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## ARTICLE I.

### THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL IN ITS THEOLOGICAL RELATIONS.

Recent discussions, conducted partly in this REVIEW, have directed special attention, and attached fresh interest, to the old but unexhausted, the perplexing but infinitely important, question of the Freedom of the Will. Almost from the dawn of philosophy, and the earliest development of theological doctrine, serious thinkers have, in testing their powers of reflection upon it, consciously touched the limits of the speculative faculty. Yet, as it never has been conclusively settled, each generation is attracted to its consideration as by an irresistible impulse. The agitation of it proceeds, and will, no doubt, continue, until the revelations of another and higher sphere of being have been reached. The relations of the question are too widely extended, its practical consequences too far-reaching, to admit of its being jostled out of the field of human inquiry. But important as it is, the keen and protracted discussions of it by the profoundest intellects of the past and of the present leave but little room for the hope of a solution upon merely speculative grounds. Kant and Hamilton have expressed the conviction that the intricacies of the subject cannot be cleared up in the domain of empirical thought. In the light of such confessions, we are not so presumptuous as to suppose that any lucubrations, the utterance of

## ARTICLE II.

## BERKELEY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF IDEALISM.

*A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge.*

By GEORGE BERKELEY, D. D., formerly Bishop of Cloyne. With Prolegomena and with Annotations, select, translated, and original. By CHARLES P. KRAUTH, D. D., Norton Professor of Systematic Theology and Church Polity in the Evangelical Lutheran Theological Seminary in Philadelphia, etc. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. Pp. 424, 8vo.

Dr. Krauth announces his desire that his edition of the great philosophic classic of Berkeley shall be in every respect the standard one. He has certainly spared no pains and labor on his part to make it such. The volume, which is beautifully printed, contains, first, Elaborate Prolegomena by Dr. Krauth, covering 147 pages, in which the editor discusses Berkeley's life, his precursors, the estimates, summaries, opponents, and critiques of Berkeley's philosophy, together with a full general outline of the relation of Berkeley's system of Idealism to the Idealism of Hume, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. The Prolegomena are followed by the preface of the *English* edition of Berkeley's complete works, by Alexander Campbell Fraser, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. This is followed by Berkeley's own Introduction to the Principles of Human Knowledge, and the "Principles" themselves, covering only some ninety octavo pages out of 424 pages in the volume. The "Principles" are annotated throughout by Prof. Fraser, his notes being given at the foot of each page. In an appendix are given, (1st) Berkeley's rough draft of the Introduction as he first wrote it; (2d) Arthur Collier's introduction to the "Clavis Universalis," a work in which Collier teaches substantially the Berkeleyan philosophy; and (3d) Berkeley's Theory of Vision vindicated.

Then follow seventy-five pages of annotations, consisting of the notes of Ueberweg translated by Dr. Krauth, together with full additional notes by the editor himself: and the whole book closes with a full Index.

The publication of this volume has evidently been a labor of love with Dr. Krauth, and it contains a wealth of philosophical learning, all tending to assist the reader clearly to understand and to weigh the theory of Berkeley. It would be difficult to suggest anything more that could have been done to make this work the standard edition.

But the question will doubtless be asked, What good is accomplished by the publication of such a book? Has not Berkeley's theory been long ago exploded? and is it not looked upon now rather as a curious and visionary hypothesis, utterly foreign to any current modes of speculation? Even if this were true, the book might be valuable as a means of stimulating mental activity, and inciting students of philosophy to go down to investigate the foundations of human thought.

Dr. Krauth claims that "the Principles of Berkeley is the best book from an English hand, for commencing thorough philosophical reading and investigation. . . . No student can make a solitary real step in genuine philosophical thinking until he understands Idealism, and there is no other such guide at the beginning of this as Berkeley's Principles."

This being the case, it matters not whether Berkeley's philosophy be true or false, if it serves as a stimulus to the mental faculties, and is a good seed-plot of fresh and vigorous thoughts. The cluster of names gathered in these pages as opponents, adherents, or critics of Berkeley, is ample proof of the value of this book as an incentive to philosophical thought.

