sophism was ever attempted than the above, repeated after Turretin by De Moor. It is well known that Ursinus and Zanchius were Supralapsarians, and that Calvin and Bullinger were Infralapsarians; and that their views differed *toto cælo* in respect to the will of God in reprobation and in the imputation of sin. And it is well known, moreover, that the Synod of Dort, while it in the fullest manner sustained the one hypothesis, utterly condemned and repudiated the other, as inconsistent and irreconcilable therewith. Did, then, that Synod of the ablest and most learned men of the age, know what it was doing in this matter? If they did, what is the meaning of this statement of De Moor and Turretin, informing their readers that on one of the great fundamental points of admitted difference, there is really no difference? And then further, as the whole cata-

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\* *Extenditur quandoque Peccati Originalis nomen ad Imputationem Peccati Adami, quod dicitur Peccatum Originale Imputatum, oppositum Inherenti, quæ Imputatio vitii nativi est fundamentum; atque hoc sensu usurpatur ab URSINO, ZANCHIO, et aliis; alias verò ad vitium inherens restringitur, non excluso, sed supposito peccato imputato, tanquam Inherentis causâ et fundamento; quo sensu BUCERUS, CALVINUS, BULLINGERUS, de eo sæpiùs loquuntur, quique hæc speciatim spectatur.”* And Turretin adds: “Et hoc sensu à nobis nunc usurpatur.”



logue of witnesses unite in declaring, the Reformed Church, except the Supralapsarians, have always explicated the doctrine of original sin without attempting to separate inherent from imputed guilt: but the aforesaid statement of De Moor and Turretin, taking the Supralapsarian ground, represents *that the Reformed Church, and even Calvin and Bullinger, when they spake of original sin inherent, did not exclude, but implied that antecedently imputed sin is the cause and foundation of that inherent sin.* Our readers have now the means (in the forecited testimonies) to know for themselves whether this statement is true, and sustained by the facts of the case; or the contrary. It is just as false (as we have abundantly shown) to say that the Reformed Church held that imputed sin is the cause of inherent sin, as to say that they held inherent sin to be the cause of imputed sin. It is just as false as it would be to say that in the economy of grace they held justification to be the cause of regeneration, or regeneration to be the cause of justification. They held that these existed synchronously both in the one case and in the other. Imputation implies the existence of subjective guilt in the posterity of Adam, and subjective guilt implies imputed guilt. And to charge, therefore, that the Reformed Church has ever so severed what God has thus joined together, as to make imputed sin causal of subjective sin, is to charge what all the facts in the case proclaim to be untrue. And then, finally, the sophism of the statement is further obvious, from considering that the imputation maintained by the school of Zanchius and the Supralapsarians is *solely from without, ab extra*; while that asserted by Calvin and the Supralapsarians is subjective also, and based upon the fact ten thousand times repeated by the divines referred to, that we sinned and fell in Adam, and so became subjectively guilty; and that his sin, along with our own sin in him, is imputed for condemnation. In the former case, *Adam's sin alone* is imputed; and in the latter, the guilt is regarded as common; and Adam's sin is imputed along with our own, we being thus guilty. The distinction is not only of the highest importance in this discussion, but is obvious and plain, seeing that the fact of our having thus sinned, and thus become subjectively guilty in Adam, is accepted by the Church on the Divine testimony, without any endeavor at philosophical solution. The

attempt, therefore, to ignore, in the aforesaid manner, this vital distinction, can not be allowed on any account whatever. And just here, and in this same connection, we will advert to another sophism, on the strength of which Dr. Hodge repeatedly endeavors to sustain the ground he has assumed. For example, the fact that his own corruption of personality in relation to Adam and his descendants, is such as to forbid his attaching any intelligible idea to the proposition that we sinned in and fell with Adam, has led him to suppose, and even to maintain, that our sin in Adam and Adam's own sin are one and the same; and consequently, that we have no subjective desert in the matter, and though we are guilty of the first sin and fall, we are guilty thereof only by imputation; and hence that imputation is antecedent and immediate, and does not in any sense arise from our own subjective guilt. This same sophism is employed in like manner by all who indorse his views. And thus to this extent, human philosophy is to be brought forward to point out what we are at liberty to believe, and what we are not at liberty to believe, of the clear and undoubted announcements of God. Those announcements declare that *Adam sinned*, and that *all sinned*; and that in consequence thereof, judgment and death came upon him and upon all. The meaning of this proposition is as plain and clear as the meaning of the statement of our blessed Redeemer, "I and my Father are one;" or the meaning of the declaration of the apostle, that Christ is "God manifest in the flesh;" or that He is "over all God blessed forever;" or any other Divine announcement whatever.

