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## I. BAPTISM UNDER THE TWO DISPENSATIONS.<sup>1</sup>

OF the three definitions of baptism given in our Westminster Standards, the most complete is that found in the Larger Catechism. It constitutes the answer to Question 165, and is in these words: "Baptism is a sacrament of the New Testament, wherein Christ hath ordained the washing with water in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, to be a sign and seal of ingrafting into himself, of remission of sins by his blood, and regeneration by his Spirit; of adoption, and resurrection unto everlasting life; and whereby the parties baptized are solemnly admitted into the visible church, and enter into an open and professed engagement to be wholly and only the Lord's."

This definition has primary reference, of course, to ritual baptism, but it distinctly indicates that "the washing with water in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost," derives its significance from the fact that it has been appointed by Jesus Christ to symbolize the benefits that come through *real* baptism, which alone introduces to membership in the invisible church.

This real baptism is effected through that operation of the Holy Spirit by which the soul is united to Christ, and thus has secured to it remission of sins and adoption into the family of God; by which it is regenerated and its resurrection unto everlasting life realized. It is to this baptism that the apostle refers in 1 Cor. xii. 12, 13: "For as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are

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<sup>1</sup> *The Great Baptizer.* A Bible History of Baptism. By Samuel J. Baird, D. D. 12mo, pp. 489. Philadelphia: James H. Baird. 1882.

### III. THOUGHTS ON THE RELATIONS OF CHURCH AND STATE.

AT first glance the books of Moses appear to mingle moral, ceremonial, civil and sanitary laws. A patient examination, however, will show that all, or most of the items in Moses' law, may be arranged under three heads, viz., moral statutes, ceremonial statutes, and civil statutes.<sup>1</sup> In seeking an answer to the question, What distinction does the Mosaic law make between things civil and things spiritual, between church and state? it will be seen that all public religious service was assigned to the tribe of Levi. Certain portions of it were further restricted to the priests, while a few could only be performed by the high priest. Here surely was not only a distinction made, but also a separation. The tribe of Levi had no secular callings, no inheritance among the other tribes, and no means of support excepting that which they received in the performance of their sacred callings. Besides this entire separation of a whole tribe for religious service, we find a most extensive ceremonial which had no secular uses nor application at all. Thus we find a strictly religious organization, and that organization supplied with a ritual. But, it may be asked, did not religious officials in the Mosaic economy perform civil functions along with their spiritual ones? A few cases bear that appearance. Moses was lawgiver, prophet, and judge. Eli was priest and judge, and so also was Samuel. There is also to be noted a single item in the law which directed that difficult cases should be brought to the priest for solution. (See Deut. xvii. 8-13.) These apparent exceptions receive sufficient answer in the following facts: Moses, like the apostles, was an extraordinary officer, so that his case establishes no precedent. Eli and Samuel were indeed judges, but there is no reason to believe that there was any mingling or confounding of the offices. The reference of a difficult case to the priest for decision was no doubt done because he could inquire of

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<sup>1</sup> Or, more accurately, non-civil moral statutes, civil moral statutes, and ceremonial statutes.

God. This fact does away with the exception, because the reference was really made to God himself.

We have seen the line distinctly drawn cutting off the spiritual service to itself; how was it about the secular? Was it a distinct department in the kingdom of Israel? The degree to which it is separated from the spiritual and set off by itself will surprise any one who has not looked into the matter. We learn in Exodus, eighteenth chapter, that Jethro counselled Moses to appoint rulers of thousands, rulers of hundreds, rulers of fifties, and rulers of tens. We read further that Moses acted upon his advice, thereby establishing a thorough system of judges, in things civil, throughout all Israel. Should any one suppose that this was merely a part of human wisdom, and merely a temporary expedient, he will only need to refer to Deut. xvi. 18-20: "Judges and officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates, which the Lord thy God giveth thee, throughout thy tribes; and they shall judge the people with just judgment. Thou shalt not wrest judgment; thou shalt not respect persons, neither take a gift." If we put these two passages together, or even omit the first, we shall have all the evidence needed to show that there was a thorough system of judges in Israel. In the judiciary, however, we have only half the evidence of the civil department of Israel. When one has collected together all the civil statutes of the law of Moses he has a complete moral code, not that it has in it all the items that we might need, but that it has in it all the items that Israel had need of, and, we hesitate not in the least to affirm, it has in it all the moral principles which any just government will need. Look over some of the items. There are here statutes covering the questions of murder, slavery, fighting, injuries done to property, casualties resulting to persons or property through carelessness or neglect, trespass, theft, property left in the hands of another, to which evil happens, seduction, adultery, protection of the helpless, restitution, marriage, divorce, weights and measures, laws of inheritance, cities of refuge, capital punishment, number of witnesses necessary to condemn to death, perjury, etc. Here, then, are two great facts, viz., a moral code of civil laws and a gradation of judges charged to execute them faithfully and justly. Some of these, moreover, are laws involving the