But Berkeley is by no means an antiquated thinker, nor has his theory only a historical interest. Many of his principles have passed into current thought. His "Theory of Vision" is now the accepted scientific belief, and some of his doctrines are held by those who are perhaps unaware of their obligation to the good Bishop. Dr. James Stirling, of Edinburgh, tells us: "Hamann, an authority of weight, declares that, 'without Berkeley, there had been no Hume, as without Hume, no Kant': and this is pretty well the truth. To the impulse of Berkeley largely then it is that we owe German philosophy!" Those critics who have most intelligently and candidly studied Berkeley are farthest

from ridiculing him, however they may disagree with him. The continued interest felt in his theory is shown by the publication of Prof. Fraser's edition of Berkeley's complete works, by the appearance of Ueberweg's German translation and annotations, and by the respect shown to him by all writers who have ever seriously undertaken the study of his philosophy. We find in a posthumous volume of essays, by John Stuart Mill, a criticism of Berkeley, in which he adopts and praises many of his principles, while not becoming an adherent of his system. So George H. Lewes, in his "History of Philosophy," defends Berkeley against the misrepresentations and shallow criticisms of some of his opponents, and speaks of him in terms of the highest respect both as a man and as a philosopher. The universal testimony of those writers, whose estimates Dr. Krauth has collected in his edition, assigns to Berkeley a high place among clear, forcible, and independent thinkers. But the publication of this volume has a special interest at this time. It is in every way timely, a valuable contribution of pure philosophy towards checking the advance of materialism.

It is not expected that every one who reads it will accept *in toto* the philosophy of Berkeley. Dr. Krauth does not, nor does Ueberweg, the German editor and translator. But they both respect Berkeley's clearness and force, and consider that he has dealt very heavy blows against the materialists.

It is in this aspect that we wish now to consider the book, not as finally settling the questions discussed in it, but as a help to every one in gaining a firm standing-ground in the midst of so many contrary winds of doctrine. An exposition or criticism of Berkeley's theory is beyond the intention of this paper. It must be premised, however, that Berkeley is generally misunderstood by those who have only the vague knowledge that he was an idealist—even denied the existence of matter. The proposition that matter does not exist seems so repugnant to universal belief and common sense, that most persons think it undeserving any serious refutation; and agree with Dr. Johnson, that a kick against a stone is a sufficient answer. No one can read the "Principles" without concluding that Berkeley saw and answered

all the most weighty objections that could be brought against his philosophy. He did not attempt to maintain a paradox which is absurd and unreasonable, but his arguments are irrefutable, if his premises be granted. He begins his work by a discussion of "abstract ideas." John Stuart Mill accounts it one of the greatest services ever rendered to philosophy, that Berkeley should so thoroughly have demolished these abstractions and substituted what may be called "symbolic ideas." That is, the relation which the general idea of any object bears to the class of objects it represents—is *symbolic*, and not *real*. "Universals," as such, have no real existence. they are but the devices which the mind employs in order to bring all its ideas to a condition of unity. Thus, for instance, the idea "triangle" does not and cannot correspond to some triangle which is neither equilateral, rectangular, isosceles, or scalene, but which is a combination of all possible triangles. But when we speak of the general class, "triangle," we always have present in the mind an image of some particular triangle, which is the symbol of the whole class; and by a mental accommodation this concept is stretched in imagination so as to cover all possible varieties of triangles; or else it is really changed so as to correspond with each particular triangle which may come before the thought. Now the *matter* which Berkeley refuses to believe in, is not that which presents itself to the senses of men. The phenomena of matter, extension, color, form, hardness, etc., he firmly believes to exist, declares that they are real and not imaginary. But, says he, philosophers inform us that these things are *not* the real existences, that they are but qualities which inhere in some substance back of them, unperceived by the senses but necessarily supplied by the reason. This is *matter* according to the philosophers, the unknown, unperceived substance in which all the sensible phenomena of an object inhere. Berkeley appeals to the "common sense" of mankind as to whether we can believe in the existence of such a substance. He wishes no man to turn sceptic and refuse to believe the evidence of his own senses; rather does he claim to uphold strictly the testimony of the senses. He says: "If any man thinks this detracts from the existence or reality of things,