And now in view of the foregoing speculation of Dr. Hodge and others, let it be considered, that an act of God imputing to us a personal sin of Adam, can only be, in its own nature, outward and forensic, as to us; and that no such act of God can, in its own nature, make us inwardly depraved. Something more is requisite. For otherwise, the imputation of our sins to Christ would have made him inwardly corrupt, and the imputation of his righteousness to us would make us inwardly holy; neither of which is true, or indeed possible. On the other hand, our inward natural pollution, would not necessarily involve and draw after it, or necessarily presuppose, an imputation outward and forensic as to us, of the guilt of any per-

sonal sin of Adam. In the one case, and in the other, the facts being absolute and synchronous and inseparable (as so fully illustrated throughout this discussion), the headship of Adam, both natural and federal, and the headship of Christ, both supernatural and federal, *are always implied*. Considered as of one nature with Adam, and being his posterity, there is no difficulty in seeing that we sinned in him and fell with him; considered as being different persons from him, and yet his descendants and of his nature, there is no difficulty in seeing that he might be our federal head. If Dr. Hodge should still insist that the ideas of oneness of nature and plurality of persons, in the human race, puts the questions of the headship of Adam and the effects upon us of his fall, in a position that renders the idea of our sinning in him incomprehensible, except it mean that we sinned in him *only* representatively (for sinning representatively, and sinning *only* representatively, are not the same), we respectfully request him to bear in mind that the doctrine of oneness of nature, and plurality of persons in the Godhead, *is the very foundation of all that is explicable in the revealed mode of salvation, and of the efficacy of it all, as revealed*. And so, too, the announcement involving an equally incomprehensible principle of oneness and plurality, is the very foundation of all that is explicable in all that is revealed to us of the doctrine of original sin. And why, then, should any Christian man make the incomprehensibility of this latter announcement a reason for disregarding or rejecting it, and yet aver that the incomprehensibility of the former furnishes no ground for rejecting that? while, at the same time, he concedes that each announcement rests alike upon the revealed testimony of God. Adam and his race have the same nature and oneness of nature, but many persons: and God is One, and He is Three, and the three persons of the Godhead have one and the same nature; and these are *facts of revelation*, not the discoveries of philosophy. In the latter case, moreover, we are lost, if our salvation is not explicable, consistently, not only with the mode of God's being, but with that mode still farther complicated (if we may so speak) by the Second Person of the Godhead taking our nature, and then renewing us in his nature; these making our union with him mean that we share a common nature with him in a two-fold way. And

now let me ask will all the seriousness which so deeply serious a theme is calculated to awaken, can anything be more idle after accepting these truths as the basis of salvation, than to quibble about the pretended difficulties of our being in Adam, sinning with him, and falling with him, because we are different persons from him? Can there possibly be any more difficulty in believing the testimony of God in the one case than in the other? Was not the Son of God a different person from the Father, and also a different person from us, and yet is He not of one nature with both? Indeed if this were not so, our whole race is lost and undone forever. The truth is, that the essence of the Supralapsarian theory is incompatible with the revealed mode of the nature both of God and of the human race; and therefore it must necessarily terminate in sequences, both ethical and philosophical, which are alike repudiated by the Scriptures, and repugnant to the general and settled convictions of the church in every age.

