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ART. I.—NATURE AND PRAYER.

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NATURE is all, say some who now claim the highest place in the scientific world. Whatever may be the cautiousness of their language, the spirit of their teachings renders such a conclusion inevitable. It is one, too, from which the boldest of them do not shrink. There is no supernatural—nothing *above* nature, nothing *aside* from nature. Nature is the eternal Power, the eternal Force, the eternal Motion, the one eternal Cause. There is nothing which is not contained in nature, and does not in some way come out of it. Spirit, if there be such a thing, properly named, is only a *result* of natural or material organization. It is only a form of matter, having, as the old atheists said, a certain σχῆμα, τάξις, θέσις, κίνησις—a peculiar *form, constitution, disposition, motion*. A God—if there be a God in any sense, any intelligence or intelligences transcending the human, any one Being as yet highest and greatest—is only nature's latest product, the remotest stage of progress yet *actually* developed from that infinite store-house of hidden powers containing, *potentially*, all life, all thought, all existence. In polar opposition to this stands the view on which is based all religion, all morality, all eternal and neces-

ART. VIII.—A NEW ANALYSIS IN FUNDAMENTAL MORALS.*

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THE author of the following article, while reading a theological book several years ago, saw, or thought he saw, some confusion of thought in its ethical statements, and was himself also perplexed with difficulties to which he had not been able to find any satisfactory solution. Impressed with the importance of clear views on fundamental morals, he determined to seek for himself an understanding of them. This, on reflection, seemed to him more likely to be obtained by an independent and methodical course of ratiocination than from the perusal of the works of eminent authors. Not indeed because he undervalued that assistance which we derive from the labors of our predecessors, and without which progress in philosophy would be impossible; but because in a course of educational and ministerial study he had already become somewhat acquainted with the various systems of ethics; and he was afraid that further reading, as his mind was then situated, might result only in greater perplexity and bewilderment. Notwithstanding the prepossessions of early training, he had not been able to rest satisfied with that cautious system, of which Dr. McCosh, of Princeton, may now be regarded as the representative and defender, and which holds that our specific perception of right and wrong in different kinds of duty are simple and ultimate intuitions; and at the same time he had been unable to content himself with any of those analytical systems which eminent New England thinkers have advocated, and of which one of the latest and the best has been recently expounded by the president of Williams College. He entered, therefore, on a course of thoughtful investigation, which, after a slow yet gradual progress, has enabled him to answer his inquiries in a manner somewhat satisfactory to himself.

*The Law of Love, and Love as a Law; or, Moral Science, Theoretical and Practical. By MARK HOPKINS, D. D., LL. D., President of Williams College. New York: Charles Scribner & Co., 1869.

The Intuitions of the Mind Inductively Investigated. By Rev. JAMES McCOSH, LL. D. Carter & Brothers.

In these circumstances he inclines to submit his views to the judgment of others, that he may be either confirmed or corrected, as his success or his failure may require, and that the cause of truth may be served by the interchange of sincere convictions. Before proceeding further, however, it may be well to indicate the method of investigation which he adopted. The correctness of results in analytic speculation depends chiefly on method. If one's plan be wrong he has little claim on our attention, however talented he may be. On the other hand, a painstaking man of moderate ability will commonly accomplish something if he pursue the right method.

PLAN OF PROCEDURE.

1. Theoretical morals, or that part of philosophy which seeks to explain the phenomena of moral life, like every other department of science, takes a certain kind and amount of knowledge for granted. Philosophy does not give facts, or the first knowledge of them, but endeavors to explain those of which we are already informed. The science of ethics takes cognizance of those thoughts, feelings and actions which, arising from the distinctions of moral right and wrong, constitute the phenomena of moral life; and it must be pursued by a study of these phenomena as they already exist. It has therefore both the advantages and difficulties incident to all kinds of psychological study. Its phenomenal facts are familiar to the consciousness of every intelligent and thoughtful man; yet the reflex exercise of the intellect necessary to explain these has been found difficult. This is particularly the case with the intellectual phenomena—the ideas, beliefs, and practical judgments of morality; so much so indeed, that the whole controversy hitherto has been regarding the nature and origin of our moral ideas. Philosophers have found comparatively little difficulty concerning emotions, impulses, tendencies and actions, considered as springing from these practical ideas. Our feelings in morals seem to follow the general laws of our emotional and motive nature, so that their nature corresponds to that of our moral perceptions and beliefs, and must be studied in the light of these. The particular consideration of

them, therefore, may be deferred till after the investigation of the intellectual phenomena. It is true, indeed, that rational life furnishes the most important objects of moral thought, and some phases of moral life become the objects of our consideration in other phases: as, for example, when one's moral conduct may become the object of our approbation or disapprobation, praise or blame. Hence our study of moral ideas is conditioned on the knowledge of rational life in general, and in some cases also on that of the more primary forms of moral life. Yet this best confirms what we have said that the difficulties in ethical philosophy lie in an understanding of the ideas and objects about which moral life is exercised. Let us therefore attend to them.

2. The many questions that have been raised in ethics, all, we think, depend on two primary questions; first, "*What essentially are those things or objects of thought of which rightness and wrongness are predicated?*" and second, "*What are that rightness and that wrongness?*" By rightness, as used here and throughout this article, we mean that peculiar quality of an action or end which morally attracts and binds us to it; for there is an inferior rightness, of which we shall have little occasion to speak, and which is simply consistency with or non-opposition to the foregoing. This belongs to that which, in the more emphatic sense, is neither right nor wrong. Now, that most ethical controversies may be resolved more or less directly into the questions above stated, would not, we believe, be difficult of proof; but into this we need not enter. For these questions are in themselves absolutely fundamental in morals, and therefore previous to all others. In any case, if our discourse be of something as having a certain character, we can discern nothing rightly if we do not understand the nature of that something, and of that character; so, if our discourse be of the matter of the moral law as right, we should determine first what this matter and what that rightness are. And in philosophical discourse we should seek to know in what these things ultimately and essentially consist; otherwise, philosophically speaking, we should not know "what we were talk-

ing about." Moreover, as wrongness is in some way the correlative of rightness, it may simplify the discussion to consider the nature of rightness before that of wrongness. Indeed, this wrongness seems to be simply the quality of inconsistency with or opposedness to what is right; and, if this be so, an understanding of rightness will give us immediately the understanding of wrongness also. In like manner, as the obligatoriness of what is right confessedly depends on its rightness, and is an essential or necessary quality of it as being right, it may be wise to leave the discussion of the former idea till after that of the latter.

We have to determine, therefore, what ultimate duty is—or what is the essential matter of the moral law;—and then what that rightness is which we predicate of this duty. But if any one should object to our use of the term "duty," in this connection, to signify "whatsoever may be said to be morally right;" inasmuch as that term has an appropriate meaning of its own, different from this, we sustain the objection and plead only necessity. Our ordinary English does not seem to furnish us with any more convenient word. But in using the term we shall endeavor to avoid misapprehensions.

3. Having then these two points for study, the question meets us: "Which of them shall we study first?" This is a matter of some importance, and one, perhaps, which has not been sufficiently regarded. If rightness, as common speech affirms, be the natural and necessary predicate of something, we certainly should seek an understanding of the essence of the subject, in order to an understanding of the essence of the predicate. For nothing assists more to the understanding of an idea than the understanding of its natural and necessary *locus*. This holds equally whether the idea of rightness be ultimate and insoluble, as many hold, or whether it be definable; and also whether it be an inseparable attribute of duty or whether it be identical with duty, that is, the essential and formal quality of which duty is simply the concrete thing. For our minds proceed from the concrete to the abstract, and from the object to its attribute.

4. Even here, however, we may assert that our idea of moral rightness possesses a distinctive existence of its own, and can not, therefore, be identified with any other of our common practical or motive ideas. It is the office of philosophy to explain, not to explain away, the ideas of common sense ; or, if an idea be ultimate, then philosophy should so explicate its locus and relations as to show that it is ultimate ; but it is equally beyond the power and the province of the speculative reason to deny the correctness of the ideas of the practical reason or to deprive them of any vital element.

5. Holding, therefore, to the existence of duty, *i. e.* of a something of which rightness is predicable, and believing that this duty, that duty, and all duties are morally right and obligatory in a true and distinctive sense, our first inquiry is, "Wherein lies the essence of duty ?" This question of course should not be dogmatically answered, but, if possible, in some way by which one may gradually gain the intellectual assent of himself and others. The present seems to be a case in which we should closely follow that critical process of analysis and generalization, which, carefully eliminating and rejecting non-essential elements, arrives finally at the essence itself. In beginning this ascending process of generalization there is no need to start from individual instances ; we may use those classifications which the practical reason has already made for the uses of life, at least so far as these coördinate with one another. Thus we may speak of the duties of honesty, benevolence, chastity, veracity, loyalty, reverence, and so forth, referring to individual cases only for exemplification.

6. It is also of little consequence for our present purpose whether we use terms immediately descriptive of morally good or right actions, alone ; or whether interchangeably with these, and with a sort of carelessness, as it were, we use the names of the virtues corresponding to these right actions. For honesty, veracity, and so forth, are only those active dispositions which severally aim at and result in different classes of actions, which relate to properly truth, and so on ; and the classification of the virtues and of their actions must be the same. By this we do not mean that the classification of our

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immanent potential virtuous dispositions and that of their actual exercises, is the same, though that is true ; we say that the classification of these dispositions, whether in potency or in act, must be the same as that of the duties or right actions which they have in view and desire to accomplish. We believe, too, that those who have generalized duty or treated of the moral law, have often found it convenient, perhaps necessary, to employ the names of virtues in lieu of describing the actions which are aimed at by them and proceed from them. This freedom of nomenclature, however, must be used with the caution that in all cases of duty we should distinguish between the right action aimed at, and the exercise of our disposition to perform it because right. So, also, we should ascertain carefully whether the term employed in speaking of a duty, belongs properly to the right action or to the virtuous disposition which aims at it. "Moral beneficence," and "the duty of doing good," will furnish a simple illustration of this remark. But our need of critical discernment in the use of language will especially appear in our study of the right exercises of our natural affections and dispositions. For in morals these exercises considered *per se* are called actions, because they are activities aimed at and governed by certain virtuous purposes or dispositions which also mingle with them ; and it is of importance to distinguish them from these regulative purposes.

But whatever may be our use of terms it will illumine our argument to remember that our present design is to analyze and generalize duty, or *right things*, so as to find their essence ; and not, directly, the consideration of virtuous dispositions.

PREPARATORY ANALYSIS.

We shall now, without any enumeration of virtues or right actions, which each one may make for himself, give that generalization which we first formed, and which, though imperfect and not far removed from that of ordinary thought, is perhaps somewhat more philosophical. All duties, we think, may be roughly classified into those of *Moral Goodness*, *Moral*

Esteem, Regulative Righteousness, and Causative Righteousness.

1. In the first class we place all those dutiful affections and efforts whose aim is sensibly and directly fixed on the good welfare or happiness of sentient beings. It includes all forms of dutiful beneficence and benevolence, and the general duty of love toward God and man. For if love be that affection by which we desire and rejoice in the good of beings, we must include love to God in this goodness, although, of course, that love can not be said so much to seek an increase of the ineffable Divine blessedness as to desire and rejoice in its greatness and permanency. We must also beg here for that further extension of the term goodness, by which it may include virtuous prudence or a becoming regard for one's own welfare. And if any object to this wide philosophical use of the expression Goodness, or Moral Goodness, we can only express regret that no other term is at hand sufficiently comprehensive to meet the difficulty.

2. In the virtue or duty of Moral Esteem we include all that special regard, whether practical or affectional, which we feel obligated to exercise towards beings, in view of their moral character. For example, we recognize it as right and dutiful to love and serve God, not only as a being capable of happiness, but also as an infinitely holy being, and we feel the propriety of the precept that we should do good to all men, but especially to those who are of the household of faith. Other things being equal, we ought to give the preference to a good man, and this, too, simply because of his goodness. This law of moral esteem may also call us, or at least permit us, to withdraw all regard from any who may be wholly and hopelessly set on evil. We certainly are under no obligation to love devils. If this be so, this law operates so as to limit, as well as to enlarge, the law of Moral Goodness.

3. The third division of duty, which we have styled Regulative Righteousness, consists in the observance of all the moral laws of life, as being in themselves right and obligatory. Of course where any law or mode of action is immediately recognized as promotive of good, and is followed on that account,

such conduct would come under the head of Moral Goodness rather than of Regulative Righteousness. But we apprehend that many practical rules of life and conduct are observed without any perception or sense of good immediately to result from them, and simply from the conviction that they are right and obligatory. Such laws are those which concern life, liberty, property, and the subordination and adjustment of interests; and those of honesty, orderly conduct, chastity, veracity, submission to proper authority, obedience to parents, to rulers, and to God, and of the faithful discharge of all responsibilities.

We may also add to the above the comprehensive duty of cherishing and regulating various natural dispositions whose tendencies fall in with the aims of moral goodness and righteousness, and whose general workings, therefore, are agreeable with, and, as it were, akin to, duty. This might be called affectional Regulative Righteousness.

4. The concluding division of virtue we have named Causative Righteousness, meaning thereby that form of virtue which aims at the causing or promoting of virtue either in ourselves or in others. All virtue, it is true, aims at causation; that is, at the bringing about certain results; but this alone aims at the causation of virtue, and so, in the absence of a better name, we employ this one. Whatever any one may do with the intention of stimulating and strengthening his own virtue, whether it be simple consideration of what is right, or whether it be more methodical self-cultivation; and whatever he may do by word or deed, by the use of means, by personal efforts, or by the employment of agencies, to maintain and advance righteousness and goodness among men, may be included under causative duty.

5. The animus or disposition of Causative Virtue assumes two forms, namely, the hatred of sin, and the love of righteousness (or of holiness); and the most remarkable development of Causative Virtue is that duty in which we seek to repress sin and promote virtue by means of rewards and punishments. This may be styled *Rectoral Righteousness* or duty; not indeed that this is the only virtue proper for a ruler, or

that it is exclusively exercised by men in official stations; but because its more striking exemplifications are to be found in formal governments. It is to be distinguished from the virtue of Moral Esteem, the essential aim of which is, not the maintenance of the law and the promotion of virtue by means of rewards and punishments, but only a certain regulation of our regards and conduct toward others. It is also widely separated from all other kinds of Causative Righteousness by the peculiar circumstances of its operation, the peculiar means which it employs, and the peculiar feelings with which it is accompanied.

Such is a brief sketch of our first generalization of duty, omitting some difficulties and objections through which we came to it. Having tested it in various ways, and among the rest by comparison with those of others: e. g., of Cicero among the ancients, and of Whewell among the moderns, we found it differently constructed from theirs, as was to be expected, yet sufficiently comprehensive to include every presentable case. All duty seemed to belong either to some one of the foregoing classes, or to a combination of more than one. We felt satisfied with the comprehensiveness of our transcript of Nature's workings, and with the correctness of it, so far as it went.

ADDITIONAL METHOD.

The object, however, of the foregoing classification was simply to bring the whole subject of duty succinctly before the mind, in a way that might facilitate further analysis and generalization. We felt that the ultimate was yet distant. The question arose, "In what way shall we proceed further?" In answer we could think only of that rule which belongs to philosophy no less than to rhetoric, viz.: that we should consider first that part of any subject the knowledge of which does not involve the knowledge of the other parts. Now, of the four divisions of duty, Moral Goodness, Moral Esteem, Regulative Righteousness, and Causative Righteousness, including in this last as its most distinguished element Rectoral Righteousness, it is evident that the second and fourth involve a consideration of the other two. The study of them

therefore should be deferred. Of the other two, Moral Goodness seems to claim first attention on account of the apparent oneness of its aim. This suggests that, if either be more ultimate than the other, it can not be Regulative Righteousness. Neither of these forms of virtue, however, has the activities or exercises of the other for the objects of its own activity; and hence, if they are related, as they must be, if the matter of the Moral Law has some supreme unity, one would suppose them probably to be coordinate developments from the same root, or that the one is in some way a development of the other. In any case their analysis may be expected mutually to assist one another. Such in fact was our experience. An analysis of Moral Goodness into beneficence as a duty and benevolence as a duty, the former of these being not at all a mere expression or manifestation of the latter, was suggested by an analysis and generalization of the various rules of Regulative Righteousness. However, for simplicity, we shall proceed as if the analysis of Moral Goodness had been an independent operation.

MORAL GOODNESS.

The distinction now made, into beneficence as a duty, and benevolence as a duty, is one perhaps seldom noticed, yet it is given even by the Practical Reason. In common language we speak both of *the duty of doing good* and of *the duty of loving*. We ought to do good to others, and we ought to love them: and these things are distinct in their nature. In other words, Moral Goodness as a virtue has two forms: one part of it consists in an inward moral respect for the welfare and happiness of beings, resulting in practical consideration and effort for them; and another part consists in determinately cherishing love, or affection properly so called, for beings. The objective laws which we obey in these exercises of duty are, (a) that we ought to do good to beings simply because this doing is right, and (b) that we ought to love beings—to cherish toward them that natural affection which seeks their good and rejoices in it—simply because it is right in us to cherish this affection.

