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ARTICLE I.

THE DIVINITY OF CHRIST.

Among all the absurdities that prevail among those who receive the Scriptures as a Divine revelation, none perhaps, is more astonishing than that which disrobes our Saviour of his Divinity. Christ is not the Supreme God, but a creature only, is the opinion of an Arius, a Socinus, a Priestly, and a Belsham, and their numerous disciples, in direct opposition to what we deem the explicit teachings of both the Testaments, which they professedly believe and revere. It is really strange, in our judgment, that candid and intelligent men, after even a cursory examination of the Scriptures, should ever arrive at such a conclusion. There is no better evidence of the extraordinary subtlety of Satan, in his work of deception and ruin, than the effort he makes, and the success with which that effort is attended, to divert serious minds from the obvious import of Divine revelation, and occupy them with a creed that has its origin in a grievous perversion of truths of infinite moment. If he cannot utterly destroy the word of God, nor arrest its circulation, he will destroy its influence, by adulterating, or else by torturing it. This remark is made with all due respect toward those whose views we are about to combat. We should all be humble enough to acknowledge that we are possibly holding with tenacity, errors which are to be attributed to Satan's power over us.

There are two facts with which our minds should be deeply impressed. The wonderful constitution of our Saviour's person, which, as we believe, combines the Divine and

they lost, when broken off from their own olive tree, to whom once belonged "the adoption, and the glory, and the covenants, and the giving of the law, and the service of God and the promises."

They rejected the Messiah and he rejected them, and the unbelief and guilt of the fathers are perpetuated in their children to the latest generations, while we, Gentiles, succeed to the inheritance, and stand, while we do stand, *by faith*.

And it is a thought that should weigh heavily on the minds of ungodly heads of families, that they are sinning, not only against their own souls, but depriving their children of a great blessing. It is often remarked of those who have been connected with the church, and have taken offence at the truth, and turned persecutors of godly Ministers, that their families become irreligious, dissipated, and go to ruin. "Yea," says a quaint old divine, "you may sometimes mark it in our churches; a church has long enjoyed an excellent Minister, but they grow at length full of unaccountable prejudices against him: the Son of God seeing this, their folly, sends for that Minister away to Heaven presently, and lets them supply themselves with such another when they can find him."

ARTICLE IV.

BLEDSON'S THEODICY.

A Theodicy; or vindication of the Divine glory, as manifested in the Constitution and government of the moral world. By ALBERT TAYLOR BLEDSON, Professor of Mathematics in the University of Mississippi. 1854.

We feel rather surprised that this book says nothing about poor, dear, Michael Servetus. It omits also, the nasal psalms of the ancient covenanters;—says nothing about the burning of witches in New England;—nothing

about the grief of St. Augustine at parting with his concubine. But, to judge from what does appear, and from the spirit of the book, those things will come yet, in some future edition, when the author's heart shall be set up in types, in complete form. Though the book is one of higher pretensions, and in some respects, of decidedly superior merits, to the common anti-Calvinistic tracts, in which our Methodist brethren take delight; yet the same hot and half-phrenzied antipathy to the theology of the apostle Paul, appears in it, whenever, in an unguarded page, the passions of the soul break through the incrustations of calm philosophic dignity in which it is intended to be written.

During the summer of 1854, Professor Bledsoe was elected by the Board of Visitors of the University of Virginia, to be Professor of Mathematics in that institution, and was accordingly, transferred from the University of Mississippi, in which he had held the similar chair, to the University of Virginia. Simultaneously with the appearance of the new, learned, and distinguished Professor in Virginia, was the appearance of this new work of his; not on subjects usually held to lie within the peculiar province of a Professor of Mathematics, but upon some of the deepest questions of moral and theological speculations of all time. The simultaneous appearance of the author and his book among us, was well adapted to give an acceptance to the book which it might not otherwise have attained. Then, although the book is on a subject on which no man has any business to inquire at all, as no man possesses either the means or the capacity to inquire; and if any man does inquire at all, it ought to be long after his undergraduate age, in his sober and mature years,—yet it has evident adaptation to captivate wayward, passionate, aspiring, young minds; is artfully addressed to those “*who may possess both the desire and the capacity to think for themselves,*” and can be held guiltless, we think, by no reader of its pages, of a wish and an attempt, to create fierce and passionate prejudices, by its constant raillery, and its frequently genuine wit, against a large class of the Christian community. In all this, we do not intend to utter one syllable of complaint. We shall admit the largest freedom

on such matters to be the best policy. We shall even admit a change of the good old Latin maxim: *Cuique in sua arte credendum*. So it used to read. But if the Professor of Mathematics wished to teach theology, or theodicy, so be it. We shall enter no protest, though the maxim be henceforth held, in the Virginia University, to read: *Cuique in altera arte credendum*;—and the other wise old saw be also newly set to read: *Omnes possumus omnia*. We say we shall make no complaint of those things, and enter no protest, but simply indicate, before hand, our reasons for treating this book, as we may be able, and as will appear further on in this article.

The great question of the Theodicy, is the great question on which men who love to speculate upon the unrevealed secrets of God, and think themselves capable of doing so, have been prone to try their flights in all ages: **HOW CAME SIN INTO THE WORLD?** To this question the following solution is given; page 197:

“The question why God permitted sin seems to be an unmeaning question. It is unmeaning because it seeks to ascertain the reason why God has permitted a thing which in reality, he has not permitted at all. Having created a world of moral agents; that is, a world endowed with the power to sin, it was impossible for him to prevent sin, so long as they continued to exist as moral agents. A universe of such agents given, its liability to sin is not a matter for the will of God to permit; this is a necessary consequence from the nature of moral agents. He could no more deny peccability to such creatures than he could deny the properties of the circle to a circle; and if he could not prevent such a thing, it is surely very absurd to ask why he permitted it. On the supposition of such a world, God did not permit sin at all. It could not have been prevented.”

This is sufficiently intelligible. It is the fundamental proposition of the book. It is not new. But so bold an espousal of it has rarely occurred. It has sometimes ✓ been brought out as a mere hypothetical mode of escape from the atheistic question, why God did not prevent sin, if he was omnipotent, and hated sin. But our author adopts it, not as a hypothesis, but as a fact;—not

because he *needs* it, but because he *likes* it;—not merely against the atheist, nor principally against the atheist, but also and principally, against the Calvinist. And he seems heartily to adopt that peculiar mode of mental philosophy, as to the nature of moral agents, which removes the human soul from under Divine influence, which necessarily goes along with his theory; we quote from page 194:

“If infinite wisdom, and goodness, and power, should muster all the means and appliances in the universe, and cause them to bear with united energy on a single mind, the effect produced, however grand and beautiful, would not be the virtue of the agent in whom it is produced. Nothing can be his virtue which is produced by an extraneous agency. This is a dictate of the universal reason and consciousness of mankind.”