And now, in conclusion, and in view of the whole matter, we ask our readers' attention to the following lengthy extract from Dr. Hodge's Review of Dr. Baird's recent work, for it is on many accounts important that it be presented in this connection:

"The design of the apostle in Romans v: 12-21, is not simply to teach that as Adam was in one way the cause of sin and death, so Christ was in another way the cause of righteousness and life, *but to illustrate the mode or way in which the righteousness of Christ avails to our justification.* From the third chapter and twenty-first verse he had been engaged in setting forth the method of justification, not sanctification. He had insisted that it was not our works, or our subjective character, but the blood of Christ, his propitiatory death, his righteousness, the righteousness of God, something therefore out of ourselves, which is the judicial ground of our justification. It is to illustrate this great fundamental doctrine of his gospel that he refers to the parallel case of Adam, and shows that antecedently to any act of our own, before any corruption of nature, the sentence of condemnation passed on all men for the offense of one. *To deny this, and to assert that our own subjective character is the ground of the sentence, is not only to deny the very thing which the apostle asserts, but to overturn his whole argument. It is to take sides with the Jews against the apostle, and to maintain that the righteousness of one man can not be the ground of the justification of another.* This doctrine which denies the immediate or antecedent imputation of

Adam's sin, and makes inherent corruption as derived from him the primary ground of the condemnation of the race, was consequently declared, almost with one voice, to be contrary to Scripture, to the faith of the Reformed Churches, and even of the Church Catholic. It was unanimously and repeatedly condemned by the National Synod of France to which Placæus belonged.\* It was no less unanimously condemned by the Church of Holland. The Leyden Professors, in their recommendation of the work which their colleague Rivetus had written against Placæus, declare the doctrine in question to be a *dogma contrarium communi omnium fermè Christianorum consensui*, and pronounce the doctrine of immediate imputation to be a *dogma verè Catholicum*. The same condemnation of this theory was pronounced by the churches in Switzerland. It was one of the errors against which the *Formula consensus Helvetica*, published in 1675, was directed. In that Formula it is said, 'Non possumus, salva cœlesti veritate, assensum præbere ūs qui Adamum posteros suos ex instituto Dei repræsentasse ac proinde ejus peccatum posteris ejus ἀπέσωσιν imputari negant, et sub imputationis mediatae et consequentis nomine, non imputationem duntaxat primi peccati tollunt, sed hæreditariæ etiam corruptionis assertionem gravi periculo objiciunt.' It would, however, be a great mistake to assume that the doctrine of the immediate imputation of Adam's sin is a doctrine peculiar to Calvinism. It is as much inwrought in the theology of the Lutheran as in that of the Reformed Churches. It is not even a distinguishing doctrine of Protestants. It is truly a Catholic doctrine. It belongs as much to the Latin Church as it does to those who were forced to withdraw from her communion." †

In this passage are exhibited in brief, Dr. Hodge's *exegesis*, his *theology*, and his *church history* as bearing upon the subject of this essay; and our readers will observe, that the facts presented in the course of our examination have shown, 1. That this exegesis of Dr. Hodge is not only wholly unsustainable by the text, but that the Reformed Church has utterly rejected it

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\* Why should Dr. Hodge repeat this inaccurate averment respecting that Synod's indorsement of antecedent imputation? *The very next National Synod* after the one which condemned the views charged upon Placæus, did, in view of his own explanation, reconsider and modify *that very act of censure in relation to him*; as we have fully shown. Why Turretin and De Moor, in a professed history of the case, should have omitted so important a fact, and one so vitally affecting the reputation of a justly eminent but calumniated man, we can not pretend to say. But we do aver that they were bound in all candor to give it a full expression in the connection.

† Princeton Review for 1860, pp. 344, 345.

from the very beginning as false and unsupported. In proof of this we have cited the testimony of Calvin, Beza, Pareus, Piscator, Chamier, De Dieu, Hyperius, Tilenus, Gomar, Rive-tus, Turretin, and Owen. 2. It has shown that his theology is false, and is likewise discarded by the Calvinistic Church, and claimed only by the Supralapsarians; and by Bellarmine and Ockham, and other divines of the Papal Church. And it has shown 3. That Dr. Hodge's church history is based upon a thorough and entire misapprehension of the facts to which he refers.\* For (1.) Neither the French Synod nor the Leyden Professors, nor the *Formula Consensus*, advocate the view for which he contends. And (2.) Neither do they condemn the view which he condemns. That is, they all unite in condemning the views attributed to Placeus, but they nowhere condemn, but on the contrary sustain the views advanced by Calvin, Edwards, Stapfer, and Breckinridge, as presented in our first Essay. All this is true, and has been abundantly established by facts. And it is moreover true, that the dogma which Dr. Hodge asserts as orthodox, not only never was received by the Calvinistic Church, but has ever been condemned by that Church; and that it has ever been fruitful of the greatest heresies, and most serious disturbances in the Church. So stands the matter.