2. This distinction is so natural to the Practical Reason, that we might conceive of a being capable of the one kind of duty and incapable of the other. We might imagine an intellectual being devoid of all passions and affections whatever, save the one sense of right and of moral obligation. Whether or not, owing to the nature of a rational spirit or some other cause, such a being is an impossibility, yet we may imagine him, that is, we may think of him as having only the practical development of our moral nature; just as we might think of one whose only moving principle would be a sense of self-interest. Such a one, if placed in the midst of ordinary rational beings, could not cherish any virtuous affections, or discharge duty so far as it lies in love, pity, and the cognate tendencies; but he could and would desire to perform every practical duty, and he would have satisfaction and enjoyment in the performance of it. His life would be beneficent and useful to all, especially to the good. He would be loyal, truthful, honest and upright in all things, and he would have satisfaction in the feeling that he had done and was doing what is right. He would also seek to have others discharge their duty, and he would rejoice in their righteousness, and be indignant at their neglect or transgression of the moral law.

Now let us suppose that the Creator gave to this singularly constituted being various desires and appetites, such as the love of knowledge, of possessions, of physical enjoyments, and so forth, having in them no necessary moral quality. After this addition to his nature, our imaginary ethical being would employ his powers, so far as was consistent with duty, in gratifying these propensities; and so, also, he would have a source of satisfaction distinct from and additional to the performance of what is right. He would also, of course, regulate and moderate these propensities, so as to keep them subordinate to the principle of duty. Let us further suppose that the Creator added yet other natural affections, whose general tendency should be a striving for the same ends for which this being, from a simple sense of right and duty, is already striving for. The question now arises, whether this person, having the power of cherishing and guiding his affections, and

finding a general correspondence of aim and operation, either possible or actual, between his perception and sense of duty and these peculiar affections, would not of necessity feel it his duty to cherish and exercise them in a manner consentaneous with the tendencies and aims of practive goodness, that is, of the virtuous disposition which aims at doing good to beings simply because this doing is right? We think that he would, and that he would feel bound to do so, not merely with reference to what practical assistance his affections might give him in his endeavors to do good, but quite as much for other reasons, also, which we shall specify hereafter. And his benevolence, thus promoted and exercised, would no longer be simply a natural but also a virtuous affection.

PRACTIVE MORAL GOODNESS.

The foregoing analysis of Moral Goodness, though not emphasized in common discourse, forces itself upon us if we would distinguish things which, though so intimately related and so practically united as to form a complex whole, are yet essentially different. For that virtuous disposition which we have called Moral Goodness is plainly double; and it separately aims at and manifests itself in two different classes of actions, the practical and the affectional. The query now arises, "How shall we express this distinction in unequivocal language?" Perhaps for this purpose we might say *Moral Beneficence* and *Moral Benevolence*, provided we should eliminate the idea of affection, properly so called, from beneficence, and should think of it only as a strong controlling sense of the rightness and duty of doing good. But this would modify the ordinary idea of the word. Or we might say *Rational Moral Goodness*, and *Affectional Moral Goodness*. Here, however, we would need to emphasize the adjective *Rational*, for every moral act is rational; and rational moral goodness would be distinguished in this respect from the affectional only as having its motive power or tendency purely and exclusively from the Moral Reason. It is simply a sense of right; and on this account also it seems to be of a calmer and more steady nature than even dutiful affection. Possibly the terms Prac-

Practive Moral Goodness, and Commotive Moral Goodness, would more exactly express our meaning than those now mentioned, the former being that which seeks the right doing of good for its own sake; and the latter being that which consists in the determinate exercise of benevolence or love towards its proper objects. Each of these, considered purely as a virtue or active moral principle, mingles in life with the actions at which it aims, the one with the practical actions of doing good, the other with the affectional actions of benevolence. But it is to be noticed that our common thought and language do not distinguish from one another the virtue and the duty of affectional goodness so clearly as they do those of practical goodness. They rather regard both as constituting one complex exercise of mind which may be regarded in one light as being virtuous and in another as right and dutiful. The reason of this mode of thought, which is applied not only to benevolence but also to all the virtues and duties of natural disposition, is, that the purely ethic aim and the natural feeling which it regulates mingle together as motive tendencies and form a unity, whereas in Practive Goodness there is only one motive tendency, that is, the purely ethic; and this is contrasted easily with the practical action at which it aims. Not only so, but it is also more important in daily morals to express the distinction between the practical action and the motive proper to it, than to express that between two motive tendencies, the moral and the natural, necessarily connected and blended in a virtuous life. In the present case, however, we might speak of Practive Moral Goodness and of Commotive Moral Goodness as the two forms of the virtue of Goodness, and of Practical and Affectional Moral Goodness as the two forms of its right actions or duties. But this does not seem necessary.

COMMOTIVE MORAL GOODNESS.

We remark again regarding these two kinds of Goodness, that the Commotive or Affectional seems subordinate to the Practive, metaphysically; or, speaking with more particularity, as to the mode of its development. This may be shown

as follows : The affection of love or benevolence seeks the good or happiness of this or that being or set of beings without any regard to rightness or wrongness ; but Practive Moral Goodness seeks that happiness according to the law of rightness, the perception sense and observance of which law are its very essence. And, as a secondary application of this law to natural Benevolence makes it the virtue of moral Love, we argue the dependence of affectional on rational or practive goodness. For to love aright is to exercise our affections in proper degree and toward proper objects. If any should object here that this places the virtuousness of loving not immediately in love, but in the cherishing and exercising of love out of and according to a sense of its rightness, (when it may be right) we reply that such is certainly the case. There is no virtue in any natural affection or desire *per se* ; it becomes virtuous only when determinately exercised, and its virtuousness depends on its determinateness. This indeed suggested the term Commotive for Affectional Virtue, because it is essentially a determinate moving of ourselves, as having the powers of natural affection, in a manner consensaneous with the aims and dispositions of Practive Virtue. Nor do we think it can be denied that man has thus a faculty of determining the direction and degree of his affections within the range of duty. We do not say that he has power to originate within himself primary virtue or practive moral goodness, but granting the existence and the supremacy of this virtue in his spiritual life, we believe that he has the power to control his affections so as to harmonize them in their workings with the aims of that practive goodness. There seems, therefore, a consistent sense in which man can love God if he will ; in other words, if he be fully established in the primary mind of duty toward his Maker.

THE LAW OF MORAL GOODNESS.

1. If, now, Practive Moral Goodness consists in the *ex animo* observance of the law of doing good to beings, and if Commotive Moral Goodness seems partially explainable as observing this law in a way of its own, that is, as cherishing affec-

tion consentaneously with it, we may reasonably suppose that a full understanding of the law of Practive Goodness will throw light on both these forms of virtue. This law has already been giving as follows, "We ought to do good to beings." The same idea is expressed more fully in saying, "It is right for us, and obligatory upon us, to labor for the good of beings." Now plainly the emphatic word here is *good*. The labor, or the doing, (which is simply labor employed so as to effect its end) would be something indifferent, were it not a laboring for, or a doing of, good. Clearly the whole moral force of the law lies in the end which it sets before us, and which it calls us to pursue as being right. Therefore to understand the law of practive goodness it is needful to understand the nature of that good, which, as a right end, it calls upon us to pursue. For it is noticeable that men speak of right ends, no less than of right actions.

2. Now, it is evident that Practive Goodness does not lead us to seek any private, or personal, or particular good or interest, as such; for if, in any case, we should aim at private good, or some single interest, to the neglect of good or interests in general, we might find ourselves doing more harm than good; or at least we might be guilty of leaving good undone. Either of these results would be contrary to the aims of Virtue. Practive Moral Goodness seeks that good which, all things being considered, will be, not merely a good, but also all the good of which the case admits; which good can be viewed either as a whole, or in its parts as related to the whole. To express this, the generic aim of moral goodness, we can think of nothing better than the phrase "*absolute good*," or "*the absolutely good*," using these words as nearly as possible in their common signification. By "*a good*," as men use the term, we understand anything which invariably or essentially is productive of happiness, and so may be said causally or conditionally to contain it; by "*good*" the same idea in the form of a general notion: and by "*absolute good*," or "*the absolutely good*," we would mean the total of good possible to be realized in any case—that is, in any conjunction or correlation of agencies and circumstances involv-

ing and affecting interests—or any element of that total considered as a part of it. This latter, perhaps, is that form of the notion in which it presents itself most frequently to us. We think of the prosecution of some interest, of the attainment of some particular good, involved in a case, both as good and as falling in with the total of good possible in the case, and so as being in itself unexceptionably and absolutely good. And we need scarcely add that we do this, not with any mathematical exactness of thought, which indeed does not belong to the sphere of moral life, but with a probable and practical judgment.

3. Absolute good is such not because without conditions or limitations, for all good of which we can have any experience is conditioned and limited, but because it is without any *save* necessary limitations. It has no limitations as to the number of its sources or its own specific forms, or as to its time, degree, or duration, or as to its distribution among beings, *save* those which are imposed either by the nature of the case, or by the law of its own fullness and completeness. In short, it is as absolute as good can be.

In dutiful goodness we do not seek the good of the body, neglecting that of the soul, nor the good of ourselves, ignoring that of others, nor the good of any one class or community to the exclusion of the rest of mankind; nor the converse of these things. Every interest of every kind is weighed and allowed for. Moral Goodness follows the impartial, and, as it were, impersonal dictates of Reason as to what is truly good; and in doing so it labors for (and attains) the absolutely good, that good which is or makes up the total of good possible in any case, every interest involved having received its proper consideration. Moreover, in any case where the best possible result may have been already attained, either wholly or in part, Moral Goodness so far forth rejoices in what has been attained, and desires its continuance.

4. If any one here should object that many cases would present practical difficulties when we should come to determine in them the absolutely good, including, of course, the best re-

sult and the best means, we would reply that our present effort is simply to show that a considerable part of virtue is what we have explained Moral Goodness to be; that indeed, it seems a moral axiom that, in every case, we should seek all the good of which the totality of the case admits; and that, if this be so, any difficulty in the practical application of the principle should not be held to invalidate the principle itself. But as a matter of fact, we believe the Practical Reason generally finds itself adequate to the solution of cases of personal duty; and we think, also, that the Speculative Reason, following some proper method, can reach a satisfactory understanding of difficult cases.

5. The explanation now given of the aim of practive moral goodness suggests an explanation of that difference which men naturally recognize as existing between this virtue and every form of benevolence or love. For if, as is plain, both these dispositions aim at good, the one at absolute, the other at the good of this or that being or set of beings, one might expect them to be very similar as modes of spiritual motivity. But, on the contrary, we make marked discrimination between our disposition to do good simply because that is right and dutiful, and our love for one or more beings. It may be said that, in the first case, we aim only at what is right as such, and not at good. This, however, is not the case. As a matter of fact, in Practive Goodness, we always aim at good as being good and as being right; and hence, while one might object to the expression that we aim at good for its own sake, yet we do aim at it as such; and the wonder is that, aiming at it as such, we do not also invariably desire it for its own sake *with a feeling akin to benevolence*. The wonder is that Love or Benevolence (which is confessedly the immediate object of the aim of Commotive Goodness), does not become an invariable and necessary part of our experience in Practive Goodness. For it seems clear that Practive Goodness, or virtuous Beneficence, especially if it be practised on some very grand scale, and with only distant results in view—as in the case of the late lamented Peabody—does not necessarily include love or affection, properly so called, within its experience.

This possible separation of love from that principled virtue which seeks the good of beings, may possibly be accounted for by distinguishing between those motivities of our nature whose origin is from the exercise of Reason, and those whose origin is from our more immediate and direct cognitions. The former, though spiritual tendencies as truly as the latter, are yet not commonly spoken of as such, but as active "principles" of conduct; for example, we speak of the principle of self-interest: while the latter, even though accompanied, guided and regulated by exercises of the Reason, retain their original character as affections, inclinations, sympathies, and so forth; and they are more emotional and impulsive than the former.

Now it is clear that the perception of absolute good is an exercise of that comparing and judging faculty by which man is distinguished above the beasts. The simple notion of good is a product of the Reason in analyzing and generalizing the essential and invariable causes and means of happiness; and the knowledge of absolute good is as yet further conditioned on a consideration of the interests in any case, as involving different kinds and degrees of good, and of their proper treatment so as to reach the best total result. Hence, where a case might present any complication, it is clear that the result, mentally speaking, would be distant—it would be something abstract, as it were, and so, though earnestly desired by the Moral Reason, it would not excite the affections. For Benevolence, as to its first origin and essential nature, does not seem to be a rational tendency. Even brutes, which are without reason, and which seek happiness, not under the idea of good, but under various specific forms of gratification, have yet affection for their fellows, desiring them to participate in their particular comforts and pleasures. Kindness seems to be a sort of natural sympathy between sentient beings whenever they are able to have immediate knowledge of each other's experience and wants; and, though in man it may be more or less regulated by an admixture of Reason, and ought always to be so regulated, it is ever conditioned on an immediate perception of its object, or at least on a perception which, if

mediate, is yet full, direct, and distinct. Whether or not this interposed condition is to be considered an imperfection of our humanity, it seems to assert itself as a fact. We can not love through abstractions, even though they have existence, that is, even though they be existing things or qualities viewed abstractly. But good is an abstraction, in the contemplation of which our minds are often necessarily withdrawn from the contemplation of those living personalities in whom alone it can be realized, and who alone, as capable of receiving good, of enjoying happiness, are the proper objects of benevolence. Absolute good is an abstraction which tends even more than the foregoing to remove our minds from love. And yet further, Practive Goodness, if we may so speak, sometimes seems to aim neither at good, nor at absolute good, but at *absoluteness of good*. By this we mean that in some cases the generic character of the end as good, though an essential, is not the prominent element of our thought, our attention being chiefly occupied by the distinctive and differential character of the good as absolute. In such a case, especially, as this last affection seems impossible—for the mind has no life-like representative image before it of sentient beings as suffering or enjoying—it has only the logical notion of good, and even that in an averted position. But the rational or practive tendency still acts with freedom and energy.

Having now spoken of Practive Goodness, let us next consider Regulative Righteousness : for additional remarks concerning Commotive or Affectional Goodness may be advantageously deferred till we come to that Affectional Regulative Righteousness to which it seems intimately related.

REGULATIVE RIGHTEOUSNESS.

Regulative Righteousness is that general department of Virtue which aims at the observance of right rules for the sake of their rightness. Goodness guides life by giving us aims, and this Righteousness regulates life by giving us rules. But, as already said, these two may be expected in their analysis mutually to illustrate each other ; and our first question is, “ Do the aims of moral Goodness in any way assist us to

understand the rules of Regulative Righteousness?" Using this thought however only as suggestive, let us proceed independently of it.

1. And, first, we remark that although there is no exercise of love, or benevolence, or affection, properly so called, in the conscientious observance of these right rules, each of them seem to have within itself, as an essential element, some reference to *good*. They concern either our property, or our security, or peace, or our freedom, or our contracts, or our families and homes, or our knowledge of fact and truth, or our relations of mutual understanding and reliance; and in short every public and private interest. The only law which at first examination has any appearance of having an existence independent of its relations to good, is that of veracity. Further reflection, however, shows that knowledge and truth constitute one of the most fundamental and invariable interests of men. But it must be allowed that our interest in the maintenance of truth is not always so apparent and obtrusive as some other interests—those, for example, in our property, our labor, or our freedom—and may therefore be more readily lost sight of.

2. This leads to a second remark. Every law of righteousness not only relates to good, but seems also to have for its end to defend or maintain absolute good. It arises from the fact that there are certain constantly recurring or general cases in life, in which the experience and Practical Reason of men approve of a certain course of conduct as, absolutely speaking, the best. Hence the absurdity, "Shall we do evil that good may come?" which might be rendered, "Shall we violate some good, approved as absolute by our Moral Reason, and therefore a right end and obligatory on our observance, that we may advance some private or particular interest?" In short, Regulative Righteousness may be said to be founded on a peculiar application of that law of practive Moral Goodness, which we have already expounded.

JUSTICE.¹

This Regulative Righteousness is what men generally have in mind when they speak of justice or of righteousness, with-

out any qualifying adjective ; and it is a limited development of the law of Practive Goodness.

1. There is indeed a general Righteousness—a "*justitia tota*"—which may be considered to include every form of practive virtue or duty, not only the more protective and conservative but also the more positive and progressive. The requirements and regulations of this righteousness are the applications of the primary law of moral goodness, the law of absoluteness of good ; and they are suggested to reason on a survey more or less extended of the constitution and condition of the natural and of the spiritual universe. They limit each other according to their importance, and are all subordinate to the primal law. For mankind, from their knowledge of things, recognize more or less correctly the requirements of absoluteness of good, which power of recognition, within an accustomed sphere of life, becomes an intuitional habit of Reason, and is sometimes called the Moral Sense. The generalization of these requirements results in the laws of Righteousness.