Many other declarations to this effect might be produced, but this is sufficient, and will hardly be denied by any one, to be a fair statement of the doctrine of the book in relation to the influence of motives on the human mind, or as they are called, “extraneous agencies.” The Book is equally explicit in denying the efficiency of the other mode of influence over the human soul, usually ascribed to God, that is, the influence of the Divine Spirit within the heart; page 353:

“All divines admit, says Bayle, that God can infallibly produce a good act of the will in a human soul, without depriving it of the use of liberty.” “This is no longer admitted,” says Professor Bledsoe. “We call it in question. We deny that such an act can be produced, either with, or without depriving the soul of liberty. We deny that it can be produced at all; for whatever God may produce in the human soul, this is not, this cannot be, the moral goodness or virtue of the soul in which it is produced. In other words, it is not, and cannot be, an object of praise or of moral approbation in him whom it is thus caused to exist.”

The reader will see from these passages, the fairness of which we do not fear that any reader of the book will question, to what an immense, and cold, and comfortless, distance from God, this book removes the soul of man. He will also, begin to see *what that thing is*, which Pro-

fessor Bledsoe calls the liberty, or freedom, of the human will. He will begin to perceive that by freedom of the will, he means its exemption, not only from subjection to God, but exemption also from the influence of truth, reason, wisdom, prudence, and every other motive of past, present, or future; heaven, earth or hell. The only exception to this remark, now remembered, is found in a glaring contradiction to the main philosophy of the book, into which the exigencies of his position drive him in the later chapters, of which we shall speak in its place. But here we shall let the author speak further, and explicitly for himself; page 133:

"It is universally agreed, that every state of the intelligence and of the sensibility is necessarily determined by the evidence and the object in view of the mind. It is not, then, either in the intelligence, or in the sensibility, that we are to look for liberty." And again, on page 135:

"The mind is passive in judging and feeling, and hence these phenomena *necessarily demand* the operation of causes to account for them; but the mind is active in its volitions, and this *necessarily excludes* the idea of causes to produce them." A more glaring exhibition of a *felo-de-se* of its own principles, in its very obvious drift, than this last sentence furnishes, as indicated by our own italics, we have rarely met with. That, however, simply by the way. The reader will be good enough to notice that it is one of the peculiar crotchets of Professor Bledsoe's psychology, that mental activity cannot have a cause; that because volitions are *active*, they cannot have been produced by a cause. This is one of the most obvious fallacies of the book. No proof is presented, that we remember. We are very sure that no adequate proof can be presented. And we do not believe that any intelligent reader needs anything more, to induce him to reject it, than the positive denial which is all we have time now to give it, and with which we appeal to ten thousand experiences of every thinking man, every week in the year.

But to permit the book further to describe itself; p. 60:

"We deny that volitions and their antecedents are necessarily connected."

And again, on page 153:

“ We lay it down then, as an established and fundamental position, that the mind acts, or puts forth its volitions, without being efficiently caused to do so,—without being impelled by its own prior action, or by the prior action of anything else. The conditions or occasions of volition being supplied, the mind itself acts in view thereof, without being subject to the power or action of any cause whatever. All rational beings must, as we have seen, either admit this exemption of the mind in willing, from the power and action of any cause, or else lose themselves in the labyrinth of an infinite series of causes. It is this exemption which constitutes the freedom of the human will.”

Why one cannot acknowledge the BLESSED SPIRIT OF God, as one single cause of the action of the human will, without being driven between the horns of the dilemma of no cause, or an infinite series of causes, we never expect to be able to see. But so reasons the Professor of Mathematics of the University of Virginia! And such are the theology, and the mental philosophy, of this book, stated in the most definite utterances we have been able to select from its pages.

He maintains that God could not have prevented sin from entering the world without destroying the freedom of the mind of man;—that holiness produced by the power of God, or as it is called necessary holiness, (that is, holiness having a cause,) is a contradiction in terms, and never is seen in fact;—that the Holy Spirit of God could not overcome the opposition of the will of all sinners; and consequently, that there are a part of mankind whose salvation is impossible even with God. It is said on page 302: “ *We believe that salvation is impossible to some*, because a necessary holiness is impossible, and they do not choose to work out for themselves what cannot be worked out for them, even by omnipotence. It was the bright and cheering light which this truth seemed to cast upon the dark places of the universe, that first inspired us with the thought and determination to produce a theodicy.”

If the fundamental principle of the philosophy of this book was true, that impression produced on the under-

standings and sensibilities of men, their prejudices and their passions, have no necessary connection with the determination of their wills, then we should at once admit that it was time thrown away to notice the book at all; for, out of its own mouth, it would follow, that the determination of the wills of the readers of the book, to turn away from what we think the basis of all comforting religion, would not be "subject to the power or action of any cause whatever," brought to bear upon them on the pages of the book itself. But, as we are sure that all the wit and logic of the Theodicy to the contrary notwithstanding, the wills of men will continue to be under the influence of judgments, of prejudices, and of motives, and that it is now, as it was in the garden of Eden of old, that when the worst is made to appear the better cause, the will follows the impressions on the judgment, we admit that we think the book a dangerous one. It is the more dangerous, the more false it is, by self-demonstration.

The Theodicy derives its name from a work by the great Leibnitz, of a very different stripe however, on the same general subject. In point of style, it is among the most readable and transparent of all books of its kind. The wit with which, when he cannot refute them, he whistles down the wind, such old fogies as Augustine, Calvin, and Edwards, is often genuine and pleasing. There is another extremely dangerous attraction about this book. With a good deal of shallow gladiation, in which the author jumps to a conclusion against one of the old giants without having seen more than the surface of that giant's thought, and shouts victory, after a fencing match with the giant's shadow, yet there is a deification of human reason, manifested throughout the work, a daring hopefulness of being able to grapple with the grandest of the state secrets of the court of Heaven, and a contemptuous sneer, everywhere more or less visible, at the expense of those prudent ones who warn us off from such inquiries, as if the prudent had no other reason than a fear that the brave thinkers would discover the shallow tricks of all prudence and caution; which are very dangerous to a certain class of bold and wrestless minds. He who accepts the *limitations* of his

religious inquiries from the Bible, as well as the solutions of them, and is content to speculate concerning the counsels of Heaven no farther than Heaven has seen fit to reveal those counsels, will pretty certainly escape the fascinations of this book; but then he will about as certainly be a Calvinist. And when, under the pretext of refuting the atheist and the Calvinist, the spirit of intellectual pride and self-confidence is as boldly invoked as it is in this book, it requires very little observation of the ordinary history of such mental epidemics as Coleridgeism, Emersonism, Taylorism, and Optimism, to see that many more of miserable and dream-haunted skeptics are made, than there are of atheists or Calvinists reclaimed. By a deep and fearful nemesis of God, men who thus spend their time in trying to give another account of the Fall than the simple one which God has given, often *re-enact the fall*;—Lucifer, son of the morning, sinks down to a loss of all his glory, for presuming to be equal with God; man is driven from the bowers of bliss forever, for eating the forbidden fruit of the knowledge of good and evil. Neither Lucifer, nor Adam, nor the man who awakes in youthful bosoms, the spirit of restless speculation beyond the confines of Divine Revelation, has the privilege of falling alone. They all pull down many hapless spirits with them. ✓