he is very far from understanding what hath been premised in the plainest terms I could think of. Take here an abstract of what hath been said: There are spiritual substances, minds, or human souls, which *will*, or excite ideas in themselves at pleasure; but these are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect of others they perceive by sense, which being impressed upon them according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak themselves the effects of a mind more powerful and wise than human spirits. These latter are said to have more *reality* in them than the former: by which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly, and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving them. And in this sense, the sun that I see by day is the real sun, and that which I imagine by night is the idea of the former. In the sense here given of *reality*, it is evident that every vegetable, star, mineral, and in general each part of the mundane system, is as much a *real being* by our principles as by any other. Whether others mean anything by the term *reality* different from what I do, I entreat them to look into their own thoughts and see." In a note on this passage, Prof. Fraser says: "The metaphysic of Berkeley is an endeavor to convert the word 'real' from being the symbol of an unintelligible abstraction into that of the conscious experience of a mind." What we know, according to Berkeley, are certain mental phenomena. Shall we go back of these phenomena and affirm the existence of a "noumenon," a figment of the imagination called "matter," which binds together the phenomena in unity? But, it will be said, there must be something which thus *unifies* these phenomena, for we perceive them as existing in the same object, and we cannot imagine them to subsist independently. For the separate and distinct qualities which we perceive existing in any external object, we perceive also as existing in a relation of unity. "Very well," says Berkeley, "this unity we grant you. There must be a *synthesis* of the perceived qualities, in order to make the idea of an external object a unit; but how is this synthesis to be obtained? Not by putting behind the phenomena an unknown something called 'matter,' an abstract idea which is not symbolic of anything we know; but by a mental synthesis." The

only things of which the mind has any knowledge are *ideas*, either present to the mind, (that is, as excited by the objects causing them,) or recalled to the mind by memory, or compounded and combined in the mind by imagination. The existence of an idea depends on its being *perceived*—its “*esse*” is “*percipi*.” The existence of an idea outside of a mind is inconceivable. The very definition of an idea implies the percipient mind in which it exists. These ideas, then, are always *real* existences to the mind in which they exist. They may be caused by the perceiving mind itself, in which case they may have no other existence: that is, they exist in no other minds. Or they may exist in the mind as the products of the Divine Mind, in which they originated. In this case they have a real existence, for they exist in the Divine Mind, which is the ground and origin of all real existence. These really existing ideas then are found in other minds, where they have been implanted by the Divine Mind as the media of communication and of knowledge. Our finite minds can communicate with each other only by sharing the ideas which were created in us by the Divine Mind.

This is the peculiarity of Berkeley’s system, that all real existence is dependent on the Divine Mind and Will; that God has created not a universe of matter, but a universe in which what we call the attributes of matter really exist only in *mind*. It is this part of his philosophy which has been chiefly abandoned; for the propositions he advances cannot be disproved, except by denying the fundamental postulates of his system, and setting up others equally dependent on the reason alone.

But to dwell longer on the system of Berkeley is beyond the limits of an essay, as is also a comparison of his theory with that of Sir William Hamilton as to our immediate perception of an external object, or with that of John Stuart Mill, that matter is only “a permanent possibility of sensations.” Sir William Hamilton’s theory may or may not be true. We cannot here go into any examination of it, but quote Dr. Krauth’s note on the subject:

“Nearly all thinkers agree that there is no consciousness of the excitant (of the perceptive act); we only know the state which results from

it. Sir William Hamilton's 'Natural Realism' assumes that there *is* a consciousness of it—it is the only *non-ego* of which we are conscious: but as the great *non-ego*, the external empirical world, is as clearly external to our bodies as it is to our minds, Sir William defies the 'common sense' to which he appeals. Nor would the race be better satisfied with a universe which is confined to Sir William's optic nerve, or to his thalami, than with one which would be shut up in his mind. At the risk of being thought a blasphemer by some of Sir William's admirers, we are compelled to confess that his 'Natural Realism' seems to us virtually a restoration of the clumsy and exploded theory of a 'representative entity present to the mind.' The hypothesis on which the Scotch school combated Idealism had reached a point at which 'there is no escape from confession but in suicide,' and Hamilton's 'Natural Realism' is the proof that 'suicide is confession.' "

Without pausing to discuss further the much argued question of the perception of the external object, let us proceed to inquire, What is the value of Idealism as an opposing theory to Materialism? Can we, by its help, make any stand against the encroachments of a materialistic philosophy? This was indeed one chief object of Berkeley in writing his treatise. He says:

"For, as we have shown the doctrine of Matter or corporeal substance to have been the main pillar and support of scepticism, so likewise upon the same foundation have been raised all the impious schemes of atheism and irreligion. Nay, so great a difficulty has it been thought to conceive Matter produced out of nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancient philosophers, even of those who maintained the being of a God, have thought Matter to be uncreated and co-eternal with Him. How great a friend *material substance* has been to atheists in all ages were needless to relate. All their monstrous systems have so visible and necessary a dependence on it that, when this corner-stone is once removed, the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground."