death penalty. One more principal fact must be added here. Provision was even made in the law for the setting up of a king. In Deut. xvii. 14, *ff.*, we read that in the event of their setting up a king, he was to be chosen of God; and the chiefest of all the requirements therein made of him is that he shall write a copy of the law, and shall read therein all the days of his life. Here, then, was civil government provided for, whether with or without a king. In any case God's law contained the only civil as well as religious code. In view of all that has been seen concerning the spiritual service and spiritual officers, and the civil laws and civil officers in Israel, it is evident that every Jew must have made a distinction between the two spheres, and, perhaps, as clearly as we do.

Were there no other facts to be examined excepting those just considered, we might conclude that there was a civil and a religious department in the kingdom of Israel, not only distinguished, but entirely distinct and separate from each other. There is, however, a class of facts which forbids us to arrive exactly at that conclusion. Distinct as the two spheres appear to have been, they were bound together, as with a chain, in this, that Moses put death as the penalty of sorcery, adultery, Sabbath-breaking, the cursing of father and mother, and the refusal to observe the passover and other religious ordinances, as well as for rape and murder. Here the two spheres of church and state appear to be bound together. The execution of men for gross offences against the state is clear enough, but here are several cases in which the offence seems to be purely moral, not appearing to affect the state, and yet the death penalty is to be executed, and, so far as we can see, under the direction of civil officers. It does not appear to have been true in the theocracy that the spiritual was wholly separated from the civil. God was teaching other things along with spiritual service. There were spiritual laws and spiritual officers, and civil laws and civil officers, and yet the two spheres were not entirely disconnected.

We may ask, therefore, Why did God combine and apparently commingle the spiritual and secular departments of the kingdom of Israel? In attempting an answer to this question we shall have

occasion to present a number of reasons, each of which we believe will serve, in part, as an answer. The first is this: God had chosen a nation as well as a church. That nation had to be cared for as a nation, as well as the church cared for as a church. In it was preserved the line of which the promised seed should come. In it also was typified the kingdom of our Lord. The state-church, moreover, afforded the best means of carrying out the elaborate symbolic ritual. Another great fact was, that God was Ruler of the state as well as of the church. This explains why it was that spiritual offenders were executed. God could as well direct the state to do it as to do it himself, seeing that he was Head of it. Another great reason why God gave those laws was, no doubt, because he wished to do more than give religious laws. The moral law would not have been fully exemplified had we not had a state as well as a church. We shall see, indeed, that both the church and the state together do not call the whole moral law into exercise. God was not serving the church only, nor Israel only, at that time, but the world. The moral law is for all men, as a rule of life; the ceremonial law is for all men, to explain and illustrate the great salvation of Jesus Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit; and the moral-civil law, with all its details, is given to guide men in framing laws for the governing of the nations of the earth. Such at least is the belief of the writer. Some reasons will be given below.

