THE CLEAVAGE OF THE WORLD

WORKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR

FRIENDSHIP
THE PRACTICE OF SELF-CULTURE
COMFORT
HAPPINESS
ACCORDING TO MY GOSPEL
THE NEW WORLD

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THE CLEAVAGE OF THE WORLD

BY

HUGH BLACK

HODDER AND STOUGHTON
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TO

THE BRIGHT MEMORY

OF MY NEPHEW

ERIC R. COATS

LIEUT. SCOTS GUARDS

KILLED IN ACTION NEAR ARRAS, MAY 1918

AND

OF OTHER HAPPY WARRIORS

Contents

I *Lest We Forget*

We have been living through one of the greatest upheavals of the world. Yet it is a common experience to meet men who say frankly that they do not want to speak about the war, that they only want to forget it. Sometimes this attitude is taken by men who have come through the hell of conflict with shattered nerves, and to many the whole subject is coloured by memory of pain and loss. It is natural that they should avoid all distressful recollection. There is a forgetting which is proper and necessary. But sometimes it is only a form of selfishness assumed by men who think merely of their personal comfort. It may even disguise itself as a very refined form of religion. Some forms of Church and some types of theology

satisfy the mind by preventing it from thinking. On the anniversary of the signing of the Armistice at a prearranged time all business and pleasure and transport stopped throughout the whole British Empire for a few minutes' silent remembrance of the Glorious Dead. It was surely a fit tribute, but there were some in England who objected to it because it was depressing! Behind the plea of war-weariness there is often a desire to forget not only sad memory but also the obligations and duties imposed on us by the past.

The man is not to be envied who can think and speak and live without reference to the tragic background of the world in which we have been living. And the preacher is not to be envied who can preach what he calls his Gospel in a vacuum. After the strain of these years of anguish there is a natural temptation to relax, and to try to forget. Some of this is indeed right and wise. We could not continue to live in the stress of

these past days, but it would be a calamity if we even tried to go back to 'as you were.' There is always possible a savage outbreak that would wreck civilisation, and we have been saved by the men who gave their body that the soul of the people may live. If we learn nothing from our dread experience, if we refuse to exercise mind and heart on its lessons, then it will mean that to a large extent these dead have died in vain.

Now that the actual tragedy is ended, it will be a worse tragedy if we settle back to our sectional life, holding by our old mental habits and traditions. We must school ourselves to look at it steadily and as a whole. What should we think about it, and what changes should we make in our opinions and our ideas? It would be the last calamity if people should have suffered so much and lost so much, and yet have exercised no thought on the real roots of the war, on the problems created by it, and on the hopes

of preventing another such catastrophe. We have to fight against the natural inertia of the human mind.

It dislikes to have to think, and now that the fighting is over men whose minds were active on their practical job do not want to be too much worried about what to do in the mass. We are all more or less fatigued over the whole beastly business, and many of us were mentally 'born tired' anyway. To be asked to reconsider fundamental positions and possibly to reconstruct our whole intellectual world is a large order at which we balk.

The war is a mighty challenge to the mind of mankind. Every one knows this and admits it vaguely. All have been saying that it is sure to make unheard-of changes in everything. But even that common mood can be used as a comfortable platitude. They say that nothing will be the same again, that people will not go back to the old ways, and having said that, they do their best

to recover old conditions. During the actual fighting these same men used to avoid all disquieting discussion by declaring, "We must win the war first, nothing else counts meanwhile; after that we will think about what it means and what next to do." It was a reasonable enough position in the presence of supreme danger, but when it has been won they follow a new policy of drift.

A tendency which makes for forgetfulness is the unrest of these days after the peace. Men are worried over the troubles which actually are facing them now. They thought that if only the war were over nothing would much matter, and they are discovering that the practical problems of peace are vaster and will last longer than the problem of war. Dangers of all sorts menace the civilised world, and problems beyond number are before us. Even liberty can be poisoned; for we have seen freedom pass into anarchy. Peace has to be established on the only firm and enduring foundation—justice. A

new world has to be created on the ruins of the old. Even to get the ordinary business of mankind going in something like a normal fashion is no light task. Nobody was foolish enough to expect calm waters immediately after the passage of such a storm, but nobody was wise enough to expect all the particular troubles that afflict us. Besides the obvious questions of the demobilising of millions of soldiers and the reorganising of industry, there are endless questions of food and housing and transport and exchange. Practical men are so busy over such problems that they have no thought for the deeper issues.

It does not mean that we should be ever recalling the ghastly horrors of the war, the holocaust of dead that grew month by month and year by year, the tide of maimed and blind and broken men that flowed back from every battle-front, the dreadful agonies of men shot to pieces by shell, burned by liquid

flame, poisoned by gas, buried under falling masonry, drowned in the bogs of Flanders. Even so it is good for us to remember at what a price others have bought us our freedom, and good also to remember that what we call the horrors of modern war are not merely an abstract idea. We need ever to think of war in terms of human suffering, the slaughter and torture of youth, the sacrifice of our best and bravest. At present especially we need to keep this in mind to provide the driving power to devise ways of saving the world from another such hell. We dare not let the memory of what our generation suffered fade away into sentimental thoughts of heroic chivalry and noble sacrifice. Unless we take care we will soon have men discussing glibly 'the next war.' In August 1917 General von Liebert in a speech at Rathenow, Prussia, said: "We cannot sign a peace before we have the Flanders coast, a colonial empire, and maritime bases. Should we not realise this now, we must prepare to work for

it after the war in view of the next war." [1] According to the newspaper reports the speech was loudly cheered by his hearers. Much has happened for Germany since 1917, but this impersonal way of thinking of war can be possible for others besides Prussians. If we keep some memory of war's agonies, we will never be tempted to look on it as something remote, and almost as a game to be resumed at leisure.

During the crisis of the actual war we felt it offensive that any should profess or display aloofness to the tragedy. It would be farcical for us to affect aloofness now to the results of the war, and to practise forgetfulness. Yet this is a special temptation both to British and Americans in different degrees. Their home interests are not palpably tied up in the continent of Europe. It is this that explains some of the delay before America came into the war. The aloofness was partly geographical, the effect of mere dis-

[1] *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, August 19, 1917.

tance. The centre of population and of political power lies in the great Mississippi valley, and there something happening in Belgium is farther away than Eastern Siberia is to England, and Serbia might be in Mars. It has been said of the English people that they learn the geography of the British Empire when a war begins. Most Europeans interested in international relations may be said to have been brought up on the Balkans, knowing what a danger-spot it was for starting a general conflagration. I have in addressing American audiences in the early days of the war referred to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and I could see that they might be names of cheeses! 'Mr. Dooley' said of his countrymen when the Philippines were first mentioned that they thought it was a new breakfast food! There have been Englishmen who thought that the Civil War was between North and South America. The aloofness was also partly historical as a tradition from Washington's time to avoid

all entanglements with Europe. Even that was in part an inheritance from the British theory of splendid isolation.

But for the menace of Belgium when the dagger was pointed at her throat there would have been a danger of Great Britain standing aloof, as she stood in 1870, and as she stood when the Central Powers played the same game and Austria gobbled up Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was with a heavy heart, though with a high conscience, that Great Britain went to war in 1914, forced by circumstances as well as in defence of the violated public law of Europe and in vindication of treaty obligation. Even more natural was the hesitation shown by America in involving herself in the conflict, until the issue became evident and no great nation could remain neutral and keep her soul. Of course the crisis could not come to America with the same dramatic intensity as to Europe. Americans lost something of the sudden steadying and exalting effect of the great

decision, but after a time they too discovered the same simple and tragic issue that swept out all trivial and selfish aims and inspired them with new ideas of service and sacrifice. The common call for devotion meant a new era in the lives of countless men and women. When our dearest were giving their lives in defence of liberty and justice to repel the deadly assault of barbarism, all life became a solemn sacrament. That consecration to a sacred cause which both nations felt was a tremendous experience, which must have left its mark.

While it would be absurd to expect human nature to live at such heights, is it too much to ask that the problems of peace should be met with the same high spirit? Are we to let ourselves slip off into a new aloofness, a selfish disregard of all for which we reverence our Glorious Dead? If we could recover and retain something of the same high valour and brotherhood and capacity for sacrifice,

we could face all the troubles of the present and all the dangers of the future with confidence. It is a cynical view of human nature to hold that war must always get the best out of manhood and peace be served with the poorest. We have proved that men will respond to the highest motives, and yet we keep ever appealing only to the meaner ones. A tithe of those qualities, stirred from the depths of men by the great crisis, would build us a new world if applied to the vast tasks of peace. We cannot get this by shutting our minds to the dread experience of these years, and by trying to forget the lessons it ought to have taught us.

In the colossal struggle for human liberty which evoked such magnificent qualities it cannot be that they have vanished without leaving their mark. For the first time some were driven to learn the deep lesson of life, to labour earnestly and endure nobly. Strength has come, as it only can come, through strain. To many, courage has

ceased to be an instinct or an effort and has become a habit. To have offered everything in the service of an ideal has permanently lifted life to a higher level. To have nursed hope in the deep dismay of a baleful time means that hope can be kept for the tasks of a brighter day. It would be folly to lose courage now, when all can see that even the unrest of our time carries hope as well as danger. Some of it is born of divine discontent, a desire to see a happier and juster and nobler state of society. The driving power in it is protest against some ancient social wrongs in which the world has too long acquiesced. The temper that took on a stern tenacity and steeled itself for endurance in a great cause can be used to shape the new world for which we long. Compared to the struggle surmounted and the victory won, what are the difficulties of social reorganisation and industrial adjustment, if only the true spirit of the war be retained ?

This is why we must not forget, why it is

necessary to go back to beginnings, to return upon the causes that created the crisis. We must not let the original conscience that brought us into the bloody conflict be submerged. We need that same conscience to bring us through to the new day. It is the proud and just British boast that they went to war with a high conscience—in defence of solemn obligations, in defence of international rights on which our civilisation depends. With equal truth can Americans declare that never nation went to war with a juster cause. Never nation went to war more deliberately, so that their decision came as moral reinforcement of the whole British position. It was after unexampled patience, after revelations of lying and treachery and corrupt intrigue, after the foul murder of hundreds of citizens, after endless breaches of faith—until the last ounce of forbearance was exhausted. Never nation went to war more unselfishly, for no national purpose except to preserve national honour. It had come

to be that everything held dear was menaced, and the country with its ideals and institutions could not exist on this planet if the German aim succeeded. The sober and stern sense of duty called forth in both countries must be kept, if we are to reap the true and full harvest of the victory. The best tonic for drooping spirits is to remember that glorious past.

The complete harvest will not be reaped if we think only of material ends, of practical reforms, of political and social changes. The challenge of the war reached to deeper issues, to the things of the mind and the things of the soul. Even intellectually we are called to set our house in order, to think out the conclusions of some of our instinctive positions. Through the fiery furnace of the war everything seems to have gone into the melting-pot. Our ultimate thought of God and man and the meaning and purpose of life demands restatement. Some of our common and ancient words to describe the

profoundest values of life had worn bare and poor. We speak easily of forgiveness and repentance, of love and faith and peace. We had not asked what the terms of forgiveness are and the conditions of repentance. Love was a sentiment without moral contents, and faith was hardened to a creed, and peace was a state with no essential relation to justice and righteousness. We have to ask anew disturbing questions about religion and life, and make revaluation of things once thought settled.

Then, there is a whole series of problems which have been accentuated by the war, dealing with the nature of the State, the limits of Patriotism, and the definition of Democracy. For example, what are we to say about the German doctrine of the State, that the highest moral duty of the State is to foster power? Heinrich von Treitschke, the most influential historian of modern Germany, rigorously expounds the doctrine that the

State is above ethics and is an end in itself to which the individual must sacrifice himself. "The State's highest law is that of self-assertion; that is for it the absolute morality. Therefore one must assert that of all political sins the worst and most contemptible is weakness; it is the sin against the holy ghost of politics." He expressly declares that "the duty of self-sacrifice does not exist for the State, for the reason that there is nothing above and beyond it in the world's history, and consequently it cannot sacrifice itself to another." So he finds it necessary to distinguish between public and private morality. He is not afraid to go to the logical conclusion of this position, that war is not an evil. "To the historian who lives in the realm of the Will, it is quite clear that the furtherance of an everlasting peace is fundamentally reactionary. He sees that to banish war from history would be to banish all progress and becoming. It is only the periods of exhaustion, weariness, and mental

stagnation that have dallied with the dream of everlasting peace."

Teaching like this gripped Germany and was the heart of her endeavour. In this faith she drenched the world in blood and blinded it with tears. If this teaching is true, then chivalry, pity, justice, goodwill, which have their place in private life, are absurd among nations when a real crisis arises. If the teaching is false, what have we to put in its place? Is it only that Germany was more logical and thoroughgoing in asserting a position which all hold? This is their contention, that they do grandly and strongly what the rest of nations do weakly. Other nations had their spy system, but theirs covered the world with a network of intrigue. Other nations trusted to power and used force for their ends, but they only did it better. It will not do to be content to say that at any rate we have beaten them and have proved them wrong, even if we do not formulate a theory of the State to oppose theirs. Ger-

many which failed to conquer us by her arms might conceivably conquer us by her ideas.

What have we to say about patriotism? The average man assents to the common maxim, "My country, right or wrong," which, as Mr. Chesterton says, is liking shouting, "My mother, drunk or sober," as if it made no difference whether one's mother was a drunkard or not. The true patriot, of course, will seek the best for his country and desire only the highest for it, and be sensitive about its honour. Most men accept the duty of patriotism by instinct and are shocked when they find the instinct lacking, but in every country there are groups of men who denounce it as the greatest hindrance to the world's progress. It is condemned as the chief cause for breeding war, by creating conceit and exclusiveness. If it is a true instinct, how is it to be guided and trained and limited?

Again, when we say that the issue of the war was a struggle between democracy and autoc-

racy, what do we mean by democracy? Was it only a contrast between different forms of government? If we look at the actual combatants we see that it cannot be so described. It was never an attempt to affect the particular organisation of government, but soon became a struggle for the independence of States whatever their form of government. The fact is that the development of our civilisation was one-sided. The international relations were left almost untouched. The nations had in their own way reached some constitutional government, with their systems of laws aiming at justice, but no real attempt was made to alter the relation in which States stood to each other. Underlying the whole system are doctrines, which when plainly stated are recognised by our modern conscience to be absolutely monstrous, yet they have been tacitly assented to by all nations. Even democracy has not acquired the courage to denounce them. It has been assumed that the highest

law of a State is power, that it can therefore declare war on another State when it chooses, and conquest gives it the right to the land, and the population goes with the land and becomes subject. In reality, even if unconsciously, we were fighting against these monstrous doctrines. Democracy by instinct knows that the State does not possess unlimited authority, and that necessity for a State does not abrogate law so that when war begins ethics end. It speaks to-day of self-determination, as older forms of democracy used to speak of the consent of the governed, but we have not analysed our complete democratic faith.

These are some of the subjects discussed in the following chapters, and it is an unwitting benefit from the German crime that we are forced to examine the very foundation of our civilisation. We are forced also by the sheer horror of the catastrophe to seek some method of preventing war. We must not forget the terrible nature of modern war with

its limitless desolation, its unspeakable pain and anguish. It was easy for Germans to believe in war as an article of faith ; for they had made so much profit out of their wars. Bismarck's cheap victories worked like a subtle poison in the blood. An ambition was aroused all the more dangerous to the world because it was disciplined, methodical, and cold-blooded. The evil genius of Germany was Bismarck, whose immense ability blinded the nation and the world to the shameless immorality of his principles. The apparent success of his plans debauched the conscience of Germany. It was such an easy and cheap way to gain the world, that it seemed nothing that Germany should lose her soul in the process. Every question about the sinister cynicism of the point of view was silenced by the fact that *it paid*. In all the books and articles written to prepare Germany for the treacherous plot against the peace of the world there was always this appeal to the policy of Bismarck.

Germany and the world were deceived about modern war by the French fiasco of 1870, when the German total casualties were only about a hundred thousand, by which she gained the rich provinces of Alsace and Lorraine with their mineral wealth, and an indemnity was exacted in money four times what it cost her to make the war. The previous war with Austria lasted a little over a month, and Prussia lost less than six thousand men killed in action. The one before that with Denmark was cheaper still, by which they acquired other provinces. War pays, if it is waged in Prussian fashion. It all seemed so easy and so short. Such gain and glory could be won at so small a cost. To the conqueror came so much at the expense of a little blood. Even to the conquered there was only the loss of territory and a greater loss of pride. A brief campaign, and the nations could settle back to adjust themselves to the new circumstances. Robert Louis Stevenson could write of the country of the Camisards in

his *Travels with a Donkey*, what is true of many wars of old:

> We travelled in the print of olden wars,
> Yet all the land was green;
> And love we found and peace
> Where fire and war had been.
>
> They pass and smile, the children of the sword—
> No more the sword they wield;
> And O, how deep the corn
> Along the battle-field!

On some of the modern battlefields, ploughed with shrapnel and salted with salt, no corn will grow in the time of any living. Of the abomination of desolation left by war on the tortured fields of France half has not been told; for it cannot be told. It cannot be told in figures or measurements, or in pictures or words. It needs to be thought of in terms of human life. That means in terms of pain and anguish and death and broken hearts and shattered families. When the last gun of the war was fired, to many it felt as if the fires of hell had been put out, but it was not until these fires had scorched and scarred

whole tracts so that even now they are the very land of death. Whole villages and towns have disappeared. The kindly earth has been smashed and defiled, pitted with shell-holes and huge craters. You can stand on the site of a village where once happy homes were and smiling gardens, and you would not know that ever human beings had lived there. The very soil has been scattered and churned up with the clay or chalk. What tragedies that whole devastated country represents! So long as we remember, we will never again let the old balderdash about the glory of war pass current.

II *The Cleavage of the World*

In the Great War we have had the astounding spectacle of the whole world divided against itself. It came to be that there could be no real neutrality. Nations naturally tried to step aside, but it was found to be impossible. Our enemy had the advantage of immense preparation and of strategic position. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, occupied a solid geographical block, while the Allies were scattered over the world. What united all these diverse units, and induced them to move vast armies hundreds and thousands of miles to oppose the ambitions of the Central Powers? It could be no ordinary war, which could split the whole civilised world in pieces. Also, during the process of the conflict it became evident that

there could be no compromise, and that it had to be fought out to the bitter end. Well-meaning people used to ask plaintively why the combatants could not get together and settle their dispute by discussion. It could be no ordinary quarrel, when men instinctively felt that there was no room for compromise. It is necessary for us to go back to the beginnings, to the situation created for us by our enemy.

When we speak here of returning upon the causes that produced the war, and that led to its continuance at all costs, we mean the making of ethical judgments. Ethics have to do with right and wrong, and mean apportioning blame. During the struggle there came a temptation to say, "Don't let us discuss how the tragedy came ; stop speaking about Serbia and Belgium ; let us smooth things over and settle the dispute." It was a natural feeling for men and women, sick at heart over the blood and misery, with years of long-drawn agony passing. Yet the mood

represented a temptation—the mood which was tired of the horrors, appalled at the bloodshed, moved by the thought of the madness of war, its unspeakable agonies and its insensate waste. If it meant that we are to make no judgment as to who is responsible for the monstrous crime, and give no testimony about right or wrong, it would mean that the world could gain nothing from its immeasurable pain.

It is all the more necessary to remain in the realm of moral judgment, because there are so many tendencies to-day dealing with history as something impersonal. There is the school of historians who see history as a branch of geography. The presence of valuable deposits of coal and iron in Belgium and northern France, and the topography of these areas making the invasion of France easy by that route—these facts are treated as if they explained what happened. Professor D. W. Johnson in his *Topography and Strategy in the War* begins his description of the western

theatre of war thus : " The violation of Belgian neutrality was predetermined by events which took place in western Europe several million years ago. Long ages before man appeared on the world stage Nature was fashioning the scenery which was not merely to serve as a setting for the European drama, but was in fact to guide the current of the play into blackest tragedy. Had the land of Belgium been raised a few hundred feet higher above the sea, or had the rock layers of north-eastern France not been given their uniform downward slope toward the west, Germany would not have been tempted to commit one of the most revolting crimes of history and Belgium would not have been crucified by her barbarous enemy." Professor Johnson in his very useful and interesting book shows that he does not really belong to this particular school of historians, for he speaks of the 'crime' of succumbing to the temptation, and he elsewhere denounces the military necessity which places itself 'above every consideration

of morality and humanity.' But the sentences quoted above indicate the tendency referred to of explaining and justifying history by geography.

There is also the economic view of history, which works by the same means and reaches the same sort of result. Everything is satisfactorily explained by statistics of population and commerce. The purely economic view of history rests on a fallacy, not that economics have played a great part in shaping history, but that you explain events by mere economic forces. In dealing with man you cannot calculate as if it were a sum in arithmetic. In the conflict of motives, and desires, and ambitions, and passions, now one and now another gets the control.

Others explain history by history. They explain all the causes of the event historically, as they call it. They explain what happened by what had happened before. This, that, and the other stream came in and produced this

final river. It is all so simple and placid. It is like the illusion of a waterfall viewed from afar, which looks solid, 'frozen by distance,' as Wordsworth calls it. Take the innumerable pamphlets on the causes of the war, in which these causes are all what is called historical. All the apologies of the pro-Germans are more or less camouflaged this way, and they are skilful because they fit in with the prevalent mood of our modern mind to explain things scientifically. We are tempted to forget that often things happen, because men *make* them happen. The biggest explanation of a happening is often that men wanted it to happen. A crisis occurs because previous events lead up to the occasion, it is true, but also because human desires, beliefs, even doctrines led up to it, and this latter really precipitated it.

It was my fortune to be in the United States at the outbreak of war, and it was interesting to notice how both sides looked on America almost as a high court of civilisation,

and it was evident that her decision as a neutral meant much in the matter of *morale.* This was specially so in Great Britain, and when at last America entered into the conflict the first great asset she brought was the reinforcement to the British people of the moral ends of the war. It strengthened them in assurance of their original conscience. It was like a judicial decision in their favour, but the real decision had been given long before. In spite of the frantic propaganda on behalf of the German case which flooded the country, the decision was absolute and came early. As an observer and witness I have to say that there were two things about which America soon made up her mind. The first was on the origin of the war, and the second was on the conduct of the war. Both were arrived at on ethical grounds. It was a most impressive experience ; for it was as if the nation went to the polls and solemnly cast their verdict, as a democracy does on national issues.

The first verdict on the war's origin came soon after the declaration of war on the evidence offered by the belligerent nations. The verdict was not influenced by any question of interest, and was unaffected by prejudices. As a fact America had no prejudice against Germany but rather an undue admiration. Indeed she had some prejudice against Great Britain, though as a set-off against that there was a sentimental favour to France. So the balance was fairly even. This judgment of America as to the origin of the war was deliberate, and has been shown to be fixed. The time that passed and all the facts that could be added only strengthened the American people in their judgment.

There is often an attempt to dodge the issue here, or to weaken the indictment, in the approved manner of the types of historical approach referred to above. If we go back beyond the *occasion* of the war we confess sorrowfully that no nation is without its share of blame. It was a vicious system. As

in a breach of civil law we confess that our social and industrial systems are terribly imperfect, and some of the blame rests there. At the same time the criminal is the criminal. So here we can go back to national ambitions, and crooked diplomacy, and military preparation more or less everywhere. For that part we can go back past 1870 or any historical date. We can go back to the nature of primitive man, to the instincts and passions of pre-neolithic man, to explain war. But we do not get far in fastening responsibility that way. As reasonable beings we must go past vague causes to the specific occasion. Here America representing the court of civilisation declared that this war was planned, and willed, and made by Germany. This is the first count in the indictment made against her by the world. By a sure instinct little thought was taken of Germany's allies, who were looked on as mere tools of her purposes, however important they were in the military situation.

