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ARTICLE I.

TESTIMONY OF THE REFORMERS TO THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

The reformers were men of eminent ability and scholarship, and familiar with the scriptures in their original languages. They were also familiar with all the controversies which had been agitated in the church respecting the doctrine of the Trinity, and were very soon called upon to engage in these controversies themselves. They acknowledged the right and duty of private judgment and the divine perfection and authority of the Scriptures as an infallible ground of faith and hope. To the bible, therefore, they appealed as the ground of their faith and hope, and with free, diligent and impartial investigation, relying on the promised guidance of the Holy Spirit, they sought to discover and present its meaning as the teaching of Him who cannot lie and who will not deceive, and who has assured us that "all scripture is given by inspiration of God and is profitable to doctrine, for reproof and for correction."

Their testimony is not the opinion of one man, nor of a few, nor of those of one country, but of many, yea, of large bodies of men in various countries acting without concert, with many conflicting interests, as at present, in the face of persecution, danger and death, with much painful and laborious investigation and discussion, with every skill in languages, understanding the signification and force of words, the drift and scope of the divine

by several peculiar relative properties and personal relations, which doctrine of the Trinity is the foundation of all our communion with God, and comfortable dependence on him.

ARTICLE II.

MODERN THEOLOGY—TAYLOR AND BLEDSOE

There is a very striking scene brought to view, by the testimony of Dr. Plumer, in the great Presbyterian Church case, tried in Philadelphia in the Spring of 1839, which has appeared to us vividly emblematical of the whole *epos* of the new divinity movement in this country. It relates to the position of persons and parties, at the time when the noted Dr. Cleveland effected that riotous, so-called, organization on which the New School base the modest claim that they are *the* Presbyterian church. This organization, as all know, was effected by simple riot and snatch. They ignored the regular moderator, the rules of order, and the regular course—set up a moderator in another part of the house—rallied round him like a rebel *corps* of bees, and thus left the house, buzzing in, at each door, the intelligence that the hive would swarm in another place. Dr. Cleveland was the Warwick that made the new schismatic president. He arose and addressed the regular moderator for form's sake, and then turned away. "I saw a little stir," and observed Dr. Beecher, and *Dr. Taylor*, who was a delegate to the Assembly from the General Association of Connecticut, seated together, I believe, in the pew behind Dr. Cleveland. They were moving their hands, and making gestures with their heads, and I thought I heard the words, "Go on! go on! I am certain they were making gestures, but I am not positive that I heard the words. The gestures could not be mistaken." There they were—an active, bold, restless, western man, in the act of rending that great denomination; and at the back of the king-maker sat Dr. Beecher—a man imported from Boston to teach theology in the Presbyterian church, who had been

tried for heresy, and Dr. Taylor!! who had been convulsing Connecticut with novel speculations for fifteen years; these two sat behind Cleveland, "moving their hands, and making gestures with their heads," and saying, or forcibly seeming to say, "Go on! go on!" This is the true emblem of the whole heroic age of the new divinity; restless men of daring nerve gave tongue, and did the deeds. They were the sword-arms, others did the thought and gave the impulse. Taylorism and Beecherism sat behind, making gestures with their heads, moving their hands and saying, "go on! go on!"

Gravely significant, too, is the present state of affairs among these parties. Taylorism and Beecherism have edged on the West with their "go on! go on!" until the West has gone, at least all that part of it which they could impel, hopelessly out of a sound conservative and Calvinistic influence. A re-union of the Old and the New School churches *en masse*, is clearly and positively out of the question. We believe that no good man on either side ought to seek it. Deep and vital doctrinal differences in relation to the atonement, the imputation of Adam's sin, and of Christ's righteousness, and the influences of the Divine Spirit exist still, or, at least, have not been disavowed by either party. Separately these differences may exist peaceably; and, indeed, the two different denominations may, perhaps, be of service to each other by each making the other more conservative, theologically and socially. But there could be, and there would be, no more peace now, if the two were put together again, than there was from 1830 to 1835. Such is the effect, no doubt, mainly of the leaven of Taylorism. It has driven its votaries and its victims into an attitude of irreconcilable contrariety to the old, deep, religious Calvinism which did not hate Edwards and philosophy, but which revered Paul and inspiration more. Meanwhile, where now are New Haven and Taylorism themselves? We experienced, the other day, a species of pity, such as we have felt in boyhood's dreams, over the murdered Red Cummyn of Scottish story, who, though he died laden with treachery, yet died by the hand of an assassin, in the holy place of the Abbey of Dumfries—when we read that there were but twenty-five

divinity students at New Haven, and that a committee of conference had been appointed by the trustees of Yale College, to seek a union of their theological school, with that very East Windsor which was established as a testimony and a barrier against the incursions of Taylorism. Verily Doctor Taylor is now, probably, of other mind than when he sat in the General Assembly, "moving his hands, and making gestures with his head" that the separation should go on. And East Windsor and New Haven may unite. Such things are characteristic of the present state of New England; but the two branches of the old Presbyterian church cannot. The prompters of Warwick may retreat. He himself cannot. He has gone too far.