It is evident that the tendency of modern scientific speculation is towards materialism; even though materialism is disowned by such men as Tyndall, Huxley, and Herbert Spencer. Many who are interested in current thought become sadly confused when they find that the existence of "spirit," or "soul," or "mind," is quietly ignored, if not directly attacked. These speculators slip away from the idea of personality as made known by consciousness; and in their discussions about sensation and association and hereditary transmission, the thinking, feeling,



willing *ego*, is entirely lost sight of. We may read page after page in some of these treatises, without getting a clear acknowledgement of the simple and fundamental truth, "I think—." The "scientific" speculator begins with outside existences. He combines two material substances, and gets a third possessing properties far superior to those of the elementary components. And so he continues, combining one compound with another, and obtaining a still higher set of properties, until he leads us gently and smoothly up to the highly organised and complex living tissues, and asks us: "Why are not sensation and consciousness and volition just as truly the natural properties of this highly organised substance, as the less wonderful properties are the results of combining simpler elementary substances?" The argument is plausible, and many who have followed the process of thought so easily are tempted to agree with the speculator.

But there is one link missing in this chain of argument. Where is the starting point, the *ego*, the perceiving subject, to be found, and whence is it to be obtained? We seem to be brought gradually up to it, but we really started *from* it, and the "evolution" by which we reach the mind itself, is purely a *mental* evolution—the operation of the mind itself. The mind traces out, recognises, and believes in these combinations, yet when the mind itself is reached in the process of thought, its distinctive peculiarity is ignored. This distinctive peculiarity is its knowledge of itself—its power to recognise itself as distinct from the material adjuncts by which it operates. Or to put the argument in a concrete form: I know and follow this train of thought, but I find no place in it for the introduction of *consciousness*, except by the action of a set of factors of which *consciousness* can testify nothing, yet which can be known only *through* (but not *in*) *consciousness*. That veracious traveller, Baron Munchausen, tells an entertaining story of his descent from the moon by means of a rope of straw. He tied one end of the rope to the moon's horn, and let himself down to the lower end of the rope. Then he cut off the upper end of the rope and *tied the cut end to the lower end*, and so proceeded, cutting and tying, until he reached the earth.

The process of reasoning up to mental phenomena by a gradual approach from the qualities of inorganic matter, much resembles Munchausen's descent from the moon. In the outset we cut ourselves entirely loose from consciousness, and tie the broken cord of our reasoning to something outside us, and so proceed until we get into ourselves again, through a process of reasoning about things outside ourselves. When entangled in such arguments, it is well for us to reach a clear and unshaken conviction as to what we really know and what we do not know. If we can grasp clearly and hold firmly the simple truth that the thinking substance—call it mind, soul, spirit, *ego*, what you will—this thinking substance really exists, that it knows *itself*, and recognises itself as acting, or is *conscious*, then we have reached a fundamental truth. We have come down with Des Cartes to the granite foundations of all thought and we cannot be lightly moved.

Now this truth is admitted in so many words by men who yet endeavor to slip away from the consequences of their admission. John Stuart Mill in a posthumous essay on Immortality, thus speaks of Mind as the only reality :

"Feeling and thought are much more real than anything else; they are the only things which we directly know to be real. all things else being merely the unknown conditions on which these, in our present state of existence or in some other, depend. All matter, apart from the feelings of sentient beings, has but an hypothetical and unsubstantial existence; it is a mere assumption to account for our sensations: itself we do not perceive, we are not conscious of it, but only of the sensations which we are said to receive from it; in reality it is a mere name for our expectation of sensations, or for our belief that we can have certain sensations, when certain other sensations give indication of them." . . . "Mind (or whatever name we give to what is implied in consciousness of a continual series of feelings) is in a philosophical point of view the only reality of which we have any evidence; and no analogy can be recognised or comparison made between it and other realities, because there are no other known realities to compare it with."

So also Huxley, in one of his "Lay Sermons," touching the "Discourse" of Des Cartes, after describing the manner in which Des Cartes sought to reach a certainty as the first principle of philosophy, continues thus :

“What, then, is certain? Why, the fact that the thought, the present consciousness, exists. Our thoughts may be delusive, but they cannot be fictitious. As thoughts they are real and existent, and the cleverest deceiver cannot make them otherwise. Thus thought is existence. More than that, so far as we are concerned, existence is thought, all our conceptions of existence being some kind or other of thought. Do not for a moment suppose that these are mere paradoxes or subtleties. A little reflection upon the commonest facts proves them to be irrefragable truths.” . . . . “Nor is our knowledge of anything we know or feel more or less than a knowledge of states of consciousness. And our whole life is made up of such states. Some of these states we refer to a cause we call ‘self;’ others, to a cause or causes which may be comprehended under the title of ‘not self.’ But neither of the existence of ‘self;’ nor of that of ‘not self;’ have we, or can we by any possibility have, any such unquestionable and immediate certainty as we have of the states of consciousness which we consider to be their effects.”