The thoughts suggested at the close of the last paragraph, with reference to God's purpose in giving a civil code of laws, as well as a religious one, leads to the inquiry, What is the application of the moral law? The one only complete answer is this: The application of the moral law is *personal*. Every one of the ten commandments is *personal*. "Thou shalt," or "thou shalt not," either expressed or implied, is the beginning of every commandment. The full application of the moral law, then, is to the individual, and to him only. It applies to him in every relationship which he can possibly sustain towards God or man. We may view man as variously situated as we will: in his relations to God, the church, the state, as ruler, as subject, as teacher, as learner, as old, as young, this moral law applies to him; and in the individual in his



several possible relationships we may conceive of all of its demands falling upon the individual man, and in this sense the moral law would exhaust itself, because it would have no further demands to make. These thoughts appear to be so clear as to need neither proof nor illustration. A few words will be added, however, lest what has been expressed should not be sufficiently lucid. We have two commandments which require the individual to perform moral duties to God, and him only; these are the first two. The second two require duties owed to God, but each has a man-ward application also. The fifth and seventh commandments require mainly the performance of duty towards the family, but the fifth applies also to the state and to society, while the seventh has a wide range of application. The sixth, eighth and ninth commandments require moral duties owed chiefly to other individuals, while the tenth enjoins upon each man the careful guarding of his own heart. Could we follow these all out in their bearings we should then see the whole moral duty of man presented, and presented, moreover, as the duty of the *individual*. This thought seems to the writer to be the key to the whole subject now in hand. "The law of the Lord is perfect." The moral law is a perfect moral law, and it abides for ever. If, therefore, the person or individual exhausts that law, then other questions ought to adjust themselves under the individual who exhausts the whole field; this will be true, provided only the other fields lie in the sphere of the moral law.

Let us pass on, then, and ask, What relation does the church sustain to the moral law? The answer to this question must be given in parts, and according to the function of the church which is considered. If we view the church as a legislative body we must answer that, strictly speaking, the church has no function to exercise. God has given her all her laws, so that legislation, excepting in some secondary sense, is outside her sphere. When we come to view the church as a teacher or witness, she has quite enough to occupy her powers. The church is appointed to deliver the whole counsel of God. With reference to the moral law, which occupies our attention chiefly just now, the church is to teach the whole moral law as found in the word of God, and

to enforce every bearing thereof found in that word, and use every detail and illustration found there relating to the individual man in all the relations of life; at least the church is not to shun to do any one of those things. No man who believes in the perfection and perpetuity of God's law will think of questioning this plain duty of the church. There is another function of the church that is to be viewed in its relation to the moral law; that is, its disciplinary function. What may or what must the church require of her members, as respects the moral law? It may be answered in general that the church, like the commandments, knows men only as individuals. If the law be given to individuals, and the gospel be given to individuals, and the great commission be given to individuals, then surely discipline can be only of individuals. Bodies of Christians might receive censure, but discipline must fall on individuals. When we come to view the field a little more closely we shall see that discipline cannot be exercised to the full limit of the moral law. This limitation arises out of several facts. Many breaches of the moral law are private, and cannot be known, or are complicated with family, social, political or civil affairs to such an extent that no church court could handle the case, because it could not command the facts.<sup>1</sup> Again, private Christians frequently go contrary to the advice and counsel of the teachers of the church; and while their actions may be sinful, yet their offences are not sufficiently clear to be made cases of discipline. What, then, are disciplinable breaches of the moral law? All gross violations of the moral law which become known, and are susceptible of proof, if committed by professing Christians, are properly disciplinable. It does not matter, either, what the position of the party may be. He may be a church officer, a private member, a man in private life, a single man or married, a merchant sinning in his business, an author sinning with his pen, a politician sinning in his tricks or with his tongue, a legislator sinning by his vote, a judge practicing corruption on his bench, or a president committing manifest wickedness in his private or official capacity. In any such case of gross sin, clearly proven, the of-

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See Professor W. M. McPheeters' *Spirituality of the Church*.

fending professor not only may be, but must be, disciplined for his offence.

This brings us directly to the question, Does the church exercise any authority or control over the state? While we are yet in the Old Testament in our investigations, still we may sufficiently anticipate the divorcement of church and state in the New Testament to give an intelligible answer to this question. We have already seen that it is the business of the church to teach the whole word of God. Whatsoever the Bible teaches concerning the duties of citizens, legislators, judges, kings, and other members of the state, it is the business of the church to inculcate in the minds of all men with whom she comes in contact. In so far as those Bible teachings instilled into the minds of men by the church influence them, just so far will the state be affected thereby. Christian states have already gained much from this source. Other than that, we know of no control or influence the church has over the state, since Jesus said, "My kingdom is not of this world." She surely has no legislative power, as she has none, properly speaking, in her own sphere; and she has no disciplinary power, excepting that which we have seen, in which she calls not the state, but her own members, to account for their sins.