The day is passed for any further marshalling of the obvious reasons for the condemnation. Never in history was anything more conclusively proved, and almost every week new evidence came. Indeed in those earlier days when Germany expected to put the thing through in a few weeks, there were frank statements about events from their own lips, and Maximilian Harden, one of the ablest German publicists, wrote: "Let us drop our miserable attempts to excuse Germany's action. Not against our will and as a nation taken by surprise did we hurl ourselves into this gigantic venture. *We willed it.* We had to will it. We do not stand before the judgment-seat of Europe. We acknowledge no such jurisdiction. Our might shall create a new law in Europe. It is Germany that strikes. When she has conquered new domains for her genius, then the priesthoods of all the gods will praise the God of War."

A very different type of man from Harden the journalist is Prince Lichnowsky, the

German Ambassador in London at the outbreak of war. In his private memorandum written in August 1916 he accuses his own country in unsparing terms of "deliberately destroying the possibility of a peaceful settlement." He reveals facts which in their cumulative effect fix the guilt of the war on his own Government. The men in power in Germany were inexorably bent on war, and when the last chance of peace came through Austria showing willingness to give way the German militarists forced her hand. After recounting the events, he adds: "In view of these indisputable facts it is not surprising that the whole world outside of Germany attributes to us the sole guilt of the war." As he relates the history of these fateful days from the inside, he concludes: "The impression became ever stronger that we desired war in all circumstances." Through the whole document we have the figure of an honest ambassador vainly striving against the villainy of his own Govern-

ment to prevent the catastrophe which he saw coming. "Thus ended my London mission. It was wrecked, not by the perfidy of the British, but by the perfidy of our policy."

What makes the perfidy worse is that it was deliberate and assiduously prepared for years. It was a great conspiracy, and not merely a sudden and tragic resolve. On April 2, 1913, the French Minister of War gave to his colleague, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a German official secret report which was dated Berlin, March 19, 1913. After giving reasons why Germany must make a marked increase in her army properly to ensure her influence in the world, it goes on to show how German public opinion must be carefully educated. "We must accustom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity. We must act with prudence so as not to arouse suspicion, and to avoid the crisis which might injure our economic existence. We must so

manage matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak of war would be considered a relief, because after it would come decades of peace and prosperity as after 1870. We must prepare for war from the financial point of view; there is much to be done in this direction." As part of the programme it points out that native Mohammedan factions must be stirred up against the French in Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, and especially against the British in India. The small European States "should be forced to follow us or be subdued." "If Belgium gave advantages to our adversary in the west, we could in no circumstances offer Belgium a guarantee for the security of her neutrality. An ultimatum with a short time limit, to be followed immediately by invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for our action in international law." [1]

[1] French Official Correspondence on Outbreak of War, sec. 2.

It is the cold-blooded point of view, so characteristically Teutonic, which makes this German crime the greatest iniquity in the annals of modern history. Weaker peoples have no rights, law has no sanctions, brute force is the ultimate reason, the whole world may be drenched in blood if only it will serve Germany's purpose. Back of it all is a philosophy of war, which was assiduously preached and drilled into the nation. Everywhere of late years the peace propaganda had made immense strides, except in Germany, where the cult of war was made a faith. It soon became clear to America where the immediate responsibility for the catastrophe lay, but that was produced by this belief in war. The world now knows something about the Prussian doctrine of war, though it is hard for us to see how any nation could be induced to accept it. It was done through careful education, which is ordered and controlled by the State. German policy was not content with making conscript soldiers, but worked

to produce *the conscript mind* which would accept authority and acquiesce in the existing order. The conscript mind was next induced to believe in some mysterious superiority of the German race. The purpose was to convince them of their destiny to dominate the world. The ascendancy was to be achieved by force of arms. Only a people with a stupid streak in them could swallow the whole doctrine, which meant among other things the idea of being a divinely chosen race. This faith in war as the supreme arbiter in human affairs is, we believe, the worship of a false god. Its biology is false; its psychology is false; its interpretation of history is false. One of the things we hope from the tragedy of our time is that the falseness of the creed may be made manifest to all the world, including Germany, which through it has been led into the valley of humiliation.

The militarist philosophy is already to a

large extent discredited, and this because the war has been carried on so logically by Germany. That brings us to the second count in the indictment—the conduct of the war. Here also America soon cast her vote and gave her verdict. The first evidence of the reckless and ruthless way Germany meant to make war was her wanton breach of her own plighted word by the unprovoked invasion of Belgium. It is a flagrant violation of international law, and if it were to be condoned it would make all international law for ever impossible. What was this solemn treaty broken for? To be able to steal a march on the enemy and strike her a foul blow! This was the admitted reason. Speed was so important, and it was such an advantage to be able to crush France and bleed her white without the trouble of getting past Verdun and the other border French fortresses—and it was not so easy to get past Verdun!

We saw the German theory of war exem-

plified almost every day for years, till the world was sickened. The subsequent tale of atrocities in Belgium, the systematic spoliation, the disregard of common humanity, the last outrages of deportation which shocked the civilised world, were all in keeping with the theory. In other quarters also there was at least consistency in ruthlessness: in northern France where the invasion has been a pestilence like hot air from the pit of hell; the 'holy war' which Germany got her ally Turkey to declare, resulting in the extermination of a million Armenians with unspeakable cruelty; the disregard of all the ethics of the sea built up painfully in a thousand years, piracy, and slaughter of non-combatants; the bombardment of Scarborough and Filey on the open Yorkshire coast; dropping bombs from airships on towns and villages murdering women and children—they are all illustrations of the working out of the theory. It is perhaps well for the world to realise into what a welter

of blood and into what a lapse to barbarism the theory issues.

We are not here referring to the acts of hot blood that will occur in all war, the isolate and sporadic deeds of violence. Regrettable as these would be, we could not condemn Germany for these. Her condemnation is because of her *acts of cold blood*, of premeditated policy, calculated cruelty, the calm working out of a doctrine of Frightfulness. It is the Bismarckian policy of blood and iron put through ruthlessly by men who act as super-men, owning no common obligations, acknowledging no laws other than military necessity. This was not a series of acts done in desperation, but acts done of set purpose according to the whole theory of war. On May 6, 1913, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, sent to his Government part of a speech made at a military meeting by General von Moltke. " We must put aside all commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor. When war has

become necessary it is essential to carry it on in such a way as to place all the chances in one's own favour. Success alone justifies war. We must anticipate our principal adversary as soon as there are nine chances to one of going to war, and begin it without delay in order ruthlessly to crush all resistance." [1]

It does not mean that all the saints were on one side and all the sinners on the other. Moral issues never come with such delightful simplicity as that. We know in ordinary life how much good is mixed with evil. "The web of our life is of a mingled yarn, good and ill together." Yet we know that there is right and wrong, and we cannot ride off placidly by declaring that things are mixed. The allied armies were not bands of stainless knights battling against devils in human shape. It was not a case of all the good men on one side and all on the other evil. It was the clash of two opposing ideals.

[1] French Official Correspondence on Outbreak of War, sec. 3.

This was the real cleavage of the world, and the reason why it was split in twain. The ideals were opposed politically, but also ethically and spiritually. This became more and more evident as the struggle went on, and this is why neutrality became impossible; for in a moral issue you cannot straddle. As of old such a question comes, and divides the world.

Because the struggle was deeper than material, it had to go on to the end. The conflict raised issues that could not be compromised. It was far more than the rivalry of armies and peoples, more than nations pitted against each other. It was a faith pitted against a faith. The pitiful blindness of some was that they thought the whole trouble arose because governments had failed to understand each other, and that fundamentally they believed the same things. The war as it developed could not be summed up as a tragedy of hot blood and a dreadful misunderstanding created by passion. No

sane person could misunderstand what Germany was standing for, and as a fact we believed exactly opposite things. The real purposes of the war became bigger than any national ends. We almost forgot the first causes of the war, and sometimes even forgot that we were fighting for self-preservation. This was because larger ideals emerged, and we saw more clearly what both sides were representing. These years of distress, which seemed to mark the breakdown of our civilisation, have really been setting a new standard and inspiring a new hope.

It was a moral gain that at last the two ideals should come to death-grips on such a scale. It may even be said to be a fortunate thing that Germany showed us so unmistakably to what one of the ideals logically leads. Serbia might have been gobbled up as Bosnia and Herzegovina were a few years before, and the militarist faith in stark Might would have one other argument on its side.

France might have been done to death and bled white in a few weeks or months, and the reign of Might been secure for another century. If Belgium and Great Britain had both chosen peace at the price of dishonour, that would probably have been the result. It is true that peace would have come soon and not after long years of bloodshed. It is true that we would have been spared some of the horrors. We would not have seen to what lengths this hideous ideal was prepared to go. Think of the prestige that would have accrued to the whole German cult of war!

There would not have been the moral cleavage of the world; for we could not have seen the issue clearly. There would have been no occasion for the display of all the German infamy. There would have been no need for the promulgation of Turkey's Holy War of massacre. We would not have seen the sea turned into a scene of carnage. There would have been no *Lusitania* horror, no

sinking of a Belgian refugee ship with its miserable freight huddled together and sent ruthlessly to destruction, no sinking of hospital ships, no diabolic act as the torpedoing a ferry-boat like the *Sussex*, no poisoning of wells in Africa and discharging asphyxiating gas in Flanders. There would have been no seeming violation of the law of nations and of the laws of war. We would have been spared the daily revelations of treachery, the offer to Mexico and Japan to dismember America, the cable of the German Ambassador in Argentina to sink ships 'without leaving a trace' of the bloody murder. We would not have seen the theory of Frightfulness put into practice, that the truest kindness was to be cruel till they broke the nerve of the world. There would have been only simple, easy triumph for Odin, the god of war.

Even to be spared the horrors of the past, can we believe that it would have been a good thing for the world that the ideal of Might should have been clothed with the

glamour of such triumph? We believe that it would not be a world worth living in. Men felt instinctively that there could be no real hope for the future unless the whole German theory were discredited, and that could only be by its defeat. The allied nations found themselves by the pressure of events getting past the mere consideration of personal interests. They found themselves (all unworthy of the honour) acting as trustees for humanity. They knew that there was at stake the whole heritage of what we mean by civilisation and religion. To have given up at any time merely for the sake of peace would have been treason to the dead, treachery to the great unspoken covenant to which they set the seal of their blood.

We were not outwitting a rival; we were judging a criminal. President Wilson's words were a sentence of judgment, that he could not come to terms with a people "who have convinced us that they are without honour, and do not intend justice, who observe no

covenants, and accept no principle but force and their own interests." It was Germany's conduct of war, more than her crime in making it, which nauseated the world. This quickening of the human conscience is one of our gains from the tragedy, and we must do our best to preserve it. The spirit of fair-play, even if it had not prevented the war, would have saved it from becoming the horror it was. Mr. Lloyd George in one of his speeches said that they were fighting for fair-play, and he indicated that after the war that same spirit could do much to redeem the world; for it meant not only a sense of right but also sympathy for the weak. In that large sense he is right in thinking that the peace and security and happiness of the world depend on simple fair-play.

We see this quickening of the human conscience in the way in which civilisation dealt with the German plea of 'military necessity.' It has been hissed out of court. There was always a sort of sneaking feeling

that there was something in the plea, that there was a supposed law of necessity which excused an illegal act and justified an injustice. The German general staff excused their violation of international agreements by the plea of necessity, but no jurist would accept the excuse. The Germans made war, not from necessity, but because they wanted war. They broke their plighted word about Belgium, not from necessity, but because they thought it was the easiest and cheapest way to Paris. They committed atrocities in Belgium, not from necessity, but because they desired to warn other small neutral nations of their fate. They dropped bombs on English cities and towns, not from necessity, but because they believed that they would scare the British people. They committed murder by submarines, not from necessity, but because they hoped to starve out Britain, and afterwards prevent America from landing reinforcements in Europe. They broke their promise not to use poison

gas, not from necessity, but because they thought it would help them to win. In their retreat they devastated northern France, not from necessity, but in bitter malice and in frantic hope that France would despair and be compelled to make peace. There never was a place for the plea of necessity in law or ethics. It is only as old as the devil, as Milton has it:

> So spake the Fiend, and with necessity,
> The tyrant's plea, excused his devilish deeds.

But never again will men dare to use it to excuse illegal and inhuman acts, if the world will keep its quickened conscience.

III *The Moral Issue*

THERE is a natural temptation to shake off the whole subject of the war as a hideous nightmare mercifully passed. We had supped horrors so long. Through the slowly creeping years we had endured such a strain. Repeated shocks had so blunted and numbed the soul, that it would seem as if the one wise thing were to forget it. Besides, others tell us that all our thought and strength are needed to establish the new order that is clamouring at our door. Many feel that the troublous days after the French Revolution described by Wordsworth are being re-enacted, when we are walking between two worlds, "one dead, the other powerless to be born." Grim problems are demanding solution, and hard questions are being

pressed upon us. Our whole industrial and social system seems at the point of dissolution. Surely the wise thing is to forget the past, and give all our mind to the tasks of the present and the future. But is it so wise as it seems? Our attitude to that past will determine the solution of our perplexities. It will decide whether we meet them nobly or meanly.

The first thing we must make sure of is that we appreciate the bigness of that issue for which the world suffered. For sheer size nothing in modern history can be compared to it. It is not merely that we have been living amid the hideous slaughter of millions of brave men. Instinctively we feel ourselves in the midst of forces incalculable. Vast changes have already been achieved, and change is still in the air. These are much more than territorial readjustments and political transformations. Crowns have fallen, and empires have been disrupted, and systems have disappeared. New nations

have emerged, and old ones been shattered. The economic effects of the war were felt in every quarter of the globe. The ends of the earth were joined, and East and West met together. Battles were fought over the world, in Europe, and Asia, and Africa, and South America, and the South Sea Islands. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, the United States sent armies across the seas. Many thousands of Chinese served in France. In Serbia and in many parts of Poland hardly a child was left living. The ancient Armenian people were almost exterminated. The wars of the old world seemed renewed as battles were waged in Egypt, and Palestine, and Mesopotamia. At Gaza, where Alexander the Great and long after Napoleon fought, another decisive engagement took place which carried the British arms to the gates of the Holy City.

What tremendous emotions also have been awakened these last years—fear, and hope, and dismay, and exultation! We have

known terror and have tasted joy. We have drunk the cup of sorrow and have felt chastened gratitude. We have seen the outraged conscience of the world rise up against entrenched wrong. All the world has witnessed heroic courage and chivalrous faith. This age of ours, horrible and beautiful, has set its mark on all the future, and we are too near it to know all it means. No sane and wise man can say that it has been a joy to have lived through these great days. Any man who honestly says so must have had nothing valuable at stake, and have known no risk of the loss of all that makes life rich. It would mean an atrophy of the moral sense to sit on the cushioned seats as at a superbly staged tragedy and be thrilled with its pathos or terror. He must be living in an unreal world.

Looking back on it men may glory in the bitter experience of our time, and many undoubtedly will so look back. If we see the issue clearly and accept the lesson faith-

fully, if we believe that we have good cause to face the future in a spirit of hope and adventure, there is no reason why we may not be glad that it was our lot to have lived in such a time. Wordsworth, whose youth was spent amid the excitement and change of the French Revolution, who saw it to be a time of terror and of hope, expressed afterwards this feeling :

> Bliss was it in that day to be alive,
> And to be young was very heaven.

The French Revolution was only as a molehill to a mountain compared to this era. If it made a landmark of history, how much more this crisis, when the destiny of the world hung in the balance. Most men as they grow older have a sense of futility and littleness. That is one reason why they look to the past for the epic quality of history, why they read of Greece and Troy and the rise and fall of the Roman Empire. How great these days of ours have been in epic quality, and how great the days to follow may be!

" Humanity has struck its tents and is once more on the march," said General Smuts. Whither no one knows exactly, nor where the great trek is going to end. Politically, the old order of things has gone with the Romanoffs, and Hapsburgs, and Hohenzollerns ; and democracy is on its trial over the world. Socially, men are dreaming of new conditions and new standards. It at least appeals to courage and faith to ask whether we can do anything in the great march of humanity to determine its direction and its objective.

Mere bigness is not in itself very much, or necessarily very important. Emerson has a little poem describing a quarrel between the mountain and the squirrel. The mountain taunts the squirrel on its smallness, that it could not carry forests on its back, and the squirrel retorts, " Neither can you crack a nut." It may be a greater achievement to be living and be able to crack a nut, than to

be a dead bulk on which forests can grow. The issue was so big, because it was the greatest of moral issues. Abraham Lincoln said over the struggle of his time: "The real issue in this country is the eternal struggle between these two principles — right and wrong — throughout the world. They are the two principles which have stood face to face from the beginning of time, and will ever continue to struggle. The one is the common right of humanity, and the other the divine right of kings." That same issue was raised in this struggle only in a far more momentous way; for it cut to the roots of our whole civilisation.

It is a good thing for us to emphasise to ourselves the moral character of the ultimate conflict, and to remind us that both men and nations are called on for moral decisions. Before the war we were tempted to think that there was very little difference between positions. Our popular phrases showed this, such as that there was so much bad in the best

and so much good in the worst that it was a case of six and half a dozen. We were in danger of losing our soul, pretending that there was no need of moral decisions. We were becoming expert in straddling, and prided ourselves on our tolerances and facile compromises. There was no 'either—or,' only muddled choices, and convenient half-way houses. We were not living in a world of categorical imperatives, where we could speak clearly of right and wrong. The old proverb has it that all cats are grey in the dark. If we live in a moral twilight, in a universal dull haze, there will be no clean-cut lines, and all the colours will shade into each other and become one grey blur. There is a wide and noble charity born of a heart that knows itself and knows pitifully the temptations of men; and there is a spurious charity born of selfishness and lack of principle. Ours was the tolerance of indifference, and not the tolerance of love.

Into such a world came the dreadful line of

cleavage, creating a chasm that could not be bridged. No man and no nation could permanently straddle the line. Our greatest shock was to find ourselves in a world of fundamental enmities that were not open to adjustment and compromise. The most peace-loving among us came to see that no peace, which left final issues undecided, could be permanent. It soon ceased to be merely a matter for the actual combatants. The trenches of the warfare ran back into civil life, and there was no escape. We needed the lesson of this, and still need it. In our political life expediency and not principle was the root of statesmanship. In business we were governed by customs of trade and cheap economic rules. Passion had deserted our ethics and our religion. It seemed dreadful to be thrust into a situation, which could not be modified and dealt with by compromise. We were not prepared for war, and still less prepared for an occasion where we were made to feel that the whole future

of the human race was at stake. The lesson of the experience will be lost to us, if we think that we can settle back into a world where moral decisions are no longer demanded of us. We must learn to bring into all life the habit of decision and the courage to choose and stand by the right. For, the two principles which came to death-grips remain in the moral life of man.

In the clash of two ideals which lay back of the Great War the opposites can be stated in many forms. They can be stated in terms of politics as autocracy opposed to democracy. This must be viewed as deeper than mere forms of government. There are two political philosophies in conflict. One of them is fundamentally pagan in its ideas of the organisation of the world. It believed that progress in civilisation must come through the domination of a single Power. How it could have reached its full development in the German system seems a mystery to men

of modern mind, but it was simply logical. Even the weird statements of it from time to time from the Kaiser's mouth are logical. He was only a cog in the machine, or to use a more grandiose figure for him, he was only the apex of the whole system. He made himself the mouthpiece of the ideal for which the nation stood. In a speech delivered in 1900 he expressed the ambition: "I hope that to Germany it will be granted to become as closely united, as powerful, and as authoritative as was once the Roman Empire, and that just as in olden times they said, 'I am a Roman citizen' (*Civis Romanus sum*), hereafter at some time in the future they will say, 'I am a German citizen.'" It grew so that the vital faith in Germany was a mystic exaltation of the destiny of the nation and all the nation stood for.

In the interests of this destiny the people accepted positions that seem to us incredible. Tolstoy in 1896 wrote his *Patriotism and Government*, in which he quotes from a speech

made by Kaiser Wilhelm in 1891 to German soldiers: "You have taken the oath of allegiance to *me*; this means, children of my Guards, that you are now *my* soldiers, that you have given yourselves up to me, body and soul. Only one enemy exists for you —*my* enemy. With the present socialistic intrigues it may happen that I shall command you to shoot your own relatives, your brothers, even your parents (from which may God preserve us), and then you are in duty bound to obey my orders unhesitatingly." Tolstoy calls the Kaiser the *enfant terrible* of State authority, who expresses what other men only venture to think. Tolstoy's comment on him is: "Poor sick miserable man, intoxicated with power, who by these words insults all that is sacred to men of modern civilisation!" It may seem amazing that an intelligent nation could accept such claims, and the only explanation is that they were in line with the claims made on behalf of the nation itself. Their world policy meant not only

boundless colonial expansion, but above all that no decision was to be taken anywhere without Germany's directing and determining voice. The Emperor was the mouthpiece of this claim also, which has been the basal principle of German foreign policy for years, as in another speech: "Nothing must henceforth be settled in the world without the intervention of Germany and the German Emperor." The fate of a so-called inferior race is either to merge itself in the dominant nation or to suffer extermination.

This doctrine of national ascendancy lies at the roots of the war. It coloured the whole German official policy for years before the conflict. In domestic policy, the Danish language was crushed by repressive methods in Slesvig, and the Polish language in German Poland. French was proscribed in Alsace and Lorraine, where children could only be registered under German names, and the performance of French plays was prohibited.

In foreign policy, Germany was to have the first place in the sun ; her destiny was on the sea : " The trident ought to be in our fist," said the Emperor ; Germany must be consulted in everything that happens in the world. The diplomacy of the mailed fist was glorified, and some enthusiasts declared lyrically that war is the noblest and holiest expression of human activity. In 1908 the Kaiser visited Constantinople, and Jerusalem, and Damascus. In the latter place he proclaimed himself as the protector of the whole Mohammedan world, though he did not possess a single Moslem subject.

The opposite political philosophy of the democratic nations stands for public liberty. To it the way of progress is not through the dominance of one Power, but through diverse nationalities seeking mutual understanding in a spirit of goodwill and in friendly co-operation. It does not look on war as a biological necessity, but looks forward to creating the means for maintaining inter-

national peace. The democratic ideal for a people is a nation of free persons, each having opportunity to be his best, and each contributing to the good of the whole. The democratic ideal for the world is a great family of nations, free to develop themselves according to their own genius and making their own contribution to the world. As is seen in a family, there may be older and younger, stronger and weaker, but all with their rights and their duties. We must hold by our democratic faith in the common right of humanity, all the more because we see the danger inherent in our civilisation with its aggregation of economic power, and its scientific control of natural resources, and all the more because we feel the temptation of modern national life with its centralised control of great races and its power through education of moving a whole nation with a unified ambition. This is one of the places where we must take care lest Germany, which failed to conquer us by her arms,

should conquer us by her ideas; for Prussianism is not necessarily confined to Prussia.

All the issues vital to democracy, freedom, self-government, justice, the rights of man, were at stake. It was a war between autocratic and democratic ideas of the organisation of the world. It was a war between the law of the jungle and the law of brotherhood among nations. There were facile optimists among us, who never seemed to see how imminent the danger was. They did not realise the immense advantages an autocracy has in its unity of purpose in time of war. It can train its disciplined hordes, can choose its time and place, and hurl the whole national resources into the conflict. The saying is as old as Virgil that the wolf does not care how many the sheep be. It is not the first time in the world's history that organised militarism has crushed the arts of peace, as Macedonia snuffed out the lights of Athens. The danger to-day came nearer than many realised

that a new barbarism would eclipse the sun of human freedom. It was only averted because men in the free nations did come to understand that all the liberties won by our fathers had to be nobly won again or meanly lost. It was only because the soul of man braced itself for the supreme struggle, knowing as of old that it had mighty allies:

> Our friends were exultations, agonies,
> And love, and man's unconquerable mind.