In contemplating the fact, however, of Dr. Hodge's undesigned attempt (for we are assured that it was undesigned) to introduce Supralapsarianism into the Church, we should do both himself and ourselves manifest injustice were we to lose sight of the circumstances under which the occurrence originally took place. To follow out an illustration referred to in

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\* We have already shown that though the Reformed Church admitted to some extent the doctrine of immediate imputation as taught by Heidegger, it never, except some of the Supralapsarians, entertained the doctrine as advocated by Dr. Hodge. Weissman, in referring to the Placean controversy, says, "Si in veteribus et recentibus hujus partis Scriptoribus attendatur—Si, inquam, hæc aliaque attendantur, apparebit, *sententiam istam Imputationis immediate vel mediate esse apud Reformatos liberam, problematicam, variè disputatam, NEQUAQUAM VERÒ NECESSARIAM ET UNIVERSALEM.*" See Hist. Eccles. Sac. XVII. § 26. This is true of even the low form of immediate imputation claimed to be held by Heidegger; how, then, can Dr. Hodge allege, as he does in the above extract, and so frequently in other places, that the Supralapsarian form of the doctrine as held by himself, was universally received, regarded as fundamental, etc., etc.?

the close of our second Essay, we may remark that when, in an Infralapsarian community the pendulum of its distinguishing tenet (or doctrine respecting grace and condemnation) is made to swing in one direction, it rarely in its return stops at the point of departure; but the backward sweep is likely to carry it beyond that point as far in the opposite direction. On the one side is Pelagianism, and on the other Supralapsarianism. And when, some thirty years since, the pendulum received a sudden stroke which caused it to vibrate in the direction of Pelagianism, it was, perhaps, what might have been looked for (where the mighty magnet of Turretinism was being brought with great labor from the opposite side to be planted at the center), that the return sweep should be in the direction of Supralapsarianism: for, where the balance is not well preserved at the center by a correct appreciation of the principles of Calvinistic theology, it is human nature in such cases and under the excitement of controversy, to meet philosophy by philosophy, and extreme by extreme. So when, especially in 1829-1831, the pendulum began to vibrate, the stupendous illiteracy of Dr. Beecher (notwithstanding his strong native powers) and the helpless incapacity of Mr. Albert Barnes, could have imparted but little force to the movement; yet where a strong effort was made by men of real learning and ability, both in New England and in our own Church, to add force to the movement towards Pelagianism, and to represent its principles as the true theology of Calvinism (as may be seen by perusing the articles in the Quarterly Christian Spectator of that period, to some of which we have referred on p. 390, of our first Essay), it is not surprising that the garrison having in charge our noble old citadel at Princeton, should have put on their harness, and stepped forward into the thickest of the fight; and it was expected, moreover, that her favorite, and at that time youthful, champion should be foremost in the charge; nor is it strange that in the excitement of the scene he should have imparted a force to the pendulum which should drive it to the opposite extreme; nor that it should still incline thitherward, attracted by the Turretinic (almost Titanic) magnet aforesaid. In other words, when subjective desert was claimed as the basis for the imputation of both sin and righteousness, and also (as in the the-