We know not whether the time has yet arrived to write the history of this peculiar new divinity as making a manifestation of itself in a settled Calvinistic church. Perhaps it has not yet come on account of the fact that there are yet among us good men—men of love and peace—the Lord Falklands of the church—who have not ceased to indulge the vain hope of a re-union, of the New and Old School; who hope this great schism may yet turn out to be like the great schism of the last century, which was eventually healed and forgotten, because they have not fairly looked at the deep moral, philosophical, and theological differences of the parties—differences, not only in theological views, but deep differences as to the rights and prerogatives of human philosophy; and differences deeper still, as to what is right and what is wrong; what is fair and what is unfair, what is candid and what is uncandid, in social and ecclesiastical manners and morality.

The history of the Taylorite new divinity, claiming to be sound and orthodox in an old fashioned Calvinistic church, and trading as deeply as a follower of Alexander Campbell himself, in the manufacture of capital, by the piteous cry of persecution, for being suspected of any heresy, or any over-reverence for philosophy, any under-reverence for revelation, or any peculiar tendency to bluntness of conscience in indirect ecclesiastical procedures,—this history will be a curious one indeed, when the time comes to write it, if it shall then fall into a fit-

ting and competent hand. Whoever the historian may be, he cannot be competent, unless he shall go back and examine especially the spiritual phenomena which surround the origin of all such movements. He must not only understand the theological doctrine of the fall of man, but he must see the deep applicability of that history to our days, in the tendency of all ambitious and speculative men to make repasts upon forbidden fruit. He must examine the prerogatives of religious philosophy, and see clearly where lies the land-mark between the things revealed, which rightfully belong to us and to our children, and the things secret, which belong to God; and which the "audax Japeti genus" may not meddle with, without worse consequences, than the

"Macies, et nova februm

Terris incubuit cohors,"

which punished the bringing down of stolen fire from heaven in the pagan myth. And he must profoundly study the arts of winning popular sympathy for deep and destructive innovations, by sneers and flings at the "jealousy" and the "bigotry" of old sound doctrine and its friends; the powerful captivation of appeals to the young, daring, and restless "who may possess both the desire and the capacity to think for themselves," to come out of the tame old sound systems which repress their "minds' aspirings," and keep them back from the happier auspices of the coming and better age. And especially must the historian of Taylorism thoroughly study the nature and the significance of that earnest effort with which the new divinity attempted to inaugurate itself, to cover every faithful man with odium, as a "heresy-hunter," who took alarm at any innovation, however bold, or thought the ark of God in danger from any shaking, however rude.

We would not persecute Professor Bledsoe, or his Theodicy, for a good deal: for two reasons—one is, that persecution is not right in itself; and the other is, that it often gives a kind of currency to a bad cause, or a bad book, which they would not otherwise obtain, through the sympathy of a certain class of minds, which seem to proceed on the principle, that when a watch-dog barks and bites, it is good and noble to sympathize deeply

with the marauder, and hang or chain the watch-dog. And yet we believe that the substantial identity of the scheme advanced in the Theodicy with Taylorism, or New Haven divinity will be disputed by no intelligent mind acquainted with the two things. There is, however, this difference between the two manifestations, that Taylorism made its appearance within the pale of Calvinism, fiercely claiming to be orthodox, quoting no authority more frequently than that of President Edwards, and indulging in loud accusations against those few faithful men who disputed its claim to unquestionable Calvinistic standing; while Bledsoism not only makes its appearance out of Calvinism, and assails the very doctrine of election itself with the old stale subterfuge of *national* election, but as we think will appear in the sequel, of God's providence at least, if not of our article, beyond the pale and the consistent possibility of any experimental religion at all.

Somewhere about the year of grace 1821, Dr. Nathaniel W. Taylor, being then either just made professor of christian theology in the divinity school, connected with Yale college at New Haven, or just about to be placed in that position—an atheistical hand-bill was reported to be in circulation in the streets of the city of New York, to about this effect:

“Sin is in the world—if God could have prevented the entrance of sin into the world, and did not do so, where then is the benevolence of God? But if God could not have prevented the entrance of sin into the world, where then is the omnipotence of God?”

Goaded by the sharp horns of this dilemma, Dr. Taylor felt impelled into a voyage on the sea of speculation, in search of a solution for the deep old riddle of the origin of evil. And about the year 1828 or 1829, returned with the following triumphant solution; after which, atheism, like the Theban Sphynx, was to brain itself upon a stone, and die.