The easy and merry facility with which this author frequently deems himself to have refuted President Edwards, the actual contempt with which that great man is treated, the different appearance of Edwards on the pages of the Theodicy, from that which he makes on his own pages, as well as the dignity and importance of the matter itself, all require us to look closely at the reasonings of the Theodicy concerning the will, and the influence of motives over it. The giant error of the book lies there. We hope we may be fortunate enough to give the reader such an insight into it, though so sadly cooped up by the limits of a single article, that he may afterwards deliberately and thoroughly unravel it for himself. In order to do so, we must attend closely to the author's various expressions of his own idea, as it occurs on different pages of the book, to see whether he does not himself do exactly that with which he has the hardi-

hood to charge Jonathan Edwards: "establish his proposition in one sense and build on it in another." We have seen, on a former page, that Professor Bledsoe denies that volitions and their antecedents are necessarily connected; denies that convictions of the judgment, or impressions on the sensibilities, control the will at all; denies indeed, that volitions have any efficient cause or antecedent of any kind. Here is another of the utterances of the book on the subject. It is found on PAGE 155: "But in truth, the freedom of the mind does not consist in its possessing a power over the determinations of its own will, for the true notion of freedom is a negative idea, and consists in the absence of every power over the determination of the will. The mind is free because it possesses a power of acting, over which there is no controlling power, either within or without itself." And here also, is another,—one of the most deliberate and measured declarations of the whole book—the enunciation of one of his prodigious victories over the shadows of some of the giants, which shadows he has conjured up for his own especial conquest. It is found on page 152: "Hence we conclude that an act of the mind, or a volition, is not produced by the action of either mind or motive, but takes its rise in the world without any such efficient cause of its existence." This is the proposition on which he builds. We shall expect to see presently, that this is not the proposition which he establishes, if there be one at all, of which that honour may be predicated. But a word concerning this the main position of the book. There are no words of more frequent occurrence on the pages of the Theodicy, than an appeal to the "universal voice and reason of man,"—"the universal voice and consciousness of man,"—"the universal intelligence of man,"—"the unbiassed reason of man." To that court of appeals then, we will go with him. We affirm that the free moral agency above described, is the moral agency of a *mad-house*, and of no other place, or world, that we know anything of, that ever did, or can exist; and for the truth of the remark we will go to individual consciousness, to our own observations upon other people, ten thousand times every year of our own lives, as the creatures of motives and

of impulses; to the implications contained in all human words and forms of expression on the subject; to all we learn from the pages of history, about the arts by which statesmen have wielded the governments of nations of men; and lastly to the views which all writers have given of human nature who have been famous for fidelity in delineations of that description. No dramatist ever did, or ever will, indite either tragedy or comedy, to give correct views of human nature, out of a Lunatic Asylum, on the principles of moral agency on which the Theodicy is built. No statesman ever dreamed of adopting any such principles for the government of rational beings capable of law. And all forms of expression in human language—even the very name of the thing under discussion itself: *moral agent*,—imply the influence of motives over volitions. The independence of the choices of the mind of man upon the character of the mind itself, and upon motives in the external world around, may be an admirable theory with which to attack Calvinism. It may be capable of beautiful and plausible arrangement in a Theodicy. It may even commend itself, as a speculation, to the adoption of many of those peculiar persons who are fond of frost-work speculations. But the mischief of the matter is, that *nature* will not adopt the theory. You may make it as a basis on which to build a great amount of inference, and inference which may deeply gratify your prejudices. But then, the theory is not TRUE. It melts the moment the sunshine of fact strikes it. Neither statesmen, nor lawyers, nor professors, nor preachers, ever lay plans on the theory of the Theodicy. The book itself could never have seen the light on its own theory. We have seen, on a former page, by its own confession, that a certain consideration, in regard to the brightness of his system, has the credit of having “*first inspired us*, (the Professor,) with the thought and *determination* to produce a Theodicy.” In this confession, from the book itself, that it owes its existence to the *determination* of its author’s will by motive, we find a refutation of the whole theory of the book, and a magnificent tribute to the unextinguishable “voice and reason of man.” Although men may speculatively believe in the system of the Theodicy, yet, until

✓ they shall have been driven, by sad calamity, to the lunatic condition of a will unhinged from the desires of the heart, and the convictions of the judgment, they cannot either speak, or act, or compose theodicies, or any other books, on the system of this theodicy. Whether you expel nature with a pitch-fork, or a theory, she will still incessantly return upon you. She brings down all castles of speculation erected against her authority, as the sun brings down the bright but chilly bowers of February frost. And while you stand sighing over the fallen and crushed mass of the icy sheen, the sunshine will soon persuade you that truth and nature are better than shining theory.