The doctrine of Herbert Spencer and of Alexander Bain is, that matter and mind have no separate and independent existence; that of “these antithetical conceptions of spirit and matter, the one is no less than the other to be regarded as but a sign of the unknown reality which underlies both.” It would be unjust to set this down as materialism, for pure materialism is disavowed by these writers and by many who accept their theory. The truth is, that the definition looks both ways, and can be taken in either a spiritual or material sense as may be preferred. It would seem impossible to induce the large mass of reflecting men to hold this theory pure and simple. For, why not suppose, as seems so much simpler, that matter is the known reality, and what we call spirit only its highest known form of manifestation? The Christian theist wishes to look upon the “unknown reality” as something not comprehended or comprehensible indeed, but as truly grasped by faith, and revered as God. Spencer’s theory seems to give up our only certain knowledge, namely, our consciousness of our thoughts and feelings, for a vague belief which leans on “an unknown reality!” Certainly we must confess that we know even ourselves inadequately, yet this knowledge, imperfect as it is, is the only certain knowledge we have. And if we give up our *knowledge* of the existence of this real something that thinks and feels and wills, (no matter by

what name we may call it,) we can easily persuade ourselves that there is nothing in the external universe, no Being above this world of ours, who thinks and wills. This is the natural and necessary outcome of materialism—atheism: and it has always been recognised as its legitimate offspring. We must retain our faith in the human spirit, (to give a name to this conscious soul-thing,) or our belief in the Divine Spirit will ultimately vanish.

Let us turn now directly to the problem itself. How do we know the existence of any external material object—for instance, a tree? The answer is given, “Because I see it, or perceive it.” But do we perceive or see the tree itself? We can follow the rays of light to the image on the retina, we can follow the effects produced in the nerves up to the sensorium, but there we must stop. At once, by some subtle magic, the undulations of light waves, and the vibrations of nervous matter are replaced by the *mental perception* of the tree. How, when, where, the transition took place; what is the nature of the connexion between the material and spiritual parts of the act; is the question of questions in psychology. If we examine ourselves, we know certainly only this: a certain impression is made upon the senses, and our consciousness of the effect of this impression gives us what we call the *perception* of the external object—the excitant of the perception. There can be no perception without the perceiving subject. But there may be perception without the actual existence of the perceived object. We may be vividly impressed with the reality of an object which has no existence save in the excited condition of our own nerves and brain. We may dream of a tree and it may seem as real to us as if we actually saw the object. Or we may call up, by the “visualising power,” the image of some well known tree, with perfect accuracy. How, then, can we be sure of the external existence of any object which is perceived by us, since the information which reaches us as to any object must come through the channel of consciousness? When an acute and subtle reasoner like Berkeley explains away the objective reality of the substance underlying the phenomena of color, form, size, etc., perceived in the tree, what answer can we make to him? The most certain knowledge we

have, is the knowledge of an instantaneous mental state, whether the impression be made through the senses or directly through consciousness. Everything else depends on the memory, the representative faculty, or on a train of inferences from certain present phenomena. Yet our "common sense" believes in the existence of any particular tree which is actually seen with the waking eye, or which is even remembered as existing, in spite of the idealist's argument. The proof which may be said to force conviction on the mind as to the fact of the real existence of a material and external world, is not the knowledge of specific and isolated objects, but the knowledge we gain of relations existing between those objects, the orderly arrangement of the universe, and the laws of nature which control all things. Our belief in the existence of any single external object may be shaken by our knowledge of the fact that we are liable to misinterpret the testimony of the senses, and also to substitute subjective impressions for objective realities. But can we persuade ourselves that the great classes and groups and orders of natural objects are but mental creations? Can the botanist believe that all the orders and divisions of plants known to him, have no existence but in his own mind? Or can the anatomist believe that comparative anatomy is based upon imaginary existences? Are we not convinced that law and order prevail in an external material universe? And do not they furnish us with a stronger proof of the reality of that universe than does our knowledge of a single specific object? Yet this stronger proof (for stronger it certainly seems) implies in us a mind to perceive and appreciate this law and order, and certainly seems to demand a designing Intelligence as the cause of law and order. For what are law and order? Are they real objective existences, or are they mental creations? do they depend purely on our empirical knowledge of the universe around us? Either natural law and the order of nature exist *per se*, or they exist only in relation to our minds. That is, natural laws must be either only "invariable co-existences and sequences made known to us by our experience," or they must have an independent existence apart from our experience.