In terms of politics then the conflict was that peoples might live their own lives, create their own institutions, and assert the claims of justice against brutal aggression. President Wilson in his letter to Pope Benedict crammed into a sentence the whole democratic indictment against Germany: "The object of this war is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and actual power of a vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible government, which having secretly planned to dominate the world proceeded to carry out the plan without regard

either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long-established practices of international action and honour; which chose its own time for the war; delivered its blow fiercely and suddenly; stopped at no barrier either of law or of mercy; swept a whole continent within a tide of blood—not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women and children also and of the helpless poor."

The conflict can also be stated in terms of ethics, if we are prepared to acknowledge any standards of right and wrong. Indeed the chief question raised by the war is as to whether there is anything rightly to be called ethics at all. You cannot abolish ethics in the realm of international relations and hope to keep it in other realms of human life. If the basal German contention is right, then we have a world where everything goes that has the mailed fist behind it. Might becomes the supreme test of right in all

social relations. Justice, fair-play, pity, sympathy, goodwill are only sentiments to be discarded whenever they seem to interfere with immediate success. If we accept this point of view in war, we must logically accept it elsewhere in man's dealings with man. We have no real complaint at anything done in the war, if we allow a fissure in the moral life of man. Like a ghastly vampire the Germans sucked the life-blood out of every land they touched—Belgium, France, Poland, Russia. They made a circle of devastation, surrounded themselves with a desert, so that they had round them a periphery of hunger. Everywhere it was a ruthless force riding pitilessly to selfish ends, without chivalry and without honour. But there can be no valid condemnation of it all, unless we insist that nations must order themselves by the same principles of action, and rules of conduct, and code of honour which our moral standards enforce on decent men.

Ethically we can speak of the whole con-

flict as from one point of view being Force versus Law. Germany began the war by her Chancellor frankly and brutally declaring that what they did was "contrary to the dictates of international law," but that the only thing of importance to them was "to hack their way through." Every other breach of law was justified by military necessity, which simply means the glorification of sheer force. There is no way out for the world that way. Peace in civil life is alone secured by law. We possess what measure of peace we have only because men consent to submit to laws by which they seek to express justice. The laws may be imperfect enough, in which case the task is to alter and improve them, but the way of law is the way of reason and the way of peace. So in international life there can be no security except by enthroning law. International law is sadly inadequate and defective, and the greatest opportunity of our time is to express our moral principles in a code of law for nations; but only through law

is there any hope for a future of just and lasting peace.

The grossest crime of Germany was that she shattered the whole fabric of law, which had been built up toilsomely in the centuries by international jurisprudence. Her spokesmen made no concealment of their contempt for the whole idea of a law of nations. Professor von Stengel, a German authority on international law so-called, wrote: "There will be no conference at The Hague when this war is over. The one condition of prosperous existence for the natives is submission to our supreme direction. Under our overlordship all international law would become superfluous; for we of ourselves, and instinctively, give to each his rights." The colossal arrogance of this is both pathetic and ludicrous, yet it is the logical alternative of the abrogation of law. If we depart from the ordered path of law, the next best thing for the world would be that some super-men or a super-nation, as benevolent as possible,

should control the world and *give* it peace. The trouble is that men of our breed will not have it on these terms. So they fought not only for freedom, but also really for law as against force, for an ordered civilisation. Our generation paid the price of blood and tears, that the Babylonian type of nation might no longer afflict the world. The moral indictment of our enemy which we make is for her breach of good faith, her breach of laws human and divine, her breach of the sanctities that have made men human. In the titanic struggle the very possibility of what we mean by civilisation was at stake. We waged the war not only for moral aims, but also for the moral end itself. We could say with truth :

> If this fail,
> The pillared firmament is rottenness
> And earth's base built on stubble.

If we failed, there could be no guarantee for a rational ethics at all, a moral order with sanctions other than stark brute force.

If we can state the ethical conflict as Force versus Law, it can also be stated ethically as Organisation versus Freedom. It means two opposing views of society. One is that of a machine whose virtue is discipline and whose driving power is force. The individual is an item in the scheme, a cog in the machine. He is not an end in himself, but exists for the State and is to be drilled into obedience and docility. The virtues of the citizen of the democratic State are despised as weakness. Initiative, self-reliance, personal independence, private judgment in politics are too dangerous qualities which would menace the authority of the government. They might tempt the people to assume control of their own national affairs. The virtues encouraged are loyalty, obedience, discipline, and in time of war courage and self-sacrifice. They are in many respects noble virtues, and in a crisis are powerful and useful habits. For a monarchical military State they are the inevitable virtues.

The machine conception of society has never been worked out with such thoroughness as in modern Germany, not only in actual practice, but also in thought as a scheme of life. The docility of the people was secured by the control of all the sources of information and opinion. The strong hand of government was laid on the school, the press, the Church, the Universities. It began early with the children in the kindergarten. A little German boy went to school with his school-bag strapped to his shoulders like a soldier's knapsack. He learned the goose-step in the drill-ground, which took the place of the playground. The government controlled the teaching right on up to the University. Every professor was a State official, and owed all his preferment to the State. There was a great appearance of academic freedom, but let a teacher criticise the government or touch the sacred doctrine of the State, and he soon found out how free he was.

There was no escape anywhere from the vast bureaucratic control. It kept hold of business by means of tariff, and subsidies, and preferential rates. Even the social legislation initiated by Bismarck was designed for the same purpose. The old-age pension system, the insurance schemes, were all arranged in the form largely of deferred pay, so that a working man who had paid in to government for twenty years was held bound hand and foot as a humble tool. The press bureau was organised as a department of the government, which could shape public opinion in the desired direction. Years ago a German boasted to me of what they would do in the world-war which even then they used to speak about. I asked him what public opinion would say about that. "We *create* public opinion," he replied. This explains the terrible situation that met us in the actual war, that we were faced with the power of the organised lie.

The other view of society is that of a living

organism, and not of a machine. The parts are not cogs, but personalities. The appeal is to *morale* rather than to discipline. We learn to obey laws, not because they are the commands imposed from above by authority, but because they represent the will of the commonwealth, and are our own laws which we share in making. We are educating for freedom, and this can only be done through freedom with all its risks. Responsibility for policy, criticism of the government, are not only rights but duties. This is a great bore and nuisance to authorities, as it is so much easier for superior people to govern servile and docile subjects. With independent folk, claiming the right of private judgment, it takes some trouble to convince them of the wisdom of a policy. But in this view of society the whole emphasis is on personality, and even the State itself exists for the person. The problem is to create organisation that will not kill freedom and that is infused with the spirit and purpose of freedom.

The way out is a courageous acceptance of our democratic doctrine, which is also the Christian doctrine, pressing the emphasis on personality. In government, in social life, in industry, we must resolutely judge them all by how they work out in happy, noble, useful life.

The issue goes deeper still, and can be stated not only in terms of politics and of ethics, but also in terms of religion. On one side the whole theory, whose fruits we saw in politics and ethics, runs down to sheer materialism. This is why it was one of history's gravest hours. If there are no sanctions other than force, we have a world of hammer and anvil, and nothing can long prevent power of all sorts from wielding the hammer and doing the striking. Professor G. Santayana of Harvard University defined German metaphysics in mordant phrase as " a forced method of speculation, producing more confusion than it found, and calculated

chiefly to enable practical materialists to call themselves idealists, and rationalists to remain theologians." When the mask comes off, we see that the theory of life which strove for mastery gives us a world which blights the soul of man. The great words, which men have used and by which they have tried to express some portion of reality, words like justice, and pity, and mercy, and love, are only words with no roots in the real world.

It was materialism over against the possibility of a spiritual interpretation of the world and life. Our Christian civilisation dimly and imperfectly had sought to build itself on that interpretation. Unjust as many of our institutions are, we at least believed in justice and blunderingly tried to embody it in practice. Cruel as much of our organised life is, we at least also created forms expressive of kindness and love. Selfish though our own lives may have been, we never derided the faith in a social state of good faith, and goodwill, and mutual helpfulness.

Bitter as have been our racial animosities, and national jealousies, and sectional strife, we have followed the gleam of a Kingdom, which oversteps all boundaries of race, and class, and caste, and which makes the brotherhood of men. In that dread crucible of war were cast more than armies and nations. The issue at its deepest meant that we had to build our civilisation on a material conception of life, or on a spiritual. Is it wonderful that such an issue could cleave the world in twain?

IV *The Meaning of the Victory*

Our first and natural impulse, when the militarist machine broke so suddenly and so dramatically, was to express simple thankfulness. We had endured so long and had suffered so deeply, that our single feeling was gratitude for a great deliverance. That the world should at last be rid of the menace to its liberties seemed good news enough to justify everything. It seemed enough that we could breathe freely, that we had triumphantly defended our freedom, and disarmed a criminal government which had drenched the earth in blood. The metrical version of the 124th Psalm, which the Scottish Church has sung for generations, fittingly describes the first sense of relief:

Now Israel may say, and that truly,
If that the Lord had not our cause maintained;
If that the Lord had not our right sustained,
When cruel men against us furiously
Rose up in wrath to make of us their prey;
Then certainly they had devoured us all.
. . . . . .
Even as a bird out of the fowler's snare
Escapes away, so is our soul set free:
Broke are their nets, and thus escaped we.

After a struggle so colossal and losses so tragic, we are tempted to be content to express triumph. The foe has been beaten, and the victory has been won. Or we became so concerned about questions of reparation and restoration that we had no thought for reminding ourselves what it all should mean.

It was fitting that we should give thanks for the dawn that broke one of the darkest nights of human history. It was seemly that we should be glad and rejoice. But if we were right in finding the origin of the war in the region of motive and ambition, and explaining it as a moral issue, we must ex-

plain the end of it in the same way. There were unknown reserves, and unseen allies, and moral resources; and the deepest lesson of the whole experience must be sought in the realm of the moral life. Surely that lesson ought to be a reinforcement of the instinctive faith which carried so many men through the years of agony, faith in what Robert Louis Stevenson calls the ultimate decency of things. During these long and bitter years we held by the primal faith of the soul that this is a moral world in which such crime could not permanently succeed. Sometimes despairingly, sometimes fearfully, but grimly we kept believing that evil would be torn from its seat of power. Thomas Hardy expresses what is an unquenchable faith of the high heart of man in his verse:

> In our heart of hearts believing
> Victory crowns the just
> And that braggarts must
> Surely bite the dust,
> March we to the field ungrieving,
> In our heart of hearts believing
> Victory crowns the just.

The triumph is first of all a reinforcement of the moral basis of life. All true men have known it, by their consciousness of weakness and by their need of strength, known it in their times of distress and in their godlike hours. It is a moral universe, however we explain it. For men and for nations, 'the chickens come home to roost.' Blessing and strength come to men and nations who seek justice, and love mercy, and obey honour.

If we could not believe this, it would cut the feet from all noble effort and all stern endurance. We need the faith to hearten us in the weariness of all well-doing, and to implant in us the keener virtues, courage, patience, faithfulness unto death. In the deep dismay of our age many only found comfort where their fathers found it, somewhere in the region of what they called the sovereignty of God, finding expression in some ancient word born of the faith and inspiration of a prophetic soul. "True and

righteous are His judgments." All the souls under the altar speak of the triumph and ultimate victory of the truth, the judgment and final defeat of evil. Their vision is ever of the new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness. Their joy in judgment is not revengeful feeling over the punishment of the oppressor, but chiefly because it is an evidence that this is a moral world. The uprooting of an evil power is a signal witness to God in the world and life. It may be too surface a view of morality and by itself would certainly be an unspiritual conception of life ; for if goodness is to be judged by outward prosperity it would often be as a flower which grows in a night and which the first breeze of adversity would wither. It would not be the highest motive to be good, if we could only say about it that it brings prosperity. Still, so far as it goes the argument is cogent enough that men should see that it does not pay to do evil. It is an instinct of our heart to believe this.

The victory then is a vindication of justice and honour. The clamour for the ending of the war without that vindication was due to a distortion of values. We had to defend to the uttermost our heritage of loyalty to great ideals. Peace is more than the sheathing of the sword; it is the triumph of righteousness. The mere stopping of warfare might have been failure instead of success for the cause which men died to save. There can be a love of peace joined to indifference to spiritual values. This is why military triumph was essential, even in the interests of Germany. The predatory nation that went out for loot needed to learn, for the sake of all as well as for their own sake, that looting is not allowed. They had to learn that 'Frightfulness' does not frighten, and above all does not pay. They had to learn that blood and iron, and the mailed fist, and the shining armour, and the flashing sword are archaisms, and in our modern world the only place for them is a

museum. The cult of war had to be discredited. The doctrine that might is right, and that military necessity justifies every kind of baseness, had to be proved a lie. All this that we may secure civilisation from the repetition of such crime. We welcome what signs there are in the defeated country of the acknowledgment that she *deserved* to fail, and that she can never regain her place in the world's esteem until she discards the principles and ambitions which have been her ruin.

We can easily see how the Nemesis worked, but we need to assure ourselves that it always has worked and always will work in the same way. The German high command put its faith in terrorism and cunning; and both recoiled on them with disastrous results. The policy of Frightfulness is one which tyranny always deems the last word of wisdom. It seemed a sure thing that it would cow civilian populations, and scare

neutral nations, and break the nerve of armies. Instead of that the soul of man rose in revolt against every new evidence of German brutality. An observer could see in every combatant country the temper taking on a stern tenacity of purpose. One could witness a hardening of sentiment as the people learned of the asphyxiating gases in Flanders, the poisoned wells in Africa, the foul murder on the seas. The effect was like blows on prepared steel. Early in the war the Kaiser in a letter said that he could make peace to-morrow if he wished it, but it would be "an incomplete result, but which would at least serve as a preparation for the future." He deceived himself, as he found when he would fain have peace. They had thrown overboard all that had been accomplished during centuries towards mitigating the cruelties of war and protecting civilians. The only result was to embitter neutral opinion, and steel their enemies to the limit of sacrifice. With any other foe peace

could have been made by negotiation. If they had shown ordinary humanity to the population of Belgium, if they had kept the common laws of honour, if their courage had been coupled with chivalry and their strength with generosity, the war could have been ended long before. The conscience of man simply decided that they had to be defeated at any cost in order to save civilisation.

Even more disastrous was the recoil of the cunning and treacherous diplomacy which accompanied every stage of the war. It gave such an impression of cleverness and strength that it seemed the wise policy in a warring world. Yet once more we have plain evidence that the constitution of things is against it. Cleverness divorced from character is not strength but weakness. When the German Government desired peace to save something out of the wreck, they found that the country had suffered moral bankruptcy and no sane people would take their

word for anything. When they most needed confidence and mutual good faith, they had no moral assets. After a long course of duplicity and deceit, every move was naturally looked on with suspicion. Who would be Germany's guarantor, and what pledges could she give? Bankrupt of honour, her plighted word a torn scrap of paper, when she talked of peace the inevitable and universal thought was: "In vain is the net spread in the sight of any bird." A time came when the German Government desperately desired credit for their fair words, but found that nobody in all the world would listen or believe. The treaty-breaking, the double-dealing, the acts of treachery destroyed all trust in their good faith. With sure insight Mr. Wilson put his finger on the spot of moral disease when he said that they recognise no principle but force and their own interests.

We see the Nemesis working in the judicial blindness which to the end seemed to pre-

vent Germany from understanding this fact. In December 1916 the Chancellor began to talk of peace, and then admitted that he was only trying to gain time, in order to build submarines to add another dastardly chapter to their method of warfare. Later, at the very moment she approached the Allies about peace, she was applying the torch to cities and towns and some of the priceless treasures of civilisation, and deporting to cruel slavery whole civilian populations. At the very time she was asking for negotiations, she was filling the seas with villainies, sinking passenger ships to leave no trace of the savagery. Seafaring peoples had developed a courtesy and chivalry of the sea, to say nothing of an ethics and law of the sea. To us the sea had become the symbol of vast immeasurable cleanness, and mercy like the wideness of God's mercy. Germany turned the sea into a place of defilement. But as we would expect in a moral world lawlessness reacts and revenges itself.

It is one other illustration of the universal truth that in the service of law is our perfect freedom. Shakespeare with his matchless insight describes the process and the inevitable result :

> Then everything includes itself in power,
> Power into will, will into appetite,
> And appetite as universal wolf,
> So doubly seconded with will and power,
> Must make perforce an universal prey,
> And last eat up himself.

Power grew into the will to more power, until Germany had become merely an appetite ; and lawless appetite ends in eating itself up. Our enemy forced us to reaffirm our faith, feeble enough as it was. She is also the best proof of the truth of our faith ; for never has the world witnessed such a collapse of materialism. If we wanted a demonstration of the utter failure of the whole philosophy we surely have it. An empire organised for force, built on sheer materialism ruthlessly applied, plunging the world back to the law of the jungle, broke

itself on the naked soul of man. Is it vindictiveness to rejoice at such a signal proof? Call it rather the vindication of the righteousness and judgment that are the habitation of God's throne; the passion for justice which lies deep in the hot heart of man; the assurance that no power can last which is based on oppression and cruelty; the prophecy of man's soul that there is a power making for righteousness.

The history of man is not the history of his achievements, his inventions and material resources. These are only the necessary foundations for the structure of his real life. We might circle the globe with steel, bridge every river and tunnel every hill, and at the end of the day we would have only material for the scrap-heap. The history of man is not even the history of his mind, his thought and literature and art and knowledge. His true history is the history of his conscience, of his moral development. Only that can give security and permanence to all his other

achievements. Where corruption prevails, where wrong and injustice exist, where selfishness and all its brood of vices hold sway, sooner or later there ceases to be room for true art or science or thought.

The meaning of the victory may be learned by the conquered, and may be lost by the conquerors. We may plume ourselves on the very things which brought ruin to the foe, and reckon up our strength and wealth in material terms. The Babylonian spirit has not left the world, and every great civilisation is menaced by the old temptations—insolence of pride, cruelty of sheer force, empty trust of resources. A commercial country like ours is ever tempted to be wholly absorbed in the material side of civilisation, to find outlets for its amazing energy and its masterful ambition, to judge of causes only by how they affect our own interests, even to decide causes by what corresponds to the mailed fist. Every great soldier knows how much

depends on what is called *morale*, not only in armies themselves but also in the nation back of them. Field-Marshal Earl Haig at a time of crisis said that "the war will be won by twenty-five per cent. military and seventy-five per cent. of other forces of which those represented by the churches are the greatest." Now that these forces have won the victory, it will be only a more disastrous defeat if we become cynical of the highest motives that move man. When the heart of a nation becomes fat, when the only passion it knows is the passion of a spurious patriotism which lives in a jingle of jingo rhymes, she needs again the high and holy word of God with its message of sacrifice and love to stir her heart to noble deeds again.

It is easy for a nation to forget the things that made her great, and that alone can keep her great. Amid the signs of success which others have earned, it is easy to be puffed up with empty conceit and windy vanity. In the wealth of material resources it is easy to

trust in the arm of flesh and lift the hoarse cry of pride at every sign of pomp and power. One foolish hour can squander the gains of a lifetime. One weak and frenzied year can hazard all that generations have brought us. A nation whose heart is true may make mistakes and recover the lost ground, by learning the lesson of the mistake, by recalling itself once more to the high tasks of life; but even for a nation whose heart is true, as for a man, there are mistakes hard to be repaired and false steps hard to be retraced. A nation cannot afford to forget the conditions of prosperity and permanence. It is not much to have gained heights, which we are not competent to keep. A height to a weakling will only mean a giddy head and staggering feet.

The common blunder seen on many a page of history is a vain trust in material resources, on what are boastingly called the sinews of war. Only a fool will despise them, but only a worse fool will count these up exultingly, as

if they made sure of fate, and as if there were no other elements to be calculated on. Big battalions, and the money, and the ships of the popular songs mean something, but we do not need to read very deeply into history to come across the wrecks of empires that had them all. A man-of-war is a stately and a costly engine, but any fool can sink a ship. A gun is a very imposing weapon in these scientific days, but there is still something in the man behind the gun. Nothing has altered, nothing can alter, the great eternal moral facts and forces that mould the life of men and sway the destinies of peoples. Even in the stress and strain of material conflict a country falls back in the last resort on moral qualities, on the soundness of heart and cleanness of blood of her sons and daughters, on courage and honour and faith and sacrifice, on the capacity to suffer and endure and believe and hope. No moves on the economic chess-board, no alliances for offence and defence, no tricks of diplomacy

and skill of statecraft, can in themselves bring security or greatness to a country. Now as ever safety comes through obedience to the laws of life. Now as ever a nation withers at the heart, when luxury and comfort are prevalent ideals, when truth and justice and purity and honour are disregarded. To a great people, conscious of greatness, rich with a splendid heritage of possession and of opportunity, it is never out of season to point the one moral of history, to call men to remember the conditions of heritage, the penalty of privilege, the responsibility of power—"lest we forget."

We know what we fought against; have we made plain to ourselves what we fought for? We fought against arbitrary power, militarism, force as the sole arbiter of human affairs. When we say that we fought for the opposite of these, for freedom, democracy, justice, the rights of man, are we only meaning that it was to regain and maintain the

status quo, the old conditions which were endangered? Surely the struggle developed into something better and bigger than that, for new conditions in national and international life. Of course in a true and deep sense we were fighting not for the new but for the old. We were fighting for the old foundations of our civilisation. Also, if democracy has won, it has been by the old means, by courage and faith. But in reality the victory only spells opportunity. It is not enough to labour earnestly to restore old conditions, to bring back to the world the measure of peace and prosperity it enjoyed, to repair as quickly as possible the economic depletion of war, to patch up the old framework of society which has been shaken if not shattered. Victory means opportunity to build on the ruins of the old order a nobler and fairer one. The passing of the old only clears the stage for the coming of the new. If we miss our opportunity now it will never come again in such hopeful shape. The future

depends on our present faith and courage, our intelligence and resolute endeavour to exact from ourselves and others the full price of the world's agony. The struggle now ended is only ended in one form. It has released incalculable forces for good and for evil. If we will not learn to subordinate our selfish ambitions to a great purpose, it will be apostasy to the cause for which so many of our heroic dead died.

The man is blind who does not recognise the idealism which the war brought forth in the midst of so much ugliness. It was not always consciously thought out, but many of our noblest knew that they were fighting for more than victory for their country. Some died happy in the belief that their death would help the world in its steep ascent. Many were willing to die that they might save their children and their children's children from such a hell of suffering. All of them trusted that the survivors would create a better and happier world, a social

state with juster and finer conditions. If we revert to selfish living and sectional strife, we will be traitors to their memory. The war drove much meanness and selfishness into hiding, and the larger loyalties were in the field—patriotism, public duty, self-sacrifice, service that was heedless of self. Some are now sneering at idealism, who would not have dared to do it when the fate of the whole world depended on the idealists. Its fate still rests on them. Democracy, which could not be crushed by armed force from outside, will break down from within if its citizens are motived only by vulgar desire for plunder. It cannot work without intelligence and unselfishness. Democracy is not a system, but a programme, and is itself an ideal.

The thought of public service, which dominated the minds of so many men during the crisis of war, must be kept for the tasks of peace if we are to conserve the true meaning of the victory. It is a false charge

that idealists are mere sentimentalists, who shirk the realities of life, and who shut their eyes to facts. The true idealist has an instinct for reality. He knows that love and hate exist. He takes the passions and ambitions of men for granted. He recognises such stubborn facts as patriotism, and does not pretend that they disappear because he might wish it. He differs from the mere opportunist simply by having ideals, and his ideals are rooted in a fundamental faith. It is a faith in man, that human nature can be changed by education, by social living, by enlightenment of conscience, by acceptance of law, by religion. He believes that man will respond to high motives as well as to low ones, and even more naturally. He can point to the exhaustless heroisms of the soul of man during the strain of war, and none can gainsay him there. He thinks he can state some idealisms as a practical programme. For instance, he believes that the nations to-day can make sure that the

Great War was indeed a war to end war. It is only a matter of faith and courage. With the courage to face facts we need the courage to believe our faith.