✓ The theory of Prof. Bledsoe's Theodicy is no more the theory of the Bible than it is the theory of the thought, and speech, and action, of practical life. Can any reader explain how it is, that good and wise men should feel called upon to write books to explain how sin entered into this world, without paying the slightest attention, or without any more than the slightest attention, to the account given of that great fact, in a book which they admit to be the inspired word of God? The simple account there given, of the entrance of sin into the world, is that a motive for disobedience was presented to the mind of Eve, which, owing to her state of mind, and to the false impressions produced on her judgment, by the arguments of the Tempter, seemed stronger to her than the motive to obedience. But there is not in the book of Genesis, or in any other place in the Bible, anything which looks, in the least degree, like an intention on the part of the Holy Spirit, to make the impression that God could not have prevented the fall of Eve without destroying the free agency of Eve. ✓ And if this theory of the Theodicy can be fairly engrafted upon the religious systems of the country, in the silence of the word of God on the subject, then so also can the Roman Catholic doctrines of purgatory, and of the invocation of Saints, and of prayers for the dead, be fairly engrafted upon the religious systems of the country, and with not one iota less of authority. The account given in the Scriptures of the successful resistance of the Tempter by the Saviour, is not, that when the Tempter plied him

with misapplied quotations from the sacred oracles, he resisted them by means of the freedom of his mind from the influence of motives,—not that his will acted “in the absence of every power of determination,”—not that his “volitions took their rise in the world “without any efficient cause of their existence.” The account is, that the proper motives clearly and fairly appeared to his divine understanding, and determined him to perfect obedience. And the statement made in the Scriptures of the grounds on which the salvation of men depends is, that the tremendous motives of God’s word are made efficient by the operation of the Divine Spirit. But, we must not yet bring our author further before a tribunal to which he so rarely appeals, as he does to the Scriptures, in this part of his work. We shall go with him to the “universal voice and reason of man,” while he wishes to go thither. We shall go with him to the Scriptures when he shall choose to go thither, which we shall see anon.

We are now fully ready to affirm, and appeal to the reader, and to the “universal reason and voice of man,” for the truth of the remark, that on the principles of this book, neither sin, holiness, nor moral agency, could ever have entered into this world at all. We mean to say that this book is justly and fairly chargeable with those very principles, destructive of all responsible and accountable agency, which, by means of false metaphysics, it endeavours to fix upon Calvinism. If “the mind is free because it possesses a power of acting, over which there is no controlling power either within or without itself,”—if its volitions “take their rise in the world without any such efficient cause of their existence” as motives, then man is not a creature to be governed by laws and motives, by rewards and punishments. Eve was only acting in accordance with the laws of her nature, in eating the forbidden fruit. In giving her a command not to eat, and threatening her with death if she should eat, God did not employ means which had a controlling power over her. The volition to eat “took its rise in the world without any controlling power within or without.” According to Professor Bledsoe, the “rise in the world” of that volition was an entirely legitimate

and natural phenomenon. It was in perfect accordance with the laws of Eve's created nature, and was, of course, perfectly innocent! According to this theory, there seems to be no such thing as moral agency connected with volition; for volitions take their "rise in the world," independently of considerations of right and wrong. They are, indeed, but the productions of blind, unthinking, undetermining chance! Threats of death and promises of life can have no controlling power over them! Mount Sinai and Mount Calvary are both swept off from the face of the earth, and nothing is left but volitions "taking their rise in the world without any controlling power either within or without." What progress has this writer made in escaping from atheism?

✓ We have seen in what sense he builds on the proposition that motives do not control the will. Let us now see whether he proves that proposition in argument, in the same sense in which he builds on it in theory. When the author's theory concerning the will comes to be used as a single stone in the erection of his whole theory of the government of God, then his theory concerning the will is, that its volitions take their rise in the world without any controlling cause, and are independent of motives. This we have already seen abundantly. Under the evil influence of this theory, the author falls into one of the most glaring mistakes which we ever remember to have met with, in a book on any exact science whatever. That is, he supposes that, when a very powerful motive infallibly leads the will against a small motive, the will cannot be free! The good man's will is not free, if it be granted that the attractions of righteousness are as *twelve* in weight to his mind, while the attractions of vice are but as *eight*! The wills of the angels in Heaven are not free, because the visible glories of God overwhelmingly win their hearts, and control their wills! Jesus Christ was not free of will, in the desert of temptation, because the correct view of providence, and of human glory, and of the proper object of worship, was to the false view which Satan presented, as a *million* to *nought*! God himself is not endowed with free will in his holy and eternal and unchangeable love of truth, because falsehood and truth

influence him as *infinity to nothing*, so that it is impossible for God to lie! "*It is true,*" says Prof. Bledsoe, on page 157 of the Theodicy, "*that if we suppose, according to the doctrine of Sir William Hamilton and Dr. Reid, that two counter-influences act upon the will, the one being as twelve and the other as eight, then the first must necessarily prevail. But, if this supposition be correct, we are not only unable to conceive the fact of liberty, we are also able to conceive that it cannot be a fact at all. There is a great difference, we have been accustomed to believe, between being able to conceive how a thing is, and being able to conceive that it cannot be any how at all: the first would leave it a mere mystery, the last would show it to be an absurdity.*"

And the writer goes on to declare the doctrine of Sir William Hamilton and Dr. Reid an absurdity! And to propose a view of "the phenomena of mind, as they exist in consciousness, and not through the medium of *material analogies!*" This may be the philosophy of Prof. Bledsoe's consciousness. But, we calmly submit to the reader, that it is *not* the philosophy of human life, in which it is one of the most common and indisputable facts, that motives, persuasives, inducements, reasons, considerations, *do make* communities, armies, senates, councils, *willing* to adopt certain courses. The world would not else be a rational world. We calmly submit the question to every intelligent and candid Christian, whether he is an Arminian or a Calvinist, an Episcopalian or a Presbyterian, *is this the philosophy of the Bible?* Shall we ignore God's influence over the mind of man, to all practical intents and purposes altogether? Was it concerning the blessed administration of our Divine Saviour, or was it not, that the principle was adopted: *thy people shall be willing in the day of thy power?*

But when Professor Bledsoe comes to refute this view of liberty entertained by Hamilton, Reid, Edwards, and others, he most generally speaks of it as if it was a *physical compulsion* of the will. In speaking of their views, on page 157, he represents them as holding that the will of God is "*impelled* by a power back of his own," if God is necessarily holy. On page 158, he speaks of God, as a being who, on his theory, "can act without being ne-

cessitated to act like the inanimate portions of creation," implying that the theory he is opposing represents God as necessitated like inanimate things. Again, on the same page, he speaks of his own notions as giving the "idea of an omnipotent power, moving in and of itself, *in obedience to the dictates of infinite wisdom and goodness*; and speaks of those opposed to him as maintaining "the dark scheme of an implexed series and concatenation of causes, binding all things fast, God himself not excepted, in the iron bonds of fate." Where now is his former theory of the independence of the will on motives? He here attributes *physical compulsion* to the Calvinists, which he has fully admitted they do not hold. He, himself, places God's will in "OBEDIENCE" to wisdom and goodness! Saul is among the prophets! Professor Bledsoe among the necessitarians!