2. The present nature of man, however, and the uses of earthly life, necessitate a great distinction between those duties, on the one hand, which immediately and constantly press upon the experience and the conscience, because evil or loss would manifestly ensue from the neglect of them or from conduct contrary to them, and those duties, on the other hand, the observance of which leads directly to a clear increase of good or happiness. When Justice rises out of the former sphere of activity, it is not commonly called Justice but the virtue or duty of Beneficence. Ordinary Justice, essentially, is defensive and conservative Righteousness, and is chiefly the negative application of that law which requires us to seek absoluteness of good. For while the law says, positively, "*Have regard for interests absolutely considered ; do good and remove evil,*" it says also negatively, "*Do not cause or permit harm or loss to interests absolutely considered, by doing or by not doing ;*" and this ever is the main animus of Justice. Were we asked to define this justice in common language, we should say, "Justice is duty so far as duty con-

sists in the recognition, defense, and conservation of rightful interests, so far as they may be dependent on our power ; and it includes also the promotion and recuperation of rightful interests so far as this is necessarily connected with the foregoing." By rightful interests we mean those which consist with good viewed absolutely, and which therefore are comprehended in it. These interests, *so far as they may be regarded by justice*, together with whatever may be necessary to their enjoyment, are commonly called one's "rights," or one's "true rights." Such are life, liberty, wages, stipulated services, the possession of property, and so forth, with regard to those to whom these things rightfully or justly belong.

3. Justice, in the broad sense now given (for the word sometimes may have other shades of meaning), has ever been recognized among men as an important phase of moral life, and has also been distinguished from the virtues of Beneficence and Benevolence. The ancients, indeed, not only made this distinction, but gave Justice the place of honor over all other virtues. We have already explained the difference between Justice or Righteousness and Practive Goodness or Beneficence ; it remains that we should account for the fact that, while Justice aims at good, Benevolence is yet no necessary part of its experience. Beyond question such is the case. Even the best of men do not exercise benevolence in telling the truth on the witness stand, or in paying taxes to the civil government ; nor indeed generally in telling truth or paying debts. Nor is there any love in the virtues of chastity, submission to proper authority, and orderly conduct ; all of which are important forms of righteousness. We account for this separation of Justice and Benevolence in two ways. First : we have already seen that Practive Goodness appears not to be accompanied with love in those instances in which its end is discerned only through complicated and abstract thinking. This perception, either from habit or from natural penetration, may be easy for the Practical Reason ; nevertheless it has not the power to excite affection. The same remark will hold more emphatically of Justice. What is occasional with Practive Goodness seems general with

Regulative Righteousness. The formation of the various rules of righteousness, each of which is a conservator of many and sometimes of diverse interests, is an exhibition of great wisdom ; but, on this very account, in using any one of them, we have only a general notion of its end as being good. † Oftentimes, too, owing to the conflict of some particular interest with the requirements of absolute good, our minds are more occupied with the absoluteness of the good than with the good which the rule has in view. All this seems to prevent us from the contemplation and the love of those living personalities whom our action may ultimately effect.

The foregoing appears to be one cause by reason of which Righteousness is not usually—as is, and ought to be, the case with Moral Beneficence—sensibly accompanied with benevolent affection. But we remark, further, that a natural affection or inclination seems to need a *positive aim in order to its development*. This is afforded in the case of Practive Goodness ; but the idea of defending and conserving interests, which is the positive side of Justice, and that of refraining from the injury of interests, which is its negative side, are both, and especially the latter, very negative ideas. They are completely negative in the sense of being non-progressive. At the same time we may hold that the idea of guarding one's self and others against unlawful harm or loss, and even that of refraining from causing such harm or loss, are more positive ideas than that of doing nothing at all in the premises ; and that Justice (so long as necessary perplexity, anxiety, and effort regarding the right, do not occupy the mind to the exclusion of other feelings) may and should be accompanied with the exercise of rational good-will.

4. Possibly the term Justice, though often used, as now, for the notion of ordinary Righteousness, expresses more frequently in men's daily language a somewhat narrower conception. To give this we might say that Justice, in the strict sense, is Righteousness (as we have defined it) considered as dealing with *personalized* interests. For interests are viewed in two ways ; and some interests may be viewed in either of

these ways. They may be regarded as belonging to some definitely known or conceived person or class of persons (most interests perhaps are always so regarded); or they may be thought of simply as being interests, that is, without any such definite reference. Justice appears to deal with interests under the former conception, while Righteousness regards them without using it. A "*jus*," in the strict sense, seems to be the rightful interest of one or more definitely conceived of persons; an "*injuria*" is a doing, or a not-doing, inconsistent with or destructive of such an interest. Possibly the aims of Righteousness can all be conceived of under the terms of this defined Justice—that is, as the "rights" and "wrongs" of individuals and of societies. But we seem able to think of *what is right* and of *what is wrong*, that is, of the aims and aversions of Righteousness, without thinking of them as *jus* and *injuria*; which indicates that Righteousness is the more generalized conception.

5. We have now analysed the virtues of Practive Goodness and Regulative Righteousness, and found them essentially similar. Both of them essentially are a regard for what is absolutely good as being morally right and obligatory; but they are different developments of this regard, the one positive, the other negative. Hereafter, when we may have occasion to speak of both these forms of virtue as forming one class, we shall call them, in relation to their manifestations, *practive virtue*, inasmuch as they aim at practical or executive actions; and, in their relation to other forms of moral excellence, we shall call them *primary virtue*, as they seem the simplest and most original developments of that excellence.

There is, indeed, a yet more primary form of virtue, which, as we have seen, is simply a desire for the absolutely good as being something right to desire, that is, as being a right end, even when we can do nothing towards it; and this we might call primal or essential virtue; but it will suffice for our present purposes to speak of practive virtue as primary.

These remarks bring us to the further consideration of that form of virtue which may be considered secondary, namely, the Commotive or Affectional.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

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ART. I.—SIN AND SUFFERING IN THE UNIVERSE.

By Rev. ALBERT BARNES, Philadelphia, Pa.

[FOURTH PAPER: CONCLUDED FROM PAGE 279.]

§ V.—THE BEARING OF THESE FACTS, AND OF THIS REASONING,
ON THE CHARACTER OF GOD.

IN entering on this part of the inquiry, it will be assumed that these facts are not inconsistent with the *being* of a God. Whatever difficulties there may be in any minds on that subject, or however there may be a disposition on the part of any persons to adopt the doctrine of Atheism, it can not be pretended that there is anything in these facts which can be regarded as inconsistent with the existence of a God, or which would in any peculiar manner strengthen the argument for Atheism. The fact of disorder, and of a violation of law, bringing innumerable evils in their train, proves rather that there is a law which is regular, and which is the result of a plan for the government of the universe, than that there is none; rather that there is a God, than that all things are subject to the control of chance, of fate, or of mere physical laws. In fact, it is impossible to see how any one could take a step in the argument for Atheism as based on the existence

ART. IX.—A NEW ANALYSIS IN FUNDAMENTAL MORALS.

By EDWARD J. HAMILTON, Holliday Prof. Hanover College, Ind.

[CONTINUED FROM PAGE 363.]

AFFECTIONAL RIGHTEOUSNESS.

AFFECTIONAL Righteousness—or, more fully, Affectional Regulative Righteousness—together with Affectional Moral Goodness, seems to constitute a generic class of virtues. For the dutiful cultivation and exercise of such natural dispositions as gratitude, awe, fear, modesty, moderation, candor, fortitude, magnanimity, liberality, and so forth, resembles in its origin the duty of benevolence or right loving.

1. It is clear that none of these natural dispositions are virtuous or moral *per se*. For example, ill-regulated gratitude, that is, ill-regulated affection toward a benefactor, may lead one to do what is wrong in order to please or benefit his benefactor. In these circumstances, gratitude evidently comes in conflict with moral principle and overcomes it; and therefore that special exercise of gratitude is not right but wrong. And if this conflict can happen where gratitude, love, or even reverence, is ill-regulated—sentiments which in the vast majority of cases are right and dutiful—how much more frequently it may occur with those other sentiments, such as fortitude, modesty, magnanimity, and liberality, which, when rightly attuned and exercised, we allow to be minor virtues? The common maxim that one should be just before he is generous contains a philosophical principle; and men, in fact, do not recognise any natural disposition as morally right and excellent save when it may be exercised in a manner consentaneous with the aims and rules of Practive Virtue.

2. We think that a comprehensive expression of the laws of Commotive or Secondary Virtue may be given as follows: *viz.*, “A rational being in the pursuit of what is right, i.e. of the aims of primary virtue, *must and should act with the wholeness of his motive nature.*” This rule, we believe, or something like it, is that actually followed by the Moral Reason; and it may be analysed into the following principles:

(a) While the sense and love of what is right ought to be supreme among our motive dispositions, because it has a supreme and obligatory end in view, (and, indeed, moral principle is not properly called virtue save when considered as thus supreme), the constitution of our nature, and the objective relations of the ends of our pursuits, are such that a supreme or controlling disposition gives law to our other motive dispositions. In this way, also, it is formative of character. By this we do not mean merely that, as virtue is of right the controlling disposition, our other dispositions should of right be limited and controlled by it; though this is true, and also actually takes place where true virtue exists. But we call attention to the further fact, that controlled dispositions oftentimes tend actively to coincide and cooperate with the controlling disposition; a result which seems to follow by a kind of spiritual necessity from the very nature and relations of these active dispositions. This truth, too, holds more emphatically of controlling moral principle than of any other controlling disposition. Primary virtue not only opens up proper and closes improper directions for the outgoings of our natural dispositions, but it also specially encourages and excites various intelligent dispositions, which, with views of their own, can seek the same objects which virtue seeks with views of her own, that is, as being right—and, perhaps, there is nothing which it is right and obligatory for us to do to which also we may not be led by some form of natural disposition; and this, too, not accidentally or occasionally, but continually and by reason of the mutual relations of the elements (and of the objects) of our intelligent motivity. Thus the exercise of certain natural dispositions, within certain limits and modes, comes to be not merely consistent, nor yet accidentally coincident, but naturally and habitually *consentaneous* with the various forms of PRACTICE VIRTUE. Such, moreover, is the nature of the case, that the more virtue is deliberately and fully exercised, the accompanying natural disposition, also, is generally the more excited; for the same thinking or consideration which shows the greater or less moral attractiveness of an object of effort, reveals also a greater or

less corresponding natural attractiveness. It is plain, also, that any exercise of motive tendency which may be opposed or impedimental to that exercise of our dispositions which in any case is consentaneous with practive virtue must also be impedimental to the exercise of that virtue itself, and should therefore be disregarded and surmounted. It is right, therefore, and obligatory upon us to exercise our natural dispositions in certain modes, because the more simple and spontaneous exercise of PRACTIVE VIRTUE involves a similar consentaneous exercise of natural dispositions; because the more deliberate and self-regulated exercise of virtue involves generally, perhaps always, a correspondingly increased or diminished exercise of the accompanying disposition; and because the disregarding and surmounting of all impediments to the full exercise of virtue (which is a duty) is equally effective and favorable for the natural disposition which is to be gratified in the attainment of the same object. For example, in a case where we are bound to do good to others, the feeling of what is right and dutiful is naturally accompanied by a feeling of benevolence; and the more deliberately, persistently and fully the former is cherished and exercised, the more the latter also is experienced. In like manner, liberality is the inevitable characteristic of one who fully and earnestly discharges the duty of giving. And in each case it is right and obligatory to cherish and exercise the natural disposition, as involved in the exercise of the PRACTIVE VIRTUE.

(b) While the foregoing thought, rather than that of any positive assistance given to PRACTIVE VIRTUE by uniting with it the power of natural disposition, seems to us the leading element in the law of COMMOTIVE VIRTUE, we can not exclude the idea of assistance or service. Our obligation to do right is unqualified; but this involves that every power of our nature, not only the virtue of that PRACTICAL MORAL REASON, or MORAL SENSE, by which the right is discovered and felt, but also every other motive tendency should, so far as possible, be brought into the service of right. A man thoroughly devoted to his sovereign seeks to have others also serve him; and so the PRACTICAL MORAL REASON, if it have the power—the Con-

science if it be a good Conscience—engages all our motive tendencies in the pursuit of duty. We even feel instinctively that any tendency which can unite its energy with that of Rational Virtue, and which does not, is opposed to it.

(c) Another strong ground of Affectional duty different from either of the foregoing: It is that both right benevolence and every other grace of natural disposition may be regarded as being in itself an absolute good. Rightly exercised affections are among the most permanent, powerful and widely operative means of happiness with which God has endowed his rational creatures: even as these same natural affections and dispositions, when wrongly exercised, may be the sources of untold evil. Thus Affectional Righteousness strikes one root, as it were, into that Primal or Essential Virtue of which we have already spoken.

3. Before leaving this part of our subject we must remark that Benevolence, as seeking good, though not absolute good, may be considered a closer and more honored ally of Primary Virtue than any other natural tendency of the soul; and also that when rightly formed and exercised it is a greater good and source of happiness than any other. Next to this disposition in moral importance is that fear and respect with which men regard those in power and authority. For, although we may honor and obey parents and civil rulers when they would have us do what is wrong, our respect for them generally operates in favor of right: and then that reverential fear of God, who is the King of kings, is justly mentioned in the Bible, and especially in the writings of the Old Dispensation, as the representative element of all piety. For, with creatures such as we, and indeed with all creatures, reverence is the necessary concomitant and assistant of practive dutiful respect for the rightfulness of Jehovah's reign. With creatures like us, and situated as we are, the virtues of Benevolence and of Reverence are nearly of equal practical importance. Close after these comes Gratitude; a virtue which might be described as a natural return of benevolence in circumstances which make it consentaneous with remunerative Justice. The other virtues of natural disposition follow this triad, but with a long interval.

MORAL ESTEEM.

Let us now, proceeding with our analysis, inquire into the nature of the remaining departments of virtue and duty; viz., those of Moral Esteem and of Causitive Righteousness. For it is not to be forgotten that our first classification was confessedly superficial, and designed chiefly to prepare the way for a more searching investigation.

1. First, then, we remark, that the law of Moral Esteem, although it seems to modify the simple law of Moral Goodness, can not properly be said to conflict with it. It does not appear to require the neglect or injury of any absolute interest, nor the withdrawal of love from any being in any degree fit and possible to be loved. On the contrary, Moral Esteem, like Practive and Affectional Righteousness, seems a peculiar and necessary development of Moral Goodness. It operates in a two-fold way: first, practically, leading us specially to favor and assist the good, and then, affectionally, leading us to love them with an especial regard, feeling that this special love is right, and that the absence of it would be wrong. In neither way does it conflict with the essential law of Goodness, which is to seek the absolutely good.

(a) For, as to *practical treatment*, duty never seems to require that we should neglect or injure one class for the benefit of another; but only that the good should have such special favor as may be consistent with the best good of beings in general. A special favor is not necessarily a robbing of the common store, but often is consistent with our utmost endeavors for the general prosperity. No other than such favor seem allowable even toward the righteous. Moreover, no moral law seems to require *per se* the neglect or ill-treatment of the wicked. On the contrary we seem bound to strive for the good of the wicked so long as they are capable of good, and in all cases in which their good may consist with absoluteness of good, that is, may not be productive of evil greater than itself. Whether the infliction of primitive evil furnishes an exception to this rule, will be discussed hereafter. At present it is enough to say that the law of Moral Esteem may sometimes require us to deny special favors to the

wicked—favors such as moral goodness would cheerfully and safely grant in other cases—but even this only as a reproof and check of wickedness. The practical operation of this form of Virtue, as distinguished from that severer righteousness which we call Primitive Justice, would not, we think, affect the wicked further than the foregoing; and this evidently is not inconsistent with the aims of simple Moral Goodness.

(b) In like manner the *Affectional operation* of the law of Moral Esteem consists with that of Moral Goodness. This latter requires us to cherish and exercise love for beings in a manner consentaneous with the aims of Practive Goodness. We can not love beings too much in this way. But an increase of love for the morally good does not interfere with the exercise of the duty of benevolence. For, as the eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear with hearing, so the heart is never so full of love that it is not capable of more. On the contrary, special love to the good—for example love to God—puts us in more perfect sympathy with them, and enlarges the heart for virtuous benevolence. But as to our affectional moral esteem of the wicked, we need scarcely say that the hatred of beings has no place within the domain of duty, and that this specific kind of duty seems to leave untouched the requirement of Moral Goodness to love all beings so far as we *can*, and so far as we can *consistently*, while aiming at absolute good. Moreover, this kind of duty brings to view three important grounds of limitation to the exercise of virtuous benevolence, which may operate singly or together. In the first place, an unrestrained love for the wicked would lead us to favor them unduly, that is, in a way injurious to absolute and general good, more often than love for any other class would lead us to favor them unduly. We feel it, therefore, to be peculiarly obligatory to love them only in a way consentaneous with the aims of Practive Virtue. Secondly, we evidently should subordinate our love for wicked beings to the claims of primitive Justice. A love which would prevent or neglect the punishment of the wicked when they ought to be punished, would be itself a wicked love. Whether this

limitation can be ultimately identified with the foregoing may be discussed elsewhere. And, in the third place, we are no longer under obligation to love the wicked when, by reason of their hopeless and determined wickedness, they have ceased to be the possible objects of our affection. In this last instance a natural law seems to determine the limit of duty in some such way as follows: Two spirits, when placed in company, and made able to understand each other's experience, would naturally have benevolent affection for each other, the simple sympathy of sentient beings. Various causes might then tend to increase and strengthen, or to weaken and destroy this affection. In particular, the moral goodness of each being would strengthen his power of natural affection, and would also make him yet more attractive to the affection of the other; and so the moral goodness of both beings would form a bond of mutual attachment, capable, we believe, of being stronger than any other. But if one of the beings were morally bad, that is in any respect or degree opposed to what is right, the other, though morally good, would of necessity love him less in proportion to his wickedness, than he would were it possible for him to regard that other being without any reference to moral character. Nevertheless, his moral goodness, if perfect, would lead him to love that other so long as he was an object possible to be loved, as also it would lead him to labor for the good of that other in all possible ways so long as there might be any hope of doing him good. But in case that wicked being became so purely and thoroughly evil that love for him should be no longer possible, or in case through his wickedness he became so hopelessly lost as to be no longer susceptible of good, the end of duty would be reached. Whether these cases always accompany each other we need not discuss; but it is plain that in either case, or in their conjuncture, considerations connected with moral character would be determinative of duty, and would justify a discontinuance of practical or affectional regard. But clearly no one of the limitations now mentioned—neither that directly from absolute good—nor that from punitive justice—

nor that from a sort of necessity of nature—is inconsistent with the law of Moral Goodness.