With the memory of all that has been, can we deny that there is a great modern argument for the paramountcy of soul? We do not exhaust the meaning of the victory by seeing in it a reinforcement of the moral basis of life. It is also a mighty affirmation of the spiritual. We recognise it in the dramatic break of the tremendous military machine which held the world in awe. We naturally think of this inherent weakness as compared with the tenacity with which the Allies held on through dark days. It was born of faith, however blind and dumb it may have been. It was more than faith in the ultimate decency of things; it was also faith in the future, a vision of what may be and shall be. Amid all the passions and resentments of the strife there gleams

an inextinguishable idealism which marks a contrast that must not be missed.

The contrast could be truly made from the other combatants, but nowhere more dramatically than between France and Germany. We think naturally of France, who bore so large a brunt of the onset throughout long years of agony. She suffered such handicap, with a third of her material resources in enemy hands from the beginning, deprived of her coal and iron and chief manufactories, all the bloody battles fought on her land, with the foe again and again beat back almost from the gates of Paris, bled white as she seemed to be, with the whole national fortunes trembling more than once in the balance. There was never a whimper or a whine. There was something in the soul of France which upheld her through the evil days. With wonder and admiration we look on that picture.

Germany for four years said boastfully and truthfully to herself and to the world,

"Look at the map!" with her armies extending the frontier of conquest everywhere. She spoke only of victories, and prated endlessly of her will to power. She had organised all industry, all education, all social life for war, had swaggered for fifty years over Europe as a bully, had held as her primal faith that might is right and by her might was prepared to stand or fall. When the tide of battle turned, before a decisive engagement had occurred, when not a foreign foot was on her soil, and not a battle waged within miles of her frontier, she broke as a lathe breaks painted to look like iron. All the world heard her whine. She had built her civilisation on materialism, had worshipped force and had believed that she possessed it. She had made an idol of power, and had sacrificed to the god of militarism. She had openly said that Corsica was stronger than Galilee. The world really though not in words accepted the challenge.

Somewhere deep in the region of life's

basal faith lie all the sources of power. The object of the faith conditions its real quality. We must not let this era of history through which we have lived pass into a chapter of a book of the human story, without learning its profoundest lesson. The economic historian will count up soldiers and guns and resources, and will tell us that the Central Powers were worsted because they were outweighed and outnumbered by the forces of the Allies. But what let loose those forces, and drove them through suffering and sacrifice to victory? Man's mind becomes unconquerable only through a living faith. The higher ideal conquered because it was the higher. The world which man inhabits is a moral and spiritual world. The cheap sneers of the worldling about idealism are proved foolish by facts. If we ally ourselves to a high purpose there is a constant invasion of strength into life. It is no idle rhetoric to say that faith achieves the impossible. We ought to look out to

the future with assurance because of the new manifestation of our day that man's destiny will be worthy of his history. The place of the spiritual forces has been proved through the fierce arbitrament of war; and the need of these same spiritual forces remain in repairing war's ravages and restoring the structure of peace.

There appeared as a New Year's message a remarkable letter which does not seem to have received the attention it merited. It was a letter signed by the six prime ministers of the British Commonwealth of Nations. It points out the fact which has become evident that "neither education, science, diplomacy, nor commercial prosperity, when allied with a belief in material force as the ultimate power, are real foundations for the ordered development of the world's life. These things are in themselves simply the tools of the spirit that handles them." It declares that even the hope expressed in a League of Nations can only be realised through

a spirit of goodwill among the peoples. "The spirit of goodwill among men rests on spiritual forces; the hope of a brotherhood of humanity reposes on the deeper spiritual fact of the Fatherhood of God. In the recognition of the fact of that Fatherhood and of the divine purpose for the world, which are central to the message of Christianity, we shall discover the ultimate foundation for the reconstruction of an ordered and harmonious life for all men." The signatories write as men occupying posts of grave responsibility in the guidance of the British Empire. "We would commend to our fellow-citizens the necessity that men of goodwill, who are everywhere reviewing their personal responsibilities in relation to the reconstruction of civilisation, should consider also the eternal validity and truth of those spiritual forces which are in fact the one hope for a permanant foundation for world peace."

Never before have we felt so tremendously

the need of the spiritual. If we cannot keep the great faith, we are lost and the world is lost. But we who make the mighty affirmation of faith know that we are not lost, that we are found, and that the world will be saved. We tie ourselves up to the purpose of God, which we believe to be a purpose of love, a purpose to redeem.

V *Some Revaluations*

THE common statement, that the Great War will mark an era in the life of man, is probably true. No one can foretell what the effects will be politically, socially, industrially. We are already in the midst of the struggle as to whether the most radical experiments will be attempted. If the old civilisation keeps its footing, it will only be by change, by adapting itself to new conditions. Nothing, however, will come by magic, or as a matter of course. We have to decide on ends, and to shape events towards the desired ends. "Now that the danger is over, the difficulties begin," said Gambetta about the crisis of his time. It is the brave way of facing trouble; for it sees in difficulties only opportunities. The most foolish

attitude towards human affairs is to assume that certain things must be, and it usually means letting our judgment swing according to our particular prejudice. We had many illustrations of this in the predictions that were made during the actual contest as to the effect of the war on the individual soldier.

Some people at home spoke as if our men had all become heroes and saints. They seemed to believe in an immense revival of heroic religion, because men were facing ultimate realities of life and death. All soldiers would come home better men and more worthy citizens to build a new state. Even some who were with the army talked sentimentally of men learning to pray in the trenches and finding God in the hour of battle. I would not deny that this has been, and surely some must have been made to think seriously who never thought before. But I confess to a deeper distrust than ever of the slushy optimism that will not look at

facts. It is not true that war as such makes men noble, and draws out the best in them. It is idiotic to expect plaster saints from single men in barracks, as Kipling long ago told us. Common sense would teach us that all would not become immeasurably better men for having engaged in war, or for living a short time in a foreign country. Some of the necessary incidents of battle are unspeakably beastly, and the temptations of relaxation are inevitably insidious.

On the other hand some saw nothing but the brutalising and degrading effects of war. They looked with a jaundiced eye on everything that pertains to soldiering, and they told us that unmitigated evil was all that we could expect from the experience of war. Every soldier would be coarsened and more or less depraved. They could see no good anywhere in the vast area of evil. One drunken soldier filled their eye until an army meant an orgy of intemperance. The British or the American soldier if he is not

'bearded like the pard' is certainly 'full of strange oaths,' and if these critics heard some strong language, immediately the whole air was to them blue with blasphemy. They are the kind of people who never can see any goodness that is inarticulate.

Of course as a matter of fact both are wrong. Like all other great human experiences it can make for either good or evil. War both makes and breaks men. Some will be stronger men, wiser and finer because of it all; and others will be weaker in character and coarser in grain. Under war conditions, and even under ordinary army conditions, men are living an unnatural life and are subject to special temptations. Only a very amateur psychologist would expect a revival of religion from life in the trenches. He would find evidence of what he looked for in the story told of the English Tommy, who when asked what they did during a specially severe bombardment of his dugout replied, "We were all saying our prayers. We were pray-

ing like hell." The average soldier is exactly the average man of his nation, tested out sometimes by danger, sometimes by temptation, and always by the very newness of his environment. At the same time we may expect in many that their devotion to a cause, that made them willing to offer the ultimate sacrifice, should give their character an uplift that must leave its mark.

In the same way we need not expect that the effect on institutions all over the world will be invariable. Now that the danger is over and the difficulties have begun, men will meet the difficulties in different fashion. What we may expect is that the ideas which are abroad in the world will offer opportunities for effecting changes. All the great changes of history have been changes of thought, new orientation of men's minds, the revaluation of ideas. When the idea becomes fixed, it rules the world. It was one of Carlyle's biting phrases about Rousseau's book, which was sneered at by those in authority, that

the second edition was bound by the skin of the people who laughed at it. Ideas about the rights of man swept Europe with a flame of fire. In the beginning of everything is the doctrine. As we have seen, it was teaching which forged the thunderbolt of war and hurled it on a quaking world. Now that the danger is over, the direction in which we shall travel will be determined by the point of view which men in the mass assume towards certain subjects. It does not follow that the changes that may be effected by the war will necessarily be good. We may say platitudinously that democracy has triumphed in the struggle, and that all is well; but what kind of democracy? It may be that of revolution, or that of evolution. It may be that of modern Russia, or of constitutional government. Robespierre said in the unrest of the French Revolution that "force can overturn a throne, but only wisdom can securely found a commonwealth." We are at the parting of the ways,

and everything depends on the wisdom of our choice.

We deal first briefly with some of the revaluations that are being made in our corporate life. The idea of democracy itself is changing its emphasis. It is broadening from mere forms of government to the whole structure of society. Formerly most people if asked for a definition would have been content to define it in Abraham Lincoln's words as government of the people for the people by the people, or they would have spoken of universal suffrage and parliamentary institutions. To-day it cannot be defined in terms of politics. The political machinery is only looked on as a means to a further end. The new democracy is not so easily defined. If we could give a scientific definition we could proceed to predict with something like mathematical accuracy some of the results; but that kind of definition is impossible. The

democratic movement is a human movement, and there are vagaries and freaks, and there will be side issues and stoppages. Sometimes it will look like a glacier; but even a glacier moves, and when it gets to the melting zone it *flows*. It is difficult to estimate the democratic movement because it is often blind, driven by blind needs and blind ideals. It is still also to a large extent dumb, in spite of the blatant noises; for men who speak for it are trying to speak for the voiceless mass. Better than a definition of it is a recognition of its ends. What is it really wanting? Towards what is it striving?

There are various brands of democracy, some of them with conflicting ideals, and much of the sincere opposition to it is due to misunderstanding of its true character. To some opponents it means an attempt to drag down all men to a dead level, to settle all questions by the counting of noses, to destroy all initiative and originality, and to swamp the individual. Well, of course the indict-

ment may seem to be proved, if we admit that a complete democratic organisation of society will effectually curb some rampant traits of individualism and root out some types of plunder. But we need not be scared by fears of equality, as there can be no such thing in the world of man. It may be that some who speak for democracy appear to look forward to a state where we shall be garbed and numbered and fed and ordered like the inmates of an asylum. If the world is incurably mad, that might be the best way of treating us, and the only question worth asking is, *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?*—Who will take care of the caretakers?

We need wisdom to found our commonwealth; we must strive to keep the democratic movement true to its own ideal. The only democracy worth considering is that which looks forward to a world of persons, each with the right and opportunity to become all that true manhood may mean. It looks to a social state where each member

will be guaranteed a chance to make the contribution of his complete self. Instead of being the end of the individual, it will really be his true beginning. The ideal to which the movement looks is the kingdom of God. That is why it cannot do without religion. The highest motives are necessary for its full attainment. I must concede willingly, joyfully, that if reasonable leisure, culture, opportunity of education are good for me they are good for others. I must be eager to grant to others all that I claim for myself. We must cease treating persons as means, and must think of them always as ends. We must give more than fair-play; we must give sympathy and help. We who fought for the rights of smaller nations must contend for the rights of the weak. Lord Acton put this aspect of democratic duty in a noble sentence that "laws should be adapted to those who have the heaviest stake in the country, the people to whom misgovernment means not mortified pride

or stinted luxury, but want and pain and degradation, risk to their own lives and risk to their children's souls." If we ever keep the emphasis on persons, democracy will take the revaluation which will make our generation glorious in the ages to come.

In the furnace of war our thoughts on almost every subject have become fluid and have suffered change. One place of change is surely that of war itself. From time immemorial war has been glorified in the stories of romance, by the songs of the minstrel, and in the sober pages of history. Men ministered to the glory by every means at their command, by spectacular parade, by martial music, by dazzling uniform. The fighting man was the natural hero. Battle meant the thrill of combat and the glory of victory. Science seemed to give its blessing by phrases about the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. All our thought went back to the days when war

was the bodily prowess of brave men, or a sort of knightly tournament. Soldiers marched out in bright array under flashing banners amid the huzzas of the crowds.

Every drop of that kind of glory has been squeezed out of war to-day. The romance and glamour of barbaric war have passed. Almost any day for years in England one could see thousands of men in drab khaki marching out to war, silent men through silent streets. The crowds would stand in dumb reverence, and men would raise their hats as they do at a passing funeral. There was only a mist before the eyes and a choke in the throat, as one watched the thousands march on in silence to die. To men of modern mind war was seen in its tragedy, and sordidness, and unspeakable stupidity. As a fact it came to be true that the war was waged and won by steel-workers, by inventors, by engineers, by munition workers, by factory hands, as well as by the fighting men. The old glory of war passed when it

became a matter of manufacture. Even in the field the ancient military virtues took a new slant. The great armies of civilian soldiers never got time to develop the machine discipline and drill of the old military. The war was won not by discipline, but by *morale*. Indeed the war ceased to be a war of armies merely, and became a war of nations. The last ditch of defence was not guns nor money, but the courage and stubborn endurance of the people.

Nothing is going to do more for a rational method of settling national disputes than the thought in millions of minds that modern war is an absurdity, and that we must devise means of eliminating it. When men think it silly they will laugh it out of court, as they laughed duelling out of court. The old commonplaces of thought and speech have passed which speak of war as a biological necessity and of man as essentially a fighting animal. We now feel that if these things are so, then man is not fit to

have a civilisation at all. In the presence of the facts no sane man can any longer believe that war promotes progress by selecting the fittest for survival. Its effect is precisely the opposite. As a matter of fact also the fighting instinct is not fundamental in man. On the contrary, but for the social instinct he could never have survived. He is the most defenceless of animals, and owes his existence and his development to the gregarious instinct. We do not need to deny that war in earlier stages aided man's development in order to hold that to-day its value has gone. To acknowledge a fighting instinct in man does not mean that it has prescriptive right to rule. We are men, in that we are not compelled to follow all our instincts. Progress is only possible by wise choice among opposing instincts. Some instincts need to be atrophied by lack of use like some organs of the body. Progress to men lies along the way of conscious intelligence. The path to some rational plan,

such as an international court or a league of nations, has been cleared to-day, simply because there has come in men's minds a revaluation about war itself.

Along with this also has come a need for a restatement of law. Before the war law everywhere was losing some of its authority, since men realised that they themselves were the makers of law. The laws they made they could amend, and if need be could break. The world seemed to be in the way of losing any sense of sacredness in law. Many men in other countries were prepared to assent to the German contention that when war begins ethics end, and that laws cease to operate. Germany's refusal to be bound by international conventions or by moral laws seemed strictly logical. Yet the conscience of man revolted, and man's common sense informed him that on these terms no civilisation was possible. Law is seen to be a necessity for social life,

and is self-imposed limitation on personal liberty. It is a recognition that there is something higher than the self-interest of men or of nations. It puts honour on the throne. When Belgium was neutralised in 1839 it took away from France and Germany in the event of war the easy way of invasion, and erected at the neutral frontier a barrier that could not be passed except at the cost of infamy. In the Hague Convention, which prohibited the use of poison gas, the nations imposed on themselves the deprivation of that weapon.

The question emerges whether we can talk of ethics and war at all. This has confused many people. For example, when Germany broke the Convention and used asphyxiating gas, some said that after all it was not any worse being killed by gas than by shot or shell. That sounds very well, but it is to miss the whole ethical point. It is to assume that unless you can get your highest ideal, there is no ideal at all. This

is the mistake many Pacifists made, who had their ethics in a vacuum. They simply denounced all war as such, and made no sort of distinction anywhere within the range of war. As practical men in every region of life, though we cannot get our highest social ideal, we do not cast off the lower ideal which the world has reached. There is always what may be called interim-ethics, the standards which we use meanwhile until something better becomes possible.

There was an ethics of slavery. The highest ethics killed it, but for thousands of years there were slaves. To refuse to take part in the alleviation of the slave's lot, or to refuse to enforce laws regarding him on the plea that the religious ideal prohibited slavery, was in practice to stand on the same ground as the brutal slave-driver who held that the slave had no rights at all. Extremes meet in weird fashion. The Pacifist and the Prussian occupied the same position regarding law in war, the one

because he hated war, the other because he glorified it.

There is an ethics of the prize-ring. A higher ethics would eliminate it altogether, and some day it will. But given the prize-ring, there are rules which have to some extent civilised it and robbed it of some of its barbarities. Even from the habitués of it a foul blow will elicit hisses and indignation.

There is, or the world thought there was, an ethics of war. The highest ethics would make war impossible, and one day it will. But given war, there are rules imposed on combatants. We thought that some of these rules had become laws which no self-respecting nation would break. There are things in civil life which a true man will rather die than do, and the idea that for a nation necessity knows no law is to give up the hard-won gains of centuries and to be thrown back to the law of the jungle.

This revaluation of law, which sees it as social necessity and self-imposed limitation,

is going to make it possible to set up international courts, with authority as valid as ordinary civil and criminal courts of law. Law is seen to be binding on groups and communities and nations as on individuals, and for the same reason. Its sanctions are precisely the same, and if law is not valid for nations it is not valid for men. The realm of international law must be extended and its instruments improved, so that here as elsewhere the appeal to reason may take the place of the appeal to force.

This conception of law also will make for peace within the democracy as well as in foreign relations. Changes have to come not by violence but by orderly constitutional means, when the people know that they themselves create their constitution and make their laws. Reforms are never easily made, and reformers are always tempted to be impatient. Every radical reform has to make headway against custom, against entrenched ways of thinking and living, against estab-

lished interests, against accepted tradition. It is the challenge of the soul of man for what ought to be against what is. The temptation to achieve by violence what is otherwise so slow in coming is an obvious one. Yet in an ordered world of democratic law the appeal to violence becomes absurd, and destroys its own case.

There are other revaluations to be made in the deeper region of man's life covered by religion. The tragedy of our age is calling us to rethink and restate with courage what we truly believe. Our slushy optimisms and sloppy systems of sentiment have broken down, and resolutely we have to think out what are the enduring moral and religious verities. We have to state the Christian thought, which seeks to gather the fruit of mankind's passion, and which seeks to save this poor broken world of ours. This revaluation has to cover the whole ground of religion from the doctrine of God itself;

for as Bacon said, "It were better to have no opinion of God at all than such an opinion as is unworthy of Him." It must deal also with the organisation of religion, and ask such a question as this, whether we can have permanently an aristocratic Church in a democratic State. These questions are hardly in line with the subjects of this book, but we proceed to other revaluations which have a bearing on them.

Some changes of thought have to be made in our personal life as well as in our corporate life. The first has to do with what we mean by faith. The war brought to men of imaginative mind a sense of disaster, as if the bottom had fallen out of their world. Men felt that life was of unstable tenure, and our footing at best was insecure, but to many this brought also the sense of a great adventure. Life itself was seen to be a venture. The war in disclosing so dramatically a moral issue came as a challenge to faith. We surely came to see

that faith at bottom is only venture, the venture the soul makes on life, the venture it makes on the world, the venture it makes on God. We had hardened it down to opinion and creed, but the essence of faith is simply venture. Donald Hankey in *The Student in Arms* said, "True religion is betting one's life that there is a God." We were forced to bet our life on a venture.

It is often stated that the great opposites are faith on the one side pitted against unfaith, but this is a mistake. It is a faith pitted against another faith. We cannot prove or disprove either side of the great contention. We cannot prove that the words that move our soul, words like justice, honour, pity, mercy, have their roots in the soil of reality. We only believe it, and we are willing to stake our life on it. We make something like a spiritual interpretation of the world and life, and we throw our weight on that side. We take all the risks of the venture and abide by the result. We cannot

disprove what lies back of the opposite contention, which bases itself on a world of sheer materialism. It may be that might is the supreme test of right, and of course all the rest follows logically. There is no sacredness in the plighted word, and the end can be made to justify any and every means. No sense of honour, no sentimental ideas of fair-play, no rights of weaker peoples, no dictates of humanity need be allowed to stand in the way. It may be that the world is only one of fang and claw. Only we refuse to believe it, and we elect to live in another world. By all the saints, by the long story of the upward march of our race, the toilsome ascent to better things, we will not believe it. If we have made our election of faith, no success of the opposing ideal will make us believe it. We know it has the seeds of ruin in its own bosom, and it cannot permanently succeed.

Along with this revaluation of faith comes a revaluation of some other qualities like

courage. The opposite of faith is not doubt, but fear. This is the New Testament contrast: "Fear not, only believe." Courage is the root virtue of human nature. You can cut a figure out of wood or stone, but you can do nothing with mud. Putty and clay are useless, unless they can be made to harden. This is the truth which in depraved form lurks in the German militarist mania. Courage is also the root of all the other virtues. Without it all the others fail at the pinch. A man may believe in truth and may love truth, but without courage in a crisis he will lie. Good intentions, without the courage to carry them out, are useless and only deceive the soul. Moral courage is closer than has often been thought to physical courage; for man is a unity. The average man's ethics which stigmatises cowardice is right. The unpardonable sin is cowardice. The world never had more cause to admire and wonder at human courage than to-day. We cannot hold mean views of men, who displayed

such indomitable, inexhaustible courage. It makes no difference whether we explain some of it as mass courage. Men who could be made, however it was done, to face death so resolutely, can be made to face the hardest tasks of life. There was no hope so forlorn that it could not get its volunteers. What this can mean for the huge problems of our day is incalculable. The misgivings in men's minds, the heart-sinkings about the future, the timidity which looks with shrinking on untried paths, can all be dissipated by courage. To conquer fear is the soul's triumph, and such triumph we now know is not rare.

Part of it was due to a revaluation of life itself, which has been a common experience of our time. The sense of disaster caused by the shock of war, which drove so many to make a great affirmation of faith, forced them also to ask the old question, What is life? When a boy could write from the trenches

that he had learned that it does not matter when a man dies, that it only matters how, all of us were compelled to make our judgments of life in *terms of quality* and not merely in terms of quantity. Many a mother asked in anguish if she had nurtured her son carefully and trained him lovingly only to have him cast in his youth as rubbish to the void. But many must have found some comfort from the thought that success in life means more than mere length of living. What more could a man ever achieve, lived he for centuries instead of years, than give his life to the highest he knows and for the highest? What more could he do in all the years of living than give himself to the greatest cause that comes his way? This is the power of the religious appeal, that it ties a life up to the greatest cause of all, and so saves it from failure. What takes the heart out of men is the thought of amounting to nothing, living for nothing, and dying for nothing. To give the full measure of devo-

tion to a great cause is success in life. Ben Jonson long ago made the contrast in the judgment of life according to quantity or to quality.

> It is not growing like a tree
> In bulk, doth make man better be;
> Or standing long an oak three hundred year,
> To fall a log at last, dry, bald, and sere:
> A lily of a day
> Is fairer far in May,
> Although it fall and die that night . . .
> It was the plant and flower of Light.
> In small proportions we just beauties see;
> And in short measures life may perfect be.

We too naturally take the vulgar standard of judgment by bulk, and value men and things by the splash they make. If we can keep this finer standard, which was forced on so many through sorrow, it will make life simpler and nobler.

We are losing one of the great opportunities of our time, if we are failing also to put a new emphasis on sacrifice and service. Surely they have acquired a deeper meaning. In the mass, as we view the tragedy of our

day, we see this torn human life of ours with an infinite pity for its infinite pathos. Left there, it would be only empty sentiment, the vainest and most dangerous mood of the soul. To be content to speak sentimentally of the countless sacrifice in the colossal struggle would be to turn it into an idle spectacle. We must use our natural feeling to impress character and to affect life. For one thing we must surely have a new humility of soul as we think of what men have done for us. It was for us they held at such cost the frontier of civilisation, for us they were wounded and bruised, for us they suffered and died; "the chastisement of our peace was upon them, and with their stripes we are healed." It is our flaming faith that one day they and we shall see of the travail of their soul and be satisfied; but only if we are one in spirit with them in the sacrifice. What of us, if we do not even see the burden and the glory of our generation?