“Moral beings must, from the nature of the case, have the *power* of sinning; and there is no evidence that God could have overruled that power, and entirely withheld them from its exercise by a direct interposition of his providence, *and yet have sustained a moral system*

in existence. Thus sin, as to God's preventing—not our committing it, is a necessary *incident* to a moral system.”—*Christian Spectator*, June, 1829, p. 378.

Now, with this, compare what Mr. Bledsoe gives, as the occasion of his embarking upon the high seas of this great speculation :

“If God were both willing and able to prevent sin, which is the only supposition consistent with the idea of God, says the atheist, he would certainly have prevented it, and sin would never have made its appearance in the world; but sin has made its appearance in the world; and hence, God must have been either unable or unwilling to prevent it. Now, if we take either term of this alternative, we must adopt a conclusion which is at war with the idea of a God.”—*Theodicy*, p. 22.

This is Professor Bledsoe's dilemma. And the solution which he brings is this: “On the supposition of such world, God did not permit sin at all; it could not have been prevented.”—*Theodicy*, p. 197, &c.

To change the figure: both Bledsoe and Taylor were defeated by the atheist, before their combat began. Both allowed the atheist fully to “beg the question,” and obtain the concession of much that he wanted, and which truth does not allow him, before they began to demolish him. The very facts of the world, as it stands to-day, together with *the Bible*, of which it is surprising that both Dr. Taylor and Mr. Bledsoe made so little use, in their great argument, show that God is neither unwilling to prevent sin, (if that means simply that he does not love it, but hates it,) and that he is not unable to prevent it, but permits it for reasons which he has not chosen to reveal. It is wonderful that the clear, simple account of the entrance of sin into this world, given in the third chapter of the book of Genesis, should be so thoroughly ignored as it usually is among such speculators. And it is wonderful too, that they feel themselves competent to judge of the decision of the very Divine mind itself, in matters in which the grounds of those decisions have not been revealed. Indeed we cannot but believe the author of the *Theodicy* to be the most deeply deluded man, in relation to the powers of the human mind over such subjects, whose productions we have, ever

perused: We have simply touched with pencil, the following incidental indications of the author's estimate of human powers; more in sorrow and surprise, than in any other feelings:

(1.) He claims the prerogative of judging and correcting the operations on this subject of "the mighty minds of the past." "It is no ground of despair, then, that the mighty minds of the past have failed to solve the problem in question, if the cause of their failure may be traced to the errors of their own systems, and not to the inherent difficulties of the subject."—*Theod.* p. 17.

(2.) He does not think the problem a hard one: "Though we have so spoken in accommodation with the views of others, the problem of the moral world is not, in reality, high and difficult *in itself*, like the great problem of the material universe. We repeat, it is simply to explode and refute the sophism of the atheist."—*Theod.* p. 23.

(We once heard a very wise worthy of Virginia declare that he thought he could solve any difficulty concerning the meaning of Scripture, that he ever heard raised; and he swept us down to silence, hour after hour, with a stream of easy wisdom, and perfectly conclusive divinity, till at last we commenced a sort of embankment, by the question: how come the hag-stirrups in a colt's mane? He could not answer *that*.)

(3.) The Professor is to make a mere morning's bit of explaining the nature of moral good and evil to the world: "It shall be our first object, then, to pull down and destroy 'the invented quibbles and sophisms which have so long darkened and confounded the light of reason and conscience, in relation to the nature of moral good and evil, to dispel the clouds which have been so industriously thrown around this subject, in order that the bright and shining light of nature may, free and unobstructed, find its way into our minds and hearts.'"—*Ibid.* p. 115.

(4.) He is to refute, like a flash, the pretended reasonings and demonstrations of such children, or fogies, as Augustine, Calvin, Leibnitz, and Edwards: "Let us see then, if we may not refute the pretended demonstration in favor of necessity, and thereby restore the mind to that internal satisfaction which it so earnestly desires,

and which it so constantly seeks in a perfect unity and harmony of principle."—*Ibid.* p. 132.

(5.) He will act the pedagogue over Jonathan Edwards (!) and show him the mistake in his work: "But lest we should be suspected of doing this great metaphysician injustice, we must point out the means by which he has so grossly deceived himself."—*Ibid.* p. 147.

(6.) He intends to do, with clearness and precision, what most other men have shrunk from attempting at all: "To describe these two spheres (of the human and of the divine agency) with clearness and precision, and to determine the precise point at which they come into contact without intersecting each other, is still a desideratum in the science of theology. We shall endeavour to define the human power and the divine sovereignty, and to exhibit the harmony subsisting between them, in such a manner as to supply, in some small degree at least, this great *desideratum* which has so long been the reproach of the most sublime of all the sciences."—*Ibid.* p. 168.