2. In thus showing that the department of duty which we have called moral esteem and consideration does not conflict with the essential aim or law of Moral Goodness we have prepared ourselves to show how it *originates* from that law. That the duties of Moral Estimation arise from their relation to absolute good may be argued as follows: (a) So far as practical consideration of persons because of their moral character is a doing good to a class without injury or loss to others, it is a direct application of the primary law of morals: it is a seeking of absolute good. But, as a rule, special favor toward those morally good is possible in a way in which it is not possible in the case of others. Take, for example, circumstances in which confidence in character or the honoring of right principles is needed, or may be a determining consideration. (b) The rightfulness of special regard for the good rests also on higher ground than mere non-interference with the welfare of others. For favor shown them as being good is succor and assistance given to the cause of virtue. Of this weighty ground of duty we shall speak more fully under the head of Causative Righteousness. (c) Then as to our affectional esteem we have seen that, owing to a strong law of spiritual affinity, the good must needs love the good. Special affection, therefore, for the good is as inseparably bound up with simple moral goodness as general benevolence is. Just in proportion as we have that rational desire for the right, or the absolutely good as being right, we must also have personal love for those in whom this principle is prevalent and powerful. The former motive tendency necessitates and involves the latter, and so imparts to it a moral character. (d) Finally, it is to be remarked that love for the good is itself an absolute good, and should therefore be cultivated and cherished as being in itself a right end. This pure and high affection is one of the chief sources of that blessedness which is diffused throughout the holy society of heaven. Causative Righteousness, which is our last division of virtue and duty, is that species of virtue which aims at the maintenance and promotion

of virtue in every form. It also, of course, seeks the suppression and destruction of vice ; that is, of all forms and degrees of disposition in rational beings which conflict with and oppose virtue. 1. Evidently it is conditioned on the fact that a rational and moral being is able to regard himself and others as rational and moral, and is able to exert influence or power on himself and on others, either favorably or adversely, to the exercise and development of virtue. When he may use power or influence favorably to virtue, and does so because he feels it to be right and dutiful to do so, then the animus of his mind is what we have termed Causative Virtue. 2. It is clear also that this animus may exist where one may not himself be able to do any thing toward that particular promotion of virtue which he desires. Thus a poor bed-ridden man might earnestly desire that the Gospel should be preached to the heathen, without being able to do anything towards the realization of his desire. True, he could do much through prayer ; but without thinking of this indirect efficiency, and regarding him as wholly impotent, we would yet consider his earnest desire as a virtue. In other words, Causative Righteousness, essentially, is such, not because actually causative of virtue, though it frequently is so, but because it desires the causation of virtue ; or, more simply, the existence of virtue as a right end ; and because whenever it has the power to maintain and promote virtue it uses this power to that end. 3. There seems to be no species or form of virtue which Causative Righteousness does not desire to perfect and promote. This scarcely needs proof. That primary or practive, and that secondary or affectional, virtue, which have been already discussed, and that virtue of moral esteem, which has been resolved into specific developments of these others, and even Causative Virtue itself, are all the objects of the care of Causative Virtue. As to this last assertion, we of course do not say that any one simple act of Causative Virtue could aim at itself, but only that one exercise of Causative Virtue may aim at another. For example, Christians may encourage and sustain each other in evangelical labors ; but, in all cases, what is immediately aimed at is *virtue*, that is, the full exercise of

moral principle, or of the disposition to regard and seek what is right. As we may have recurring occasion to speak of virtue as aimed at by Causative Righteousness, we may sometimes, when viewing it in that relation, call it *object-virtue*.

REFLEX EXERCISE OF MORAL PRINCIPLE.

The analysis of Causative, like that of Practive and of Commotive virtue, and, indeed, of every motivity of spirit, must proceed from an investigation of the ends which it properly has in view. Before proceeding with this, however, we may notice what one might call *Incipient Causative Righteousness*, or what might be named the Reflex Exercise of Moral Principle; though we should regard this latter expression as less adequate and complete than the former. This mode of Causative Virtue is more subtle than any other, and the exercise of it frequently mingles in our bosoms with the exercise of the virtue which it promotes; therefore those who would assure themselves of its existence and its specific nature, should regard it with peculiar attention.

1. The exercise of such virtue is evidently conditioned on the existence of a self-regulative faculty in man, by which he may guide and regulate his own virtue as well as his other motivities. Beyond doubt we have such a faculty. For first of all the soul has a *reflective* faculty whereby it takes cognizance of its own states, tendencies and acts, and of their true nature, value, character and objects. This faculty is indeed a part of reason; and it differs from mere consciousness, which even brutes may have, in that it is attentive and discriminating. By it reason also takes cognizance of all those operations in which she participates, and especially of man's moral thinkings and movements: that is, one faculty of reason observes and judges of all the operations of man's rational life. In the next place, it is clear that man is able to exercise desire or motive feeling concerning his own rationally understood experiences and motivities as well as concerning other objects of thought. Hence men, in fact, often exhibit the desire to be virtuous; they wish to be willing to do what is right. Sometimes they may desire virtue only as personally advantageous to themselves, in which case their desire would

not be of the nature of virtue; but sometimes, also, they desire virtue because it is, in effect, an accomplishing of right ends, and also for its own sake, as we say, that is, because it is in itself something absolutely good and right to be desired; in which case, or if they desire virtue for either of these reasons, their desire is itself of the nature of virtue. Thus Christians virtuously desire that they themselves and others may grow in grace.

Finally, we remark, the soul, as reflective, has the faculty of intelligently directing and developing its own motivities, and in particular its own moral dispositions. This faculty seems to depend on the power which one has of fixing and guiding the motive regards of his own mind. Thus a man, in the intervals of the actual performance of some practical or affectional duty—and perhaps even while he is engaged in it—has a faculty of encouraging or dissuading himself as to its performance. Now should he, with and in the exercise of this self-regulative faculty, purposely strive to be virtuous; this would be a simple and rudimental form of Causative Righteousness. He might thus be doubly virtuous, first as simply seeking what is right for its own sake, and then again as desiring and striving to do so. In the first instance his purpose would be simply to do what is right; in the second his purpose would be to have and exercise the disposition of virtue.

2. The chief aim and animus of this incipient or subjective Causative Righteousness seem to be precisely the same as those of the object-virtue which it promotes; and, therefore, we may say that the chief element of it is a reflex exercise of moral principle. For example, a man may consciously desire and strive to be morally honest simply that he may do honest things, which is also the aim of honesty; and he may desire and strive to be morally truthful in order that he may speak the truth, as he ought to speak it, which is the aim of veracity. In these and similar cases the causative virtue is only a reflex exercise of the virtue caused: it is the essential moral disposition of some species of virtue seeking to strengthen and perfect itself so as better to accomplish its

proper aim. At the same time we allow that even incipient Causative Virtue often—perhaps generally—corresponds somewhat with other more deliberate and methodical forms of Causative Virtue in regarding virtue as an end in itself, and not merely as leading to the special ends aimed at by the form of object-virtue promoted.

3. It is not so easy to distinguish between the simple exercise of moral principle and the exercise of Causative Virtue which aims at it, in the case of a Commotive, as it is in the case of a Practive virtue. We can, however, conceive of an earnest consideration and feeling of the rightness and dutifulness of right affection and of Commotive virtue, as preceding and leading to the exercise of Commotive virtue. This might be distinguished from a simple sense of the duty of right affection as immediately regulating, inciting, and mingling with that affection. We should not regard this as an unfounded refinement of thought; although it is in no way necessary to the system we are unfolding.

4. Incipient Causative Righteousness and Commotive Virtue closely resemble each other in that they both aim at the regulation and guidance of motive feelings or tendencies, and this too within the personality of the one moral agent; but they differ in respect to the motivities with which they deal, and as to their aims or laws: the one would make natural disposition consentaneous with moral; the other would give to moral disposition its own right developments. The workings of the causative virtue are also of course peculiar. To stimulate and strength the dull or weak conscience, to inform and regulate the unstable or eccentric conscience, and, as those may be needed, to modify and to conform to truth those habits of disposition into which even the Moral Reason falls—these are the practical uses of virtuous reflection.

5. The consideration of that reflex exercise of Moral Principle, which we have now repeatedly mentioned, is of some importance in connection with an understanding of the nature of virtue in general. Many, who have found two forms of virtue, the promoted and the promoting, closely and constantly connected in our experience, have spoken as if all

virtue were essentially and necessarily reflective and self-regulative. But primary or practive virtue seems to consist simply in the seeking of absolute good, i.e., the absolute of natural good, as being right, and not in the self-regulation of moral principle. For example, intentional self-regulation is not an essential or necessary part of beneficence, honesty, or veracity. These involve only the objective exercise of reason and rational tendency. In like manner, affectional or secondary virtue, essentially, does not seem to involve the intentional regulation of the moral principle which it includes ; it consists simply in the sustained and promoted consentaneity of natural affection with Primary Virtue. We shall, however, have further occasion to speak of this reflex exercise of principle.

MORAL GOOD.

The more pronounced and methodical forms of Causative Virtue include those in which one may use outward means for his own moral improvement and rectitude of life—as for example, the exercises of religion or the society of the good—and those also in which he endeavors in any way to maintain and promote righteousness and virtue among men.

1. The animus of Causative Virtue thus developed seems to consist of the same elements which we have found in its incipency, but they are combined in a different proportion. In the incipient or subjective forms of Causative Righteousness, though the immediate effort of the mind is to promote some form of righteousness or virtue, this righteousness is chiefly regarded as something effectual for the realization of the right end, which it seeks, and which also is prominently within the view of the mind; we see that what it is right and obligatory to do, it is also right and obligatory to cause to be done, and do not think so much of the righteousness itself as being in itself a right end. But in the more developed forms of Causative Virtue, though we may often have the right things to be accomplished by the object-virtue more or less consciously in view, yet we generally aim chiefly at the object-virtue, or at object-virtue in general, as something good in itself and right to be sought without any very distinct notion

of the right results to proceed from it. The end sought after by the mind in this second case is, in our conception of it, very different from the ends aimed at by object-virtue. For we regard virtue as being in itself an end, and as a very great, comprehensive and excelling end; which end also we generally call *Moral Good*; as, for example, when we speak of the moral good of a community or of an individual.

2. Such being the case, let us now endeavor to obtain a correct analysis and understanding of the idea of moral good, i. e. of that notion under which we conceive of virtue when we regard it as in itself, or *per se*, a right end. But some may say, "No; the notion of moral good is absolutely simple, and therefore analysis and explanation of it are impossible." Two considerations, however, render it difficult for us to yield to such advice. In the first place, the case is one in which an earnest and thoughtful mind asks for an analysis of the presentation of the Practical Reason, and also for something common in the matter of this right end with that of others. And, secondly, we think that reasons can be assigned for virtue being to us a right end, which satisfy the mind as truly analytical and explanatory, and also as analogical with the nature of other right ends.

3. These reasons of course reveal themselves fully only to critical and analytical thought. But they are suggested by that phrase which the common and practical judgment of men uses to express its notion of virtue as a rational end. For we certainly regard Moral Good as a species of absolute Good, a peculiar and most important species; nor can it be disputed that we aim at virtue as a right end under this notice of it; and not only so, but we believe it would be difficult for us to think of virtue as a right end after divesting it of this notion. It is evident too, that if, in duty, we labor for virtue as a right end because it is a form of absolute good, and therefore something right to labor for, there is in this a perfect analogy with the fundamental law of primary and secondary virtue.

THE SUMMUM BONUM.

The modes in which moral is also absolute good, and in

view of which, we believe, the Practical Reason regards it as a right end, may be stated as follows :

1. In the first place, Virtue is an absolute good *as permanently aiming at and continually maintaining and accomplishing things absolutely good*. For as we have seen the aims of virtue—or right ends—consist of all forms of absolute good, and are sought and realized partly in practical, partly in affectional, actions. (a) As to the first of these the good which Practive Virtue effectually labors for must be regarded as absolute, whether sought for and accomplished by Moral Goodness or cared for and conserved by Regulative Righteousness. For although the notion of good is more prominent in the aim of Goodness, while the absoluteness of the good, and consequently the rightness of the end, is more consciously prominent in the aim of Righteousness, nevertheless, as we have seen, both good and the absoluteness of it are involved in every aim of Practive Virtue. Sometimes, too, as we have noticed, Goodness seems even more exercised about the absoluteness of the good than about the good; for example, good men, in seeking to improve and ameliorate the condition of imprisoned convicts, would chiefly consider what method of doing this would be truly or absolutely good; and we would say that they were more exercised about the right mode or form of good, or about the right way of doing good, than about good or doing good. Sometimes, on the other hand, in a case of justice or righteousness, men have their attention more called to the good involved and cared for than to the absoluteness of it; as when the oppressed widow demanded rightful aid from the unjust judge. Such cases confirm that analysis which makes practive virtue of every kind aim at the absolutely good. Virtue, therefore, is absolutely good as practically aiming at and realizing absolute good. In like manner, as we have seen, Commotive Virtue essentially is a regard for that absolute good which necessarily belongs to right exercises of our natural affections by reason of their implication with primary virtue, of their practical operation, and of their intrinsic excellence. It may, therefore, be considered as permanently influential for and causative of this good. Hence ob-

ject-virtue in general may justly be regarded as an absolute good, and, therefore, also a right end, since it is the natural and permanent agency and cause of all those multiplied forms of absolute good which this disposition seeks and labors for. For, as has been repeatedly remarked, whatever is permanently and by reason of its own nature productive in any way or ways of peace, comfort, happiness, or blessedness, men call a good; and they seek it under this notion as an end, and under the additional notion of absoluteness as a right end.

2. But, in the second place, Virtue is regarded as an absolute good because of *certain natural and invariable results*, which, as distinguished from the ends at which it aims, may be called its *concomitants*. These may be specified as three. (a) First, there is the *loveliness* of virtue, if we may use this term to signify the attribute of being a proper object of affection. Virtue of course is the quality of a spirit, and aside from the spirit to whom it belongs has no existence. Constant mental reference to this fact contributes to clearness of conception in morals; for in some forms of ethical thought the notion of personality is more prominent than in others, though it is present in them all. In the case under consideration we can easily distinguish the loveliness of a virtuous person from the moral attractiveness of right, practical and affectional conduct considered as an end. Moral loveliness is that pre-eminent personal attractiveness which nothing save the possession of virtue can confer. We distinguish again between this and mere loveableness, or amiability, because the latter belongs to natural rather than to moral character. Moral loveliness is a quality which specially attracts and unites the good together in pure affection; and it is the condition of the mutual love of holy beings and of the happy fellowship of Heaven. A perfect exemplification of it is found in the character of our Saviour. Now, evidently we should labor for virtue as being thus because of its loveliness, a mighty bond of union and an exhaustless source of blessedness to rational beings. (b) A second concomitant closely allied to the foregoing is that *well-ordered condition both of inward capacity*

and of outward relations which conformity to the laws of rectitude produces in the case of virtuous beings. For such is the constitution of the universe, and such the mind of the Creator, that virtuous beings, though seeking absolute good, and not good as privately related, are yet in the way of receiving greater good, personally, than they could in any other course of life. Hence all nations believe and say that it will be well with the righteous, but that evil will overtake the wicked. (c) A third concomitant, as a source of which also virtue is unqualifiedly and absolutely good is *that satisfaction which the virtuous have both in the conscious possession and exercise of their own virtue and in the beholding of the virtue of others*. The rational spirit has a deep and peaceful happiness in realizing a conscious harmony between himself and that law of absoluteness of good which he regards as right and obligatory; and the virtuous spirit has similar pleasure in seeing others also obedient to that law. He also rejoices in his harmony with all powers and agencies of good, and with the mind and government of God. Vice, on the other hand, excites unrest and dissatisfaction in the sinful spirit.

BLESSEDNESS.

The happiness which thus results from virtue, by reason of its moral loveliness—its concomitant personal prosperity—and its inward satisfactions, when thought of as fully realized, gives to us the Christian notion of blessedness. This great and holy happiness is the endless portion of the inhabitants of Heaven; and it differs vastly in nature and in degree from all happiness not conditioned upon virtue.