ology of Mr. Finney) of both election and reprobation, it is not strange that, in the circumstances aforesaid, the speculation should have been met by another speculation involving the denial of subjective desert in both. And when such an idea of Divine justice was taught, as to make it recognize human desert in the matter of grace, or subjective merit as the ground of the imputation of righteousness, and of election to eternal life, it is nowise remarkable that (where Beza and Gomar and Turretin had been accepted as the true exponents of Calvinism) the whole matter in relation to both eternal life and eternal death, should be referred to the mere will or sovereignty of God; and that the great fact should be lost sight of that there is an infinite difference in their principles between the theology, which, in the matter of grace and condemnation regards man as unfallen, and that which regards him as already fallen and lost. But in the excitement of controversy, and when human philosophy is allowed to mingle with our theology, it is not remarkable that this difference should be lost sight of. And, therefore, in forming a judgment concerning Dr. Hodge's introduction of the Supralapsarian element into the Calvinistic theology of the Presbyterian communion, we should do him as great injustice to ignore these considerations, as he has done to Placæus by ignoring the like in his case. But when Dr. Hodge, from the high Supralapsarian position thus assumed, insists that they who abide upon the Infralapsarian center should either ascend to his airy castle by the Turretinic causeway, or be exterminated as heretics, he leaves us no alternative but to show that his castle wholly lacks a foundation—that it is a mere balloon; and that the causeway, through its paving shows many a topaz, and jasper, and chrysolite, and many a massive block hewn from the diamond quarries of Heaven, yet rests upon pillars some of which are partly iron and partly clay; and that it can not be safely trusted, even by those who are most agile in leaping over the chasms already formed by the crumbling of those formidable-looking, but frail supporters.

And just here, it may be proper, before closing, to add that though we have referred to Dr. Hodge and his positions plainly and pointedly throughout this discussion (though not with the unsparing severity which he is prone to employ on similar



occasions), it is no part of the design of this discussion to impair his influence or standing in the theological world. Nor need any such result follow of necessity. For if his views can be successfully defended, he can defend them. Or if, on the contrary, he has been laboring under a theological mistake, we do not believe that he is the man to persist in it against his own convictions. It is true that the history of theological discussion rarely furnishes an instance where a gentleman of commanding position and influence, has frankly admitted that he was mistaken on a point in support of which he had consecrated the earnest labor of many years; but it is still true that no one who has done so, has ever forfeited thereby his influence with the Church of God; or has failed to enshrine himself more deeply than ever in its sincerest love and regard. Dr. Hodge has said:

“If we have cited the concurrent opinion of the church improperly; if we have supposed the great body of the people of God to have believed what they did not believe, let us be set right, and we shall be thankful.” (*Princeton Essays I*, p. 131.)

And believe he meant what he said. And were we capable of indulging an emotion of pleasure in view of fastening a serious error upon a learned and accomplished professor, who is aiming faithfully to serve his day and generation, we should feel that we were a despicable creature. And if it may be here permitted to say a word of a personal nature in this connection, no one knows better than we do how to sympathize with Dr. Hodge in this whole matter. In early life, and even before our ordination to the work of the Christian ministry, we saw the importance and felt the necessity of a more thorough knowledge of the theology of the doctrines of grace, from the times of the apostles to our own day, than we could find in the possession of those who were writing and speaking very dogmatically in relation thereto; and we seriously set out to obtain it. We commenced with the era of the Reformation, as the most frequent references were to the doctrines of the Reformed Church of that period. We first fell in with some things of Beza, and with the *Syntagma* of Polanus (of Basel), and soon after with the works of Gomar. Calvin, of course, we studied; but we became perfectly enraptured in tracing from

proposition to proposition, and from theme to theme, the logical concatenation running through that huge work of Polanus; but Gomar with his great learning, and wonderful power of analysis, led us completely captive; and had we then been appointed to read lectures on theology, or called into a discussion of the doctrines of grace before the public, we should have viewed them, to a very considerable extent, from the stand-point of these two great divines. And having identified such a position with our literary reputation (whatever that might be) before the church and public, we understand the operations of the human heart well enough to know the power of that influence which must have been brought to bear upon all our subsequent reading; and the tendency which it is calculated to produce in the mind. We have felt all this; and while pursuing the present discussion, have ever had it in memory. And we should have deemed it scarcely worth our while to criticise the earlier productions of Dr. Hodge on the subject before us, had it not been for his recent indorsement and reiteration, and even advance upon the very principles inculcated in those earlier tractates; and for the evidence derived from other sources that these views were becoming current in our church; and in some places even constituted the touchstone of Calvinistic orthodoxy. In such a case, we have felt that silence would be injustice to the cause of God and truth. The truly painful feature of the case, and that which we were not prepared to meet so extensively is the misuse which Dr. Hodge has made of his authorities. But we know how easily, and in how many ways, a mistake may be made here; and we have no doubt that he will correct those errors. No upright mind who has any knowledge of Dr. Hodge can suspect for a moment that they were intentional; nor do we doubt that their occurrence is susceptible of a satisfactory solution.