(7.) He intends to set to rights, easily, at once, and forever, all that clamor *de minimis* between Augustine and Pelagius: "We shall first stand on the same platform with Pelagius, and endeavour to view the subject with his eyes: to see all that he saw, as well as to correct the errors of his observations. And having done this, we shall then transport ourselves to the platform of Augustine; and contemplate the subject from his point of view, so as to possess ourselves of his great truths, and also to correct the errors of his observations."—*Ibid.* p. 171.

(8.) He easily sees the common error—(quaere: a belief in the authority of Scripture?) of the Calvinists and the Arminians: "Now in this contest of arms (between the Arminian and the Calvinist) it is our humble opinion that each party gets the better of the other. Each overthrows the other; but neither perceives that he is himself overthrown. Hence, though each demolishes the other, neither is convinced, and the controversy still rages. Nor can there be an end of this wrangling and jangling, while the arguments of the opposite parties have their roots in a common error."—*Ibid.* p. 244.

(9.) What he has done to Leibnitz and Edwards, the Augustinians and the Pelagians, the Calvinists and the Arminians, is nothing when compared to what he means to do to the sceptic, or atheist: "The effects of the hypothesis of the sceptic may be neutralized by opposing to it the hypothesis of the theist. But we are not satisfied to stop at that point. We intend not merely to neutralize, but to explode, the theory of the sceptic. We intend to wrest from it the element of its strength, and grind it to atoms. We intend to lay our finger precisely upon the fallacy which lies deeply concealed in its bosom, and from which it derives all its apparent force and conclusiveness. We shall drag this false principle from its place of concealment into the open light of day, and thereby expose the utter futility, the inherent absurdity of the whole atheistical hypothesis, to which it has so long imparted its deceptive power."—*Ibid.* p. 188.

There! ye laudators of the past, take that! say, have we no giants in these days? Since our sophomore days, we have rarely encountered so great a man. A friend informs us that he has a very worthy servant man, with whom it is a point of honour, never to admit that any thing is too hard for him. He thinks that if he should address the servant thus: "Billy, can you make me a world?" The reply would be promptly rendered: "Yes, massa, certainly, massa."

Meanwhile, no body hears of a single atheist convinced, or of a single sceptic reclaimed by the works of Dr. Taylor, Professor Bledsoe, or by any such means. And we suppose indeed that those who have attended particularly to the history of such speculations, would generally concur in the remark, that it is really never the expectation of the writers of such works, to convince atheists or to reclaim sceptics; but scepticism and atheism are merely brought upon the stage as auxiliaries in dumb-show, and in the uniform only, of enemies, to create, by the undefined horrors of their forms, and especially their shadows, the pretended necessity, in order to escape them, of trampling upon the honours of Calvinism, and drawing away the minds of the young, from the authority of the Scriptures, and from humble dependence on God's grace, into those drear and tremen-

dous realms of self-idolatry, and assumed equality with God, where the upas waves, and the sirocco blows.

There is the same remarkable coincidence between the other parts of the two systems respectively of Dr. Taylor and Professor Bledsoe :

Both deny the sinfulness of *propensities, dispositions, and principles*; and make all sin consist in voluntary acts.

Both deny and revile the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin, and of Christ's righteousness.

Professor Bledsoe takes away the whole doctrine of a vicarious atonement; making the Saviour's death a mere symbolical mode of instructing mankind concerning God's hatred of sin. The Taylorites, if not Dr. Taylor himself, and especially Jenkyn and Bedman, did about the same thing.

And in the Review of Dr. Harvey, published in the New Haven Christian Spectator for 1859, may be seen evident resemblances and foreshadowings of Professor Bledsoe's singular doctrine concerning the Human Will.

It is designed to offer here some suggestions concerning this New Haven phase of religious philosophy, and philosophizing, which may perhaps be of some advantage to other persons of more leisure and better abilities, in clearly evincing and exposing its errors, when it has thoroughly and fully developed itself, and when the true time has come for writing its history, and adding to the recorded sum of human knowledge, the contribution which its errors and the full detection of them will make.

1. Sometimes a *practical test* is the only one which is in the reach, especially of youthful minds, from a want of acquaintance with the history of such philosophizings; and in fact, from the want of any such a history, among all our religious books, as the history of theories and theorizers, on subjects unrevealed in Scripture. A good history of that kind, prepared by the proper hands, would be of vast service in guarding young and ambitious minds against the sins and errors of intellectual pride and presumption. In the absence of such a book, the only test, oftentimes, which will recall them to the truth, is something of this kind: Try whether you can

pray freely on that theory; try its power to give you comfort in darkness, in affliction, or in spiritual conflict; try whether it places you near to, or far from the Saviour; try whether its tendency is to induce you to rely more or less fully upon the grace of God; try whether it will do for your heart as well as your head; try whether it will do to live by; read the Epistle of Paul to the Ephesians, and see whether the spirit and tone of the philosophy accords practically with the spirit and tone of that Epistle.