We examine next the question, What relation does the state sustain to the moral law? Rev. Dr. T. E. Peck styles the state "God's ordinance, a moral institute." One thing is very certain, it has its authority and foundation in the moral law. We find in all just civil laws a wonderful correspondence with the moral law. Indeed, it could not be otherwise. "The law of the Lord is perfect," consequently all those laws which Moses gave for the state, as items falling under the Decalogue, were absolutely perfect when given, and are so yet. If civil laws be just, they must agree with the moral law. One other thought must be given by way of preface, and that is, that the relation of the state to the moral law will be clearly seen by seeing the duty of each individual member of the state towards the moral law; the duties of each will of course be varied according to his position in the state. We begin the answer of the question, "How is the state related to the moral



law?" by saying, first, that the legislator is in duty bound to frame laws for the state agreeably to the moral law, so far as civil statutes touch morals at all. This is true from more considerations than one. It is true because God has furnished him with a civil code which he declared to be perfect. It was absolutely perfect and complete for Israel; all they needed, and every principle in it, is perfect yet; hence the man who knowingly departs from this moral law given by God, and assists in legislation for man, and not agreeably thereto, is disobedient to God's revealed law, and sins against God. He moreover wrongs the state by giving to it laws which are inferior to those at least indicated by the moral law. This appears very clearly from Romans xiii. 4, where Paul, speaking of the civil magistrate, says, "For he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain; for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil." Here it will be observed that Paul calls the civil magistrate God's minister, and adds, that he is his minister to perform a certain thing, viz., to execute wrath upon evil doers. If, then, God appoints a man to do this specific thing, where does he learn his duty? He can learn it nowhere but in this moral law. It follows from this, without other evidence, that God means his moral civil code to become substantially the code of the nations. Another powerful evidence is presented in capital punishment. It would be monstrous to think of taking life as a mere human expedient. God tells the civil magistrate when he may rightly do so. The same argument applies, with less force, however, to all legal punishments; we have our authority for them in God's law.

Just here we feel that a digression must be made far enough to apply the principle just proven. One Sanford H. Cobb, of whose calling in life we have no knowledge, wrote an article in the *Princeton Review* some time since, entitled "The Theory of Prohibition," which has been reprinted in pamphlet form by the National Publication Association, Louisville, Ky. The fact that it has been reprinted shows that it has received no little attention. Mr. Cobb is evidently a candid, thoughtful Christian gentleman. His article is cited here because the writer believes

his fundamental proposition in the pamphlet to be false, and because that principle is contradictory to one just established in this article. He says, page 1, pamphlet edition, "The only justifying ground for a prohibitory law, if found at all, must be found in the principles, not of morality, but of political economy." Again, on page 3, "Thus far it is clear that the essential question is solely one of public good. The morality of the question is accidental." Again, on page 5, he says: "When the general sense of society is agreed that the greatest good of the greatest number requires a prohibitory law, that law will be enacted and enforced as naturally and promptly as are the laws against stealing and smuggling." Now, we are not appearing at this time on behalf of prohibition, but on behalf of the truth. Mr. Cobb seems to hold that all civil legislation must proceed upon grounds of political economy, and not on moral grounds; indeed, he flatly says so with reference to prohibition, and yet he owns that it is a moral question. Such a position is simply monstrous. Here is a moral responsible being—a legislator—who is handling a moral question, legislating for a nation of Christian people, and lowering that question to a utilitarian standpoint! Would the gentleman have his neighbor hanged on such grounds—for the greatest good of the greatest number? God forbid that such sentiments should ever prevail. If intemperance did not affect the state, then state legislation would evidently be out of place; but if intemperance does touch the state, and a moral question is involved, then God demands that justice must be done, and not utility followed. The reason why the state may imprison men, fine them, or execute them, is because God has given such authority in his holy law. Had God not clothed the civil magistrate with the sword to execute justice, no human compact could have made it right to execute a man; and other punishments have a like authority. It is but putting it mildly to say that civil law has a moral basis, and it is that which constitutes the right of the state to punish offenders. This theory of legislation, where moral questions are involved, may not be acceptable to many people, but we believe we have shown that it is right, and consequently ought to be accepted.