As to the work of Dr. Baird, to which we have had occasion to refer in connection with the Reviews of it, we hope that nothing which has been said in relation thereto will be so considered as to imply our approval of its main speculations, or our sympathy with the mode of treating the subject as therein exhibited. It has been very harshly assailed by Dr. Hodge, from a Supralapsarian stand-point; and has been criti-

cised by Dr. Thornwell from a stand-point evincing a strong sympathy with the same scheme, and its defenders; and we have felt that whatever may be the merits or demerits of the work itself, some of the grounds upon which it has been assailed are presumptive of its merit rather than otherwise. We are not, however, called upon to give here our own views of this performance, except so far as respects the point before us; and we do not regret it, for Calvinism has no more to do with such philosophical speculations than with the speculations of the Supralapsarian school. And it is quite time that the ministry and the church at large, were made fully to understand this fact. Dr. Baird has done good service by his arguments, evincing that the guilt of Adam and his posterity was a common guilt; and this, after all, was the great point bearing directly upon the subject before us, which his reviewers, if they attempted to say anything against his work, were required to meet. But neither of them make any more allusion to it, as a topic ably treated therein, and in connection with the real theme of discussion, than they do to the contents of the yet unrolled volumes discovered among the ruins of Pompeii. But instead of attempting to meet this the actual issue involved, they assail his philosophy, and absurdities, and what not; whereas, great as are the absurdities of Dr. Baird's speculative system, they, both in weight and measurement, sink into insignificance if compared with the speculative errors involved in the philosophy of his antagonists. And then, moreover, Dr. Baird's vindication of the justice of God, against the speculations by which it is often impugned—speculations with which, as it now appears, his reviewers were in deep sympathy, is complete, so far as he confines himself to the Word of God; but when he departs from this, he is weaker than an infant. His work has also done this good service, that it has drawn forth a fuller expression of the Supralapsarian element than would probably have been otherwise made for some time to come. Dr. Baird's work is on many accounts intrinsically valuable, and will take its place in our theological libraries as a work evincing great industry and ability; and will be remembered, moreover, as the tractate which developed the last great effort of the Supralapsarian scheme to obtain the ascendancy in Calvinistic theology.

In this same connection and in view of the persistent efforts (unkind and uncandid too almost without a parallel) to destroy the reputation of a work of singular merit, to which we have had occasion to refer repeatedly in this discussion, we take the opportunity to say, that the most perfect exposition of the Calvinistic system in its doctrinal and practical details which we have as yet had the fortune to meet with in the Reformed theology, and the most perfect development of the Infralapsarian principle as distinguished from the Supralapsarian, elaborated, too, in all its facts, with a depth and consistency rarely attained and never surpassed, and to the utmost allowable limits of that principle, without the slightest compromise either with Supralapsarianism on the one hand, or Pelagianism on the other, is the treatise of our theological Professor in Danville Seminary, Kentucky. To any one extensively familiar with the writings of the Reformed divines, it must be a matter of surprise how Dr. Breckinridge, in the work referred to, has succeeded in restating with such remarkable clearness the Calvinistic system, so as both to include all the desirable results of past investigation, and to avoid the errors which, through the influence of false philosophies, have sought at various times and by the potency of illustrious names, to associate themselves with the doctrines of grace. To us it appears truly surprising that persons in our own church who claim to possess a reputable acquaintance with Calvinistic theology, should undertake to disparage such a work; a work which we regard as an honor both to our church and country, and one which is calculated, in an eminent degree, to make known the true and saving knowledge of God.