It is an interesting question whether, in dutifully promoting virtue as an absolute good, we conceive of it more as thus generative of prosperity and blessedness, or as an agency intentionally seeking what is right, that is, the absolutely good. We can not discuss this question now, but would express the opinion that men generally realize the rightness of promoting virtue more under the latter view of it. At the same time it is clear that virtue often becomes to us a right end as being a generative source of good and happiness. True, we may

labor for the virtue of an individual or of a community while we are governed by some merely natural affection or tendency (which may have been enlarged and liberalized, though not subdued, by reason); and in this case our conduct would not be virtuous. A bad man might desire his son to be a good man, or a wicked ruler that his people should be virtuous; nay, men may even from a selfish principle desire to be virtuous themselves. Nevertheless it is evident that we may and do virtuously desire the spiritual good of ourselves and others; as, for example, when Christians seeking the absolutely good as right labor and pray for the *salvation* of sinners.

THE GREATNESS OF MORAL GOOD.

The convictions which men have of the greatness and importance of moral good and of its obligativeness as a right end, can scarcely be accounted for by the course and conclusion of things in this world. Such are the present limitations and checks of man's condition that virtue has not free scope for the accomplishment of all the good which it desires and labors for, or for the production of that with which it is naturally accompanied; nor yet have pride, selfishness and passion the power to do all the evil to which they directly tend. But there is a deep conviction among the more thoughtful portion of mankind, that, in the total of existence, virtue will find herself grandly efficacious for good, and vice terribly productive of evil. Even for temporal interests, thoughtful men hold virtue to be a great and absolute good, and vice a great and absolute evil; but their sober estimate of the inner and essential importance of these things can scarcely be accounted for in this way. They must and do regard virtue as something likely to be productive hereafter and indefinitely of untold good, and vice as the natural cause of untold evil. Nay; as rational beings must be either virtuous or vicious, men regard virtue, not only as the cause of vast good, but also as indirectly preventive of all that evil which the vice which it displaces would bring about.

ORDINARY LANGUAGE.

If, as we have seen, moral be the greatest and most com-

prehensive form of absolute good, it should, of course, when contrasted with other right ends, be granted a preëminence; just as the lower and less comprehensive forms of absolute good should be strongly distinguished from those forms of good which are not absolute, or which, though absolute, are not viewed as such. For example, limiting terms somewhat, we might designate by natural, absolute, and moral good, respectively, *first*, good considered as private or individual and not as regulated or affected by the law of absoluteness; *secondly*, all of absolute good which does not lie in virtue and moral life; and *thirdly*, that absolute good which does lie in goodness, and righteousness, and virtuous life generally. And we might do this the more boldly, because there seems to be something correspondent to it in ordinary speech, whenever we speak of good simply, or of natural good; then of the right; and finally of moral good; considering these as three different ends or aims of the rational spirit. However, in *philosophy* one should use language as now suggested very sparingly, and only when the context might make his meaning plain.

DIFFICULTIES CONSIDERED.

The doctrine now elucidated from the analysis of our pursuit and promotion of virtue as a right or moral end is, that the essential condition of virtue being a right end is to be found in the fact that moral good is a species of absolute good; and so that the matter of duty in Causative Righteousness is *generically the same* with the matter of duty in all other departments of virtue. Now we suppose that most persons will agree that virtue is an absolute good, and that, too, in the modes we have specified, and that it is right and obligatory to seek virtue as being thus absolutely good; but it may be questioned whether it is only under this aspect or view of it that we seek it as a right and obligatory end. To such questions we reply as follows:

1. The only way in which we could hope fully to satisfy the objector would be by inducing him to follow without undue prepossession the same course of patient analysis that we have followed ourselves. For, as men's minds have not im-

mediately acquiesced in many even of the most correct conclusions of philosophy, so we can not expect such acquiescence here. Only thought and study can enable one to feel the force of analytic truth. The following considerations, however, are submitted for the assistance of sincere inquiry.

2. The fact that absoluteness of good is *the only quality* which pertains in common to all ends which are right ends, and that this quality pertains *to them only*, is very significant. For no other ends save right ends have this quality of absoluteness of good.

We can regard the Moral Law, that is, all right and obligatory ends and the actions connected with them, generalized and viewed as a comprehensive ideal object—we can regard this law as a concrete thing; and we can regard the rightness of it, that is, of its ends and actions, as a quality, viewed abstractly, belonging to the Law. Now if the analysis of that law, which consists confessedly of conceptions of things that are right, shows that these conceptions are also invariably of things that are absolutely good, is it not likely that there is some necessary connection between these two qualities, of rightness and of absoluteness of good? May not we conclude that one of them is in some way a condition of the other? And would we not be confirmed in this opinion if, on further investigation, the conceptions of the moral law apparently include all possible forms of rational actions and aims which contain absolute good?

3. And, indeed, the more we scrutinize the matter, we find that absoluteness of good in the end or action prescribed is the condition of the moral rightness of it. We have seen this to be the case in all the simpler requirements of the Moral Law; it is so also in the duty of promoting virtue. For, let us mentally abstract this condition; let us suppose that in promoting virtue we should not accomplish any good whatever of any kind. How quickly under such a supposition does the duty of caring for virtue fade away?

4. Nor should it cause difficulty here, that men in laboring for virtue may think more consciously of its peculiar species as moral good, than of its generic character as absolute good.

This is but natural. In many other cases we have to think and ponder whether the good proposed agrees with the law of absoluteness or not, but in this case that question can not be raised ; and so the mind is chiefly occupied with the specific character of the good—*at the same time, however, thinking of this as conferring on the good both its absoluteness and its greatness.* For it would be absurd to suppose that a disposition whose very nature, in whatever form, is rationally to seek and effect absolute good should not be absolutely good itself. In addition to which, consciousness and experience teach men that this disposition is absolutely good both in its operations and in its concomitants. As a matter of fact men always regard moral good as absolute.

5. Finally, we believe that much misapprehension and difficulty as to the condition or reason of the moral rightness and obligatoriness of virtue as an end may be obviated by a clear understanding of the following statements :

(a) First, it should be borne in mind that virtue as moral good has *an exceedingly marked specific character of its own, by which it is contrasted not only with all other good but even with all other forms of absolute good.* It is the absolute good, not of the outward actions or natural affections, but of the inner moral dispositions of rational beings. It is an absolute good because the beings who possess it habitually do every right action, whether practical or affectional ; and also, because, in thus doing, they bring about a holy blessedness in which they themselves and all holy beings participate. When we consider the nature and the developments of this good, we ascribe to it a spirituality, a comprehensiveness, a greatness and a permanency, which distinguish it from and elevate it above all other good. Hence it is not to be wondered at that excellent men, desiring to maintain for themselves and others an exalted appreciation of virtue as a moral end, have sometimes seemed to deny that virtue is a good at all. At least one might infer from their language that in thinking of virtue as a moral end, they think, or suppose they think of it, not as a good, but as an end higher, that is, more morally attractive and obligatory, than any good or than all good. For our

part we think it sufficient to say that virtue is a far higher end than any other good—that, indeed, it is the highest conceivable form of absolute good which can be originated from the nature of rational beings; and we believe that good men promote virtue under this notion of it. For, if they dutifully labor for virtue, first as the agency which seeks, and, so far as possible, realizes all things that are absolutely good, and then as the generative and diffusive source of a holy blessedness, which also is an absolute good, they certainly in this labor for what they consider an absolute good. But here let our course of thought be properly understood. We have not asserted hitherto and do not now say that virtue is dutifully sought *for its own sake as a great and absolute good*, but only that virtue is an absolute good and that by reason of its being such it becomes also a right and obligatory end, and that it is dutifully sought on account of this rightness. We have not come to that point of our inquiry at which we propose to investigate the nature of moral rightness and the mode in which it is dependant on absoluteness of good. But we have seen how in the case of virtue, as in all others, the rightness of the end is conditioned on its being something absolutely good, and thus that absoluteness of good is the invariable and essential characteristic of all those actions and aims which constitute the matter of the Moral Law.

(6.) But, in the second place, it should be noted that *virtue is absolutely good in various modes and directions, and that it is a right and obligatory end in every mode and direction in which it can be viewed as absolutely good*; which fact, if it be not fully apprehended, may lead to confusion of thought. Virtue is a right end as seeking, maintaining and accomplishing all things absolutely good—as producing all absolutely good affections—as being morally lovely—as conforming rational beings to the conditions of prosperous existence—as giving a satisfaction *sui generis* to all holy beings; in all these ways virtue is permanently, and, by reason of its very nature, an absolute good. And in the case of every one of these modes in which we consider virtue as absolutely a good we regard it not merely as a good to its possessor, but as

generally diffusive of good, or as a general good. For in every case we look at the good absolutely. Consequently our complete notion of virtue as an absolute good or right end, is an exceedingly comprehensive one, and is founded on a high generalization.

Hence objection might justly be made should we teach that our conception of virtue as a right end includes either only one or two modes of good, or good only as privately related. On the one hand, for example, it would not be enough to say that virtue is a dutiful end because it is the bond of the harmonious and affectional fellowship of rational beings, though this is true; nor yet that virtue is a dutiful end because it is a general source of blessedness to rational beings, though that is true. These expressions might be objected to as not giving the whole truth as to the various modes of the rightness of virtue of which the Practical Reason is conscious; this, too, might be done by those who could not give any more complete and satisfactory statements. And, on the other hand, it would be insufficient to say that we should seek the moral good of an individual, or of some set of individuals, because it is his or their moral good. This would be true, because in this case the particular good, being moral, would also be absolute; that is, it would be a part of the absolute total, *and would really be considered as such*. But the statement might be taken to mean that the ground of duty in promoting virtue is simply and only the good of the person or persons morally improved, others being disregarded—in other words, that virtue is a moral end as privately related to its possessor; which would not be true. An illustration of these remarks may be taken from the duty of seeking and promoting *piety*, or that form of rational life which consists in and proceeds from moral regard for God as the greatest and best of persons. It would be weak and insufficient to say that we should labor for piety because of the right and good things which it strives for among men, and equally so to say that it is a moral end because of the good and blessedness which it confers on its possessor and the society of the godly. These things, indeed, as being absolutely good, and

when so considered, are aims of virtue. Nevertheless, in promoting piety we are and should be chiefly influenced by knowing that the Good Lord takes pleasure in the right conduct of his servants, in their deeds of beneficence and in their lives of love; that the Holy Ruler of all has satisfaction in the virtue and righteousness of his creatures; that our Heavenly Father delights in the unfeigned affection of his children; and that the God of Love rejoices in the assured prosperity and blessedness of those that fear his name. In short, we should labor for piety as being the highest development of virtue, and the chief good in every possible way, and in the eyes both of God and man.

(c) Thirdly, it should be remarked that virtue as an object of thought has various relations and attributes in addition to those which constitute it a great absolute good; and *our minds may be sentimentally impressed by those aspects of virtue, even while we are dutifully affected only by its abiding and absolute excellence.* Hence a good man, in speaking analytically, might find a difficulty in seizing and presenting with exact correctness those aspects of virtue in which he regarded it as a right end; especially as these are closely and necessarily involved with others. For example, moral disposition and conduct may be considered as conducive to or destructive of the good of some individual or community, that good, however, being thought of only as privately related. In such a case we would say that virtue was regarded, not as a right thing, but as a good thing. Or virtue and vice may be conceived of simply as dispositions with which we may or may not sympathize. Or virtue may be looked upon simply as something amiable and vice as something hateful. Or we may view moral conduct as giving satisfaction, or the reverse, to the agent or to others—as being solemnly enforced by authority and legal sanctions—or as about to bring the moral agent rewards or punishments. These and other particulars cause us to regard virtue and vice with various sentiments and with a general complex sentiment; yet, except so far as they indirectly commend virtue as absolutely good, they do not excite our sense of duty in respect to it. They should, there-

fore, be distinguished from those aspects of virtue in which we do regard it as absolutely good, and therefore a right and obligatory end.

RECAPITULATION.

We have now analysed all of virtue, and consequently all of the Moral Law, or of that duty at which virtue aims, with the exception of rectoral righteousness. Before considering that let us recapitulate the results of our analysis. First of all, there is Rational or Practive Goodness, of which Regulative Righteousness is a peculiar development, and which consists in desiring and aiming at all forms of absolute good as right, and so in the *ex animo* performance of all actions which contain absolute good, as promoting or conserving it. More simply it is that animus, or disposition of mind, which seeks the absolute of natural good as being a right end. Secondly, there is Affectional Virtue, which includes benevolence, reverence, and gratitude, as rightly exercised, together with all the other virtues of rightly ordered natural disposition. It is founded partly on the fact that owing to the constitution of our nature Practive Virtue necessarily involves an exercise of our natural dispositions consentaneous with itself, and partly on the fact that these dispositions thus exercised are themselves things absolutely good in their immediate experience and influence, and in their practical operation. For we are bound to cultivate and maintain right natural dispositions as being both necessarily involved with the pursuit of absolute good, and as being things absolutely good themselves. Next, we have the virtues of Moral Esteem and Regard. These, observe, contain right and necessary limits which arise as to our practical and affectional duty towards the wicked; and they lead us especially to seek the good of the righteous as being both immediately, and governmentally and causatively, an absolute good, and yet more to cherish special love to the righteous as being like benevolence necessarily involved in other virtue, and also in itself a great and absolute good. Finally, we have Causative Righteousness or virtue which, in seeking righteousness or virtue, resembles all the foregoing forms of virtue in aiming at the absolutely good.

For Moral Good is in its own nature pure and priceless.

2. Thus, in finding a generic agreement between absolute natural good and moral good as absolute, we find that material unity in the Moral Law, which is demanded equally by philosophy and by the common reason of mankind. At the same time, by insisting on the very marked specific character of moral good, and on that excellence—spirituality and greatness by which it is distinguished from all other good—even from such as it may be right and obligatory for us to seek—we have endeavored, while explaining, not to disfigure our notion of Moral Good. For, beyond question, it is difficult to set forth the nature of moral good in the terms of ordinary language. Those who say that it is not good as directly and indirectly producing peace, comfort, happiness, blessedness, and as preventive of the opposite of these things, and this too endlessly and by reason of its essential operation; or who at least deny that it is a right and obligatory end as thus productive and preventive, assert what is true in more ways than one. Indeed, what they say is true according to all the lower or more limited conceptions of the Practical Reason. It is only when our notion of virtue as an end or of moral good becomes completely filled out and perfected by the application of the notion of its absoluteness, that the Practical Reason comes to consider it a right and obligatory end. Moral good, however, thus viewed, appeals to a different element in our motive nature from that which even this same good would affect under any limited aspect; just as the absolute of natural good when seen to be absolute is no longer what is good, but what is right. It is not then matter for wonder that pious and able men have long and earnestly protested against various systems of ethics, which, without insisting on the idea of absoluteness, have in one way or another made good a condition of moral rightness. Such systems of necessity tend to weaken if not to destroy our distinctions of right and wrong. At the same time sufficient allowance can scarcely be made for the difficulty of expressing the high generalizations, necessary to analytical morals, by means of the limited terms and conceptions of common

language. Of all departments of philosophy ethics is the least adequately furnished with an appropriate nomenclature.

RECTORAL RIGHTEOUSNESS.

Now, as to that Rectoral Righteousness which has been described as the most striking form of Causative Righteousness, we need not dwell upon it at great length. For, if its essential animus be the love of virtue and the hatred of vice, it is easy to see that absolute good, and that of the highest kind, is the matter at which it aims. 1. We do not know how far any may find such a statement objectionable. Perhaps all will accept it so far as *the justice (or justness) of rewards* is concerned. By this we mean that, in addition to the law of Moral Esteem already explained, the only other law leading us specially to favor the righteous is that of Causative Virtue. These two laws are easily distinguishable one from the other. In dutiful moral esteem we favor the righteous essentially, because this favor practically and affectionally is a thing absolutely good; and if, at the same time, we desire to encourage them and others in virtue, this end is not prominent in the mind, but rather an accompaniment of that essential end. In Rectoral Righteousness, on the contrary, we offer and confer favor as a *reward*, and think of it as such, and *the essential aim of this kind of duty is the maintenance and promotion of virtue*. And although this exercise of Causative Virtue may, in turn, be accompanied with an immediate and dutiful regard for the rewarded person, these two dispositions of mind and their aims are clearly different. We do not know that any one holds that the bestowal of rewards on the virtuous, as being right and dutiful, involves any peculiar principle of duty additional to these now explained.

2. Nevertheless, some hold, or seem to hold, that the infliction of punishment on the wicked, as a thing right and dutiful, is chiefly founded on a principle of duty altogether different from any that we have specified. They say that Punitive Justice looks simply on *the inherent ill-desert of sin*, which ground of punishment is to be regarded as an ultimate and insoluble fact of morals. They may allow that sin should be punished, in order to the support of the Moral Law, and

in the behalf of virtue ; but yet they hold that the essence of punitive justice is to punish sin because of its inherent ill-desert, that is, because it ought to be punished, and that this principle is simple, ultimate, irresolvable. We consent to the truth that sin has an inherent ill-desert, and that it should be punished because it ought to be punished, i. e. because its punishment is right and obligatory ; but we take issue with those who say that this is a simple and an ultimate principle.