2. It may be observed that such speculations, notwithstanding their high pretensions, almost always leave the victory at last, to the errorist, atheist or sceptic, as the case may be, against whom they specially profess to march out to fight. The doctrine, for instance, which is the main staple of the Theodicy, that the acts or volitions of the human will, take their rise in the world without any connection, as effects, with anything within or without the mind, as their cause, is itself a thoroughly atheistic doctrine. It concedes that there may be an effect without a cause. The atheist has but to reply: for aught we know, this earth, the sun, the moon, "the stars with all their shining frame," may have taken their rise in the same manner as the acts and volitions of the human will without any efficient cause.

And then, although the Theodicy distinctly pleads the testimony of consciousness (p. 135,) for the assertion that "the mind knows and feels that it is exempt from the power and efficacy of a producing cause in its volitions," yet it is one of the most distinct and definite of all the teachings of consciousness, of experience, and of observation, against both the Theodicy and Atheism, that our volitions *have* a causal connection with things within and things without. Let but the thoughtful mind turn its attention to the little circle of its own thoughts, or the little circle of society within its acquaintance, or to the social delineations of those writers who are accounted great masters of human nature, or to the pages of history, or more especially to the inspired pages of the Holy Scriptures, and the clear and certain light will come to him, that the great law of cause and effect reigns, and must reign, in mind, will, motive, action,

life—everywhere; and that God is really and truly on the throne of his own universe.

It may be proper to say here, that we confess that we are not a little jealous—we hope with a not ungodly jealousy—of the flippant vogue of the modern philosophy of consciousness, sound, clear, and reliable, as that witness may be in its place. But one man's consciousness will tell him one thing, and another's will tell him another thing. Men will ever find *their own* doctrines in their consciousness; as we have a writer here—and not the least gifted of writers by any means—professing to find “*dimly, at least,*” as he says, a doctrine in his consciousness totally different from what had before been conceded to be the universal consciousness of mankind. This consciousness ought to be required to produce *corroborating* testimony whenever that can be done. One would think, for example, that Dr. Chalmers of Scotland, had possessed quite as clear and legible a consciousness, and was quite as reliable a reader of the records inscribed by the finger of God upon the soul of man, as Professor Bledsøe, or any other person whom this age has known. And yet it is the only matter about which we remember to have met with any thing like indignant contempt in all the theological lectures of that great thinker. When he comes to speak of this theory, (*Institutes, vol. II, p. 328,*) of “an act of the will that comes of itself unbidden, and without any parentage whatever in the order of successive nature,” he says, “there is the revolt of all human sense and human experience against it.” Now, it is in relation to this very identical point that Professor Bledsøe says: “The mind clearly perceives, by due reflection, and at all times sees dimly, at least, that an act of volition is different in its nature from a passive impression or a produced effect; and hence it knows and feels that it is exempt from the power and efficacy of a producing cause in its volitions,” p. 135. Dr. Chalmers' consciousness is unequivocal on one side. Professor Bledsøe's “mind clearly perceives, by due reflection, and at all times sees dimly, at least,” exactly the reverse. Now, whose consciousness reflects the general truth of human nature on this point? We unhesitatingly say

that of Dr. Chalmers. But then we are not far from being in the same ecclesiastical connection in which Chalmers was, and this may warp our consciousness, or our interpretation of consciousness. We have not the pleasure to know what Professor Bledsoe's ecclesiastical connections are. We suppose that if they are Episcopalian, they cannot be very cordially so, from his "speaking from personal experience,"—*Theodicy*, p. 219,—of the Puseyites charging him with "pride and presumption," for setting up his individual opinion against "the decisions of the mother church;" unless, peradventure, he means, in that place, to distinguish between a class of Episcopalians with whom he does not range himself, and a class with whom he does; yet, the *Theodicy* itself will doubtless have followers; we hope and believe, not a great multitude, especially among those who ever attentively read the Epistle to the Ephesians. Yet, some it will doubtless have. They will follow Professor Bledsoe's views of consciousness—that volitions have no causes. Consciousness then, or the interpretation of consciousness, which is all the same, will become a party matter, and there can be no other arbiter than that which the great Scotchman refers to, and on account of his reference to which, chiefly, we follow him; that is; "all human sense and human experience," and he might have added: all human observation, language, science, history, implication of every kind.