The truth is, that Prof. Bledsoe uses his own strange theory of the will, while he is building his system. But, in conducting the argument, on whatever high place he builds his seven altars, he is still compelled, like the prophet of Moab, to prophecy as the Balak of his theory does *not* require. He only does what all sound philosophy, and all human literature, and all human history, and the word of God had done before. He establishes the Calvinistic scheme of the necessary influence of character, principles, and motives. Perhaps it is not a matter upon which we ought to venture to indulge the hope of convincing the learned writer himself. We own however, that that hope has sometimes crossed our vision. We hope to be pardoned if it be presumptuous. But it is human to err. It is something higher and nobler, of which we have no right to suppose this writer incapable, to forsake error. There is one place where the usually intricate sophistry, of using against the Calvinists, what is good only against the advocates of physical compulsion, becomes *so plain, so transparent*, that we almost dare to hope that when it is pointed out to him, the author will not be the last, candidly, to see it. It is found on the 148th page of the Theodicy. It is in the argument against Edwards, in which the facility of his supposed victory over that grand old intellectual Paladin, ought itself to have led Professor Bledsoe to suspect

some fallacy in his own reasonings: "*There could be,*" says he, "*no act of the mind unless there were a mind to act, and unless there were a motive in view of which, it acts.*" This, the Professor states as his own ground. And now, he proceeds to state what he apprehends to be Edwards' ground against which he is battling: "*but it does not follow that the mind is compelled to act by the motive.*" This is one of the grand sophisms of the whole affair. Here, it is perfectly transparent. No one ever did hold, we presume, that motives *compel the will*. The author must pardon us for saying that he has permitted himself to be blinded by "*material analogies.*" Motives control men, not wills only. In one sense they *create* wills. They make men willing.

But we have a word or two to say on behalf of President Edwards. We really begin to think that the remark of an intelligent friend, when he first heard of the professed achievement of the Theodicy, was true: "No man would ever undertake to refute Edwards if he understood him." If the reader wishes a perfect contrast, let him make it by putting the bright sparkling pages of the Theodicy down before him, through which you never get a single glimpse of practical religion, of human nature, or of objective truth, but live ever in a world of theory; and then put down by the side of them; the plain, affectionate, simple, homely, unpretending pages of Edwards, through which, nevertheless, at every turn, you obtain clear views of practical religion, of human nature, and of objective truth. It is not the first time by many, and it will not probably be the last by many, when men shout victory over the dead lion. But, for our parts, we have ceased to be greatly moved by these shouts of victory. Just call me back from theory to fact, and the victory evaporates. We should just as much expect to see a victory in athletics won over a ponderous Roman legionary, from the field of Lama, or of Munda, or of Pharsalia, by one of the well-dressed gentlemen clerks of Broadway, whose forms furnish those lithographed moulds of fashion which are nailed up over the tailors' boards.

But we mean to be satisfied with nothing short of a complete vindication of Edwards from the charge of

holding that the will is compelled by motives—or compelled in any otherwise. We think that this will be perfectly attained by a simple quotation of Edward's own language;—part of it written in capitals by the author himself, as a definition of which, he claimed the benefit, in his ensuing treatise. It is from the Inquiry on the Freedom of the Will, Part I., Section 8.

"It appears from what has been said, that these terms *necessary, impossible, &c.*, are often used by philosophers and metaphysicians in a sense quite diverse from their common and original signification; for they apply them to many cases in which no opposition is supposable. Thus they use them with respect to God's existence, before the creation of the world, when there was no other being; with regard to many of the dispositions and acts of the Divine Being, such as his loving himself, his loving righteousness, hating sin, &c. So, they apply them to many cases of the inclinations and actions of created beings *wherein all opposition of the will is excluded* in the nature of the case." These last are our italics. They are intended to call the attention of the reader to the fact, that the *necessity* which Edwards maintains, is expressly declared by himself to be one in which *all opposition of the will*, and of course all compulsion of the will, are excluded in the nature of the case. But let us hear him further:

"*Metaphysical or philosophical necessity* (his own italics,) is nothing different from their certainty." When these explanations are over, then he gives his definition, as follows, italics and capitals all his:

"*Philosophical Necessity* is really nothing else than the FULL AND FIXED CONNEXION BETWEEN THE *things signified by the subject and* PREDICATE OF A PROPOSITION which affirms something to be true. When there is such a connexion, then the thing affirmed in the proposition is necessary, in a philosophical sense, whether any opposition or contrary effect be supposed, or no."

We think the reader is now pretty well able to judge for himself whether the boasted conclusion, that *motives do not compell the will*, is a conclusion against God's own Jonathan Edwards, who lived a century ago, and wrote a book on the will; or whether it is a conclusion

against that very different person, the Edwards of the fourth chapter of the first part of the Theodicy. Will the candid reader sit down and look over Edwards on the Will, and tell us: how *did* the impression arise, that the author of that book held the *compulsion of the will by motives*? We can account for that impression in no other way than that it took its "rise in the world" "without any efficient cause of its existence," and free from "any controlling power within or without itself;" as all the volitions in which the author of the Theodicy believes, "take their rise in the world."

There is no case on record, with which we have met, of a handsomer refutation of one's own principles by himself, than is to be found in the logic of the second part of the Theodicy, considered as directed against the first part. Let the reader who would satisfy himself on this point, sit patiently down and compare the reasonings of the two fourth chapters; that in the first part, with which we have been principally engaged, with that in the second part, in which the author tilts with that other grand Paladin of the past, John Foster. In the first part, as we have seen, every such a thing as necessary sin, and necessary holiness, is scornfully repudiated. But, in the second part, the very awful fact of eternal punishment is justified, not simply on the ground of clear declarations of God's word, which we think all the justification required on that subject,—but on the ground that "*the habit of sinning may be so completely wrought into the soul, and so firmly fixed there, that nothing can check it in its career of guilt.*" That is, here is a necessary sinfulness confessed, and exactly in the sense in which Calvinists hold necessary sin and necessary holiness; save that they do not hold such things to be beyond the omnipotence of the Spirit of God, or affirm at all on the latter point. And the writer, who had, in the first part, denied to motives any controlling power over rational minds, in the second part, vindicates eternal punishment, and we believe with truth and propriety, as far as we can see into the subject, as a gigantic motive, needed by "the exigences of the case;" and from the very tremendousness of the motive, probably better for the universe on the whole, than if

the punishment of sin were limited. We humbly think, that this is a giving up of the case concerning the influence of motives, as well as a giving up of the point concerning necessary sinfulness.