THE ILL-DESSERT OF PERSONS.

The expression ill-desert, in morals, has plainly a two-fold application. First, it seems properly applied to persons considered as evil-doers and as related to punitive law ; and it then signifies the obligation (or obligatedness) of a person to punishment by reason of his sin or ill-service. For, in morals, we are the servants or subjects of the law of right. When we say that a person deserves ill, we mean that he has transgressed or disobeyed the law, and is therefore affected by the claims of punitive justice. Ill-desert has precisely the same meaning as demerit, and is the peculiar relation in which the sinner stands to punishment as something right and obligatory. It is just obligation to penalty because of one's disregard of the moral law ; and the reason of it is that the moral law and the cause of virtue must be honored and maintained. Such a desert, though simple, is yet not an absolutely simple and ultimate principle. It is a development of the duty of maintaining and promoting virtue and the right. In other words, it is an application of the principle of Causative Righteousness.

THE ILL-DESSERT OF SIN.

Secondly, the expressions ill-desert and demerit are applied, not to the transgressor considered as brought under the force of penal law, *but to his sin as a causative of the foregoing relation.* Hence that ill-desert of sin already mentioned. This ill-desert of sin evidently is that quality in personal moral conduct which renders it the just ground of the ill-desert of the evil-doer. It is the heinousness of sin. In other words it is the character of *sin as being absolutely and extremely evil in that*

it is opposed to right doing and to moral good, and as being thus the ground for that punitive duty which has been described. For the end and essential aim of punitive justice is to suppress and prevent and, so far as possible, to destroy sin, by means of threatenings and punishments, simply because it is sin, and as such morally evil and hateful. But clearly, in this sense of ill-desert, penalty or punishment is not a thing right and obligatory simply as suffering inflicted on the sinner, and without reference to its operation in favor of the cause of right and virtue. On the contrary, it is still simply a suitable and necessary means of suppressing wickedness and of maintaining righteousness — that is, of promoting the requisite agency and the highest form of absolute good. The resolution, therefore, of the matter of all duty into the observance and pursuit of absolute good is consistent with the idea of the inherent ill-desert of sin; and indeed it enables us better to understand that idea and feel its force. For it explains it as arising from the fact that sin is wholly and intensely evil; which evil, as the opposite of moral good, we are under obligation to repress and destroy.

DIFFICULTIES OBIATED.

We believe that the views, now presented, of Rectoral Righteousness, whether as promotive of virtue, or as repressive of vice, can not be set aside by analytical argument; nevertheless difficulty may be found in the interpretation of all our experience in accordance with them. For it is to be acknowledged that in the more rapid and impulsive discharge of the duty of Punitive Justice, we appear sometimes to aim simply at the suffering of the sinner, without thinking of any end beyond that. And, indeed, there is a sense in which we may truly say, that not merely indignation or righteous anger, but also the calm and deliberate exercise of the punitive disposition, aims at the infliction of penalty without regard to any end beyond this infliction. The following considerations however may contribute to relieve the subject of obscurity.

1. In the first place, it is important to understand that in the exercise of punitive justice, our minds do not think of

any end *other than the maintenance of the cause of right and virtue*. Other obligatory ends may be and often are connected in our minds with the aim of Punitive Justice; but they can not be considered as essential and necessary to it. Such, for example, are the reformation of the offender, when this is possible, the peace of the community, and the preservation of civil order and government. These are all right and obligatory ends; and each of them is frequently promoted by punitive actions. But it would be a mistake to explain the punitive moral disposition as aiming essentially at them. It seeks simply to maintain righteousness as the supreme and absolute good, or rather to suppress vice as the extreme of absolute evil.

2. In the next place, we remark that our minds do not commonly, in their practical workings, regard the punishment of the sinner, and the maintenance of right and virtue, as two distinct things: *they rather regard punishment as being one thing, viz., the infliction of suffering or loss on the evil doer so as to maintain virtue and the moral law*. This is a case in which two notions coalesce so as to form one notion. There is first the idea of the infliction of suffering on the sinner, and secondly the idea of the maintenance of virtue and right. The mind may distinctly conceive of each of these things, and may also think distinctly of their connecting relation. But in the common notion of punishment, both of these ideas, together with the thought of their connecting relation, are contracted together, and are no longer two, but one. Punishment, therefore, though properly analyzed and defined by the speculative reason, as suffering inflicted on the evil doer so as to maintain virtue and right, constitutes but one object of thought to the practical reason, and is inflicted as containing its own end, and not for any end beyond itself.

Moreover, in compounded notions of this kind, it is to be noticed that one element is generally more distinctly apprehended by the mind than another: for various causes lead us to put the stress of the mind's attention on one element rather than on another. In such a case we might say that one element is *thought of* and the others only *referred to*,

meaning by this last an indistinct kind of thought. In the present instance the idea of suffering inflicted on the evil doer seems generally, and especially in the more rapid and impulsive exercises of the punitive disposition, to be more prominent than the idea of the maintenance of virtue, and the suppression of vice. Hence, in an attempted analysis, it may be taken as the only element. But both ideas are always present; both are essential parts of the notion of punishment, whenever this is conceived and spoken of as being or including an ultimate end.

3. Something similar to this occurs in the formation of the notion of *good*, which, like that of punishment, is not absolutely simple and irresolvable. A good may be defined as an object which, either immediately or mediately, is a condition of some form of relief, peace, comfort, satisfaction or blessedness. The conception of anything as a good may, therefore, be said to involve three ideas; first, that of an object viewed by itself or as to its natural essence; secondly, that of satisfaction in some of its forms, whether general or particular, moral or natural; and thirdly, that of the conditional relation of the object to the satisfaction, whether the object be a mediate or an immediate, an active or a passive, cause of the satisfaction. Of these three ideas, when they are compounded into one, the notion of satisfaction (including relief from any distress), is that which principally affects the mind; and yet it is commonly less definitely apprehended than the idea of the conditioning object. For, in most kinds of good—property, for example—the conditioned satisfactions are so various that they can be conceived only in the general. Hence, and because of the immediate presence of the object, the notion of satisfaction seems, as it were, to hide itself within that of the object. Yet it is always there; and like the flavoring ingredient which constitutes the pleasing quality of a fruit, it gives to the idea of the object its importance and attractiveness as being good. Such seems to be the common notion of a good; and men accordingly think and speak of a good as being an end.

4. That we have correctly analyzed the notion of punish-

ment as a right end, and have given truly the right end which it contains, will make itself evident, we think, on a little reflection. For, it is to be remembered, that punishment as a duty is a part of what is right and not of what is wrong, and that consequently we are at present directly concerned only with the aims of virtuous indignation and of justice, not with those either of purely natural anger or of wicked anger and hatred. Now, though it may be allowed that even the moral faculty sometimes acts rapidly and impulsively, in righteous indignation, it is yet clear that we never act virtuously without some moral thought. Such cases, therefore, must be accounted for by saying that the Practical Reason, when she forms for herself such a notion as *punishment*, or as *good*, follows it by a sort of habit, and often applies it instantly; recognizing its intrinsic value and obligatory character, yet not analyzing it so as to know distinctly the elements of the notion, and, in particular, those parts of it which give it value and authority as a rule. But *when we act slowly, and especially when we deliberately reflect upon our conduct, then the essential reason of the rule appears, and by this only we justify ourselves in the use of it.* This is a principle of general application in morals. As to the present case, it is clear that no good man would consider himself justified in inflicting punishment on his children or on other persons subject to him, if he could not on deliberation conclude that he thereby was honoring and maintaining the moral law and serving the cause of virtue.

ANGER.

In this connection we think it important to distinguish Anger, including therein even righteous indignation, from the proper and essential animus or motive disposition of punitive justice. Anger, like benevolence, seems in itself to be only a natural exercise of disposition, and to become moral only as consentaneous with justice. Like benevolence, too, it may be divided into the purely natural or instinctive, the rationalized, and the moral; but in every form it seems conditioned on a much nearer, fuller, and more vivid view of its object than is necessary or possible, for such beings as we are, in the case of

the moral faculty. Instinctive anger, which even brutes exhibit, and which may be regarded as the simplest and purest form of anger, has no connection with evil, viewed absolutely, nor with any general evil, nor even with any instance of evil which can be apprehended only through the processes of the reason ; it deals in every respect with particulars only, and with these as immediately perceived. And, even when more or less rationalized, anger is still conditioned on a full and vivid view of its object, that is, of some person as doing harm. For example, we may be instinctively angry on suddenly finding that some one has lost money for us through his incompetence. Whenever any particular person or spirit, in some particular case, is suddenly perceived as causing or striving to cause harm, then we are perturbed and impulsively desire to repel, not simply that harm, but that spirit as harmful. This rationalized anger is nothing more than the instinctive anger acting with some admixture of rational thought. But when we see some particular person, endowed with reason, striving to do some specified evil which we know that he should avoid as absolute and wrong, and so also committing sin, which is moral evil within himself, then our anger becomes consentaneous with the animus of Punitive Justice ; indeed the two for the time seem to coalesce ; and we impulsively seek to suppress and conquer that spirit as doing evil and as acting evilly. This kind of anger is called indignation. It is anger as moral, or as consentaneous with the views and aims of Punitive Justice. It may be distinguished, however, from that animus of justice with which it coalesces, not only as being the impulsive element, but also as regarding sin rather as a doing of evil and wrong than as also being itself moral evil. Its view does not seem to be so comprehensive and far-reaching as that of Justice ; in which fact we have another indication than even Moral Anger has its specific form, rather than its origin, from the Moral Reason. The full and proper aims of the latter are more comprehensive than those of any sudden impulsion or passion.

2. When Anger is thus consentaneous with the true animus of Punitive Justice—which animus essentially is hatred for

sin as evil—it is not wrong but right. Indignation seems to be an assistance given by our natural constitution to our moral faculty, so as to intensify our attention, and to secure and stir up our activity. Nevertheless, anger of any kind does not appear to be consentaneous or even consistent with the dispositions and aims of duty, if cherished after the exciting occasion of it has passed away. It is then recognized as a disturbing element in moral life. In this respect it is strikingly contrasted with Benevolence, which fact is significant of the truth that good is ever the main and essential aim of duty, while evil, whether punitive or remedial, is inflicted only as subsidiary to good. The animus of punitive justice, however, remains after righteous indignation may have passed away. It gives life, endurance and power to one's determination to punish the guilty.

3. Here it would be interesting to study particularly that perturbation and impulsiveness which characterize both natural and moral anger, but especially the former; and also to discuss that wicked hatred of persons which seems to be a chronic perversion of the motive animus of anger without its perturbation and impulsiveness. But the former of these topics belongs rather to psychology than to ethics, and the latter to an analysis of sin rather than to the theory of duty; at which last only we aim at present.

We think, too, it has been shown sufficiently that Punitive Justice properly aims to inflict penalty on the evil doer because this is right and obligatory; and that penalty, as such, is right and obligatory as repressive of moral evil and as promotive of moral good.

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ART. I.—A NEW ANALYSIS IN FUNDAMENTAL MORALS.

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[CONTINUED FROM PAGE 559.]

THE GOAL IN VIEW.

WE HAVE NOW determined the matter of the Moral Law, in other words, the essential nature of that subject of which moral rightness can always be predicated. It is the absolutely good considered as an end of rational desire and effort, which notion evidently contains three related elements, namely, those of good, of absoluteness, and of the end of rational desire.

We have seen, too, that rightness is not an accidental predicate of absolute good as an end—that there is a necessary connection between these two things—and that the latter is the condition of the former. Thus we have found the natural *locus* or essential subject of the quality of moral rightness, and have found that this contains three related conditions of its existence, and only three. Let there be some good, let it be an absolute good, and let it be considered as being a possible end of desire and effort to a rational being, and immediately we recognize it as something right and obligatory.

2. Since, then, the absolutely good as an end has always and necessarily the quality of rightness, the question arises, How is moral rightness related to an absolute good end? Evidently this must be in one of two ways. Either it is the attribute, viewed abstractly, of which the absolutely good, as being a specific end, is the concrete thing; that is, it is absoluteness of good as belonging to something and constituting it an end; or else it is some property belonging to the absolutely good, as being (by reason of its nature) the end that it is; or, in other words, some property either included in or necessarily connected with absoluteness of good as constituting anything an end. Now, if Moral Rightness (as some contend) be a thing absolutely simple and irresolvable, we should say that the latter supposition is the true one; and in this case Moral Rightness might be said to be that peculiar and indefinable attractiveness which the absolutely good, when practically presented, exercises on one who has motive moral reason; that is, it is the attribute of *its being an end* of desire or intelligent motive tendency—*its final-causality*, if we may use the expression. For although this can not be conceived to exist apart from the absolutely good, of which it is a property, it can yet be distinguished from it. Nevertheless, although we should consider any who should hold the foregoing view as not differing much from ourselves, we prefer to say that Moral Rightness (as men think of it, and as it truly is,) includes *both* the idea of absoluteness of good and the idea of the final causality or inherent attractiveness of this; and, indeed, that the former idea is the more consciously prominent element in our notion of moral rightness. In other words, we believe that moral rightness is the abstract quality of which the absolutely good as being a specific end, or the absolute good as attractive to the moral reason as motive, is the concrete thing; and that the moral rightness of any end and its absoluteness of good as constituting it the end of moral desire, are identical.—The present discussion shall have reached its destination when our reasons for this opinion shall have been given. Before giving these, however, it may be well to consider with greater exactness the elements

of that idea which we now propose to identify with the notion of moral rightness, for this may remove some causes of confusion which otherwise might affect our thought.

ABSOLUTENESS OF GOOD.

The notion of good has already been sufficiently dwelt upon, especially in the discussion of Causative Righteousness and Punitive Justice. At this point, therefore, we shall only emphasize the fact already stated that some forms of good, even of absolute good, are vastly higher than others; not only as containing more happiness or blessedness in themselves, but also as being eminently congruous and coherent with the aims and dispositions of virtue in seeking absolute and general and universal good. All moral good is of this character; and hence it is very difficult to express in language our full notion of it as a right end. To say simply that moral good is a right end as producing or yielding happiness, satisfaction or even blessedness would be poor and insufficient language, did we not complete and fill out the notion by a specific consideration of the circumstances of the case and by an application of the notion of absoluteness to them.

1. This notion of absoluteness has been already explained in the discussion of Moral Goodness. We often call a thing absolute when we think of it as having reached the full development possible in the nature and necessary relations of the particular thing considered. The absolute power of a sovereign is that which is unrestricted by any limitation save those of the agencies and means of his kingdom. An absolute promise or refusal is that which can not be any more of a promise or a refusal. Absolute knowledge, in any case, is that which is so complete that it can not be added to. So, when we seek absolute good, we seek the total of good possible in any case, disregarding of course any relations save those which may be necessary to the realization of this total. We may also—and we often do—conceive and speak of a thing as absolutely good, and so as right and obligatory, because it is a part of this total. For then, of course, it may be considered absolutely

good as contributing to make up the total, that is, in a case that is included within another case.

2. By the term case in this connection we mean any conjuncture of circumstances—including agencies, instrumentalities, and conditions generally—by which one or more interests are affected. Thus Honesty is a virtue in view of, or in relation to, the general case in which men deal with men as obtaining and having material goods, or property. The law of absoluteness of good determines that certain relations of having or possession should be instituted, respected and observed, and also in what ways and how far. Murder, on the other hand, is a crime in the general case of man preserving or destroying the life of man. For the law of absoluteness determines that man should not take but sustain the life of his fellow ; and also the modes of limitation of this duty. The law of absoluteness in morals may be further explained by saying that there are three general cases in which we can conceive of its application.

(a) First, the case may be one in which *the power or influence of the moral agent himself is engaged*. In such a case the attention necessarily fixes itself on that particular action or exercise of power on the part of the agent by which he may contribute his part to make the case productive of all the good possible in it ; and he then regards the required action as absolutely good and morally right. The action is thought of in its relation to the case and to its own consequences—and so becomes right and obligatory. By far the greater part of virtue pertains to the general case now considered. (b) Secondly, there may be cases in which interests, and consequently interests viewed absolutely, or absolute interests, are involved, *in which other moral agents are engaged, we ourselves having no power to do anything* ; and which yet press themselves as facts upon the attention of the mind. Take for example, some war in which the freedom of a people or other great interests are involved. Many people can not go and fight on the battlefield. What does duty require and virtue do while one is a spectator of some such conflict? Clearly it is to recognize the absolute good at stake—or good as viewed absolutely—

and to desire the realization of it, the success of the right. Not to desire that result or to desire something different from it would be an offense against morality. (c) Thirdly, cases are possible in which *no personal agent, but only natural causes*, may be thought of as at work so as to effect the welfare of beings. Take, for example, a dismantled vessel hurried by the storm on a distant reef of rocks. In the contemplation of such a case, putting natural feelings out of view, what would virtue be? Would it not be to desire the safety of crew and passengers? The man indifferent to that would be a hardened wretch; and wreckers, who for their own profit might desire the shipwreck, would be committing sin. Here, as before, we are morally bound to desire absolute good; that is, all the good which may be or may seem possible in the case. This is the only right end.