It should also have sharpened our insight into the daily sacrifice, by which our human world is sustained. Sacrifice is shot through life like a crimson thread through the web. The lesson of it all is that a life will be judged not by what it gets but by what it gives, not by income but by output, not by possessions but by service. It comes both as warning and as inspiration to the sheltered classes, the classes of privilege, that in honour they are bound to offer service if only in part payment of their privilege. Could we trace the history of our smallest commodity, necessities and luxuries alike, we would read a story of danger encountered and enemies overcome more thrilling than the subject of any bard's ballad. If we stopped to think what the least of our possessions represents of human toil and suffering, we would be filled with the wonder of life. We live by the blood of the men who go in the jeopardy of life. Our appreciation of the ghastly sacrifices by land and

sea joyfully made to protect our freedom should quicken our imagination to appreciate the heroism of common life. We are bound up in a brotherhood of sacrifice and service. We will be unworthy of all that our heroic dead have saved for us, if we lose the conception of life as held for public ends. All our social selfishness and cruelties are due to a lack of imaginative insight, for which to-day there is no excuse.

Snug in my easy chair,
I stirred the fire to flame.
Fantastically fair,
The flickering fancies came
Born of heart's desire.

I shut my eyes to heat and light;
And saw in sudden night,
Crouched in the dripping dark,
With steaming shoulders stark
The man who hews the coal to feed my fire.

VI *A Democracy Safe for the World*

THE great issue of our time considered politically is democracy as against autocracy, but the issue even politically goes deeper than a mere method of government. It depends upon our conception of national purpose. If we primarily think of a nation as organised for power, which logically means organised for war, we are beaten before we begin. There seems to be almost incurable defects in democracy. In foreign policy the democratic changes of government are a weakness compared to the tenacity of purpose, combined with continuity of policy, in autocratic government. In the latter, chancellors may come and chancellors may go, and the plans laid down fifty years ahead can proceed. The democratic demand

for publicity seems weak compared to the secrecy which the opposing form encourages. Autocracy, which gives power for discipline and for control all along the line, is obviously capable of creating and maintaining a great military machine. A democracy will not prepare for war in the same way. Certainly it does not. It is interested in so many other things. I asked a professor in the University of Louvain, which to their eternal shame was destroyed by the Germans, if he did not know that the German strategic railroads converged on Belgium. As I knew it I assumed that all intelligent Belgians knew it. He confessed that they had known it. I then asked him if they thought that these railroads were for fun. He replied that they were not so foolish as to assume that. Why then were they not better prepared? He began to explain that the peace propaganda had made such headway in Belgium that you couldn't get a Belgian peasant to vote an extra dollar

for an extra soldier. The people also naturally spoke of the treaty which had been respected by both France and Germany in 1870. After floundering on a bit with explanations, he turned to me and said that Lord Roberts had been preaching that in England for fifteen years and with what effect? I threw up my hands! It is also true of America that if a man had spoken with the tongues of men and of angels for adequate military preparation, it would have had no more results than in England.

We have to settle this primary question of national purpose before we can even discuss our subject. Back of it there is the conception of life and human nature, which we must choose as our fundamental faith. What is man and what for? So that here politically stated we are near the source of religion. For example, is material comfort our end? If so, perhaps Potsdam can even in this beat any democratic city. Before the war many

American tourists used to feel like that in Germany, where everything was regulated and ordered, with a list of the things allowed and all the things forbidden. But it does make for a certain kind of comfort. A benevolent despot could govern a British city better than it governs itself. But when he is done, only another benevolent despot can carry on the work. We need to make up our minds as to what is the purpose of our democratic method. We educate for freedom, and that can only be done by freedom. Meanwhile we take all the risks of freedom, believing that it is worth while. We believe that the irritating changes in a democracy are not merely like the swinging back of a pendulum, but that the progress is spiral, each in turn coming back to a higher level.

What is the democracy for which we ask a safe world? Democracy is an ideal. It cannot of course be perfectly reached. It is a bigger thing than its particular manifesta-

tions. Democracy like Christianity is a programme as well as a creed. The creed exists for the programme. It means a state of society founded on the intrinsic value of the human soul.

The charter of modern democracy came from France with its slogan — Liberty — Equality—Fraternity. We have to confess that these words have lost their old force. They were stated so broadly that men instinctively felt that there was fallacy somewhere. The meshes of the net were so wide that they caught nothing. We may have to interpret these old words anew, but if democracy cannot use them to-day, it has nothing for the world. From one point of view the great struggle has been to fight over again for these things.

First of all for *Liberty*. We are perhaps not so sure of the rights of man as some of our forefathers were. Certainly we do not consider the doctrine of the rights of man as

dogmatically as they did. We are being compelled to ask again the fundamental questions, Have we the right as men to be free, and what does freedom mean? How much freedom have we the right to claim? Are there no limits? Obviously there must be, or we would have anarchy. We claim freedom of speech, and yet the democratic countries at war had to submit to the loss of much freedom of speech. Even in normal times we do not allow complete freedom here. Or we may speak of the freedom of religion. It is true that we will allow a group of people to have what religion they will. A group might institute devil worship. The United States allows Mormonism. But that means that we allow a religion, so long as it does not practice what it preaches. In other words there are limits which are fixed for freedom by its effects on society. It becomes a practical question limited by social necessity —the necessity of living together. Yet we believe that liberty is a right of man, and we

are not surprised that men will die for freedom.

> We who speak the tongue that Shakespeare spoke,
> The faith and morals hold that Milton held,
> We must be free or die.

The real ground for the amazing claim of liberty lies in an estimate of the worth of man. This will become more plain as we discuss the second claim of democracy, namely, *Equality*. It seemed more natural at the time of the foundation of the American Republic and at the time of the French Revolution to say dogmatically that all men are born equal. Here again such an unlimited claim seems an obvious fallacy. There is no such thing as equality. Men are not equal in gifts, capacity, knowledge, character, and in no conceivable way can they be made equal. Keen intellects like Thomas Carlyle and Edmund Burke poured the acid of criticism on the claim of equality, and there seemed no reply. In what sense can we make the claim? Some of us have

said piously that, at least, men are equal in the eyes of God, but that is nonsense. If to our imperfect knowledge men are not equal, still less could they be to God who can judge in regions where we can only guess.

The root of the democratic claim of equality is that all men have worth as men. We recognise in men moral and spiritual worth, if it is only the possibility of it. Other things are mere accidents, such as wealth, and knowledge, and culture. This ultimately is the source of democracy, and it is a religious source. From this estimate of worth we learn that the first demand of man is for respect. If we acknowledge moral worth we must concede respect. As a matter of fact we may admire one man for ability, and envy another for wealth. The man we respect most may have nothing of the world's most prized gifts, but he has character which commands our deepest regard. From this spring the real rights of man. Here we must build up our doctrine

of democracy. From this comes the right to justice, which means equality of all civil rights. Without this, men cannot be sure of justice. To get these civil rights, and to maintain them, there must be equality of political rights.

This, at first, does not seem so inevitable, for there might be a case where the sudden giving of universal political equality might imperil the safety of the State. This probably has been one of the reasons for the situation in Russia, and most wise men think that after the Civil War in America, it was a mistake to give the negro full political rights without regard to education. But this is merely a practical question of statecraft and does not invalidate the principle. If we respect man for moral worth, we must desire that the sphere of that worth be extended to every other possible region of man's life. We cannot have true democracy, without enlisting all the citizens in the larger interests of life.

Many will go so far. Some because they must, but they draw the line at these instal-

ments of equality. Some of us go further, and assert that other inequalities need amending, and that our primary assertion of moral worth demands more equality of opportunity. If we think of men as of moral worth, we will be anxious to give that worth the chance of fullest development. Cruel conditions of work, grinding states of poverty, are self-condemned. It is not for the loaves and fishes. It is because life is more than livelihood that conditions of livelihood are important. The great insistent question asked of us to-day is: Does our industry make it easy for our citizens to be their best?

This does not mean levelling down, and it does not mean dull, dead equality. Rather the opposite. The democratic ideal is a world of persons, each contributing to the common whole according to his capacity, with full opportunity to be his best that he may have a best to give. I do not know how far this will take us, but if our emphasis is put on moral worth we need not fear *where* it takes us.

Democracy has dreamt also of a world-wide *Fraternity*. Once again, this seems a foolish dream. Here is our tragic world, where men have been shedding blood until the rivers run red, and the earth rots with carcasses. Even before the war the tendencies seemed all the other way. Business was becoming more and more impersonal. Great corporations were controlling every commodity, and they seemed to have neither a soul to save nor a body to kick. The forms of monopoly that were controlling industry seemed as opposed to fraternity as the cut-throat competition they were displacing. Even science seemed turned away from the dream of democracy. Its phrases, the struggle for existence, the survival of the fit, the elimination of the unfit, became part of our thinking, and a world nation has argued from them for the biological necessity for war.

In line with this, many economists have depicted a democratic society, with fraternity

left out. It would be a society of capable, independent citizens, full of vigour. It would be one that ensures justice, where the ideal is personal liberty and generous opportunity. It would be a society that would even defend itself against the weak that it might, if need be, be strong against the strong. Here we are near the root of the German doctrine, whose bitter fruit the world has been eating. It is so bitter that we suspect some fallacy, unless it is only weak sentiment to think of the world as man's kindly foster-mother. Instinct revolts.

Once more we find the democratic claim of fraternity in the acknowledgment of the moral worth of man. We cannot give respect to worth without glorying in its triumphs and grieving in its defects; without feeling intensely the sorrows of men; with pity for their distress and sympathy for all their lot. So we cannot go as far as equality without going further to fraternity. If the real value of man lies in the moral

life, if that is the common denominator to which we are all reduced, then we are in the place where the whole world of man is kin. That means moral sympathy, which is the essence of fraternity. It comes to this —that ultimate democracy is impossible without religion. The greatest prophet of modern democracy is not Rousseau but Mazzini, for he saw and proclaimed this inevitable connection. And religion takes us deeper to a firmer foundation of fraternity. When we think of men in relation to God, we are on the only bed-rock of brotherhood. Nothing else will do it. There is one God the heavenly Father, "and all ye are brethren."

Democracy cannot be magically acquired. The American democracy is an ordered historical development from the great English history of constitutional liberty. In the main, it has been orderly evolved. It is part of our heritage, from the Magna Charta, the English Bill of Rights, the American

Declaration of Independence. One great opportunity of our time, and a great task, is to cement these sister democracies of the English-speaking world. Our enemies see it if we do not. They have the insight of fear and hate. We should have the finer insight of love and hope. In 1916 before America declared war, an American writer asserted that the great issue of the war was: "Shall Germany or Britain prevail?" He went on to say: "Which will win? I do not know. Which is best? I will not say. But one thing I *do* know and *will* say. The British civilisation is ours. In it we live, and move, and have our being. Outside of it we have no future. We speak one language, we cherish one literature, we recognise one political principle of temperate central rule and local freedom, and these are the language, the literature, and the ideal of Britain." This is the great contribution our race has to make to the world—this thing which we call political democracy.

VII *Patriotism True and False*

THE Great War has made acute some old problems and has also compelled us to question over again some subjects hitherto unquestioned. Among these is the whole subject of patriotism. Men tell us that it was an over-exalted national feeling which was responsible for the great tragedy. Even before the war in every country there were groups of men who were working for the decay of patriotic feeling. A labour party organised itself and called itself, not the Independent Workers of America, but the Independent Workers of the World. During the war, some good people were seriously offended at Christian congregations singing a national anthem in church, and putting the flag in the sacred place. And now, some of

the objections to the League of Nations, on the part of a considerable number, is due to the fear they have lest the nation should lose something that they feel is essential to it.

There is certainly an opportunity for reconsidering the question sanely and wisely. One has seen in these recent years some leaders of opinion losing their influence with the thoughtful, because they were merely outrageous flag-flappers. Others have lost influence with the mass, because of the reputation they acquired for disloyalty or at least lukewarmness about national interests.

There are obviously false forms of patriotism which give ground for the widespread criticism. There is the narrow, selfish view which easily joins hands with corruption. Dr. Johnson, who was a sturdy and even stubborn patriot, defined patriotism as the last refuge of a scoundrel. We can understand the kind of men to whom he was referring, the men who play on the passion and who profit by it. Then there is the false

patriotism which means conceit and exclusiveness, feeding a windy pride. It does not grasp the fact of a family of nations, each with its contribution to make, with mutual giving and receiving. All nations are of course open to this temptation, especially after success. It lends itself to militarism and it grows into the myth of the superior race, and that can be exalted even to the super-race. A nation can have a swelled head as well as an individual. This was one of the beginnings of the German crime. For years there was persistent teaching about German excellence, and virtue, and science, and art, and even theology. All good was native born: our *kultur* is obviously best: we are worthy to dominate the world.

So great have been the evils of false patriotism, that many have called it a wicked ideal, and have thrown it over and have set up in its place what may be called in this connection cosmopolitanism. One who knows the world, and has lived in different

countries with an open mind and a hospitable heart, sees how vicious much patriotism is. He despises it and is inclined to worship at the cosmopolitan altar. This seems to be such a larger and nobler ideal. To be a citizen of the world, to see that no one race has all the virtues, and no one land all the beauty, and no one nation all the achievements, to have a heart to which nothing human is alien—is assuredly a larger vision than a parochial, sectional, national view-point.

In spite of the attraction of this seemingly larger conception, there are reasons why the beautiful sentiment is dangerous, and why we cannot let go all that has hitherto been meant by patriotism. The average man is right when in a time of national crisis he enthrones patriotism and puts the flag even in the house of God and sings national anthems in public worship. The fallacy underlying the cosmopolitan extreme can be seen from the following very simple reasons.

I. It carries with it the real danger of aloofness from the duties and responsibilities of the actual relations in which we are. The idealist is always in danger of despising the day of small things because of some great day coming which never comes. He is in danger of losing hold of reality, and of being unwilling to face facts. Unregulated idealism tempts men to neglect the plain duties and fall off into universal slush. There is a detachment which is the worst kind of selfishness because it seems justified by a larger ideal. A Hebrew proverb has it that the fool has his eyes in the ends of the earth. At first we would hardly be inclined to agree with this; for we are well acquainted with the type of fool who has his eyes on the village pump. The other proverb, however, has its obvious application. Perhaps if the Bolshevists thought more of Russia and less of the proletariat of the world it would be better for Russia and better for the world.

There is a fool, not uncommon, whose

mouth is always full of universal brotherhood but whose heart has never room for an actual brother close at hand. Charles Kingsley in one of his books has for a character an old Scotsman who speaks about the poor creatures who would rather hear an Italian dog howl than listen to an English nightingale sing. There is the man who washes his hands of all responsibility for his family circle because the family is admittedly a smaller group and a smaller ideal than the wider social and political duty. There is the man who despises the Church in the interest of the kingdom of heaven. He will talk windily of that great religious ideal, but will never lift his little finger to help the great instrument in the world which exists for the fulfilment of that ideal. There is the man who seems to love every woman except his own wife. The cosmopolitan type who loves every country but his own is a pretty useless member for any particular help in an emergency. He has nothing to

offer but criticism, and criticism is like a mustard plaster which has its uses and its limits. One finds also that this beautiful sentiment usually ends in moral neutrality. This ignominy was displayed by many cosmopolitans in the great moral crisis through which the world has been passing, and one thinks of Dante's scorn for "the angels who were not rebellious nor faithful to God, but were for themselves."

II. The second obvious objection is that cosmopolitanism ignores facts, above all, the fact of experience and history which we call patriotism. It is rooted in the human heart, as is proved in the literature of all the peoples of the world. I turn for the classic expression to Walter Scott:

> Breathes there a man, with soul so dead,
> Who never to himself hath said,
> This is my own, my native land!
> . . . . . .
> O Caledonia! stern and wild,
> Meet nurse for a poetic child!
> Land of brown heath and shaggy wood;
> Land of the mountain and the flood.

Every Scottish heart thrills to the lines. Scotsmen, I suppose, are great patriots—but there are others! The poetry of all people discloses the fact that this is a human passion.

What are we to do with it? Are we to try to crush it and uproot it? Surely if we are wise we must use it, train it, discipline it. And this in these two simple ways. First, we must turn it into noble channels by making the nation we love worthy of our love, by making ourselves and others worthy of our heritage, by seeking to impress on ourselves and others the obligation of privilege, and by serving the land to which we owe so much. Next, we can discipline it by acknowledging that it is a *human passion* and therefore is not confined to us and our country. All men have it. Nobody denies the intense patriotism of Germans. If anything they rather overdid it. I have seen them weep over their beer-mugs as they sang the songs of the Fatherland. But nobody else should love their land as fervently. It

seemed an outrage that Belgians should love Belgium, that Frenchmen should die for France, that Englishmen should give all for England, "that land of such dear souls, that dear, dear land," in the words of Shakespeare, whom Germans claimed alone to understand. It seemed an outrage that Canadians, and Australians, and New Zealanders should cross the seas and fight for the empire that was to them the land of hope and glory, mother of the free. If we consistently use this thought that it is a human passion it will carry us very far in our foreign policy and in helping to build a new organisation of society which the world so urgently needs. It will be good for us who believe in patriotism to make clear to our minds that just as Americans love America, Japanese love Japan!

III. The third and fatal objection to cosmopolitanism is that it mistakes the whole nature of the evolutionary process. This is a hard thing to say about men who above

all things plume themselves on their scientific attitude. The cosmopolitan is right in seeing that nationality is only a stage in the evolution of man. Man's interests widen in enlarging circles from the self, the family, the village, the clan, the nation; and the cosmopolitan is right in seeing that we cannot stop there but must move out to the larger circle still. He mistakes in assuming that we pass through and depart from the stage of nationality.

As a matter of fact we never do that in the other stages of man's progress. When a man extends his interest past that sweet gentleman self to take in even a small group like the family, we never expect him to quite forget self. He is still expected to count as a distinct member of the family. When a man extends his interest to the nation it does not mean neglect of the family. Rather if he is wise he recognises that only through the family can the nation be strong. So, if we can go so far as to think of a family

of nations it will not mean neglect of the single nation of which we are a part. Only in so far as our nation has a distinctive life can it make a distinctive contribution. The true ideal is not a vague and hazy cosmopolitanism, but a real family of nations in which the nations count.

Patriotism is thus not only a legitimate but an inevitable motive. We must give it ethical content and use it for the true human ends of our day. Man is a social animal and has never been anything else. It is through the nurture of society that man can become and can remain man. Society makes its mark on us through many means —the family in which we live, the industrial system by which we make a living, the school and church, all the affiliations of friendship and group relations. It works also through the larger unity of the State of which we are members. We inherit the whole history of our nation and partake of its destiny.

The nation is more than the sum of the individual lives of its members. It becomes a separate entity by itself. New elements come in, new relations are established, new duties and responsibilities emerge. This separate national life has a continuity unbroken by the death of all who at any one time compose it. The nation has its history which is a moral history also. It is a bundle of life from which there is no escape. We take our place in that history and are held responsible by the universe for all the past and all the present. A Briton anywhere in the world has to carry Great Britain on his shoulders. This is the tragedy of it. A decent German has to take the responsibility for the deeds for which Germany has been judged and condemned by the civilised world. Sometimes a later generation has to pay the penalty for the accumulated follies and sins of previous generations.

Even in this matter of retribution there is a higher attitude which the true patriot

will take. He will love the best in his country and seek the best for her. There was no more intense patriotism ever known than in the Hebrew prophets, for Palestine stood to them for religion as well as for country, for God as well as for home, and they strove to conserve their national existence with a fierce patriotism. Because they loved the best in Israel they desired to have the nation brought back to nobler life at any cost. They were willing even to see her go out into the bitterness of the exile that she might be worthy to be loved.

The religious ideal is necessary to save every relation of life, to keep the family pure, to preserve politics from corruption, to save us from living merely in the life of sense and setting us to larger and enduring ends. So here it is necessary to preserve patriotism and also to lead out to what is larger still. It points to a brotherhood of nations. To reach out to that larger ideal which is the world's great opportunity to-

day will not mean the loss of anything worth while in what we call patriotism. A brotherhood only increases the worth of the individual members of it. And in this larger family of nations each will only gain something more from the wider life to which all are called. We will not love our nation less but all the more, because she will take her share in the burden and the glory of the future.

We remember that the country does not mean its geography. America does not mean to us its rivers and mountains and plains and prairies. It was the same geography when the only living inhabitants were Red Indians. That was not America. It means rather its history than its geography, its institutions, its record of great men and great deeds, its ideals. The more we know and appreciate that for which our country stands, and the more we truly love her, the more will we try to keep her true to her past and prepare her for an even nobler future.

VIII *The Doctrine of the State*

THE conscience of the civilised world has been so outraged during the last bitter years that men feel there must either be a taint in the German blood or a taint in the German thinking. I take the charitable and the hopeful side of these alternatives. If we trace the taint in the German thinking far enough down we reach its root in the doctrine of the State. If one asked the question any time during the last fifty years, What is the matter with Europe? the answer was always Germany. It was Europe's curse and disease. Of course that does not mean that Germany had a monopoly of the curse. It was a spiritual disease, for it poisoned the soul of the world. Germany was so organised that no other country could get out of the cursed

circle, and she herself could not escape from it without revolution. It meant the Great Power idea that a State is an end in itself and that each State is necessarily in conflict with every other State, so that by intrigue in peace, by force in war, it is its right and its duty to grasp points of vantage for further strife.

Before discussing what this doctrine is there are two preliminary remarks which may be made. First, all true ethics, using the word in its common sense of moral action, must be founded on doctrine. If not, ethics becomes expediency, a mere rule of thumb morality, practical details not regulated by a standard and inspired by an ideal. Or, if it escapes that fate it becomes the victim of slushy emotion. I am reminded of the verdict on a certain type of Scottish minister by an acute parishioner: "In doctrine he's no verra outstanding, but he's a deevil on the moralities." In the second place, all doctrine must be judged by its ethics. If not, doctrine

becomes hard and cruel, unrelated to life, and faith becomes mere adherence to creed. This second proposition is merely a variant of the old saying that by their fruits ye shall know them.

This latter is very important. The average man can sometimes be confused with logic and clever dialectic, but he knows that the thing is not so. He really judges the position practically, and he feels that there must be a fallacy even if he cannot put his finger on it. That is, he judges it ethically. It was interesting to notice during the first years of the war in Europe how the average American took the tremendous German propaganda that flooded the country. Even when he could not answer, he kept reverting to concrete facts such as the rape of Belgium. By this principle it follows that even if we could not set over against the German doctrine of the State a completely satisfactory definition of the democratic State, we would have the right to judge and condemn the

German doctrine as of hell, for it works out in such hellish manifestations. For example, in October 1917 two sea fights occurred in the North Sea. In one of them German raiders sank some ships of a neutral convoy, and when the Norwegian sailors of the merchant vessels took to the life-boats the German cruisers deliberately fired on them. In the other a German raider and a convoy of armed trawlers was destroyed by British war vessels. No sooner was victory won than the British sailors gave themselves to the rescue of the surviving Germans. The average man looks on this picture and on that, and he says that if these things issue out of opposing doctrines he knows which to condemn as false. At the same time we must try to get a doctrine on which we can intellectually rest, or we are at immense disadvantage.

I. The German doctrine of the State is a simple and logical one. When rigorously applied it is tremendously powerful. In a

word it is that the individual exists for the State. His first loyalty therefore is to the State. In certain things—and the State decides on these things—a good German gives over his conscience to the State as a good Jesuit gave his to the Church. At all costs the State must exist, therefore nothing else can compare in importance with the survival of the State. The State therefore must be power, above all power. It naturally organises itself for war, and in war the State is the seat of ultimate power and can command anything.

This explains some things which have shocked the rest of the world, as for example the whole spy system which seems to have covered every land in a network of intrigue. It explains how a man, presumably a gentleman, as ambassador could abuse the hospitality of the country to which he was sent. Take a simple illustration which could be duplicated a thousand times. Shortly after the war broke out two officers came to a

certain house in England on a spy trail. The master of the house said to them that he supposed they came to investigate their German governess. If so, he asserted it was a mare's nest, because Fräulein had been with them for eight years, and loved every member of the family as every member of the family loved her. After the investigation it was discovered that she had been acting as a go-between for certain spies of the district and the home government. Now it was absolutely true that she loved every member of the family and every member loved her, but she had been taught that her *first loyalty* was not to the people among whom she lived and from whom she got her living, nor to the people whom she loved and who loved her. Her first loyalty was to the entity called the German State. We can all remember how incredible at first many things appeared to us, and we said, "Why, I know Germans, and the things told of them are unbelievable." This would be so

in ordinary relations, and in circumstances where the doctrine is not applied. We make a mistake if we do not see that it can be just as sincere as Jesuitism was, and naturally goes on to the principle that the end justifies the means. That is to say, the State is above ethics. There is nothing higher than the State. So when war begins ethics end. I have heard Germans in America whom I respected and even counted good Christians actually say this—that when war begins ethics end. They were of course only repeating what was said from practically every pulpit in Germany and every professor's chair.