It was a style of argument which we do not greatly admire, entirely to suppress and ignore Edwards' definition of necessity, and then march out against him with drum and trumpet, as if he were standing there, just where he says positively that he is not standing, and shout out victory over the shadows with which we may choose to people an empty encampment. But there is another specimen of the spirit of the book, still less in accordance, we humbly opine, with a lofty and philosophic candour than that. It is this. The first section of the chapter on "God's Eternal Decree," in the Westminster Confession of Faith, is *entirely suppressed* in the Theodicy. The author endeavours, through a large part of his book, to blacken Calvinism for *making God the author of sin*;—for offering *violence to the will of the creatures*;—and for taking away *the liberty and contingency of second causes*. These are some of his gravest charges against it. They are some of the very spots on the disc of the divine glory, which the Theodicy came to sweep away. And Professor Bledsoe very carefully quotes the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh sections of that chapter, in full, word for word. How is this? We will show how it is. Here is the *first* section of that chapter in the Confession; that wicked first section, which is not so much as noticed, in all the thunders of the Theodicy against Calvinism for making God the author of sin, for enslaving the human will, and for binding all things in the iron links of fate. "God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; YET SO AS THEREBY NEITHER IS GOD THE AUTHOR OF SIN; NOR IS VIOLENCE OFFERED TO THE WILL OF THE CREATURES, NOR IS THE LIBERTY OR CONTINGENCY OF SECOND CAUSES TAKEN AWAY, BUT RATHER ESTABLISHED."

That is, the Confession distinctly disavows, in the threshold, the very charges brought against it! And the readers of the Theodicy are never informed that it is so! We suppose that this mode of dealing must be ta-

ken as another specimen of the new species of volitions, which the consciousness of the author tells him, are to be found in his own mind;—volitions not caused by the prior action of the mind, nor of anything else;—volitions which take their rise in the world without an efficient cause; and acknowledge no controlling power, from within or from without. If so, we have only to say that we admire the practical operation of such volitions, no better than we do the philosophy in which they appear.

The subject of the imputation of Adam's sin to infants is entirely misapprehended in the Theodicy. We do not say that the author does not understand it. For to the author, aside from this book, we owe nothing but respect and kindness. We do say that there is no sign in the book that he understood it. And we say very plainly, moreover, that he ought at least to have understood it, before railing at it as is done. He seems to regard the Calvinistic doctrine of imputation, simply as a mode of accounting for the sufferings of infants by their descent from Adam. Not a glance seems to have been thrown towards the fourth and fifth chapters of the epistle to the Romans, where the doctrine of imputation is stated and enforced. But little, if any attention could have been paid by the writer, to the language of the Westminster Confession, whose doctrines he was in the act of reviling. The Confession says: "*They—the first man and woman—being the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation.*" And the spirit of God most distinctly declares that: *by one man's disobedience many were made sinners. Romans fifth chapter, nineteenth verse.* The doctrine of imputation is simply a mode of explaining the tendency to sin, with which children are born. A writer might say that our invariably sinning, as soon as we grow up, is no proof of native depravity, or of a tendency to sin in our nature. But we should not hold such a writer bound by the laws of reason. Whoever will admit that invariably acting in one way, is a proof of a native tendency in that direction, admits the fact of which we speak, the "death in sin and corrupted nature" of which the Bible

and the Confession speak. The question is, how are we to account for the birth of children with this corrupted nature? The Scriptures tell us that it is to be accounted for by the connection of the children of men with the "*transgression of Adam*,"—that it was "*by one that sinned*;"—"*by one man's offence*;"—"*by one man's disobedience*." The Calvinistic doctrine introduces no new fact—either gloomy or otherwise, into the matter. It simply explains a fact which all men who need to be reasoned with, must admit, that children are born with a tendency to sin. It explains that fact, as the Bible does, by saying that the children of serpents are serpents, the children of doves are doves, and the children of men are men. But, what will the reader think of a book written by a Professor of Mathematics, a book earnestly inviting men to come out of the Calvinistic system, that they may obtain clear views of truth, which treats this whole subject of imputation, as if it were merely a mode of explaining the *sufferings* of infants;—a book which proposes too, to account for those sufferings of infants, as *disciplinary sufferings*!—and not sufferings which are owing to their being born of a race of sinners! Really, it would seem that one might be completely outside of Calvinism, and completely on the inside of the metaphysics, and the theology of this book, without a great superfluity, either of clear views, or correct apprehensions.

There is one precious topic more in the Theodicy, which we cannot fail to notice. It is a topic on which, at length, the writer condescends to exhibit some little dependence upon the declarations of the Scriptures. It is a topic on which he comes down from the lofty heights of philosophy, to deal in questions of interpretation. It is the doctrine of ELECTION. We welcome, with warm congratulations, the descent of the aeronaut, and shall seek to meet him upon the firm ground.

We quote from Theodicy, page 330:

"We cannot suppose that God elected any one because he foresaw his good works, so as to make election to depend upon them, instead of making them to depend upon election. This does not prevent an individual, however, from having been elected because God fore-

saw from all eternity, that the influences attending upon his election would, by his own voluntary coöperation therewith, be rendered effectual to his salvation. This is the ground on which we believe the election of individuals to eternal life to proceed. Accordingly, we suppose that God never selected, or determined to save any one who he foresaw would not yield to the influences of his grace, provided they should be given. And we also suppose, that such is the overflowing goodness of God, that all were elected by him, and had their names written in the book of life, who, he foresaw, would yield to the influences of his grace, and, by their coöperation therewith, "make their calling and election sure."

Such is the Professor's scheme of election. Though here softly stated, throughout, as what he *supposes*, yet he seems to hold it very tenaciously; and in fact, it is the natural consequence of the peculiar philosophy of this book. No account is here taken of the enmity of the carnal mind to God, in consequence of which the coöperation of such a mind with God, is absurd. In accordance with the author's wild Pelagian philosophy, all power is denied to the grace of God to make an unwilling mind willing;—to make a hostile mind friendly;—to make an opposing mind yielding. Without the exercise of this power by the Holy Spirit, to remove the resisting, opposing, unfriendly principle from the heart of the sinner, we submit it to the experience of our readers, if all religion is not an impossibility. Such we verily believe to be the case. Let any thoughtful mind look closely, and see whether this theory of conversion, is not the very main-spring of Unitarianism, with its substitution of moral culture for spiritual religion. ✓