3. It makes little or no difference in the theory of this paper whether we say that the Moral Faculty aims at absolute good or at good viewed absolutely. For these two are practically identical; inasmuch as the only way we have of perceiving absolute good, whether more or less exactly, is by that absolute exercise of reason which disregards all relations save those which belong to good as such, and which also disregards none of them. The fact, however, that the absolutely good is thus perceived through an exercise of reason, gives to us at once a permanent and fixed morality, and an explanation of the varying moral convictions of mankind. Perhaps the most exact statement of the matter is that the aim of the mind in duty is the absolutely good as seen by the exercise of reason proper for seeing it, or the absolutely good as viewed absolutely; thus combining the objective and the subjective in one. The truth of this statement is especially evident in those cases in which the moral reason has to act on probabilities; for in such cases we clearly seek that which, so far as we can see and know, is absolutely good. Hence, also, in morals the natural and proper contrasts of the absolutely good are not merely absolute evil and good that falls short of the absolute, but also good not viewed absolutely, even though it may be absolute. Good not viewed as absolute might be called

privately-related good, whether it be absolute or not, while good which falls short of the absolute as being only particular or personal when it might be absolute or a part of the absolute—and also good which is so particular or personal as *practively* to conflict with the absolute—might be called *privatively-related* good. For example, a merchant, in an honorable business, may seek good as privately related, but in an evil or useless business, he would seek good both as *privately* and as *privatively* related. In the first case his conduct would not be virtuous ; in the second it would be wrong and sinful.

ENDS IN ETHICS.

An end may be defined as that which is an object of desire or intelligent motive tendency, using these expressions in the widest possible sense. There are two ways in which a thing may become an end or object of desire to man in his ordinary and practical life. First of all a thing may be desired for its own sake, and then, after that, a thing may be desired for the sake of something else of which it is a cause or condition. Accordingly ends have been divided into ultimate ends and subordinate or instrumental ends. A man may desire a good house to live in as an ultimate end, and the tools to make it with as a subordinate end, or he may desire the rest and comfort of his home as an ultimate end, and a means of conveyance to his home as an end subordinate to this. Whether an end be regarded as ultimate or as subordinate by the Practical Reason can be determined only by a questioning of experience. At present we have been chiefly concerned to know what ends men seek as ultimate in moral life, or what the Moral Reason regards as ultimate. For evidently any ends which are sought only as subordinate and instrumental to these, and which derive all their rightness and moral attractiveness from these, can not be considered necessary moral ends—can not constitute the essential matter of the moral law. We therefore eliminate all subordinate moral ends.

So, also, we need not discuss such aims in duty as are suggested by *expediency*. For expediency does not pertain to ultimate ends, but only to the use of proper means and in-

strumentalities in cases where there can be reasonable question as to the best use of them so as to effect the ultimate ends in view.

2. Now, in every ultimate end—in every thing that is truly and emphatically an object of desire—three things are to be noticed; first, the object viewed in its own true nature; secondly, the desire corresponding to it; and thirdly, the power of the object to attract the desire; but of these three elements of thought that of the object in its own nature is ever the most prominent in the consciousness. The word attract, in this connection, is of course metaphorical, and must be taken to mean only that the object is the natural occasion—not the efficient cause—of the desire. Moreover, in every specific or particular end we have a specific object, a specific motive tendency, and a specific attractiveness; the specific object being the prominent element. In other words what makes anything, that is an end, *the end* that it is, is its own nature as objective to the mind and as attractive to the spiritual tendency corresponding to it. For this correspondence, arising from the constitution of our nature, is such that the object reveals to us the desire which as an end it implies. Hence it is clear that for the understanding of any end we have only to understand the thing itself, which, when objective to spiritual thought and tendency, becomes an end, by reason of its own nature.

In the larger portion of this article we have been examining all possible kinds of actions and other objects which are right as ends, in order to determine their general nature, and consequently their specific character as ends; and we have found that the common and necessary character of them all is absoluteness of good.

3. For it is of importance to notice that an ultimate end in practical life is not always ultimate in the same sense in which a truth or principle may be ultimate to the Speculative Reason. An ultimate truth is always absolutely simple and irresolvable; it represents an ultimate element of existence. But an ultimate end is the ultimate object which the mind has in view, whether this object be simple or complex; and

the notion of it analyzable or not. Thus food, clothing, society and occupation, are each of them ultimate yet complex objects of intelligent desire. So, also, we have seen that the notion of good, though that of an ultimate end, is not absolutely simple. It is that of something viewed as to its natural capacity to yield satisfaction. This capacity is oftentimes permanent and manifold; by reason of which the full definition and analytical conception of some specific kind of good is a matter of difficulty, and for which reason also we sometimes seem to exalt the idea of good above that of happiness or satisfaction, the good being as it were the fountain out of which manifold satisfactions flow.

This capacity of the good to yield satisfaction is also considered as characteristic or invariable; though this invariability is not always absolute, but often conditioned, the conditions being, as it were, taken for granted in our conception of the good. For example, property, as a species of good, is considered an invariable means of comfort and satisfaction; that is (of course) to those who have the good sense to use it rightly, and who have the need of what it can afford. In like manner what is morally right is an ultimate end to the Moral Reason, although (as we think, and hope to show) the notion of moral rightness is capable of analysis and definition.

ACTIONS IN ETHICS.

The foregoing views of ends as subordinate and as ultimate to the Practical Intelligence may prepare us to understand the doctrine of moral actions, concerning which some confusion of thought seems to prevail. For men often speak of actions as being essentially or intrinsically right—as being right *per se*—and as being themselves ultimate ends to the Moral Reason; which language we must accept as true.

1. The various meanings of the word action, illustrate, in a very interesting way, what might be termed the *expansibility and contractility*, not merely of the general terms of common speech, but also of the notions which they express. For men constantly increase or diminish the content of a notion according to the need of the relations in which they use it. Perhaps the simplest meaning in which we use the word

action—what might be termed our radical conception of an action—is that merely of a *particular exercise of power*. Thus we might say “The water falls,” or “The soul thinks.” Then the word comes to signify a *particular exercise of power so as to produce a given result*. Thus we say “The sun hardens the clay,” “The fire consumes the wood;” and we call these things actions. In this way the notion of an action is expanded so as to make the idea of the effect of the exercise of power an essential part of the notion. Next, the notion, being applied to the actions of thinking and rational beings, comes to mean an *intelligent or intentional exercise of power so as to produce a given result*; in which signification we have a further expansion. Thus the following are actions: “The dog defended his master,” “The woodman felled the tree,” “The student read his book.” All rational actions are a species of this last kind of actions, and are so thought of whether we speak of them as rational or not. And all moral actions are a species of rational actions, and are invariably viewed as such.

2. Now moral actions are conceived of in two ways; first, as being right or wrong, and secondly, as being virtuous or wicked. Actions are right when they are the intentional (and rational) effectuation of absolute good; but even yet they are not righteous or virtuous actions. For we must distinguish between the *intention of a rational action* (without which it could not be what it is, and which we regard as a part of it) and the *animus of the action*. One may perform a right action intending to do it, and yet he may not do it for its own sake, or simply because it is a right action; in which case, though the action would be still a right action, it would not be a righteous one. We call an action right when it is a rational exercise of power so as to effect good absolutely; and when, in addition to this, the action is thought of as proceeding from that animus which seeks the right for its own sake, then the action is regarded as righteous or virtuous. Thus instructing the ignorant is a right action because it includes within the conception of it their improvement in useful knowledge; and stealing is a wrong action because it is (in effect) a disarrangement of those *meum* and *tuum* rela-

tions, to which indeed we are led by natural necessities and inclinations, but which are right as being essential both to individual and general well-being. And when we conceive of instructing the ignorant, and of taking what is not one's own, as right and wrong, we always think of these actions as including rational intention; for any action done unconsciously, or even without a rational intelligence of its nature, *could not furnish a possible object of the moral choice or disregard of the doer of it*; which an action as right or wrong always does. It is plain also, that the two actions now referred to can also be thought of as virtuous and wicked; the former when done and conceived of as done, from its own proper animus; the latter as done in conscious disregard of the right for any reason. And indeed an action intrinsically wrong appears to be always wicked also; for we can not do wrong without disregarding the right.

3. From the foregoing it is clear that *things may be morally right and wrong which are not of the nature of virtue and vice*. Some seem not to regard this distinction sufficiently; but even common language distinguishes rightness and wrongness from virtuousness and viciousness. Moral rightness belongs primarily and essentially to those ends which virtue desires; moral wrongness to whatever may conflict with the realization of these ends, this opposing element in the case being considered as actually or possibly aimed at. They are properly predicated of actions as being the intentional effectuation of right ends or of results at variance with such ends.

But virtuousness and viciousness belong properly to the soul, or some exercise of the soul's activity, as having, or as including, the disposition to do what is right because it is right, or the disposition to trample on what is right for any reason; and they are predicated of actions only when, by a larger expansion of the term than is employed when we speak of a right or wrong action, we conceive of the moral action as proceeding from a virtuous or vicious animus, and include the idea of the animus in the enlarged notion of the action.

MORAL RIGHTNESS.

Now, an identification of the absolutely good as an end with the morally right seems to be a necessary inference and conclusion from the previous discussions of this article.

1. For the doctrine (which we shall now assume as established) that the essential subject of moral rightness—or the essential matter of the moral law—is the absolutely good (in its various forms) as an end, shuts us up to one of two meanings for our common notion of moral rightness. Either it is the undefinable moral attractiveness of absolute good—its final causality, if we may so speak; or it is the quality viewed abstractly, of which the absolutely good, as having its own peculiar attractiveness, is the concrete thing; in other words, it is absoluteness of good as belonging to an object and constituting it an end. Very little reflection will show that only one or the other of these meanings will satisfy our conception of that moral rightness, which, when belonging to any object, makes it attractive to the moral reason. *Either it is the attractiveness itself, or that quality which originates the attractiveness, considered as originating it; i. e., absoluteness of good as an end.* And now, although these two meanings differ but little, we feel compelled to prefer the latter, because men generally seem to speak of the moral rightness of an end as lying *in the very nature of the object which is an end*, and not simply as being a power of appeal or attractiveness belonging to that nature.

2. Moreover, this result, to which we have come by a slow and careful process of analysis, generalization and comparison, is confirmed by *that direct analysis of the nature of moral rightness, for which the knowledge of its essential subject has prepared us.* For none will deny that two things are identical if it can be shown that the essential elements and necessary attributes of the one are also the essential elements and necessary attributes of the other.

(a) In the first place, then, it is noticeable that *men consider that which is right to be good simply as being right.* How often do they say of some action or end or course of conduct

that it is right and good, evidently deducing good from right, and emphasizing the right as containing the good.

(b) In the next place, it is a natural dictate of the understanding that *any end or designed result which is morally right could not be bettered, and that this is a part of its rightness*. A different result might advance some private or particular interest more; yet, on the whole, what is morally right could not be bettered, it is absolutely good.

(c) And it is also an essential part of our idea of moral rightness that *the morally right appeals to the moral reason*. What is right, in being right, recommends itself in a peculiar way to man—or has a peculiar kind of attractiveness for man—as having a rational nature. Hence their praises who have identified the right with the good, the true, the fair, and the beautiful. Hence, too, the love of right and the hatred of wrong, in those beings in whom the moral reason has power. But it seems clear that this attractiveness is the same as that which the absolutely good exercises toward reason as motive—that is upon man as being able through reason to discern what is absolutely good, and as capable of being more or less affected through this perception.

3. The foregoing appear to be all the elements absolutely essential to, or necessarily included in, our notion of moral rightness; we have indicated rather than explained them, because they have been already dwelt upon at length, and a consideration of them evidently identifies the absolutely good as an end with the morally right. But it is to be remarked that there are several necessary relations in each of which the morally right has a certain necessary attribute; and these attributes are so intimately united in our ordinary thinking with what is the ultimate essence of the right, that we seem oftentimes to enlarge our notion of the right so as to take in one or more of these attributes. For men's minds need not and do not distinguish carefully between the essential and that which is necessarily connected with the essential. Let us therefore regard these attributes in their relation to our definition of moral rightness; for in this way this definition may be tested and proved. They may be enumerated as follows:

(a) First of all, the Practical Reason recognizes *an innate superiority of the right over any or all good which can in any way conflict with it*. It is something inherently more valuable than anything which can take its place. Men feel that on the whole nothing would be lost even though many precious interests were ruined in the maintenance and accomplishment of what is right. But plainly in this we have only the necessary attribute of the right when viewed as the absolutely good. For absolute good when compared with any other form of good possible in the case, is of necessity more valuable or a superior good.

Moreover, in most cases where we find ourselves contrasting good as particular or private with the right, we perceive also that to neglect the right for the good would be to sacrifice a very great absolute interest for a *comparatively* small personal or private interest; and this contrast and distinction between the right and the not-right is yet greater when, as constantly happens, what is useless or injurious is opposed to what is right.

The attribute now described, viz. that of an inherent superlative excellence, gives oftentimes a peculiar phase to what is right, and frequently seems included in our conception or notion of moral rightness.

(b) Another necessary attribute of the right, which also is the immediate result of the foregoing, is its *inherent superlative attractiveness as an end, or its preferableness to any possible competitive end, in the view and sense of the absolute or moral reason*. This preferableness is always ascribed to the right as having inherent superlative excellence; and it is the attractiveness of this excellence considered as superlative. Because of this preferableness, also, men ascribe an inherent excellency and office of guidance to the Moral Reason as discerning and tending toward the right; hence, also, the recognized excellence of the Moral Law, which is that product of the Moral Reason in and by which she indicates and sets forth the right for our pursuit and realization. But here again, in this superlative preferableness, we have evidently a necessary attribute of the absolutely good as an end, when viewed as abso-

lutely and inherently superior—and in most cases as vastly superior—to any good or other end which can be regarded as competitive with it. For good men ever love and choose the right in preference to aught else.

(c) Again we recognize the right, in its relation to all competitive ends, as having, not only a superlative preferableness, but also a *supremacy*; this recognition, of course, being an act of the moral reason. The right, in its appeal to the soul, may meet with no decided or sensible opposition; for, in a case where there are no strong competitive ends, a spirit devoted to the right and attuned to virtue would choose the right simply for its own sake, and as the best and noblest of ends, and without formal decision against aught else. In such a case there would be no sensible conflict between the right and other motive ideas in the spirit; and in such a case we would say that one chooses the right simply because it *is* the right, i. e. simply because it is the absolutely good or because of its inherent superlative excellence. But when the right contends with some other motive thought (or object) in the soul, and the opposition, however ineffectual, is sensibly felt, then the moral reason regards the right as supreme over other ends; and if, in such a case, one should choose the right, we would use peculiar emphasis in saying that he chose it because it was the *right*, or we would say that he chose it because it *ought* to be chosen.

Thus we would say that an honorable man of business in surrendering all of a large property to satisfy creditors did so because he felt that this was something *right* and *dutiful*, or something *that ought to be done*; and in this language we would refer to that inherent supremacy which the right has over every competitive end in the view of the Moral Reason. But what is this supremacy but that superlative preferableness of the absolute good when this good asserts its preferableness before the Moral Reason against the inducements of other motive objects? This supremacy, of course, oftentimes does not belong, as a realized fact, to the right; for man, in the exercise of the total of his motive regards, frequently considers other ends more attractive and important.

than the right ; but it always belongs to it in Reason and in Law—that is in the practical judgment of the moral reason, and in that moral law which is the product and practical conception of the moral reason. In other words, it is a supremacy which always exists as a *thing claimed* by reason in behalf of the absolutely good.

(d) Finally ; the right is recognized as having *obligatoriness*, and is often *conceived of as the obligatory*. This is closely allied to the last characteristic, and may be regarded as but another phase of the same thing ; yet it is distinguished from it. For we speak of the right as supreme over all opposing ends, but as obligatory upon persons. But this obligatoriness is simply an immediate consequence or development of that supremacy ; for evidently that which is supreme over all competitive ends is supreme also over all of one's motive life, and so also over the person as living and choosing. Hence, we say that persons are bound to the observance of the right, or are subjected to the right ; this obligation or subjection existing, of course, in law or in the conception of the moral reason. An operative sense of the right, as thus obligatory, or supreme over one's self, makes one willing to perform any labor or make any sacrifice in its service. And when we conceive of and observe the right as the obligatory, then we speak of the right as that which we (owe or) ought to do, and say that we do it simply because we ought to do it, i. e. because we are bound as to the doing of it. For, generally some price is necessary to be paid for the realization of right ; some sacrifice, however willingly, must be laid on the altar of duty. Our sense of the obligatory is to be distinguished from both the desire to have an easy conscience and the fear of punishment or hope of reward. Should one do what is right merely to escape punishment, to gain a reward, or to be free from troubling emotions, he could not properly be said to do right because he ought to do it, though we do not condemn such motives as wrong *per se*. The right is the obligatory simply as claiming royalty or supremacy over that personal life in which man aims at various ends ; and, therefore, when men

obey the obligatory, they simply have an operative sense of this supremacy as a thing claimed by the right.