We have now completed our work; one design of which has been to evince by a full presentation of the facts in the case that the whole doctrine of the imputation of sin as taught and insisted on by a portion of our church, requires to be modified. The doctrine of antecedent imputation, as entertained and asserted by Dr. Hodge, never was the doctrine of the Presbyterian Church either in this land or in the British Islands; nor of the Reformed Church on the continent. We might show how Dr. Hodge was led into the mistake which resulted in the opposite conclusion, but this is hardly necessary. His own attempt, or any attempt to reconcile the Supralapsarian scheme

with Calvinism, by occasionally adopting the representations which each presents of the subject before us, while it is calculated only to confuse and mislead, can result in nothing but failure. To say that the imputation of sin is antecedent, and moral corruption consequent thereupon is to utter a sentiment inconsistent with the doctrine that we having sinned and fallen in Adam, God finds us guilty and corrupted by that fall, and treats us as sinful, guilty, and corrupt. The former is Dr. Hodge's views, and the latter the doctrine of the Reformed Church, which has ever taught that *we are exposed to the displeasure of God, not only because Adam sinned, but because we sinned in and fell with him in his first transgression* (though not in his *other transgressions*, as must be the fact, if the philosophical theories of identity are to be recognized). *How we then sinned*, the church has never pretended to say, though some have philosophized hereon; claiming, that antecedent imputation, identity with Adam, traduction, and what not, may solve the problem. **BUT LET NO SUCH SPECULATIONS BE CHARGED UPON THE CHURCH HERSELF.** She has ever been satisfied with the simple fact announced on the testimony of God; and has held that the doctrine of original sin can be properly explicated only by a full recognition of both the natural and federal headship of Adam. "The sin of Adam is imputed, but never irrespective of our nature and its inherent sin. That is, we must not attempt to separate Adam's federal from his natural headship—by the union of which he is the *Root* of the human race."\* This is the doctrine of God's own blessed Word; and has ever been the doctrine of the Calvinistic Church.

DANVILLE, Ky., Dec. 16, 1861.

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P. S. As the writer has accepted a chaplaincy in the army of the United States, with which he expects to continue, if his life be spared, until the conclusion of the present struggle on behalf of our Constitution and Government, he would request

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\* See p. 499, of the "Knowledge of God Objectively Considered," by Dr. Breckinridge.

that, in case any reply is, in the meantime, offered to the foregoing argument, the public will, before pronouncing a final decision on any issue which may be taken, allow to him (if living) a reasonable time and opportunity to give to such rejoinder a proper consideration.

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 E R R A T A .

The following errata occur in our article on Imputation published in the September number;

- P. 514, line 12, for *fleshy* read *fleshly*.
- P. 518, l. 2, for *tandum* read *tantum*.
- P. 519, l. 7 from bottom, add an \* after *imputation*.
- P. 520, l. 20, for "they never denied," read "it never deemed."
- P. 522, l. 13, omit the quotation marks.
- P. 522, l. 18, for "*Frigland*" read "*Trigland*."
- P. 522, l. 32, for *were* read *are*.
- P. 522, l. 2 from bottom, for *parable* read *parallel*.
- P. 524, l. 17, after *says*, use a ; instead of a .
- P. 524, l. 23, for *See* read *So*.
- P. 524, first line of note, insert *in* before *Rom*.
- P. 527, note, line 8, after *Adam* read a , instead of a . ; and for *We* read *we*.
- P. 528, l. 6 from bottom, add a ; after *ostendunt*.
- P. 529, l. 24, omit the words "teach that."
- P. 530, l. 1, for "*antithesis or analogy*" read "*notion of imputation*."
- P. 531, l. 4, for *first* read *one*.
- P. 531, l. 5, for *second* read *other*.
- P. 538, l. 7 from bottom, read *in propria persona*.

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 A R T . II.—*Mental Science*.

IT is a curious and significant fact that the human mind, ever active, takes but little notice of itself. This is the more remarkable, as the mind is not, as the eye, dependent on a reflector for its self-cognition. It is capable of scanning and analyzing its own constitution and operations.

The conceded mystery of its own existence is sometimes assigned as a reason for this reluctance of the mind to self-investigation. There is, however, no more mystery involved in the existence and operations of mind than in the existence and organization of matter. Neither can be defined.