Let us return now from our digression, and ask, What is the relation of the executive officer of the civil law to the moral law? What does the moral law require of him? If the civil laws, which he is called upon to execute, be just and right, then the executive officer of the law will have nothing to do but to go on and execute it faithfully, "for they are the ministers of God attending continually upon this very thing." If, however, a man were chosen or appointed to an office, the duties of which he could not conscientiously perform, then he would be bound, in duty to God, to resign his office, or decline it, in case he foresaw the difficulty.

The relation of the private citizen to the moral law is equally simple. He is to obey the law of the land so long as the state stands and the laws remain unchanged, provided he can do so in consistency with the moral law (the law of his God); but if he finds that he is directed to act one way by God and the opposite by man, he must obey God rather than man. In that case, however, he must submit to the penalty of the broken human law, if need be. Some other features of Bible-teaching, relating to the state and to its citizens, will be presented from the New Testament. Before we leave this general subject of the relation of the state to the moral law, however, we shall briefly consider two things. The first is this: The only difficulty that could plausibly be urged against our theory of a divine basis for civil law would be the fact that corporeal punishment, even death, was inflicted by law upon some who committed moral offences, not touching the state. That is true, but the answer is at hand, and it is complete, viz., The separation of church and state by our Lord put all such cases outside the sphere of the state. The other matter to be considered is this: Does the state possess any authority or control over the church? We have already seen that the responsibility of the individual exhausts the moral law, and that the church as well as the gospel deals with the individual; it may be added that the civil law also makes its requirements upon individuals. So long as the church adheres to her legitimate work, the state, if it keep its sphere, has no concern with the church, excepting with its individual members,

and then only in state matters. As the church has to deal with members of the state concerning church duties, so the state deals with church members concerning civil matters, and yet neither does thereby interfere with the other. Even in cases in which property is involved it is a worldly affair on the part of the state.

What has been already said has, to some extent, anticipated the teachings of the New Testament. Let us, however, more fully examine the latter, as it is under it we are living. One remark must be made, before all others, which is this: All the moral teachings of the Old Testament remain in force, and must do so, so long as the present dispensation endures. All that was established, therefore, in our study of the Old Testament stands, excepting as modified by the separation of the church from the state. That act of our Lord was the great modifying act in this matter of church and state. He told Pilate (see John xviii. 36), "My kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews; but now is my kingdom not from hence." Our Lord is speaking of the visible, as well as of the invisible church. Had he referred only to the invisible church his remark would not have been candid. He meant to say, evidently, that he was in no such sense a king as in any way to militate against any civil government. He meant also to announce the termination of the church-state of Israel. Civil punishments for purely moral offences, as under Moses, are unauthorized under this dispensation. Paul speaks to the same effect in 2 Corinthians x. 4: "For the weapons of our warfare are not carnal." Jesus stood just on the border of the two dispensations. He had already changed the sacrament of the passover into that of the Lord's supper, and he now virtually announced the close of the old dispensation. Physical force, then, is not a means of supporting or propagating the spiritual kingdom. What, then, are the means of its propagation? These are the word, the sacraments and prayer, on man's part, and Christ's intercession, pastoral care and providence, and the work of the Holy Spirit, on God's part. This kingdom is one which exists for spiritual ends, viz., the glory of God and the salvation of man. It is a kingdom

which acknowledges no ruler excepting Christ, who is its King. He alone gives laws to the church, and, under the New Testament dispensation, those laws are spiritual only. These spiritual laws are to be enforced only by spiritual means, and for spiritual ends alone. This much concerning the purely spiritual character of the church may suffice for present purposes.