But evidently this obligatoriness—this supremacy over personal life—like that absolute preferableness in the view of the Moral Reason, and that legal supremacy overall opposing ends, to both of which it is closely allied, is a necessary attribute of the absolutely good as an end, i. e. of the right (as we have defined it) in its full essence.

4. Other attributes than the above might be mentioned, though none perhaps so intimately united with the essence of the right. But the foregoing analysis makes it clear that every essential or necessary characteristic of moral rightness may be easily and necessarily accounted for by identifying that rightness with absoluteness of good as an end; and we can not conceive of any other way in which this explanation can be made. Moreover, with this identification, every aspect of rightness is luminous and intelligible; but if we reject and deny it, there is left indeed a grand name, but its authority, like that of a sovereign whose power has been taken away, may be boldly questioned. Thus, too, our expectation has been realized in finding that an understanding of the nature of moral rightness has included an understanding of the nature of moral obligatoriness; and we are put in a position to define that moral obligation which we recognize as belonging to persons. It is simply the correlative of moral obligatoriness. It is the legal relationship in which a person, as capable of rational life, stands to the right as supreme, in law, over one's life and self. It is his being subject or bound, in law, to absolute good as an end; for this the Moral Reason, when discerning the absolutely good, suggests, calls for, and approves.

A CONFUSION OBIATED.

We have now completed that analytical argument to the development of which this article was devoted. Clearness of conception, however, regarding some points already advanced, requires some further statements. And, first, we would make a remark concerning the nature of virtue in general. Some

seem to think that virtue always and essentially includes that self-regulation, or reflex exercise of the moral faculty, of which we have already spoken.

1. It will be noticed that the question as to the truth or falsity of this opinion does not effect that as to what the morally right essentially is. It only affirms that, in every case of one virtuously seeking the morally right, there is not only a love and choice of the right, but also that this, in part at least, is the result of designed moral self-determination. For any self-determination to be moral must be designed or intentional. Now we have already seen how in all secondary or affectional virtue there is moral self-determination, and also how this exists in the incipient exercise of Causative Virtue; and we may allow that the Reflex Exercise of the Moral Faculty is a necessary, if not an invariable, accompaniment and development of all virtue. Nevertheless, for the following reasons, we can not consider intentional self-regulation and determination an essential part of all virtue.

2. In the first place, it is impossible by the closest analysis to discover this intentional self-regulation in those notions of the various simple virtues which we receive from the common consciousness of men. We feel that it is right and obligatory to do good, to speak the truth, to deal honestly, to act justly, and so on; and in relation to each of these duties we recognize virtue to be simply a controlling rational regard for the right and the obligatory. By which we mean, not that it controls *virtue*, but that it is the controlling and determinative element in the total of man's complex motive life. We can, indeed, cultivate and exercise these simple virtues more or less determinately or on purpose; but in doing so we have a determination additional to the simple and original determination to do what is good, and just, and right.

3. Secondly, the idea of conditioning the exercise of the simpler virtues on a regulation of the Moral Faculty itself seems to involve a psychological absurdity. For if there be any virtue in this intentional self-regulation, it must arise from a regard to the right and the obligatory, the self-regulation being in itself only a subordinate or instrumental end. But,

if we should hold that no animus of the soul toward the right of sufficient strength to be controlling and determinative of conduct can exist of itself, and that every such animus must be developed by a self-regulative faculty acting from a regard to the right and the obligatory, it is plain that here we would, at one and the same time, have and not have a controlling respect for the right and the obligatory. For the moral animus would have the same conflict with the other motivities of man for the self-determination that it would have for the control of direct objective efficiency. We therefore suppose that the existence of object virtue—that is of virtue in its more simple forms—is the condition of the existence of virtue as self-regulated.

4. Yet, while denying that the exercise of our self-determining power is an essential element of virtue, and while holding that it is only a frequent accompaniment and development of virtue, it may be allowed that a greater deliberation and a clearer consciousness naturally accompany even the simpler and more objective exercises of virtue than are generally found with less rational states of mind. We hold also that Reason and Freedom are necessary conditions of all virtue. For one could not see the right without reason, or desire and choose the right without freedom. But whether or how far the soul of man in his present natural condition has truly the power of simple virtue, and whether the possession of this power be inseparable from moral freedom, and what moral freedom is, are questions beyond the scope of our present undertaking.

THE ADJECTIVE RIGHT, IN MORALS.

In connection with the doctrine of moral rightness and moral obligation, a critical definition of some terms in our ordinary language may serve a good purpose. For nothing is more productive of confusion in philosophy than the arbitrary and private use of common terms.

1. The adjective "right"—signifying originally conformity to rule—may at first in morals have been applied only to actions and rules of actions (practical and affectional), and not *ends*. A right action in morals, as distinguished from a

virtuous action, is a certain exercise of power, intelligently or intentionally, so as to produce a practical or affectional result ; the action being viewed as to its result and not as to its animus. A moral rule is the notion of a mode of action which the mind may use as its guide. The rule, of course, is right only as the mode of action which it sets forth is right ; and indeed we may use the words rule and mode of action interchangeably.

Now, in the introductory use of the word right, particular actions may have been so designated because conformed in their intended and actual result to some moral rule or generalized form of action ; and the rule or general mode of action may have been called right because similarly conformed to some yet greater generalization. But it is evident that in this way we would come to a supreme rule which could not properly be called right, but only the ultimate test and rule of rightness ; and evidently the result aimed at and accomplished by the mode of intelligent action prescribed by this rule, would be the source of its excellence, and would be the hidden essence of the excellence of all rules and actions conformed to it, that is of all right actions and modes of action. Thus the ultimate idea would not be rightness—or conformity to rule—but only absolute good as the essential end of moral action.

2. We apprehend, however, that common language does not employ the word right only or chiefly in the sense given above, but that particular actions and general modes of action are called right as including within them certain results which are also conceived of as ends. Good, as already mentioned, is a general notion of reason, and signifies, not happiness, satisfaction or blessedness of any kind, but only means, causes or conditions of happiness. An action, therefore, which may be the condition or cause of good, becomes itself a good ; and in like manner an action productive of absolute good is itself an absolute good. Now we believe that generally when men speak of right actions or forms of action, they mean actions or forms of action which are absolutely good, as having absolutely good results included within them

and which consequently appeal to us as having this absolute-ness of good. In other words, right actions are such (analytically) as including, or (practically) as being themselves ends that are absolutely good.

3. Agreeably to this, various ends in life are often spoken of and praised as right even when actions producing them are not in question, and when there is no thought of any rule, nor of anything save the end as such. For instance, we might say that the salvation of the soul, or the glory of God, or the welfare of the race, is a right end of desire ; and in so doing our chief thought would be, not of conformity to a rule, but of the absolute goodness of the end.

Hence, also, the term right is always applied indifferently to the end or intended result, and to the action considered as accomplishing it. We say equally, "To do this is right," and "This is right to do ;" meaning by the first, "This action is an absolutely good end," and, by the second, "This (the *result* of some action, or some action viewed chiefly as to its result) is an absolutely good end as to our doing of it ;" that is, "an absolutely good end for our accomplishment." The same thought as this latter is expressed when we say "This is right to be done ;" but in the use of the passive infinitive the agent is conceived of less determinately, as if we should say "This is a right end," not for *our*, or *your*, or *his* or *their* accomplishment, but simply "for accomplishment," the agent not being as yet definitely thought of.

Now, in this second and common signification of the word right, right things of course are ultimate ends of desire and effort. But in the former they are not : for rules as such are not ultimate ; but ends are.

THE VERB OUGHT.

The word *ought*, in morals, is next in frequency and importance to the word right.

1. This word has the appearance of having two contrasted significations, and possibly it may have them in our ordinary language, that is, it may mean either "bound" or "binding ;" "obligated" or "obligatory." Thus we might say, "I ought

to assist my brother," and, "my brother ought to be assisted by me;" and again, "Men ought to speak the truth," and "The truth ought to be spoken by men." These sentences might be paraphrased as follows: "I am obligated as to the assisting of my brother," and "my brother as to his being assisted by me—or the assistance of my brother by me—is obligatory (upon me)." So, also, "Men are obligated as to the speaking of the truth," and "The truth as to its being spoken by men—or the speaking of truth by men—is obligatory (upon them).

In these examples, which might be multiplied indefinitely, the first meaning of ought would express the obligation (obligatedness) of a person, i. e. of a being capable of moral intelligence and motivity, and generally also considered as possessed of some power of practical or affectional action which may become subject to the movement of his moral nature; the second meaning of "ought" would express the obligatoriness of some action or doing as containing, and therefore being, a right end.

2. But we think the word ought, in ordinary language, does not properly have the two meanings now given, but only *the first of them, together with a modification or derivative of it*. As already seen, moral obligation essentially is the relation between a right end as supreme and a person as having a moral nature. It is the claim of absolute good, asserted through Reason, that a person on seeing the absolutely good should desire it supremely according to its supreme excellence. But this supreme desire for, or choice of, anything right, involves on the part of the person whatever action or doing of his may be needful to the accomplishment or attainment of the right. Consequently one's moral obligation may be said to affect with its binding efficacy first, *one's self*, as capable of moral desire or choice, then *one's moral desire and choice*, and finally, *whatever action or doing may be needful to the accomplishment of the end*. A similar case is presented when one's labor and money, as well as himself, are said to be obligated to pay his debts. The labor and money, on the one hand, and the choice and actions, on the other, are not obligated in pre-

cisely the same sense in which the person is bound ; nevertheless his obligation puts them in a new relation ; they are things (not to which) but in respect to which, he is bound ; they are in law affected and controlled by his obligation ; and this, their relationship, may naturally be called their obligation (or obligatedness). In this way actions, as causative of right ends, and as being therefore the necessary result of the choice of right ends, yet not as being themselves right ends, come to have an obligation, in a way not exactly similar, yet somewhat analogous to that in which, as causally including right ends, they may be, and are, regarded as right ends themselves. For, in cases like the present, the mind chooses according to practical convenience or necessity in what relation things shall be viewed, and views them in diverse relations at different times. We believe, therefore, that the verb "ought," which, when applied to persons, signifies "to be obligated," when applied to actions, signifies their being *due*, rather than their being obligatory. In the instances already cited we would interpret "ought" as predicated of actions thus, "The assisting of my brother by me is a thing due (from me)"—"The speaking of truth by men is a thing due (from men)"—the dueness being the relationship of the personal action as affected by the moral obligatoriness of the absolute good to be accomplished.

3. What corroborates the foregoing views is that the verb "ought" never seems to be applied to things which are right ends so as to signify unequivocally that they obligate or are obligatory. We can not use the verb ought interchangeably with "obligates" or "is obligatory" in such expressions as "The right obligates, or is obligatory upon, me and my actions ;" nor in any other way in which it would unequivocally signify to exercise a binding power. It is true that in some sentences, in which the name of a right end is the grammatical subject, "ought" has the appearance of signifying the exercise of obligatory power ; but such sentences naturally and in conformity with the analogy of similarly constructed sentences, may be interpreted differently. For instance, "The good of mankind ought to be sought," might be

taken to mean "The good of mankind obligates or is obligatory as to its being sought." But when we say "The money ought to be paid," (which is a sentence of the same form) we naturally mean that "The money as to payment, or the payment of the money, is something obligated, or due;" and so the former sentence might be rendered "The good of mankind as to its being sought, or the seeking of the good of mankind, is a thing obligated or due." In short the English infinitive mood, when used after the words "right" and "ought," seems to resemble those Greek accusatives of specification, (employed both with objectives and with intransitive verbs) whose limiting force chiefly affects the subject of the predication, and which themselves are really an essential part of the subject.

4. For it is also to be noted that we use the verb "ought" of the desire or choice of a right end even while this choice may be considered as the simple objective (that is objectively directed) activity of the rational spirit in view of the right and the obligatory; and when we do not consider it as an object of the soul's reflection, and so as being itself a right and obligatory end and the aim of reflex or causative virtue. And plainly, in the case now specified, the word ought can not designate obligatoriness, but only obligation (or obligatedness. For instance, we say a man ought to be just, or to desire just things; or we say that he ought to be honest, or to desire honest things; or that he should desire what is right, and use such language meaning—*not that a man ought to act honestly, or justly, or rightly—nor yet that he ought to strive after the virtuous dispositions of honesty, justice, and rectitude generally—but simply that he is bound in circumstances of duty to have and exercise the practive dispositions of virtue.*

Now clearly such language, when used to express such a meaning, can not signify obligatoriness, but only obligation. That a man ought to be just or to desire just things can only mean that a man, as to the disposition of justice or the desire of what is just is obligated, but can not mean that the disposition of justice (in its simple objective exercise and not as an object of reflection) is obligatory; for this disposition in its

simple objective exercise is not the obligatory but the obligated ; the just things which it regards being the obligatory. It can not be the obligatory, being not as yet an end.

But now should we say "Just things ought to be desired," we would naturally recognize this as only an impersonal way of saying "A man—or these or those men—ought to desire just things," and we would interpret that sentence "Just things, as to their being desired, are obligated, or matters of obligation"—or, "The desire of just things is something due or obligated." But it would not mean that just things are obligatory ; although, of course, one conversant with the nature of the case would recognize this also as true.

5. The word ought, therefore, seems properly to express, not obligatoriness (though it always implies that as existing somewhere), but only obligation ; and it has a two-fold application, first to persons as rationally active, and then to things as affected by personal obligation because included in or connected with personal activity. But if any should wish to insist on obligatoriness as a second meaning, there is no doubt that this thought is very often intended to be conveyed as of necessity implied in the other ; and setting merely terminology aside, we believe that every philosophical end in ethics will be served if it be admitted that obligation or obligatedness is the *ordinary* and *proper* signification of the verb "ought."

THE NOUN DUTY.

The noun "duty," which we conjecture to be the Latin *debitum*, coming to us through the French, corresponds in its application and meaning with the verb ought in its secondary or derivative signification. It presents in the concrete what the verb presents in the abstract. In other words it stands for any activity of a rational being—for any desire, choice, or action—as obligated or due to a right end ; or for such activity in general as due to the right in general. (a) Hence, this term does not apply to all right ends, but only to those right ends which are also the activities of a moral agent in the pursuit of the right ; these being viewed, of course, not

as right ends, but as obligated activities. For any absolute good viewed as an end is not *per se* a duty, but only the object and end of duty. This indicates the inadequacy of the word "duty" as the equivalent of "that which is right;" for there are some right things—namely, all right ends which are not rational activities and which might be called absolutely-ultimate right ends—which are not duty, but only the aim and result of duty. Thus the glory of God and the good of mankind are right ends, but they are not duties.

(b) So also, even though the duties of simple moral desire—and all other less primal or fundamental duties—may be regarded as right things, this rightness is not an essential part of their nature as *duties*, but results from the fact that they become right ends as the objects of the soul's reflection. When not regarded as the objects of the soul's reflection, they are thought of as duties only. Thus when we say "it is man's duty to desire to do right," this desire as the simple objective embrace of the right is a duty; but this objectively-directed desire is not *simply* as such a right thing, any more than absolute good in general, *simply* as such, is the right. The simple desire of the right—whether as the "*motus primo primi*" of the soul, or as a more developed objective motivity—is obligated; is a part of duty; but it is not, simply as such, a thing right and obligatory. To be so regarded, it must, like all other absolute good of every kind, be regarded also *as an end*. Thus, while some objects of thought are right things but not duties, other objects of thought are duties but not right things.

(c) Hence we infer that the term "duty," though *generally* applicable to right things, is not the name proper for right things in strict philosophical speech. Yet we know of no other noun in our ordinary language by which to designate "that which is right," as such. "*The right*" is sometimes used; but this is not a common word, and in the singular with the indefinite article, as also in the plural, signifies an interest belonging to some one according to the rules of ordinary justice.

We have now given the results of that investigation to which we were drawn by a great anxiety for a clearer understanding of the Moral Law. They are in some respects different from what we had expected. We entered, however, on this search, and continued in it, looking for guidance to higher wisdom than our own ; and perhaps on that account, as well as because conscious of an earnest sincerity, have both thought and spoken with an independence of human authority. Yet it is to be acknowledged that success, very frequently, in some particular undertaking, is not granted to the most honest and persevering. Therefore, while holding our opinions with confidence, we would sincerely rejoice to see them refuted and set at naught, if they can be shown to be wrong. Moreover, in this article we have endeavored to present fully both our opinions and the methods by which we came to them : for, in this way, if our notions be untrue or unfounded, their falsity, or at least their want of proof, can be more easily detected and exposed. We pray that our effort, in some way, may advance the cause of truth.

ART. II.—THE SONG OF SONGS.

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THE NAME.

Shir Hashirim, which is translated by the Septuagint *ἄσμα αἰσματων*, by the Vulgate *Canticum Canticorum*, and by the English version, "SONG OF SONGS," is in the common form of the Hebrew superlative, as is seen in King of kings, Holy of holies, etc. The same denotes that this Song is the best, either in itself, or the best of its author. This is the common interpretation of the title, and is more natural, and to be preferred to that which makes it mean, simply, that this is one from among the songs of Solomon ; or is a collection or chain of songs. For the discussion of this point see *The Song of Songs*, etc., by Christian D. Ginsburg, London, 1857 ; ditto by Otto Zöckler in Lange's Commentaries, and