But, how are we to understand the remark with which the author introduces this topic? "We agree," says he, "with both Calvinistic and Armenian writers, in the position, that no man is elected to eternal life on account of his merits. Indeed, the idea that a human being can merit anything, much less eternal life, of God, is preposterous in the extreme. All his gifts are of pure grace." How is this? Is there then no merit in that "voluntary coöperation" with the divine influences? Is there no merit in "yielding to the influences of his grace?" Use

words as the author may, it is clear, in his scheme, that eternal life depends on this "yielding" and coöperation." If he does not choose to give it the name of merit, he makes it the price the sinner pays to God for salvation. He assigns to it the *power* of merit, we care not for the name. This is not all. The philosophy of this book denies to God the control of the will. It most distinctly denies that motives control the will. It distinctly denies that the will is controlled by any power, within or without, as we have abundantly seen. Now, election is made to depend on the *voluntary* coöperation of man. On what then, is the eternal life of the soul of man made to depend, in this book? on a wild, lawless, uncontrolled volition, of which no account can be given or taken;—that is, on blind CHANCE;—on the most horrible of all fatalisms, the fatalism of accident. All this is done from a sheer disregard of numerous declarations of Scripture, definitely declaring that "*it is God which worketh in us both to will and to do of his good pleasure.*"

But, why is this attempt, at page 330, to show that the election treated of in the Scriptures, is a conditional election of persons to eternal life, the condition being, their coöperation with the grace of God? It had been laboriously shown, at page 318, that the election treated of in the Romans was *national* election. Is it then, nations who are to be saved on condition of their coöperating with the grace of God? Will not the device of national election quiet the author's conscience for twelve pages! Has the ghost of Banquo come back so soon upon the author's vision? Does he find two separate and distinct elections, taught in the Scriptures, one national, as in the ninth chapter of the Romans, and the other personal, but conditional, as we have seen above? If so, it ought to have been distinctly so stated, in a work exhibiting such clear light, that men are importuned to come into it to obtain that privilege. As it appears in this book, it seems as if the national election was the device to escape the clear point of Scripture, in one chapter where all conditions were out of the question; and the conditional election, a similar device in another chapter, where nations are out of the question. Which parts of Scripture are to be referred to the na-

tional device, and which to the conditional, ought to have been clearly stated. There would have been this great advantage in it, that we could, a little more easily, make the author answer himself. Where it is claimed to be national, we could bring his admission that it is unconditional. And where he thinks it conditional, we could quote his admission that it is personal. Then, we could bring that most decisive and irrefragable proof, which must present itself readily to the mind of the intelligent reader, that the lofty theme of the apostle in both places, is the same in principle, in all places, and chapters.

But, let us fairly and patiently hear our author, page 318:

“The precise passage on which the greatest stress is laid seems to be the following: The children not yet being born, neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God, according to election, might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth; it was said unto her, The elder shall serve the younger. As it is written, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated. Now, the question is, does this refer to the election of Jacob to eternal life, and the eternal reprobation of Esau; or does it refer to the selection of the descendants of the former to constitute the visible people of God on earth? This is the question; and it is one which, we think, is by no means difficult of solution.”

The device of conditional election, on a foresight of “coöperation,” would not answer in this place. The tone of the apostle is too decided. The national device must be tried here. And the writer subsequently informs us that there is not the least shadow of such a thing as election to eternal life in the whole record. This is the disposal made of the cases of Esau and Jacob, the first of the apostle’s illustrations of his doctrine, in the ninth chapter of Romans. He makes it the election of the descendants of Jacob to constitute the visible church;—and the rejection of the descendants of Esau from that privilege; without a shadow of eternal life in the whole affair. Pharoah, King of Egypt, is the apostle’s second illustration: “*For the Scripture saith unto Pharoah.*” But what the author of the Theodicy does

with this case, it has not entered into the heart of man to conceive. The national crotchet clearly will not bear to be introduced here; for Pharoah was not a descendant of Abraham, as Esau and Jacob were. And it would be rather too absurd to talk of rejecting Pharoah from the visible church. Nor will the conditional crotchet serve the purpose here, for the language of the apostle is too stern and definite: *for this same purpose have I raised thee up*. For aught that we can see, a *third* species of election will have to be discovered, in some future edition of the Theodicy; a separate category for Pharoah, King of Egypt, by himself.

But, how are we to understand national election? Was there no eternal life enjoyed among the visible people of God, which was not enjoyed by other nations? Was eternal life not one of the privileges of the Old Testament Church? Will this author deliberately say that no eternal life fell upon the hearts of those who came believingly under the Jewish types and shadows? Did the promise made to Abraham include only temporal blessings? If we are Christ's then, are we, or are we not, Abraham's seed and heirs according to the promise? When the Jews were constituted a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, an holy nation, a peculiar people, were the privileges of eternal life equal among the Babylonians, the Arabs and the Egyptians? In short, was our Saviour himself mistaken, when he told the woman of Samaria: *Salvation is of the Jews?* National election then, was personal election to eternal life by the wholesale. Nothing else can be made of it, except by affirming that the Old Testament Church had nothing to do with eternal life. The votaries of the Church of Rome, and some Protestants of strong papistical leanings, hold that salvation is confined to the visible church. We have not yet met with those who hold, save as the expedient of escape from the point of some clear Scripture, that salvation is not now, or that there ever was a time when it was *not specifically connected* with the visible church. That is, indeed, Theodicy, with a witness!

But, let us hear our author again, page 321:

"We shall not dwell upon other portions of the chapter in question: for if the foregoing remarks be just, it

will be easy to dispose of every text which may, at first view, appear to support the Calvinistic doctrine of election."

We do not think the author's difficulties are quite so nearly at an end, as he has flattered himself to believe. For, in that very same chapter, there is still another election spoken of, an election *from among* Israel itself. "A remnant shall be saved." "The Lord of Sabaoth hath left us a seed." "The election hath obtained it and the rest were blinded." To a Calvinist, these various historic cases adduced by the inspired apostles, are but different illustrations of the grand principle of the Divine sovereignty. But they have this wonderful peculiarity, that hardly any two of them can be reduced to the same sophistical crotchet by which the doctrine of election is usually explained away. The cases of Esau and Pharoah cannot be reduced to the conditional crotchet. The cases of Pharoah and the Israelitish remnant in the days of Isaiah, cannot be reduced to the national crotchet. We cannot see but that there must be yet another, a *fourth* device still, for the election *from among* the Jews.

But we must again hear the Theodicy: "We shall dismiss the consideration of the ninth chapter of Romans," says Professor Bledsoe, "with an extract from Dr. Macknight, who, although a firm believer in the Calvinistic view of election and reprobation, does not find any support for his doctrine in this portion of Scripture. "Although some passages in this chapter, (says he,) which pious and learned men have understood of the election and reprobation of individuals, are in the foregoing illustration, interpreted of the election of nations to be the people of God, and to enjoy the advantage of an external revelation, and of their losing these honourable distinctions, the reader must not, on that account, suppose the author rejects the doctrines of the decree and foreknowledge of God. These doctrines are taught in other passages of Scripture.—See Rom. viii: 20." "Thus," says Professor Bledsoe again, "this enlightened critic candidly abandons the ninth chapter of Romans, and seeks support for his Calvinistic view of the divine decrees elsewhere."—Page 321.