We next ask definitely, What duties to the state are enjoined in the New Testament? They are few in number, but important, and of wide application. The first that will be cited is that of submission to existing governments. In Rom. xiii. 1, Paul says, "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God; the powers that be are ordained of God." This thought is further enforced in the six verses which follow. Again, in 1 Peter ii. 13, 14: "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake: whether it be to the king as supreme, or unto governors." Titus iii. 1 is of the same import. It will be observed here that the duty enjoined is submission—submission to such governments as exist under the providence of God. Christians live under all sorts of civil governments, and often under cruel governments. They are not exhorted to enthusiastic support, which might be impossible, but to render submission, which is a duty that is always possible. This class of passages does not forbid necessary and righteous revolution, but requires Christians to be good, subordinate citizens, two things which are not inconsistent. Another duty is the payment of taxes. Rom. xiii. 6: "For this cause pay ye tribute also: for they are God's ministers attending continually upon this very thing." Matt. xxii. 21: "Render therefore unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's." Here is a clear statement of the duty of paying taxes, and even intimations of the reasons why it is a duty. A third duty enjoined as owed to the state is a duty to rulers. 1 Tim. ii. 1, 2: "I will therefore that, first of all, supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks be made for all men: for kings and for all that are in authority," etc. This duty differs from the foregoing in that it is spiritual. The fourth and last of the civic duties enjoined by the New Testament is honor to civil rulers, 1 Peter ii. 17: "Honor all men, love the brotherhood, fear God, honor the king."



The reader will recall the fact that the relation of the state to the moral law was considered in the light of the Old Testament. It will be observed here that the duties enjoined upon the individual, as owed to the state, are all *moral* duties. These duties fall under the commandments as follows: Under the fifth fall honor to rulers, submission to rulers, and prayer for rulers; under the eighth falls the payment of taxes. And if we were to infer the duties of patriotism and protection of rulers, they would fall under the sixth. If any one will consider the extent of application these few injunctions of duty have, he will see that little, if anything, could be added by way of civic duties. Two thoughts already insisted upon are further confirmed, we may say thoroughly settled. They are these: 1, All the duties enjoined by the Old and New Testaments, as owed to the state, are *moral*; 2, All these moral duties enjoined upon men, as owed to the state, are *personal*, *not collective*, not for the church but for the individual to perform.

It will be proper to consider more fully a class of subjects already referred to upon which the Bible refuses to speak. The Bible does not decide concerning the legitimacy of governments. "The powers that *be* are ordained of God," whether they be republics, kingdoms, empires or despotisms. What, then, about revolutions? Are they utterly prohibited? Certainly not, for then Christians could hardly be enjoined to submit to the new governments resulting from them. What then? Why, plainly God has left men to follow their own judgments, enlightened, of course, by his word. What God does say amounts to this: So long as governments stand, the individual citizen is to render lawful obedience; that, however, does not debar him from engaging in a revolution to overturn a government that is unendurable. The right of revolution and the legitimacy of governments are two kindred questions not pretended to be handled by the word of God. Another field, somewhat akin, is likewise excluded; *i. e.*, questions of equity. Jesus was approached by a man who asked him to speak to his brother that he divide the inheritance with him. Jesus replied (Luke xii. 14): "Man, who made me a judge

or divider over you?" In the former case, matters of the legitimacy of governments are evidently left by the Bible to private judgment, while in this case they would be referred to the civil tribunal.

From all that has been found in the word of God it will be seen that, under the New Testament dispensation, church and state are intended by our Saviour to be absolutely separate and distinct. They are different spheres, touching at no point. They contain, to some extent, the same people, and take cognizance of the same sins and duties, under the guidance of the same moral law, but deal with people from a different point of view, with different ends in view. The state seeks temporal ends only and requires civic duties. The church seeks moral, eternal salvation. The state uses brute force; the church the sword of the Spirit. Incidentally church and state render assistance to each other, but they can only do so (lawfully) incidentally. The church teaches the people morals and instills submission, while the state affords protection.

To summarize: 1. A foundation principle is that the moral law covers all of man's original duties, is personal in its application, but requires him to perform each branch of his duty toward its appropriate object. Duties are owed to God, other men, self, the church, the family, the state, society. The individual owes his duty toward each, and each may hold him bound to perform the part due to itself, the church may hold him responsible for the part owed to her, the state may hold him responsible for the part due to it, etc., but only God can hold man bound for his whole moral duty.

2. The church is a spiritual body, seeking spiritual ends, and using spiritual means to accomplish them. Her allegiance is given to Christ, her spiritual Head. She has no lawful connection with any civil government, has no commission to endorse any, nor to support any, nor to destroy any, but is enjoined to teach submission to such as God may set up wherever Christian people live.