There is not, perhaps, any cause for apprehension that the doctrines of the *Theodicy*, or of Taylorism, will prevail to any considerable extent beyond what they now do, with persons of mature judgment, after they come fully to understand those doctrines. But from the confidence with which consciousness, is appealed to in them, in direct opposition to the commonest and clearest mental conviction of nine tenths of educated mankind who do not, and cannot think their volition causeless, unhinged and fortuitous—we may derive a lesson not to be worthless, in a coming day, in our country. Those who are better acquainted with the German mental science than the present writer can either boast of, or lament, tell us that they have sometimes made a great deal, on the witness's stand, of what, in their

most expressively sounding language, they call the *Gefühl*—(we believe, however, that there should be another vowel, the ü.) And that a speculative mind will think itself justifiable in bringing out the wildest theories on the ground that his consciousness, his feelings or his aesthetic sentiments tell him this and this. These impulses may be entitled to some influence over the mind in which they arise; but if they have no necessary connection with memory, reflection, reason, and observation, as their *producing causes*, they are entitled to no weight whatever upon the minds of other people, and can never become the proper materials out of which to build metaphysical systems. We say nothing against a legitimate and guarded use of the testimony of consciousness; even the German *Gefühl* may have its place in mere matters of taste and sentiment, concerning which there is no such thing as positive objective truth. But we do object to the assumption of the imposing name of consciousness, by every new notion in philosophy, in behalf of which there happens not to be any other witness.

3. Our third observation upon this philosophical divinity is, that it is astonishing that it should proceed as quietly as it does upon the completely erroneous assumption that the action of the will under the influence of decisive motives, is not free action. Nothing can be more contrary to experience, observation, and every other testimony, than this assumption. All men see and know, in practical life, that they never act more freely, at any time, than when under the most powerful motives. The fallacy may be seen underlying this whole school of philosophy—Taylor, Fitch, Finney, Duffield, Bledsoe,—more or less—that the action of motives enslaves the mind. If they could prove this to be the case, as they assume it to be, if it could be proved to be true that motives of the most powerful description make slaves of the mind which they influence, then the result would be very different from that which is anticipated by the advocates of the new divinity. It would establish that distorted form of the doctrine of necessity, against which they so stoutly protest, beyond all possibility of escape: motives enslave the will. All mankind have ever been, are now,

and forever hereafter will be, under the influence of motives. Therefore, the wills of all mankind are enslaved, and not free. This syllogism, we submit, must follow the doctrine, that the action of motives takes away the freedom of the will. The truth is far otherwise, however. The will of no being in the universe is freer than that of the "wrapt seraph" in heaven, "who adores and burns" so near to the throne of God, and in such full view of his glory, as to overwhelm every power within him with love and reverence.

There is no freer will than that of the holy man described in the hymn of Augustus Toplady, who finds daily that it is

Sweet in the confidence of faith
To trust His firm decrees;
Sweet to lie passive in His hands,
And know no will but His.

No man's will is, or can be, any freer than that of the ripe saint, who has served God so long, that the motives for the continuance of his service, as they appear to this man's view, are to those against the service of God, as preponderating and overwhelming as the proportion of one million to a unit; and who says with Payson, in his last days: "Hitherto I have viewed God as a fixed star, bright indeed, but often intercepted by clouds; but now he is coming nearer and nearer, and spreads into a sun so vast and glorious, that the light is too dazzling for flesh and blood to sustain."

On any other ground, there are but two possible conditions of free will that we can see; the one, when no motives are present to the mind at all, and then though it might have a free will, yet it never could be a rational agent; and the other, when motives are just balanced, one to one, five to five, an hundred to an hundred; and in that case, there could be no choice at all: Look at mankind every where, in history, in the drama, in all life-histories, in actual life, in every state and mode of action, each is conscious that he is free himself. Each perceives that others are free. Yet the influence of motives is universal. And in cases where motives of great power appear in operation, as in the case of the holy man near to God, in the case of the patriot dying for his

country, in the case of the youth following the lures of the prizes of life, the more powerful the motive, the more voluntary does the soul become in its compliance. It is surprising that systems of mental philosophy should ever have been constructed on any other hypothesis, for it would really appear that human nature cannot be regarded as rational nature on any other ground.