Now this doctrine, briefly sketched as it has been, does seem in some respects a noble ideal and it is immensely effective. It has also so much truth in it, for all of us admit that the nation is of more importance in a sense than any member of it. It is bigger than many other doctrines, bigger than some of our slushy democratic theories

of rank individualism. It does lead to discipline, and to possible unselfish service. It offers a high purpose which gives a great motive and ambition to an ordinary common life. It is above all personal or parochial or sectional ends. To believe in the State, and of course that means the German State, to feel yourself bound up in its success, to be willing to sacrifice yourself to its interests, to look upon yourself as an agent of empire—all that means a certain uplift. That is how Germany has been served all over the world by an army of agents gathering information, seeking to weaken the hands of all other governments, ready for anything to add strength to the German Government and give glory to the common cause. There is something of missionary zeal in it, and this explains the emotional exaltation even in dry books of German history, and Heaven knows they can be dry enough. In practical life it becomes a kind of religion. So natural in this con-

nection that we have the Good Old German God, for even in religion it has to be specifically German.

We can at least see the value of this from the point of view of the rulers of the State. The doctrine has been enforced and elaborated because it lends itself to militarism. Both in preparation for war and in waging war it makes for efficiency of a certain ruthless sort. The first thing of importance is that at any cost to the individual the State should exist and persist. The average German in his emotional exaltation did not see that it is an abstraction. For if he stopped to ask who, not what, is the State, he might see that it was designed for the ruling class, the Kaiser, the Junkers, the military caste. It seemed quite natural for the Crown Prince to say: "I—I am willing to lose a hundred thousand men to take Verdun."

The logical issue of this German doctrine of the State is of course world dominion; for if the State is the ultimate end and is above

ethics, the question arises, Which State? There must be one that is It. That means permeation, and control, and sooner or later war and conquest. Being a religion the first commandment applies, "Thou shalt have no other gods before me."

There is nothing really new about this whole situation. The only new thing is the stupid, bone-headed logic that seems native to Germany. The attempt at a world empire is not new. Personal ambition and national pride have made conquering armies to dream of universal dominion. But we do not do full justice to the German case, if we do not see a deeper root than that in the attempt. Thinkers for centuries who have been distressed at the miseries of constant wars have made a case for general empire as necessary for human welfare. They have seen the value of peace for man's best life, and have despaired of peace except by this unity of one strong government. The poet Dante wrote a book in which he argues for this secular world

empire. He uses some arguments that to us will appear mediæval, such as that only thus can the unity of human nature and destiny be expressed and the unity of God be imitated. He has, however, some practical arguments, that it will assure the world peace, and that thus there would be a final court of appeal for local disputes, and that there would be impartial justice. A world monarch from his position would be removed from envy and would possess the power and the desire to do justice. We can see how naturally the Romans of the empire had to make their Cæsar a god to do that job!

Of course Dante argues that this universal empire must be in the hands of the Roman people. Naturally enough to him they are the imperial nation. This is the real rub. Any one arguing for a world monarchy assumes that his own race is designed by God to wield that sovereignty. This was the actual claim of Germany. They are the super-race and they will *give* the world peace. They will

impose their 'kultur' on all lesser breeds. They will build a better Belgium. They will restore and of course improve everything that the necessity of war has compelled them to destroy. The pathetic thing is that they really thought they could. The ancient Goth looked with worship on the old Latin civilisation even when he was destroying it. His modern descendent does not even know that he cannot replace what he gaily set out to overturn.

Whatever we may be able to do in a rival doctrine we know that this German doctrine is false. We must destroy it at its root and deny the monstrous theory that the essence of the State is supreme power. It is on that we attack the doctrine, for though only Germany of modern States has openly professed it and carried it to its logical conclusion, it is tacitly assented to almost everywhere and nobody has really questioned or denounced it.

II. When we turn to the crude democratic

doctrine we have to confess that it has shown itself weak. That doctrine when stated in its naked form is simply the opposite of the Prussian theory. It is that the State exists for the individual. That often is interpreted to mean just as little interference as possible. The old dictum which could be heard both in England and in America was that the government which governs least is the best. It boiled down to police protection. All we have asked of the State was a free field and no favour. We had no great duty to the State. The result often was that State service was looked on as polite and innocent graft.

Now the democratic doctrine that the State exists for the individual and not vice versa is, we believe, fundamentally true and the only safe doctrine. It is the only doctrine that can safeguard the rights of man and the rights of other men. It is the only doctrine that can keep the moral life untainted. We must learn to state our

doctrine with courage and with complete faith if we believe in democracy.

At the same time obviously the old *laissez-faire* interpretation is wrong, and it is because we have not been true democrats that we have left room for the growth of the monstrous German doctrine. As a fact we English-speaking people have been jealous of the State, and have narrowed down its functions to police. That explains the American and the British distrust of a standing army. Only dire necessity would have compelled us to a step like conscription. As usual, facts have been too much for us.

But even before the war we were forced to criticise our bare, bald theory. We were seeing that our principle was leading to an individualism that of course meant mob rule. In industry the principle of every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost meant that the devil was taking us all. Plutocracy was getting to be as great a danger to liberty even as despotism. And

so the State was interfering. We were beginning to see that the State need not be looked on as an enemy. Indeed our thinking as usual had lagged behind our social development. We had been acquiring a democratic State, but our thinking kept in terms of the outworn centuries, like a child afraid of being in the dark who keeps the unreasoning fear when grown up. Meanwhile as a fact the State had ceased to be an alien force. We were waking up to see that We are the State. We were seeing that our Government is only the agent of the democracy. The State is only ourselves in one of our social activities. When we see that the moral life of man organises itself socially in the State, as it does in the family and the Church, we cease to be scared of the State as such. We can decide what the State exists for, and as a democracy we are dead sure that it does not exist for war. We are just as dead sure that it exists for us. That is, the State is

not an end in itself but a means. Here the democratic doctrine joins hands again with the religious. Fundamentally we are right in saying that the State exists for the person. That is the only way of safeguarding ethics, both for the single man and for the State.

Designedly I have shifted from the word 'individual' to the word 'person.' What we really needed for our doctrine was an interpretation of the individual. We thought of man as single atoms making up a mass. We have surely ceased to think of men as naked individuals. Man as a person is a social and a political being, as well as an individual. In all our thinking we must never forget that the ethical unit is the person, the whole man. It is for the person the State must exist. It is because of this that the State has a right to interfere with our personal liberty sometimes in the interest of that true liberty itself—for others and for ourselves. Because of this the State

has the right and the duty to interfere in industry to safeguard the person both of the employer and of the employee. There was a time when a manufacturer could say that he would attend to his own business and run it in his own way and allow no interference. Gradually the State has introduced its restrictions, its regulations, its laws about labour—regulating the hours of child labour, insisting on adequate protection in the working of machinery, and so on. Now this is a practical question, but if we work out our democratic ideal as a world of persons, each coming as far as possible to his best, and each contributing to the welfare of the whole, we need not fear the result. Democracy will not work by magic. There is no magic in the world. Democracy above all else will not work without intelligence.

The ultimate problem of politics as of religion in every form is the reconciliation of religion with authority. A State is impos-

sible without authority, which here means the subordination of the citizen to the Government. But with us democrats there is no degradation in this. It is willing submission to a constitution which is ours, not imposed on us except by ourselves. If liberty meant that each man could do as he pleases, it would be anarchy. If the official is above the law, it is tyranny. When the ultimate sovereign is the State, our officials become executives, and it is a business proposition, just as truly business as when we say that a railroad or a university needs executives.

From this springs our old democratic phrases about 'responsible government' and 'the consent of the governed,' simpler language than the present talk about 'self-determination' and meaning the same thing. It is only when we make this ethical interpretation of the person that we see the full force of the great American experiment with its avowed purpose of making a State

whose end is life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, for all the members of the State.

In the region of ethics as well as of practice the clean-cut line of cleavage has been drawn in the world to-day. We ought to take our side confidently and rationally. We, the members of a democratic State, are not dumb driven cattle, to be exploited for an entity called the State, not even our own State, still less any foreign State. Above all we do not hand over our conscience to the State. Once more democracy joins hands with religion when we say in the name of both that there may be a situation where at any cost we must obey God rather than man. In this we are only asserting our democratic principle that the State exists for the person. We refuse to render to Cæsar the things which are God's. If the State does not aid the true moral life of the person and sets itself as above ethics, if it makes itself an end in itself to which we as persons are subordinated, if it deifies itself

by brute force, then the soul of man must revolt. In the name of the true God, we must smash it as we have risen above this Prussian tyranny and have smashed it. Once again we have simply been doing battle for the rights of man. We have given our best beloved to cleanse the earth, that once more self-respecting men and self-respecting nations might live on it.

IX *Peace and Pacifism*

DURING the war there were many tender consciences made uneasy about the highest duty. They hated war with all its brood of evil, and yet there seemed no way of escape. They were only irritated by the calm assumption of moral superiority of the pacifist position, which treated the ordinary Christian as occupying a lower plane of ethics. They wished that they could honestly be pacifists as an easy way out of their problem; only they felt that if they were they would have to be much humbler than the ordinary type. They smiled when they heard, in our day of blood and tears, of the sufferings of the conscientious objector. They would have been too humble to speak, if their conscience obliged them to evade the anguish

and refuse the obligations of the war. Yet they had an uneasy feeling that the pacifist emphasis was right. They too were oppressed by the insanity of war, and felt it to be a wrong to man and an insult to God. Our civilisation seemed to have failed, and we were faced with endless problems.

The problems raised by the war are serious enough, but we need not exaggerate them. They are not new. The tragedy has only accentuated what has always been. The fundamental questions are what they were before, and even the practical questions that deal with the State are old ones. We had them all before the war, and will have them in one form or other after it. It is only the size of the catastrophe, its appalling scope, that makes us think that they are new. In line with this, we have the despairing cry that Christianity has failed. Well, we have to acknowledge that failure, as we acknowledge that other things have failed also, our education, our statecraft, our

whole civilisation. If Christianity has failed because peace has been broken, then it is no new failure. Peace seems to have always been fragile, as fragile as a German treaty. We are specially distressed because we could say that our generation saw a serious attempt to find a solid foundation for peace. We ought not to forget, however, that much was achieved, and that we have not lost everything. The mere fact that a breach of peace caused such distress is itself a proof of immense progress. Not so long ago few would have questioned the right of a nation to provoke war if it thought fit. The great international peace movement had its source and inspiration in Christianity. More and more through the centuries men had felt the contrast between our faith and our national practice. We may remember for our encouragement that the peace movement has had its triumphs. All forms of private war have been eliminated, the wager of battle, the ordeal, and the duel. There have been

triumphs among nations also. The Balance of Power in Europe was a practical attempt to preserve the peace. Many disputes have been settled by arbitration. At the time of this outbreak there were committees preparing to celebrate the hundred years' peace between Great Britain and the United States. The Hague Conferences seemed the beginning of a new era for the world.

Yet the peace movement would have been more effective if it had given more attention to practical ways of enforcing law. Most of its strength was given to enlarging sentiment and educating opinion about the waste and horror of modern war. The arguments would have no weight with a predatory nation that might go out for loot. The pacifists especially were living in a fool's paradise before the war. They used to assert loudly that there never would be another war, because it did not pay, heedless of the plain teaching of history. The argument probably

ought to be a sound one, but it shows a remarkable ignorance of human nature. Economic reasons never prevented nations from going to war, but have sometimes induced them to go to war. The economic arguments are not so effective as the deriders of human nature make out. To preach peace as though its chief value were financial interest is to reduce human life to a low level of rank materialism. Our peace propaganda was not very efficient, consisting mostly of encouraging friendly relations and talking of the evils of war, but with little grip on facts and with no constructive plan. International peace can only be secured by the growth and strengthening of law. In order to make law more than a mere name there must be provision for enforcing it.

Civil peace is kept through law, and back of law is force. Disputes in ordinary life are settled by law; and international peace can only come by international law. That is why the German contention, which was the

negation of international law, had to be crushed before there could be even a hope of orderly development. International law naturally divides itself into the relation of States in peace, and in war. In effect this means to make wars less common, and in war to make it less brutal. The whole tendency, when nations fought, has been to make them keep what rules there were, to protect neutrals and civilians from unnecessary suffering. On the whole, law was making progress, in limiting the use of force, and when the sword was drawn in restricting the area of suffering. The opponent of both lines of international peace effort since 1870 has been Germany. She systematically blocked progress in the Hague Peace Conferences. She refused to consider a limitation of armaments. Great Britain twice proposed to Germany a mutual reduction of naval armaments, and twice Germany answered by voting increases. She rejected the proposal to make arbitration compulsory even in a few selected cases.

Then, in her conduct of this war Germany has thrown overboard all the arduous achievements of men to humanise warfare. She has practically denied that law exists here at all. The principle of sparing non-combatants as far as possible in warfare had been the growingly accepted principle for centuries. To the modern German this is only weakness and sentimentality. In 1878 General von Hartmann wrote: "Whenever a national war breaks out, terrorism becomes a necessary military principle. It is a gratuitous illusion to suppose that modern war does not demand far more brutality, far more violence, and an action far more general than was formerly the case." The world still remembers Kaiser Wilhelm's speech to his soldiers as he sent them to China, in which he commanded them to take no prisoners and to give no quarter. The German War Book sneers at the "sentimentality and flabby emotion" of being humanitarian in war. It asserts that "certain severities are indispensable in war,

nay more, that the only true humanity very often lies in a ruthless application of them. War should be made against the entire moral and material resources of the enemy." [1]

This then is the first answer to the pacifist position by all who believe that the only hope for an enduring peace is by an ordered law. Pacifism is inverted Prussianism; for it too makes law impossible. It would take the props from under our civilisation, and deprives itself of even the chance of realising its own ideal. It would hand the world over into the iron hand of militarism. Militarism does not mean having an army, even a great army. In a civilised State it means that the military power is in the saddle, and controls the government. When the military is above the civil power, there is militarism and all its dangers. Even Bismarck saw the danger of this. In his *Reflections and Recollections* he declares that it is very risky to let young

[1] *Vide* "German War Practices," by U.S. Committee on Public Information.

military men, in their anxiety to put their troops into action, get control so as to menace the nation's peace. This is the sure democratic instinct both in the United States and in Great Britain, which puts civilians at the head of the army and navy. It turned out in the long run that Germany suffered even military ruin by letting the military control policy. This is a matter of which the democracy must ever be careful; for especially in war-time there is a specious argument for handing over policy to the military authorities. We are told that it makes for efficiency, but efficiency can be secured at too great a cost. Our traditional usage of having a civilian at the head of military affairs is too valuable a safeguard to risk a change.

So clear was the national conscience on the issue of the war that the existence of pacifists was a curious phenomenon. On examination it was found that there were various types, and something is to be learned

from the analysis of them. Of course there was first of all the pro-German who wanted Germany to win, and who used the creed as a weapon. A sincere pacifist who went to Washington with the many deputations which sought to influence the Government to maintain neutrality, returned converted, because he found that nearly all the men who were with him on the errand spoke English with a German accent! He asked himself if he and his like were being used in the great intrigue.

Then there were the very sensitive people, who shudder at pain and hate violence. We can all sympathise with them; for we all have some of it in our make-up as civilised beings. Their philosophy is frankly the pleasure and pain calculus. It judges life by the purely physical standard of comfort and well-being. Pain becomes the only real evil of life. It was almost grotesque that these men sometimes appealed to religion in support of their position. Where-

as it is the complete negation of Christianity, which puts the emphasis on the soul. To this type of pacifist the mere killing is the sin, the killing of the body.

Other pacifists were the fruit of our social injustice. They had got so little out of life, had been so crushed by the industrial machine, that they had little sense of social obligation, and no thought of duty to the State. Their dreary lot had poisoned them with resentment. What was the State to them except the policeman to enforce the order without which capital would not be safe? Many of them were merely soured by a hard lot, and they could not see that they had anything to fight for. They were blind to the real issue of the struggle. Some of them called themselves socialists, but as a matter of fact they were individualists of the first water, having no conception of society as a whole. We may despise the attitude of such 'conscientious objectors,' but we cannot altogether escape respon-

sibility for the system that produced them. Compared with the happy warriors we have known in all classes, these pacifists were a pitiful lot. All the same the driving force of the whole anarchist movement has to be sought for there. Men have said, and are saying, that if the old system produces such misery and has its fruition in a tragedy like this war, then the only thing is to smash the system. The one thing is to destroy. Never mind what is to be built on the ruins, or even if anything can be built on them, the only thing is to be sure of laying it in ruins. The wonder is that we have so few such anarchists in our industrial countries; and once again we have a chance after this storm to make the breed impossible.

There were other scattered little groups of individualists from which many of our pacifists were drawn. Some belonged to the specially sheltered classes, whose whole idea of life was to stay under the lee. The larger social life was merely used by them to safe-

guard their interests. They were timid folk scared of the north wind and with no sense of adventure in their blood. Some of them belonged to the so-called cultured classes, dilettante artists and dabblers in literature. They are hangers-on of the capitalist system, with enough inherited investments to shelter them in normal times. The German crime against civilisation did not impress their mind as an evil to be met and destroyed; it only bruised their nerves. Any war, even a war in defence of all that men hold sacred, would be to them only brutal and vulgar. No sacrifice or noble service can be expected of them; for no real passion is possible to them.

There remain a small group of real idealists, who were the salt of the pacifist class and are in some respects the salt of the earth. Mistaken we think them in this particular judgment, but sincere they undoubtedly were. We ought to have sympathy with their ideal, and indeed ought

to believe in it. We needed these men badly during the war, and we need them much more now, but they would be of more use if they had not been so wrong-headed in the crisis. We sometimes speak as if having an ideal was enough to justify it, but we must "*try* the spirits whether they be of God" as the apostle counsels. There can be mistaken ideals, and even wicked ones. Germany got her strength from her ideal. She prepared for war, and began war, and waged it by virtue of her ideal. To us it is an evil ideal, which every true man and every self-respecting nation had to contend against to the death.

Apart from that, even with a true ideal, we have to discriminate. We have two goals, one on the way to the other, what may be called the ideal and the practical ideal. This is what was meant by what we have called interim ethics in a previous chapter. The ideal solution of our human

problems remains the same, but the particular solution each age needs is different. Our abstract ideal can be stated as a general principle which all will accept. The difficulty lies in the application. In the clash of two opposing ideals, which the war was, the struggle as men saw it was not between the highest and the lowest, but between a practical higher and an actual lower. That higher becomes for all true-hearted men the interim ideal. The man, who insists only on the ideal and refuses his aid to anything less than the ideal, may be an idealist, but of the impractical and rather useless variety. He would serve his ideal end, if he would come down from his high horse and take hold of something practical.

For example, the ultimate ideal is that all men should love each other. If they did, all our troubles would depart, wrongs disappear, war cease. But it is *easier* to stop war than to get men to love each other. Every one will admit that to put an end to

war as a practical achievement would be worth while, and that it is not inconsistent with the final ideal of universal love. Indeed that is the test of our interim ethics, that it is in line with our final ethics. These present practical ideals, which are admittedly on a lower plane, need to be tested. This is the test, that we must judge the present ideal by the ultimate. For this reason our practical ideal changes, while the ultimate stays like a fixed star. Our ideal during the war might be, and indeed was, to show resistance to the German crime, resistance unto blood. That could be no permanent ideal, and yet at the time there was no higher. Our ideal later may be to welcome to the family of nations a repentant Germany. At every stage, that is to say, we have to make sure that the practical ideal is in line with the final ideal. This distinction never seemed to be able to get into the head of the pacifist.

Where he was right was in insisting on the

absolute importance of the ideal. If we do not keep judging our present aim by that pole-star of the ideal, we give ground for the complaint that "the good is the enemy of the best." That means that we stay content with a low level, and if we are content with the second best, we can easily subside to the worst. But if we grasp the principle we have been establishing of interim ethics, we see the truth of the opposite saying that "half a loaf is better than no bread." This has always been the problem of reform, whether to hold out for the complete reform and run the risk of losing everything or to be willing to work for it stage by stage. Undoubtedly, human nature being what it is, the latter method is the only wise one, provided we make sure that each stage is truly a stage towards the true end.

As a matter of fact the pacifist position regarding the war had the effect of evaporating the ideal altogether. In effect there never was such a cynical judgment as

the attitude of the pacifists implied. The cynicism inferred that there was nothing to choose between the two sides of the conflict. There was no real issue, and no moral judgments to be made. It might have been a dog fight, when the only thing to do for the sake of the neighbours was to stop the fight. The callous cynicism of this passes belief, and turns the tragedy into a farce. It was an insult to the men who laid down their lives for the cause.

The pacifist escaped always from the world of realities by refusing to consider such concrete facts as the rape of Belgium and the exterminations of the Armenians. They evaded every particular issue by discussing war and peace in general. But practically no sane man among us believed in war. It does not need arguments about economic waste and human suffering and the slaughter of our youth to convince us of the stupidity and the crime of war. What is needed is a practical working scheme which the world can use to

prevent such calamity. The trouble is that we can get no help for such a scheme from the logical pacifist who denies the use of force. He is living in an unreal world and seems never willing to face facts. Abraham Lincoln once said in his own quaint way that a man's legs should be long enough for his feet to touch the ground, implying that the true idealist must always keep hold of reality.

Further, the pacifist ideal is vitiated by its insistence that peace in itself is the end for which we should aim. We must not assume that we have got everything worth while in personal or social life if we only have peace. We may have lost everything worth while. There can be a rotten peace. There is the peace of death, where all is quiet and nothing stirs. There is the peace of inertia, the black slime of the stagnant pool. There is the peace of defeat, that accepts the tyrant's yoke and for peace sake bends the neck to it, stills in cowardice

the hot heart silent under wrongs, the peace that will breed a spawn of slaves. This is the peace that Germany offered the world, and in contempt thought it all the peace which we deserved, a peace that the super-nation would *give* us. Human life needs, far above peace, courage, clean courage, willing to suffer and to die, that has lost fear of evil.

There is a peace which is cheaply got. We can always get peace, if we are willing to pay the price, and the price seems low. We can always get peace by giving way at the place of least resistance. A man, who makes peace his only ideal, becomes a straw borne by any current. A nation which makes peace its only ideal has the soul of a huckster and withers at the heart. A nation can get peace at a price. Belgium could have had it at the price of dishonour. She might have broken her treaty obligation, and would never have dearly earned the right to be called " the little country with

the great soul." Great Britain could have had it with the fattest of all fat bribes thrown in, at the price of breach of her plighted word. She could have had peace —meanwhile! America could have had it to the end, if she had been content to gain the world and lose her soul, content to swallow insult and eat dirt, to see her citizens foully murdered, her just rights insulted, and all the rights of man trampled on. Peace is so beautiful that it is worth while sacrificing everything for, except integrity. It has to be asserted in contradiction of the pacifist teaching that peace is never the Christian end for men or nations. The Christian end is righteousness, and the only true and lasting peace is a fruit of righteousness. We have no enduring peace in industry and in social life, as well as in international relations, because we do not build on justice. Until we do, we cannot have secure peace. The true pacifists of our tragic time are the men who try to base

peace on its only solid foundation, justice, and who try to prevent wanton breach of it by reason and right.