Now, herein is a wonderful thing; and one of those wonderful things which will give the reader of this article, who has not read the Theodicy, some idea of the spirit of that book. The passage selected by the author for his refutation of the Calvinists, as "the *precise passage on which greatest stress is laid*," is a passage concerning which the author had, doubtless, lying before him at the moment, the concession of a candid and enlightened Calvinistic critic, that no stress was by him laid on that passage at all!

We shall give our author further room to speak for himself, page 132; he says:

"Let us, then, proceed to examine the eighth chapter of Romans, on which he (Dr. Macknight,) relies. The words are as follows: 'For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his son, that he might be the first born among many brethren. Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he also called, and whom he called, them he also justified; and whom he justified them he also glorified.'" We need have no dispute with the Calvinists respecting the interpretation of these words. If we mistake not, we may adopt their own construction of them, and yet clearly show that they lend not the least support to their views of election and reprobation."

After some explanations of the manner in which he understands, and agrees with Professor Hodge, in his annotations on these words, the author of the Theodicy proceeds:

"The bare fact of the election is all that is here disclosed. The reason, or the ground, or the principle, of that election, is not even alluded to; and we are left to gather it from other portions of Scripture, or from the eternal dictates of love and mercy. Hence, as this passage makes no allusion to the ground or reason of the divine election, it does not begin to touch the controversy we have with the theologians of the Calvinistic school. Every link in the chain here presented is perfect, except that which connects its first link, the election to eternal life, with the unconditional decree of God; and that link, the only one in controversy, is absolutely wanting. We have no occasion to break the

chain, for it is only to the imagination that it seems to be unconditionally bound to the throne of the Omnipotent."

The crotchet of conditional election is here yielded, not expressly, but as implied in the adoption of yet another device of interpretation. National election will not answer in this place, for obvious reasons. The Pharaonic category admits no other case but the individual one for which it was manufactured. Something else still was now to be done. The links of this chain were too strong. The order in which they come was too definitely stated; foreknowledge, predestination, calling, justification, and final glory. The link which binds this chain "unconditionally to the throne of the Omnipotent" is not expressly stated, we admit, in the passage itself. It is a link, however, which is found in the English Grammar. It is, indeed, one of the first principles of grammar, that a verb must have a nominative case; and that the person who is the nominative to the verb, does those things which the verb affirms to be done. There is the wanting link. We challenge mortal man to break it. Inspiration itself wraps it "around the throne of the Omnipotent!" God foreknew. God predestinated. God called. God justified. God glorified. Let the reader remember that this chain, *in its order*, is conceded, in the passage above quoted from the Theodicy. An election based on a foresight of the sinner's coöperation with the divine influences, is but expressing, in other words, a predestination based on justification. But justification is admitted to flow from predestination, according to the plain order, and the obvious sense of the passage of Scripture in question. And this is all we can make of the interpretation, that predestination is based upon justification, and justification is based upon predestination! It does not seem to be a better device of escape from distasteful Scripture truth than the others.

Why is this author so reluctant that the chain of the government of this world should be "unconditionally bound to the throne of the Omnipotent?" We beg to know around what other throne he would wish to have it bound? Does it give him more pleasure to contem-

plate human destinies, as bound around the throne of those peculiar volitions of his philosophy, which, being too strong for law, for motive, or for God, "take their rise in the world without any efficient cause of their existence," and without being subject to the control of "any power within or without?" The Christian knows of no such thing as fate, chance, or accident. He beholds an all-wise, all-powerful, and spotlessly holy God upon the throne. What are not revealed of the reasons of that God for what he does, are known, in the confidence of faith, to be holy, and just, and good. And there is comfort, deep and strong, in this vision of a universe with a righteous God on the throne. But, we believe that the strongest teachings of the stoic Chrysippus himself, concerning the "adamantine links of Fate," will be found, on practical experiment, as pleasant to the Christian heart, as that apotheosis of a lawless human will, which constitutes the main staple of this whole book.

There are many and overwhelming testimonies in the Scriptures, against the philosophy of this book, and against its view of what it calls the "great *theandric* fact of regeneration," which would have greatly cheered and warmed our discussion, if our space had permitted their introduction: such as the calm assumption, everywhere visible in the Bible, that God has efficient power over the human will without destroying its freedom;—that his counsel shall stand and he will do all his pleasure;—that he can turn the hearts of all men whithersoever he will, when reasons dictate, which must be forever unknown to us, save that they are holy, just, and good; that his designs find as infallible fulfilment through the free agency of Nebuchadnezzar and Cyrus, Caiaphas and Herod, Pilate and Judas, as through Elijah, Isaiah and Paul; that he risks his veracity, and places the pledge on record, for the infallible certainty of the largest, and longest, and deepest, and highest concert and harmony, and chorus of events, on the widest stream of prophecy, just as if he were the real and efficient Lord of all. We may add, that he directs repeatedly, constantly, distinctly, that we PRAY to him, not as the God of this Theodicy, who cannot turn the human

will, but as able, when the time shall come, to turn the hearts of all, to bow all stubborn knees, and to make all human souls willing to the reign of him whose right it is to rule.

There was once a man among us, one of the humble and childlike great men of other days; the Washington of the theological chair; a man of giant intellect, but one who found theodicy enough for him, in the written word of God; a man in whose decease there passed away from the earth, intellect enough to have made very many ambitious Theodices, but who has left upon paper, almost nothing to show his mighty powers; from whose lips it was once our labour of love to catch falling pearls of deep and genuine, but temperate and modest wisdom, and commit them to paper, for others sake and not for his. Here is one such pearl, with which we conclude this article:

“I have never read a treatise on the subject of the power of motive over the will, which did not seem to lean too far one way or the other. If the power of motive is made to deprive the mind of all causal power, it takes away guilt. If it gives it too much self-determining power, it removes the sovereignty of God, and contradicts the Scriptures. How a free being is controlled by the sovereign God, is, perhaps, a secret to the highest angel in Heaven. Most treatises on the subject are attempts to find out this deep secret. It is better to let the metaphysics of this point entirely alone.”

ARTICLE V.

ON ELOHIM AS A TITLE OF GOD, AND AS IMPLYING A PLURALITY IN THE GODHEAD.*

The names of the Deity in general and constant use in the Hebrew language are more numerous than in either of the beautiful languages of classical antiquity,

* Intended to illustrate and confirm the argument from this name in the article on the objection to the Trinity, founded on the unity of God, in the January No. of this Review.