4. It is surprising that books should be written on religious subjects, in tones so bold and confident as some of these works in the philosophic divinity of the present century have been—and the remark applies in all its force to Mr. Bledsoe's Theodicy—and yet should so directly and awfully *contradict the Scriptures* on the subject of the power of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of men—or the Divine efficiency, as it is technically called. With full heart, we say, that the God of Bledsoe's Theodicy is not our God. He is not the God of the Bible. He is not the God to whom pious men, in any age of the world, have looked up and addressed their prayers. Irrespective of the full, definite, unequivocal exhibitions of God, in the Epistle to the Ephesians, as one “who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will,” (of which epistle we are amazed that no notice should be taken in a work which professes to receive the Scriptures as inspired, and to refute the common views of divine efficiency based on them,) the God of the Bible is every where represented as possessing the very power over human wills which the Theodicy denies to him. Prayer is addressed to Him, simply because he possesses that power. Prophecies are made in his name, and fulfilled by his working, only because he has that power. And by far the more interesting part of the vast schemes of Providence, which he is exhibited as laying in his counsels, and conducting to their issue, necessarily depend on the very efficiency denied to him in Professor Bledsoe's Theodicy. He withholds Abimelech from sinning against him; *Gen. xx.* He promises the Hebrews that he will hold back the desires of their neighbours, “neither shall any man desire thy land when thou shalt go up to appear before the Lord thy God thrice in the year;” *Exod. 34.* He says he will send faintness into the people's hearts in the land of their enemies, as a punish-

ment for their disobedience; *Lev.* 26. He says that he will take of the Spirit that is upon Moses, and put it upon the elders; *Numb.* xi. When Samson is ensnared by a woman of the Philistines, it is declared to be of the Lord, because "he sought on occasion against the Philistines; *Judges* 14. There is a vision of the Lord sitting on his throne, and calling for a Spirit to go and persuade Ahab to evil for a punishment." And there came forth a Spirit, and stood before the Lord, and said I will persuade him. And the Lord said unto him wherewith? And he said I will go forth, and I will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. And he said thou shalt persuade him, and prevail also: go forth and do so"; I *Kings*, xxii. Then when King Amaziah would not hear, "it came from God, that he might deliver them into the hands of their enemies;" II *Chron.* 25. The prophet Daniel says distinctly that it was the duty of the Jewish people to make their prayer to God, that they might turn from their iniquities and understand his truth. *Chap.* ix. Nor could Isaiah have spoken much differently from what he does in that sublime exaltation of the Divine efficient power in his 46th chap. of his prophecies, if he had had the Theodicy specially in view. "I am God, and there is none like me: declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times, the things which are not yet done, saying my counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure, calling a ravenous bird from the East, the man that executeth my counsel from a far country: yea, I have purposed, and I also will do it. I have spoken and I will bring it to pass."

And then ascending from particular declarations of the divine efficiency, of which the Scriptures are almost as full as the night-sky is of stars—look at the great facts which are ascribed to the power of the Spirit of God as the fundamental principles of all evangelical religion: the awaking of the soul from security in spiritual ruin; the inspiring in it of a desire for a better condition;—the preparation of the heart to seek God;—the convincing of the conscience;—the raising of the souls of individuals and of nations from the spiritually dead;—the renovation of the heart or will, or the creation and gift of a new

heart;—the authorship of the new birth;—the daily renewal of the spirit of the mind;—the authorship of daily grace and readiness for every trial, difficulty and duty of life; the re-forming of the lost image of God in the soul;—the actual preparation of the lost, by changes in their spiritual nature for the kingdom of heaven. How can men look such a book in the face and deny the efficiency of God?

Nor do the Scriptures anywhere, give any hint of the truth of the modern expedient, that though the feelings of our mind are necessitated, and though our judgments are necessary, yet, the connection of cause with effect has no existence between the judgment and the volition. If so, then there could be no such thing as mental science at all. There would be two lands, in each of which we could discover the operation of some laws which might be the objects of science, and then a great gulf between them, over which there would be, and could be, no bridge; through which a stream of the darkest and deepest waters of mental hap-hazard flows forever. The acts of the will, the volitions, the proceedings which make up human life, having no causal connection with feelings, motives, judgments, convictions, conscience, sense of duty, or any thing else of that kind, the intuitive conviction of every man that *there are laws of the mind*, would be constantly contradicted by the affirmation of the pretended science of mind, that there are no laws of the mind. The mental world would be one great bedlam, mental science would be a constant and necessary suicide. All religion would be an impossibility, because the only known principle on which it is possible—the efficient production of it by the divine Spirit would be denied and annulled. Having withdrawn our wills from under the control of the divine Spirit, we should seek to *account* for our conduct—such is the invincible inclination of our minds to look out mental causes for mental effects,—by omens, and signs and fates, and auspices. The spilling of the salt—the crowing of the cock—the flight of birds—the direction of the horns of the new moon—the appearances of the entrails of newly slain beasts, would again have to be consulted by the augurs and aruspex to account for the volition of individuals,

and the proceedings of bodies of men, and the shapings of the destinies of life; which would have been emancipated by the new philosophy from the causative influence of feelings, judgments and motion, and the efficient influence and government of the living God. There is a hideous darkness of discomfort in such philosophy. It is better that motive, truth, reason and God should govern the world; and that we should wait for the solution of riddles, till we see the whole unfolding of the scheme, than that the ape-gods of superstition, fatalism, chance, caprice, should again be enthroned in a world which professes to be rational and christian.