It comes to this, then, that in order to attain peace, it may be our duty to fight—strange irony as it is. That was indeed the pathos of the situation for those who hated war and loved peace, that our enemy could compel us against our will to meet her with her own weapons, could compel peace-lovers to take up arms in order to be peace-makers. Many of our heroic dead knew that they were fighting not for themselves but for generations yet to be, that their children's children might be spared from similar agony. It may be that this is the great thing to be accomplished by this generation at the costly price of its blood and its tears. We must at least strive to realise the dream for which so many died. We have to work for a state of society, for a comity of nations, where this kind of wrong shall be for ever impossible.

The only logical pacifism is the non-resistance type, which denies the use of force everywhere. It is absurd to accept and acknowledge force within a nation, and refuse its validity among nations. To be consistent, pacifists cannot even accept the protection of force in social life. They cannot believe in the *enforcement* of law. To them law can only be a gentle preachment, sweet counsel, and good advice; and the only police would be preachers! So, to be logical the pacifist would need to escape from organised society. There is an idealism which is parasitic. It is easy to hold freakish views about doctors and profess as a sort of idealism faith in the non-existence of disease, in a society protected by sanitation, and pure water supply, and laws of public health and officials to enforce them. It is easy to hold freakish views about force in a society protected by the strong arm. Pacifism is parasitic idealism, so long as it accepts a social order like the present. I only once met a pacifist, who did not try to

wriggle out of the logic of his position, and who went to its limit. He assured me that, if a brute broke into his house, he would not stand between him and his wife, would not ask any one else to interfere, would refuse to call in a policeman. I did not tell him all that I thought of him. I merely told him as the most charitable view that I thought him a liar. He however at least understood where the logic of his position led him.

In the beautiful parable of the Good Samaritan we are at one in commending him for his loving care of the man who had fallen among thieves and was left bruised and bleeding by the wayside. It was true service to bind up his wounds, take him to an inn, and make provision for his needs. But supposing the Good Samaritan had come down that way a little earlier, before the thugs had robbed and half murdered their victim, what would have been his duty then? Should he have skulked around the corner and waited until he could safely perform his

Red Cross 'stunts,' which we all agree to be commendable in their time and place? Or should he have interposed like a brave man, and have done his best by force to prevent the outrage? So, in the foul wrong done to the weak, in the face of broken and defiled laws, as brutal might made its insolent claim to be all the right there is, what were we to do? Shut our ears, and seal our lips, and hold our hands in the smug faith of pacifism too dainty and tender to lift a finger? This was precisely the temptation of America, to be content to organise Red Cross charity and Belgian relief, to be profuse with ointment and bandages, and evade the costlier burden—a temptation which she gloriously surmounted.

The pacifists' constant reference to the duty of love even in time of war is right, but there is a time element in ethics which they neglect. When they spoke of love in our tragic situation, they seemed to be always and only meaning love to the aggressors, and never to their victims. We find the same strange phen-

omenon in civil life, when a peculiarly brutal murder is committed which ensures it notoriety. Sentimentalists will give endless thought to the murderer and sign petitions for his release, and never seem to have a thought for his hapless victims. It was the duty of love which made us think first, not of the aggressors but of their victims, and which made us hasten to their aid. To do other than oppose the assault on civilisation would be to consent to the death of the victims and be partner in the crime. We are fulfilling the full duty of love even in the use of physical force when we subordinate it to the moral ends of life. The justification of the use of force is complete when it is under the law of love.

The last and sufficient answer to the pacifist is the thrill of the soul of man to the heroic.

> Though love repine and reason chafe,
> There came a voice without reply—
> 'Tis man's perdition to be safe,
> When for the truth he ought to die.

X *The Binding of the Nations*

AMID the throes of the world's anguish there has struggled to birth an actual League of Nations. What it shall become depends largely on the men of this generation. It is still weak and imperfect, and it can easily be snuffed out of life. Or it may be the most tremendous happening of human history. The very hope of it comes as an appeal to all men of goodwill. Only something like this will save the war from utter tragedy. To think of it ending merely by a treaty of peace, and the nations reverting as nearly as possible to the old system, with a chance of the same or a worse catastrophe happening, would be an insult to our reason and a dishonour to our dead. Any one who travelled through the land of death in Belgium and

northern France with its appalling burden of agony must have realised that the world had come to a place of decision. I hate war and despise militarism in all its forms, but on that journey I felt that no price was too much to pay by way of insurance to make certain that no country I loved should ever have to suffer such torture and be left with such a legacy. If war must be, then I would say to Americans that they must live on cents and spend dollars for war, and to Britons that they must live on pennies and spend pounds for war. To a sensible man there is no other way of wisdom, if we are to leave our civilisation open to such possible catastrophe. Rather than risk the chance of seeing the country devastated like France and Belgium and its people suffer such cruel wrongs, there is no sacrifice too much that would prevent it. But surely that is a *reductio ad absurdum.* Surely there are in the world enough sanity and reason, to say nothing of higher qualities, to support

a practical scheme which may save our children from passing through such a hell.

So obvious is this, that few openly deride the League, though many are sceptical and more are lukewarm. The great danger lies in public apathy and public ignorance. The biggest task of our day is to share in educating opinion, so that it will heartily support the sincere effort to build some enduring international organisation to safeguard the world from war. A man of our time can be inspired by the thought that he is working for more than his nation, for the world itself, for more than the men of to-day, for all who are to be. Everywhere there is opportunity and need for creating and strengthening a generous public opinion which shall realise the age-old dream. It would be madness to let the reactionaries wreck such a hopeful plan. We do not forget that in all the countries there are these reactionaries, who for one reason or another would hand us back to the system which

produced the war. They have many and powerful allies in appealing to ancient resentments, racial prejudice, and national interests. The foe to be feared is the scepticism of the average man, the doubt as to whether a system enthroned by centuries can be overturned. Educated opinion is also needed for criticism of the League's policy and amendment of its machinery. The Paris Covenant is only a beginning, a foundation on which to build. The marvel is that a foundation could be laid at all, on which can be reared a structure the motto on which might be carved, "Above the nations is Humanity."

Some of the inertia to be overcome is due to a false sense of security in some, now that the danger is past. There is a smug assurance born of our victory, as if it had been after all a simple, easy thing and indeed an inevitable thing. It is foolish to say that civilisation has been saved, and that if need be it will be saved again. At

what cost the work had to be done! It is facile optimism to leave it at that, forgetting the plain lessons of history. History records many instances where barbaric militarism has destroyed higher forms of civilisation. The Macedonian phalanx crushed out the light of that temple of man's mind that "once looked down on Marathon, as Marathon looks on the sea," and the fairest republic of the ancient world passed away. Militarism burnt the library of Alexandria, as yesterday it burnt the library of Louvain University. Many seem to have already forgotten how desperately critical the situation was through the unpreparedness of the Allies. The democracies of the world were caught napping, as a democracy always must be for purposes of war. A democracy by its very nature is organised for peace and industry. Sometimes it looked as if the great military machine would crush us before we could get ready.

War is a relic of barbarism. If we believe that man must always be barbarian, then we can assent to the faith that there always must be war. But the facts are not with the deriders of man. Law has displaced violence in civil life in settling disputes among individuals. We have the right to believe that it will displace violence in settling controversies among nations. If this generation will not boldly attempt to create an alternative to war, it will belie the courage and the faith of countless brave men who died to make it possible. If we must believe that mankind cannot arrange difficulties on grounds of reason and justice, we may as well despair of the future and give up the arduous path of the steep ascent. We would be traitors to the long passion of the saints and seers. Even if it were only a forlorn hope, we could not escape the appeal to disprove the cynical estimates of human nature and the sceptical interpretation of human history. We are all the more

solemnly pledged to the great endeavour, the more we see by what a narrow shave European civilisation was saved when Germany after years of preparation struck her disabling blow and tried in France for what she called 'the battle without a morrow.' There would have been no morrow for man worth having, if the crime had succeeded.

It is no real condemnation of the plan of the League of Nations that the organisation is imperfect, that many points of it are open to just criticism. There will always be room for criticism so long as the League lasts. The question to be raised and pressed now is simply, Do we really *want* this new organisation of our human society or do we not? The real division among us lies here, not in criticism of details or procedure. The true division is not created by such criticisms, but by the fact that there are some men who do not want a League of Nations at all. There are such in all the countries. To us they are out of date and have not kept step

with the progress of the world. In supporting it we are not necessarily tying ourselves permanently with this specific plan. Let us criticise it, amend it, alter it, but let us distinguish between the specific details of the plan and the great ideal which we have the chance to put into action. Such opportunities do not come any time we want them, and such opportunities do not remain.

Whatever criticism can rightly be made on the constitution of the Paris Covenant, all men of goodwill must joyfully accept the purpose stated in the Preamble. There the constitution of the League of Nations is declared to be adopted " in order to promote international co-operation and to secure international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just, and honourable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments, and by the mainten-

ance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised people with one another." It would be to despair of an ordered civilisation, if we practically insist that the nations must revert to the stage of a frontier mining camp, where the only protection for life and property lay at the point of the pistol, and where criminals could only be dealt with by lynch-law. In no civilised society is a man permitted to be judge and jury and executioner in his own case, but the nations are still at the stage of lynch-law and the frontier mining camp.

The criticism that the League of Nations ought not to have been bound up with the Treaty of Peace is a foolish one, though we have to acknowledge that it was a natural criticism. We must have great sympathy with the point made by many, that while they approved of the plan they wanted the actual settlement of the war with Germany first. They wanted justice done in connection with the manifest

brutal wrongs perpetrated by the enemy on the world. They thought that this was the first duty of the Allies, and that it should not be mixed up with another purpose however ideal. But on the other hand the terms of the Treaty would have in justice to be different, if it did not presuppose a League of Nations. One of the aims of the war, in addition to restoration and reparation, was sufficient guarantees against such aggression. The British aim was stated at the very beginning by the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, that they would never sheath the sword which they had not lightly drawn "until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression." With this aim, among others, all the Allies associated themselves.

France has been left with countless acres made sterile, with towns and villages wiped out, with once flourishing industries destroyed. In bitter malice factories have been ruined, and cities burnt, and a trail of devastation of unspeakable horror has been

left. France had suffered so much in repelling for all the assault on civilisation, that she had the right to ask for *military* security for the future. Her military advisers asserted that such security required that she should occupy the territory to the Rhine. From the purely military point of view this is probably a just claim. She has too good cause to know the malice and hate of her enemy, and the world would be compelled to assent to her claim. But it would be attained at the expense of the future. It would create a new wrong similar to the wrong of 1871, when two French provinces were torn from France leaving a rankling sore. Yet the civilised world recognises the claims of France to security. The only way to prevent the righting of a wrong by creating a new wrong was to give France security by a different sort of assurance. This the establishment of a League of Nations gave, and will give, if it is made a reality. We cannot forget that until there is evidence of a change of heart in Germany, which is more important

than a change of government, France still stands at the frontier of civilisation. With miles of her land blasted and hundreds of her towns smashed into rubble-heaps, she finds herself in spite of victory worse off than before the war, unless she can count absolutely on allies. This in effect means Great Britain and the United States, and how can they give security better than by wholeheartedly supporting a League which will offer a complete guaranty of peace?

We are told that war must always be, that nothing can finally prevent men from fighting. Even if a League of Nations cannot assure the world of peace, rightly organised it can formulate a code of international law, which would express the conscience of the world. It needs to be reaffirmed that the German crimes in the conduct of war were a greater offence than her crime in making war. If war has to be, it is false to say that it cannot be within law. Even if the League of Nations could not by arms enforce its code of law, it would still be of value as a final

court of civilised opinion. It would certainly mean that never again would a nation offend in such heinous ways. The Germans committed many of their outrages, because they believed that there were no laws to be kept, at least by them. A short list of some of these outrages shows the pass to which we were brought worse than

> Abominations of old days
> That men believed were dead.

They were guilty of things like the taking and even the execution of hostages, driving women and children in front as screens for troops, destroying forests and girdling fruit trees, defiling and poisoning wells, devastating lands and destroying coal mines in retreat, exporting machinery and all other resources, sinking passenger boats and drowning crews and passengers, sinking hospital ships, scattering mines indiscriminately on the high seas, deporting into exile and enslaving populations, spreading anthrax and glanders as was officially proved in Roumania.

Only in a lawless world could that last evidence of insane fury be even thought of by a nation. Professor G. F. Nicolai, of the University of Berlin, wrote a book on *The Biology of War*, which he had to get published in Switzerland, and for which he suffered imprisonment. He had acted as military doctor in the German army. He says: "Men shoot in cold blood people, for example hostages, of whose innocence they must be convinced." He relates that a highly placed officer "asked me if it would not be possible to throw bombs filled with cholera germs or plague bacilli behind the enemy front. When I replied that this seemed neither a profitable nor a very humane proceeding, he replied with a contemptuous gesture: 'What have we to do with humanity in this war? Germany has a right to do whatever she pleases.' And millions unhappily think with this eminent personage. Staff Surgeon H. told me in Graudenz that he had often wondered whether he could not make his way into

Russia in order to inoculate the Russians with living bacteria. Such degenerates no longer see in the enemy their fellow-creatures. Or, rather, they see in them precisely their fellow-creatures; for they see in them beasts." Men like Dr. Nicolai would not have been like a voice crying in the wilderness, if there had been some code with the authority of a League behind it.

Law is not quite useless, even if it cannot be enforced. It helps to raise the standard, makes a line below which decent men would fain not fall. It educates and enlightens conscience. But when it is not enforced it carries the danger of debauching the conscience, and of course it is helpless in the presence of wilful crime. International law did have the effect of imposing standards of honour, and of justice, and of mercy. Its weakness was that there was no assurance of its having any power just at the place where it was most needed, namely, in the presence of wilful breach of it.

A real League of Nations would mean the acceptance of the self-imposed limitations of law by the contracting parties. It would also provide, and assure the world of, the use of force to curb a nation that ran amuck. Of course ordinary honour should be enough to secure a certain guarantee in specified cases. For example, when the neutrality of Belgium was declared in 1839 it meant for both France and Germany that it could not be broken except by the fatal breach of honour. But if one of the nations was prepared to accept infamy for the sake of its pay, there was no necessary penalty. As it happened there was penalty, and the fact that the crime outraged the conscience of the world and raised defenders for the broken covenant is a proof that mankind is ripe for an assured system of law. Or, when it was laid down by the Declaration of Paris in 1856 that captured ships had to be adjudged by a legal court, the nations fettered their freedom. Thereafter to sink ships secretly became a criminal action.

But the weakness of all previous legislation was that there was no assured and inevitable punishment for breach of it. Again, as it happened there was punishment in this case; for the German crimes on the sea earned the contempt and enmity of all sea-faring peoples. Still it was haphazard, and only because the indictment against Germany grew until the civilised world concluded that she was the enemy of man.

Most of the arguments against the League of Nations are refuted by a knowledge of what it really is. It has been objected that we are creating an organised tyranny that may hamper the free life of nations. But it is not a super-state that is proposed to govern the world, but an alliance of sovereign powers to preserve peace. It has also been objected that it will crush out patriotism. There are some forms of patriotism that would bear some crushing, but it is a strange objection in face of so many facts. The infinitely closer federation of the United States has not killed local patriotism, as all who know

America can testify. A Scotsman has not ceased to be a patriotic Scot, although his country has been for centuries incorporated in Great Britain. Indeed his general reputation is that he is patriotic to a fault. No one can say that Canadians and Australians and New Zealanders do not love their own land, although they belong to the British Empire. They have only added to their patriotism another loyalty. How the much laxer bonds of being partners in this noble league could weaken the rightful ties of attachment to native land is a mystery. One can conceive of a richer and grander patriotism being the result to the contracting parties. Patriotism will assuredly remain as a motive to men, and more than ever; for they will seek to make their nation's contribution greater and nobler. It may well be a strnger mootive, not reserved, as too often now, for the time when the nation is in danger and fighting for its life. There will remain rightful pride in its history and achievements. A better

patriotism may be the result, acting as a motive to make us not only worthy of the heroic past, but worthy also of the great new opportunity.

The fact is that the time is past when splendid isolation can be the ideal for any nation, as we pray that the time is surely passing when conquest can be a nation's ideal. We are seeing in every region of social life that the way of co-operation has to be substituted for the way of conflict. As the ideal for a democracy is a land of free persons, each having opportunity to come to his best, and each contributing of his best to the good of the whole; so the ideal for a democratic world is a world of free nations, each belonging to the family, each with a right to be itself that it may have a real self to contribute to the whole. As a matter of fact something of this ideal has already been realised, and much of the moral distress caused by the war has been due to the feeling that it was a shocking anachronism. We had been living in a time

of international intercourse. We saw this in industry, and commerce, and education, and in the external goals of civilisation. A manufacturing nation gets its raw material from others, and finds in them markets for its finished product. Lancashire gets cotton from America, and sells its goods from China to Peru. We were learning that if we will not buy we cannot sell. A simple English breakfast-table gets its tea from India, or its coffee from Brazil, its wheat from Canada its oranges from California or Spain. We were learning that nations must serve each other or perish. The ruin of Germany came from her insensate ambition to gobble everything in sight. She thought that she could only get her place in the sun by robbing her neighbours. They must fall, that she might rise. That is not the kind of world in which we are living. This life of intercourse could be illustrated in a hundred other ways. The English language, for another simple illustration, is so rich and noble, because it has not been too proud

to borrow from every language under the sun.

Of course the contracting parties in such a League have to give up something of what they used to deem their sovereign rights. For instance, they give up the right to plunge the world in war at a moment's notice. But as a matter of fact that is a right which they no longer possess. The conscience of mankind has declared on that. The odium which a nation incurs by wilfully declaring war more than counterbalances any seeming advantage. This has become increasingly the case, but even in 1870 Bismarck recognised it. When he wished to make war on France, he forged a telegram in order to push France into the position of being the apparent aggressor. One great advantage of a League will be at least that diplomacy will have to come out into the open and cease to be a matter of finesse, and trickery, and low cunning.

There is no use disguising the fact that

the nations do give up some of their prerogatives, and do fetter their freedom, but as we have seen that is precisely what all law means. Law is the free acceptance of self-imposed limitation of freedom. Without it, however, there is no real freedom, but only licence. After all, how little the nations are asked to give up in order to attain so great an end! Besides, the sacrifice, if sacrifice it be, is a mutual one. We must respect some of the fears expressed in America lest the League will affect their country's traditional policy towards Europe, and affect its position on the Western Hemisphere summed up in the Monroe Doctrine. These are really two sides of the same thing. About it this is to be said, that isolation is no longer possible. Recent history has proved that never again can America stand aloof from any such world conflagration. She is so tied up with other nations that a policy of separation is impossible. As to the Monroe Doctrine, we do not forget that the only European Power that took umbrage

at it and wanted it annulled was Germany. Some of that doctrine will simply have lapsed. The important part of it will be really enforced, and indeed in a sense the plan of the League of Nations means the acceptance and extension of the Monroe Doctrine to all the world.

A statement appeared in an American paper that Washington and Jefferson would never have assented to any entanglement with European nations. Such a statement shows ignorance of American history. The writer had never read the remarkable letter written by Jefferson to President Monroe, in which Jefferson declared even then that the time had come in his judgment when the United States and Great Britain should enter into an alliance. It was because Monroe could not carry that out at the time that he took, at the suggestion of the British Government, the proposal which has since then been called the Monroe Doctrine. All who know and love America best will not believe that the idealist among nations will

play the world false. They refuse to believe that the great nation, which naturally should think big through the very bigness of her resources and her obvious destiny and her opportunities, will remain petty when the big occasion arises. It would be irony if the stumbling-block to the world's progress should be America that boasted herself the land of the future. We will not believe that democracy at the final pinch will fail and rob the world of its vision.

The League of Nations will fail, if it is looked on merely as insurance against war, if its work is supposed to be negative. It has positive work to do. It has to codify law for the nations, and secure their assent to it. There is also an increasing number of subjects of international importance, questions of public health, questions relating to labour, questions of finance, of trade routes, of tariff. Indeed the world has become so small and so related that practically no subject remains provincial. In our modern world 'splendid isolation' is an impossible

policy for any nation. The binding of the nations has happened, and the cleavage through the war has only emphasised the fact. The League of Nations is the next natural step to legalise the fact, and to find ways of substituting co-operation for conflict.

It would be foolish, however, to assume that it will be easy to make the great venture a success because the need for it is so pressing and the reasonableness of it so evident. Only a cheap optimism will minimise the desperate difficulties in the way—the prejudices, and interests, and false estimates of national honour, and resentments, and inflated patriotisms. Nothing but the blazing zeal of a profound faith will move the mountains of difficulty in the way. Mere wisdom of practical organisation will not assure success. Here is where our unseen sanctions must come in. This is the irrefragable position of religion, to which the spirit of co-operation and brotherhood and

mutual service is natural. The absolute need of religion is all the more evident, when we see the failure of all the possible substitutes. For instance, not long ago men said that education would do it, that culture had no frontiers, that knowledge was not local or sectional. We talked about the republic of letters. Yet we have seen the most dreadful war of history waged in the name of a national 'kultur,' and their universities for years have bred the very spirit which has given us a torn and distracted world.

We were told that the increasing ramification of modern commerce would prove the world's salvation. Men said that nations even could not afford to go to war. Now, face to face with the facts, it almost makes us laugh in bitter derision. Yet we might have known beforehand what a feeble hope there was here. Adam Smith, who may be said to be the father of our modern economic knowledge, wrote long ago: "Commerce, which ought naturally to be among nations

as among individuals a bond of union and friendship, has become the most fertile source of discord and animosity." Some men in Germany told us frankly and brutally that this war was necessary for German industry, to control raw material and to gain new markets.

Or again, men used to pin their faith on science, and told us how scientific advance, the mastery of the natural forces and the harnessing of them to the use of man, would be a bond of union the world over. Once more what do we find? We find science turning the world into desolation and making human life a hell. We find all the resources of modern science converging on destruction, so much so that we feel that in another half century a war with all the instruments of modern science would mean the collapse of our world; for science has been made 'procuress to the lords of hell.' Even the philosophy which lies back of science has been used to justify war. The phrases of science were bandied about, 'the struggle

for existence,' 'the survival of the fit,' and were made an argument for the biological necessity of war and therefore for the right of a nation to make war and even the duty of a nation to make war.

Men have looked for security from the wise leadership that the great nations were expected to have. They felt that when the resources of diplomacy were brought to bear on a situation, they could surely avert the greatest menace of all. Diplomacy had produced alliances, and made treaties, and built up a balance of power which was supposed to be able to keep the peace of Europe. Again in the face of the facts, can we any longer trust in such a bruised reed? Even a treaty can be called 'a scrap of paper,' and the rival alliances only inflame the situation, and the balance topples over in the crash of nations.

If jealousies and hatreds and suspicions reign, if lust for land or wealth or power rage, how can peace be long kept? In the last issue religion is the only power that can

use all our good forces, our education, and commerce, and science, and diplomacy, and drive them to the true end. These can only be instruments which can be applied to good or to evil. Only a vital faith can move the deeps of the soul, and purify ambitions, and regulate purposes. The fundamental truth, without which we are back to the savage state, is the great assertion of faith, "God hath made of one blood all nations and men who dwell on the face of the earth." That itself remains only an assertion with no abiding and certain sanction, and with no impetuous driving force, unless we go further and say once more in another great assertion of faith, "There is one God, the heavenly Father, and all ye are brethren."

Too often religion has left its message here, something in the clouds, until men could believe that it was only a glittering generality. We must work our principle down and out into actual life. That means that we support the practical plan *that goes our way*. The great danger of the religious

point of view is to be placidly and impractically idealist. We say rightly that there is no permanent cure for the evils of the world in the mere machinery of organisation. We say that only when men with sincere hearts learn to do justly and love mercy and walk humbly with God will an end come to the distress of life. We say that the kingdom of God is the only way out for the world. We say that, if men would love each other, there would be no wars or rumours of wars. This final goal must never be lost sight of, and this religious motive must ever be used as the dynamic to drive all our practical plans. But as a matter of fact it is easier to stop war by a practical scheme than to realise the religious ideal. If we waited until we got that, we would get nowhere. As practical men we have to put our ideals into practice however imperfect the realisation may be. The one question is, Does a particular plan go our way? The question is not whether it is perfect, without fault, leaving no crevice for criticism,

but whether it is a step forward, and whether it is inspired with the right spirit. To ask this question about the League of Nations is to answer it.