3. It is the business of the church, by her standards and from

her pulpits, to seek to declare the whole counsel of God. This will involve the teaching of the moral law in its bearings upon duties owed to God, man, the church, the state, the family, society, commerce, letters, etc. The church is to enforce all the moral principles taught in the word of God and all the details therein given.

4. In matters of discipline, the church is to require all her members to abstain from gross sin in all their relations in life. This is true regardless of the positions men may occupy. Sabbath-breaking, dishonesty, polygamy, etc., are disciplinable, if committed in private life; they would be none the less so if a legislator, in framing laws for his state or country, should give his vote in favor of laws which would legalize these sins. There might be difficulty in making out a case, but if the case were made out the latter would be as much a subject of discipline as the former.

5. Certain questions arise concerning the relations of church and state, and the right of petition by the church to the state. It may be said in general, if each kept within its sphere there would be no need of petitions, unless perhaps by way of securing moneyed interests, a secular matter, so to speak. If, however, the state has infringed upon the rights of the church, it is but just that she should be allowed to ask the removal of the wrongs inflicted upon her. There is something in Scripture bearing somewhat of that appearance. Paul's life was twice endangered under the forms of law, and twice he appealed to civil powers for protection; once to Cæsar himself. It is true he sought bodily safety, but the case is sufficiently parallel to be quoted. What is to be said, however, respecting those great moral questions which engage the attention of the public, as temperance or the Sabbath? The answer to these hinges upon other questions. Has the state made laws on these moral questions which infringe upon the liberties and privileges of the church? If so, then the church may and should petition their repeal. So far as the Sabbath is concerned, we believe the state has so legislated and should be petitioned to undo it. In this case the church as such has a right to petition. What about prohibition? We have not been able to see that legislation on this point.

has affected the church; hence, though a moral question, the church has no right to petition. Citizens may petition, if they think they ought to do so, but not the church until she is molested.

6. On the whole matter of moral reforms it is to be noted that many are only to be accomplished by voluntary efforts. Some things are to be regulated by the family, by being kept in bounds or kept out, neither church nor state being able to reach them; *e. g.*, doubtful literature. Some things are to be corrected by the government upon petition of citizens. In such case they must be matters affecting the state, else the state could not handle them; *e. g.*, the sale of liquor. Moral questions which are outside the province of the church, and which affect the state, may always be laid hold of in this way, by petition on the part of Christian and other moral citizens.

7. One other question arises relative to the church's attitude towards the state. Granted a settled, civil government, without a rival and without revolution, does not the church as such owe certain duties to that government as such? Beyond teaching the duties prescribed in the Bible to the people as individuals, we fail to see any. The church's duty in the premises is to teach individuals to perform their individual duties to governments and rulers, and if need be to require the performance thereof, by spiritual means of course.

8. Turning now towards the state, we note that the whole moral foundation of the state, as well as of the church, is the moral law. If we leave off the first two and the last commandments, we shall find need for all the others as guides for the civil legislator in the preparation of statutes. Even the first commandment is in practical use whenever an oath is administered. But the fact that we have a moral basis for civil law in the ten commandments is not definite enough. God evidently gave the civil code to Israel, not only for their use, but that it might serve as a perfect model by which the nations should frame their laws.

9. The civil legislator is in duty bound to take the moral law as his guide in framing laws for the commonwealth. This duty is two-fold: to God who gave the law, and to man who needs its benefits.

10. The duty of magistrates and citizens is plain in view of all that has been said. Magistrates are to execute the laws faithfully, if they can do so without sin; if they cannot, they must give up their offices. Citizens are to obey the laws, if they can do so without sin; if they cannot do so without sin, they are to refuse obedience, even though they should suffer for it.

11. The right of revolution is reserved to the decision of the private judgment in the light of God's word and providence.

12. We are now able to pronounce upon the relation of church and state as finally set forth in the New Testament. The church knows no state further than to teach the people their duties toward any state which God in his providence may set up, and to see that her people lead exemplary lives in whatsoever positions they may occupy. The state knows no church as such; she only knows individuals who constitute the state, and she requires of them only civic duties. So long as church and state keep within their legitimate spheres there can be no conflict between them.

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