The Scriptures indeed positively contradict, expressly and impliedly, the doctrine that there is any link of certainty wanting, anywhere, between the purpose of God and the corresponding event, whether the alleged wanting link be that between feeling and judgment, or that between judgment and will, or that between will and volition. Wherever you may choose to locate the chasm it is equally unscriptural. The very clearest Scriptures, which it can hardly be necessary to cite further, except to refer to Romans viii. 28 and 29, in confirmation of the passage quoted from Isaiah—definitely guarantee the whole length of the chain. There is no link wanting. Some of the links lie between mere material and physical cause and effect; and are matters of necessity in the proper sense of that word. But other links lie between what we may call *free causes* and their effects. The main great difficulty in this department of the subject has been a failure to understand the nature of free causes; and to see that their efficiency does not take away mental freedom, but rather establishes it; that these causes are efficient and may be relied on as certain, just simply because the mind and will *are free*; and make their choices, and exercise their volitions, unconstrained by any real necessity. The word *necessity* is no doubt an unfortunate one for the certain influence of rational considerations over men according to their character. The *sound* of the word, as implying material fate and force, is the very breath which fills the sails of such schemes as Bledsoe's Theodicy. Explain that word clearly, and you explode such systems as infallibly as

they expect (but fail) to explode atheism and scepticism. Within the ambiguities of that single word lie their only grounds of existence. The love of truth is not a force, or a fate, or a compulsion over the nature of God; yet it is a necessity; for God cannot lie. Fidelity to the Redeemer is not a force, or a fate, or a compulsion over the soul of the martyr; and yet he cannot deny his master, and will rather die. The love of country is not a force, or a fate, or compulsion over the mind of the patriot; and yet it is "a ruling passion strong in death." Gold exercises no power of compulsion, force, or fate over the miser; and yet its power is a tremendous necessity. The most abandoned generations of men are under no force, fate, or compulsion to sin—else sin would not be sin—and yet, when the Ethiopian changes his skin and the leopard his spots, then may they who have accustomed themselves to do evil learn of their own selves, to do well. The certainty of the moral sequence is simply declared in the word of God to be as complete as the certainty of material necessity. The two things are simply compared in this one point. Now, if men will ever understand this moral certainty, the power of which is not force on the will, but on the contrary, the full current of the will in a given direction, then there will be light on the subject. If they will understand that this moral certainty consists in the very hearty, voluntary current of the human will, which, instead of taking away responsibility, as material necessity would do, does most thoroughly involve responsibility, then we shall cease to be teased with Theodicies which construct splendid and unreal theories on the ambiguities of necessity, moral and material.

And what a grotesque and strange whim of philosophy it is, to contend that causes of volitions destroy the freedom of volitions—that motives, inducements, reason, cannot make the mind willing—cannot cause its volitions—cannot ensure the putting of them forth; that no amount of the perceived glory of God could cause volitions in the mind of St. Paul; that no amount of perceived lustre to the reign of the Saints could have caused volitions in Cromwell's mind; that no military

glory could have infallibly lured Napoleon; and no future civil good to his country, could have made Washington willing to endure privation and hardship?

We feel, not "*dimly*," but clearly, that universal consciousness fairly contradicts the fundamental principles of this bad book. It matters little to us whether our Arminian brethren espouse it, as its bitter assaults on Calvinism may induce some of the less far-seeing and more passionate of them do. It may serve then for a while, as an auxiliary in hunting down Calvinism. But that is the vainest of all crusades. Calvinism can never die while the Epistles of St. Paul are regarded as inspired authority, and the spirit of God gives faith in his word, to new-born souls. All appeals to popular outcry, all accumulation of odium, all self-idolatrous and captivating philosophies together, can never destroy it while there is piety and faith in God's word on the earth. And if it were dead to-day, then given a new heart, and a Bible, to-morrow morning, in a solitary island; and Calvinism would again be alive as soon as the new heart had perused the Bible with the question in view; what saith God on these matters? Arminianism would not be born till the question was started: "Do I like what God says, or does it humble me?" And the damage which the cold and cheerless principles of the Theodicy would do to the truly pious Arminian branches of the church of Christ at the present day, in cutting man loose from dependence on God; in restraining prayer to God by the representation of his spiritual power as already exhausted; and in extinguishing that sun of the theological system, a vicarious atonement, would far more than counterbalance the temporary aid which it would derive from the book in hunting down that, on the principle of which, the lives of the more excellent of them are practically ordered; and of which, we believe, they always think the more kindly, as they learn the more candidly to distinguish the thing itself, from the horrible caricatures of it which form the staple of too many of their own authors.