We have a chance of doing something for future generations that will make sure that our infinite sacrifice has not been fruitless. We have a chance of making sure that the costly price of blood and tears has brought us something commensurate. But if all plans for a League of Nations fail, what is the alternative? At the best it means plunging the world back again into its rivalries and enmities, each nation arming itself to the teeth, building its defences, one day sooner or later to end in a cataclysm. It means a reversion to the same old system, and nations will be held in the same devil's toils, and these dead shall have died in vain.

The real alternative is even worse than that. Mankind would have lost its hope for a fair future, for a new organisation that might eliminate such miseries. The alternative is Bolshevism, or a proletarian Inter-

nationale. That has no frontiers. It cannot be kept east of the Danube, or east of the Rhine, or across the ocean. It will pervade and destroy our present civilisation; and if our civilisation has nothing to offer except reversion to barbarous type it will deserve to be destroyed. The real alternative is anarchy. Despair will strike the hearts of the masses of men and drive them into madness. They will say that rather than face the menace of such agony again they will smash the whole system. If this ideal of a wider brotherhood, of a family of nations, is unattainable, it means despair of an ordered civilisation, of a state of society that is not condemned by the conscience and the heart of man. Shall men have passed through such anguish only to bequeath the same fate to generations to follow? Many men who gave everything to the sacred cause, who even made the ultimate sacrifice, died with the dream in their soul that their death would not be lost to the world. What was in the soul of these noble dead is alive in

the hearts of some noble living. That is why we can have confidence that in spite of difficulties and fears the world will lay hold of this plan to help save the future. All men of goodwill must recognise that the plan for a League of Nations is inspired with their highest ideal, and they can make it invincible.

XI *The English-Speaking Peoples*

THE chief obstacle to a League of Nations lies in the common belief among practical men that it will not work. They point to the diversity of race and above all of point of view; they point to the different types of civilisation and different stages of development among the nations. They think that a league, composed of British and American and Slav and Italian and French and Japanese, will be more like a dog-fight than a happy family. They appeal to history to show that all such attempts at a league, even on a much more modest scale, have failed. They assert that the plan is asking far too much of human nature, that the elemental desires and ambitions and passions which have found expression in war cannot be uprooted nor curbed in a generation. They are willing to

try for a plan that will make wars more difficult and less frequent, but they do not believe that war can be prevented or prohibited by a league of all nations.

Yet all thinking men are convinced that war has become a stupid and grotesque reversion to type, that it is something out of date in our modern world. Nowhere during the war was this more felt than among the fighting men themselves. The most universal note of comment that came from our soldiers in the trenches was resentment that they should be against their nature involved in such a mad and beastly business. Most of the time they suffered from infinite boredom, because the whole thing struck them as simply idiotic. The Germans by the logical barbarism of their method of war have helped to convince the world that war itself is only a relic of barbarism. The democratic countries, which were organised for industry, looked on war as an intolerable nuisance, as something which belonged to a lower stage of civilisation. Practical men feel this

intensely, and yet it is the practical man who is most sceptical of the League of Nations being a practical working scheme.

Some men both in America and in Great Britain are so impressed by this that they have advocated a smaller plan instead of the more ambitious one. They argued for a league based on common ideals, and common purposes of policy, and common standards. It would be a partnership more informal, but more flexible, and all the stronger because it trusted nothing to force and everything to like-mindedness between the peoples. It would begin with an alliance between the English-speaking peoples and their natural allies, the nations that are like-minded enough to wish to join them. It would be willing to start with an understanding between the Commonwealth of Nations that make the British Empire and the United States. Such a plan undoubtedly would be easier than one which aims at a league of all the nations, for the obvious reason that a partnership among like-minded peoples will

have more chance of holding together. It would be easier also, because it could begin with a simple common understanding and would need only the simplest machinery, compared with a plan which is based on treaties and legal agreements. It would appear, further, as if events pointed to this method; for the war had practically created a league, which only needed to be maintained and legalised. The objection to this is that we risk dividing the world into two rival leagues, and we would be back to where we were, except that we would be striving to maintain a world balance of power instead of a European one. This would only be a second best, and it would be a pity not to try for the larger aim. If it failed, there would still be open the more modest alternative, so that everything would not be lost.

As a matter of fact, however, the two plans are not alternatives in the sense of being opposed to each other. There is no real opposition between the more formal and

larger league and the closer relation between the English-speaking peoples. Indeed the League cannot be a permanent success unless it produces common ideals and common standards of right and wrong among nations. Because of their long history of constitutional liberty, and because of their position and resources, these same English-speaking nations must be the backbone of the League. If they cannot hold together with their common heritage of language and traditions and ideals, what can we expect from the heterogeneous mob of nations? The optimists, who seem to think that we might realise to-morrow the poet's dream of "the parliament of man, the federation of the world," use the illustration of the United States of America as an argument for their faith. The example of the United States is immensely useful and hopeful for the world, but it can be, and has been, exaggerated. Those who indiscriminately use it conveniently forget some important facts. One is that the original

colonies which confederated were of the same language and lineage, were like-minded and practically homogeneous groups. They were brought together under the pressure of a defensive war waged on their own soil. Another fact is that even the federated states had a bloody civil war, and that they preserved the union by force.

Both types of effort are needed to-day. The one does not exclude the other, but is needed to supplement and enforce the other. We would be unworthy of our great opportunity, if we did not strive honestly and valiantly to make the League of Nations an effective instrument for the peace and welfare of mankind. It will not hinder but will help this, if we also seek an understanding with those who are moved by similar ideals and acknowledge similar standards of international conduct. This latter need not be in the form of a treaty or a regular alliance, but might be all the more effective because informal. It would work by common convictions regarding the true democratic aims

to be pursued and by common agreement on policy. We find these convictions and agreements coming up spontaneously when faced with a definite situation in a crisis, but it is not enough to trust to chance and haphazard for this. We must become fully conscious of our real agreement, and must work for the realisation of our convictions. The policy of drift will leave us pretty much where we were, and will weaken the advocacy of our cause. This is why it is not sufficient to have a democratic State, and why we should have a doctrine of the State expressed in terms of purpose. We must draw out into consciousness what we are standing for, in order that we may the better direct what we should aim at.

As a fact we are nearer to each other than we know, and in the crisis we felt it. In ordinary times we naturally make much of surface differences, and forget the vast underlying resemblances. The ear catches the little varieties of speech and pronunciation, and pays no heed to the fact that it

is the same language. The eye notes the diversities of custom and unfamiliar usage, and is blind to the habitual similarities. In the late crisis we discovered that we really stood for the same things. Far more than the possession of a common language was the discovery that we had a common order of life, with common interests of peace and progress, a common point of view and attitude to the world, and common ideals of government. We are swept in the same current of history. A common policy is the natural outcome of the recognition of the similarity of ideals and standards. The duty of the hour to us is to cement the bonds of friendship, the kinship of mind and soul that now unite us even more than kinship of blood.

It is not a matter merely of race. The importance of lineage has been grossly exaggerated. There is no such thing as a pure race in our modern world. That is one of the many fallacies of which so much was made in German academic circles, and by

them infused into the people's minds. They glorified a race called the Teutons and despised the Slavs. It is irony that the only part of Europe which we are sure is chiefly Slavic is Prussia! Long ago Daniel Defoe satirised in a poem the assumed purity of strain of the 'true-born Englishman,' and Tennyson used the fact by way of compliment to the Danish princess who became Queen Alexandra, "Norman, and Saxon, and Dane are we." Many British are none of these by descent, but are mostly Celtic. The great majority of the so-called Celts, Cornish, Welsh, Scottish, Irish, are glad inheritors of the common tradition and proud contributors to it in literature, and art, and statesmanship. If there is an Irish question, it is not a question of race, as is proved by the Welsh and Scottish Highlanders, and by the northern Irish who are if anything more Celtic in origin than the southern.

What is true of the British Isles is even more true, and dramatically true, of the United States. Of recent years the strains

that make up the population have become more varied and have been drawn from the most diverse quarters. It has been declared that the original British stock must be swamped by the huge tide of alien immigration. Of course there is a practical problem here, to which statesmen are alive, but the swamping process has not happened and is not now likely to happen. Apart from the overwhelming preponderance of the British race in the United States, the type of institution, the law and order, the political and social thinking, are so fixed and so dominant, that there is no chance of their collapse. Foreigners are simply absorbed in the most complete fashion. In most cases the second generation cannot even speak the original mother-tongue. I have spoken to little Bohemian boys in New York, who either did not know or pretended they did not know Bohemian, though that was the language of their home. Their one ambition was to be completely American, and that means to be conformed to the type. The groups,

which for sentimental reasons or through the force of outside propaganda tried to preserve the ancient bond, discovered in the crisis of the war that the bond was severed. They learned that they did not belong to the old but really had their place in the English-speaking tradition. They had been reading and speaking and thinking English, and were heirs—for a time unconscious heirs —of the one great heritage.

The reason for this is obvious. The United States is not a new nation, as is so often stated or implied, but an old nation in a new environment. A favourite hymn about the exiled Fathers who crossed the seas has a verse beginning:

> Laws, freedom, truth, and faith in God
> Came with those exiles o'er the waves.

They did not start fresh, except that it was a fresh scene for the old life. So true to type were they that even to-day much is to be learned in America of the past inner history of the British tradition. They have

retained some forms of speech, customs, laws, which the old country has lost. They have only added to and enriched the tradition, by meeting new conditions and facing new problems. The men who formed the United States took over all the old civilisation which had been their cradle and their environment. The whole structure of the society they created was made on the old model.

For example, they took with them the language, with all that means of literature, and the achievements of the race to which the language belonged. Shakespeare belongs to all the world, but he belongs first of all, and in a measure that no one else can quite share, to us. To us all belong the saints and sages, the statesmen and leaders, the men of letters and of science, the ethical teachers and religious prophets. We think how the English Bible has formed and stabilised our speech, has governed our practice, has saturated our literature, and inspired our life wherever the English tongue

is spoken. Its tone can be recognised in the speeches of statesmen in America, the British Isles, and Australasia. Its influence can be traced in the prose and poetry of all English-speaking peoples. There are the poets of our common past from Chaucer to Milton, and then through two streams along one to Tennyson and Browning and along another to Longfellow and Poe and Whittier and Whitman. There are the thinkers before and after Francis Bacon through a long list of ethical teachers, and once more two streams with names like Thomas Carlyle on one and on the other Emerson to William James. It is one vast and glorious heritage common to us all, and the noblest gift we have to offer to all of every race who care to drink at that perennial stream. I once visited a school in America where the children sang some songs, one of which was about the cuckoo, and another about the skylark, neither of which birds had ever been seen or heard by any of them. The old English songs were simply part of their heritage.

On the other hand the first poet given me to read as a boy in Scotland was Longfellow, and I did not know that he was not a native-born English poet.

The first settlers took with them not only the language and literature, but also the law and order that cemented the civilisation. They never at any time dreamed of starting over again with a new code of laws. Their law was English law, statute and common law. Ever since, the development of law on both sides of the ocean has gone along almost concurrently, and jurists in both countries appeal to rulings and practice in the other country. So rooted is American law in English law that when a case is not covered by a statute the decision is made according to old English common law. Not very long ago a judge in New Jersey decided such a case by a judgment of Lord Bacon made in Queen Elizabeth's time. In 1919 two men were tried for murder in New York, and as there was no statute to cover the rather peculiar case they were

tried for their life by an old English common law.

The founders of the nation took with them also the polity and government. Later on, when the colonies became a separate nation, she did not start fresh. She only carried forward the line of constitutional government along which history had brought her. The new nation governed herself by the representative parliamentary government with which men were accustomed in the mother country. Even the three estates of Commons, Lords, and Throne found their counterpart in House of Representatives, Senate, and President. The great document the American Declaration of Independence itself is in direct lineage with some other great documents, like the English Bill of Rights. In the words of the one we can hear some of the mighty echoes of the other. They both go back to other documents that mark stages in the sacred road of liberty; they go back to the Magna Charta itself. It is a great single stream of political

history and experience, which is in some respects the greatest contribution of the English-speaking people to the world.

There "came with those exiles o'er the waves" more than language and literature, law and order, polity and government. They took with them the view of life, which gets crystallised in ethics and philosophy and religion and political institutions. It is in that common view of life we find the reason for the essential like-mindedness of the peoples in spite of differences in environment. In none of the great regions of human thought and activity do we claim to have made the only or even the chief contribution. The rich life of man has been fed from many sources. The art, and literature, and science, and philosophy, and moral and religious gains of the world come wherever the mind of man has thought and the soul of man has felt. Only, we do claim to be of a single intellectual and spiritual lineage. Out of this pit we were digged, and from this rock we were quarried. We propose not

to lose it. We seek to be conscious of it, to be true to it, to develop it, and to give in glad service to the world. First of all it is our sacred duty to realise the moral unity of ideal and purpose, which comes from our common view of life.

If we do not see it, our late enemy saw it with envy and fear. For years their books and papers were full of recognition of the fact. The driving force that led to this war—or rather it was meant to be the war after this one—was the German determination to displace what they called 'the Anglo-Saxon block' from its place of pre-eminence in the world. In the Spanish-American War German diplomacy strove to unite Europe against the United States. In 1911 when Germany had trouble with France, Maximilian Harden advocated a conciliatory policy with France and even proposed to make up the old quarrel. The reason he gives is very instructive. He is a pure opportunist and always goes with the

wind and tide, but he is a great journalist and can be counted on to give the near view of events. He wrote in support of the policy: "Great Britain and North America tend to form a community of interests. On the two oceans the Anglo-Saxons of the two continents group themselves in unity of will. The hegemony of the white race will be theirs, if we do not make up the old quarrel. United with France we should be invincible on land and sea." Of course the proposal was hopeless, unless Germany was prepared to disgorge the plunder of 1870, but the argument for it shows insight and also reveals a fact. For years Germany has hated the widespread power of the British Empire, and has hated the Monroe Doctrine which kept her from South America.

Nobody could, and nobody did, object to the German ambition to make their 'kultur' count in the world, and exercise as much influence as possible. If she had been content to effect this peacefully, if she had tried

to do this by trade, by literature, by conciliation, by all the methods of civilised contact, she would probably have succeeded to a large extent. But her point of view was fatal to this. To do it presupposes a world of free nations, each making its contribution. The German method was the mailed fist. She was to construct her Prussian universe on the ruins of all other rival systems. She would force her language, her culture, her control, wherever she could. She would take everything needed, and then freeze the map when she had been satiated. She would play providence with us all and give us peace.

Our point of view is different. Both Great Britain and America have had wars, even wars of conquest, but neither desires to impose its civilisation, and hold down other nations by force, and mould all the world to one pattern. It is really by a misnomer that Great Britain is called an empire. Only by a loose definition of the word can it be so called. It is a huge collection of Commonwealths, a unity of immense diversity. It

represents one of the greatest experiments of history, and the measure of its success, in spite of all its failures and mistakes, points the way to a world-order of limitless hope. It is so loosely held, so diverse in its methods, so little dependent on force, that Germany despised it, and declared it to be a fraud, an empty bladder that only needed to be pricked by the German sword to show its vanity. How deceived they were in this has been shown by the crisis, when from the free nations, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, from the Malay Peninsula, from India, and the Islands of the sea, thronged men by the hundred thousand to give their lives for the common cause.

Here is suggested in the realm of government the great achievement of the English-speaking world, that it does not aim at uniformity. Liberty is the keynote, and seeks underlying unity amid variety. The unity it seeks is of external policy, not of internal regulation. It works by conference and negotiation and compromise, not by imposing

legislation on local units from above. So in the British Empire colonies become dominions, self-governing, with freedom so absolute that they possess the right to pass immigration laws excluding even other British subjects, and to impose tariff even against the mother country. There is no article of self-government which has been denied. So that to-day an understanding of the English-speaking peoples for certain purposes such as the maintenance of peace would not be an alliance of two countries but of seven nations.

We find the same solution of the same problem in the case of the United States, only different because of different conditions. It is a union which allows experiments in legislation by the several States. The temptation of a federal union is always that of imposing legislation on all the parts even when some are opposed to it. In the desire for uniformity the Government overrides local opposition. Authority does not like the trouble of conducting negotiations, and educating public opinion. The history of the United

States illustrates how on the whole that temptation has been resisted. As an illustration of the difficulty of centralised government, California has views about the immigration of Asiatics which the Government at Washington might try to overrule. Of course if the position of California endangered the whole nation or was contrary to fundamental national policy, it would have to be overruled, but the democratic method is to bring to bear general opinion for the settlement of an acute local question. Australia takes the same position on Asiatic immigration that California does, and as things are the British Government in London would never think of interfering with the right of Australia to regulate her own immigration. With a closer federation of the English-speaking peoples if such a question became serious, it would have to be settled as between nations by negotiation and not by outside legislation. It has to be borne in mind that the real purpose of any such federation, or even understanding, is not for internal control but for external policy. This

is all the easier when we remember that both in the British Empire and in the United States we have not sought for uniformity. Indeed part of the political contribution we have to make is the dearly bought lesson of tolerance, of liberty within bounds, of central control and outlying freedom, of unity in diversity.

There are demagogues in both countries, whose utterances always receive more attention than they deserve. They appeal to ignorance, and prejudice, and spurious patriotism. In Great Britain they glorify the vast world-wide empire, and ask grandiloquently what larger unit can be needed. In America they distort history and revive old resentments. In both they assert blatantly that each is self-sufficient, independent of outside help, quite capable of attending to their own business. They think nothing of the mighty service to the world which the English-speaking peoples together could render, leading the nations into the

path of peace, and helping to solve some of the problems of industry. Besides the loud-mouthed demagogues who are only stupid, there is also a propaganda, whether organised or not, which seeks to create a fissure between the countries in the interests of the enemies of a good understanding. It produces irritations and suspicions, and insinuates selfish motives on both sides. It rekindles buried rancours, but never mentions the amazing fact that the two countries have had more than a century of peace. At present it seeks to blot out the significance even of the brotherhood in arms to preserve all that both peoples count dear in the world.

The distortion of history is almost grotesque. The American Revolution was really a civil war in which democracy won against autocracy. The stubborn reactionary Hanoverian king was not willing to reign in British constitutional fashion but meant to rule after the fashion of a Kaiser. There was a party in Great Britain who took the side of the revolutionaries in

the colonies, and who saw clearly that the battle for the true England had to be fought and won in America. Robert Burns, poet of Scotland and poet of democracy, was a civil servant in a humble post. At an official banquet when the toast of Pitt was proposed, Burns said, "A greater than Pitt—George Washington!" and he did not even lose his job for the indiscretion. George Washington won the battle for more than America; he won it for the liberties of England.

In a sense also the battle for America was won in Britain. If it had not been a civil war, if all Great Britain had been resolutely united, the result might well have been different. As a matter of fact the war was so unpopular in Britain that some officers resigned their commissions in the army rather than fight, and enough soldiers would not enlist, so that the king had to hire Hessian mercenaries. The ablest statesmen fought out the issue in Parliament, and the Government was hindered in prosecuting

the war in the usual stubborn British manner. The result of the struggle and of the American victory was a defeat for the king at home, and a triumph for the Parliament, which finally reaped the fruit of the long contest from the days of Magna Charta. Also, the whole colonial policy of Great Britain was affected by the victory, until we see free self-governing nations making up the empire. So we can understand why George Washington was once acclaimed in the British Parliament as 'The founder of the British Empire.' The men in America who fought the war of revolution began it to defend their rights not as Americans but as Englishmen, and by it found their larger rights as Americans.

A page from that history is instructive by way of contrast. In the German Reichstag in 1914 Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg announced the invasion of Belgium and declared that military necessity knew no law. It was received with thunderous applause, and not a single voice was raised

to challenge the doctrine. In the British House of Lords in 1777 Lord Suffolk referring to the use of American-Indian allies by Burgoyne defended it on the ground that "it was perfectly justifiable to use all the means that God and nature put in our hands." The greatest statesman in Britain, Lord Chatham, sprang to his feet and delivered a speech of scathing rebuke; and Bethmann-Hollweg, though he was not answered in the German Reichstag, was answered nearly a century and a half ago in the British Parliament. "We are called upon as members of this House, as men, and as Christian men, to protest against such notions. I know not what ideas that lord may entertain of God and nature, but I know that such principles are equally abhorrent to religion and humanity. They shock every sentiment of honour; they shock me as a lover of honourable war and as a detester of murderous barbarity. These abominable principles, and this more abominable avowal of them, demand the most

decisive indignation." He called on the bishops to perform a lustration, to purify the House and the country from the sin. He called on the men of law and on all who had regard for the great British traditions to vindicate the national character. He finished his noble oration with these words: "My lords, I am old and weak, and at present unable to say more; but my feelings and my indignation were too strong to have said less. I could not have slept this night in my bed, nor reposed my head upon my pillow, without giving this vent to my eternal abhorrence of such preposterous and enormous principles."

As in all other partnerships, however slight or however close, there must be mutual concession, and mutual generosity of mind. When we give up the barren ideal of uniformity, we see that the common life is enriched by variety. The only true unity is unity in difference. The spirit of compromise can be a mean one, but it can also be noble,

and in all human relations it is a necessary one. If there is the unity of a common ideal and a common purpose, we can afford to be tolerant of other differences. That there is underlying unity is proved by the experience that a native of any of the countries finds little difficulty in adjusting himself to the life of any other of the English-speaking countries. The variations only add to the interest of life.

The partnership of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the United States, to which history is calling us, should not be difficult to maintain, because it would be among like-minded peoples. Both of them in their own way have worked out the problem of combining liberty with a larger loyalty, individual freedom with national union. It would be a co-operation to make the world safe for our type of civilisation, not to achieve domination over the world for it. If we believe that substantially we belong to the same type, why should we not find some way of declaring the fact? Such recognised co-operation, instead of being a

menace to the rest of the world, would be to them in this hour of distress a source of strength for the present and of hope for the future. The practical men in all the nations who are sceptical of a league of nations would have before their eyes an illustration of the accomplished fact. Even if the English-speaking peoples only declared that they accepted the obligation not to resort to war among themselves, to forgo all ambition of domination, to follow open, just, and honourable relations to other nations, they would give assurance to the rest of the world that the larger plan of the Covenant of Paris was possible. This thing having been done, it would bring conviction and proof to the men who doubt that such things can be done. If we assert that, whether other nations will or not, we unite for this common international policy, it will be a preliminary step to securing the establishment of the larger League.

History is on our side to convince us that it can be done, and that the time is ripe for

its doing. For more than a hundred years the two great nations have kept the peace, though with a frontier of more than three thousand miles, without a gun, or a soldier, or a fort, or a battleship. During that time there were many occasions for bitter controversy—disputes about Newfoundland fisheries, and Alaska boundaries, and other difficulties even more acute—but in spite of the hot heads and the charlatans on both sides sound sense and better feeling always prevailed. It was because we know each other instinctively and trust each other. It was because we felt that to draw the sword against each other would be a disgrace. It would be civil war, and would set back the clock of civilisation for centuries. Just before this war broke out great international committees had perfected plans for celebrating the completion of a century of peace among the English-speaking peoples. Since then we have fought together in a noble brotherhood of arms, and suffered together, and triumphed together for a cause

that was of the essence of our like-mindedness. We have sealed the sacred compact with our blood.

The English-speaking peoples in their long story have proved by countless costly struggles that they love and value Liberty. It is enshrined in their heart and embodied in their institutions. They have also proved that they understand that liberty can only be realised in Union. Through other costly struggles they have drawn and kept together the bonds. If they take the next step to which their history invites them, they will reap the fruit of a larger union for themselves, and will point the way to the family of man for a finer and freer development than they have yet found in the history of the world. The motto of union, 'E pluribus unum,' has taken a larger meaning for all English-speaking people, and through that will spell blessing for all mankind.

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