Assuming, then, that they are invariable co-existences and sequences made known to us by experience, does it not follow that were our experience swept away, were every sentient creature on this globe annihilated at once, these natural laws would cease to exist? Certainly they would cease to exist *as known to us*, and it may be said we have no right to ask whether they could have any other and independent existence. But though Positivism may decline the question, man's reason craves an answer to it. We believe that these laws would continue to exist. We believe, as science teaches, that these natural laws existed for untold ages before any percipient intelligence made its appearance on this planet. We believe that when the solar system, and the universe beyond, existed only as a nebulous mass, according to the scientific hypothesis, these natural laws existed, that the forces acted in accordance with these laws upon the nebulous mass and gradually evolved its symmetry and order out of chaos. Here religion, science, and philosophy are all at one, so far as belief is concerned.

But what were these natural laws if here on earth no percipient mind existed, when they could not therefore be defined as "invariable co-existences and sequences made known to us by experience"? Did they exist as forms of matter, or properties of matter, or potentialities of matter? This is an incomprehensible, if not an unthinkable, proposition.

But if these natural laws existed *then*, they must have been related to something. We may say *now*, in this age, that they are related to our experience, our intelligence; but to what were they related in the very dawn of cosmical history? There seems to be no insuperable obstacle to our believing that they were related to a great Intelligence—even to the Divine Mind. For it is belief, and not knowledge, upon which we must rest at this stage of our inquiry. The belief in invariable natural law stretches far beyond the horizon of our present or past experience. The scientific investigator, in his theories, carries these laws with him back into the earliest dawn of creation or evolution, and holds that they existed then, and we fully share in this belief. But must we not ask this question as to the relation of these laws to

*thought* in that period? To us the knowledge of these laws is a source of wonderful power over natural forces, and we can forecast future discoveries by means of hypotheses based on belief in the ceaseless and unvarying action of these laws. Why may they not have existed then in the dim dawn of cosmical history; not as "experiences," but as "invariable co-existences and sequences" based on a Divine Intelligence and a Divine Will? In this way Berkeley accounts for natural laws. "Now the set rules or established methods wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense, are called the laws of nature, and these we learn by experience, which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas in the ordinary course of things." This is the same view of natural laws that is held by Hume, Brown, Comte, and John Stuart Mill, that they are "co-existences and sequences known to us by experience." Now Berkeley demands that we shall believe them to be produced by the Divine Intelligence, and that our mental conceptions of these laws are but the ideas which God implants in our minds as the means of our gaining a knowledge of the external world.

If, then, law and order have a real and independent existence apart from us, and exist not simply when perceived by us, on what does that existence depend? On matter? Such a thing is inconceivable. For the laws of nature are the methods of acting of those forces which have caused the universe as we know it. To make these laws properties of matter would be to confound effect with cause and stultify all thinking. Can we hang these great conceptions on nothing? Must not natural laws seek and find their home "in the bosom of God"? The conception of the mental or spiritual is necessarily antecedent to that of the material. And if so, supposing the doctrine of evolution in its widest sweep to be true, can it disprove the existence of a God, who knew from all eternity how his work should be evolved in the course of ages? When Tyndall proclaims to us, "I discern in matter the promise and potency of every form and quality of life," are we not compelled to ask, "Whence the discerning *ego* which reads into matter these 'potencies' which seem well nigh infinite?"

If natural law and the order of the universe, as known to us, are after all only forms of our own intelligence projected upon nature, why may not that intelligence project the whole of external nature also—its substance no less than its form; and the mind of the thinker be left, as Fichte imagined it, alone in a vast universe of its own creation? The supposition is not a whit less probable or less philosophical than the supposition that in the beginning matter was, and nought else, and that in some way matter evolved force, and force evolved law, and force working by law evolved a Kosmos, and through the course of ages a conscious intellect was at last evolved, which recognised all this process and woke up to the mystery that Itself was the greatest mystery of all. "But," say the opponents of the theistic conception, "we do not suppose matter to have been the only thing existing, we assume that there was force also;" and it turns out that they believe this force to have acted, not blindly nor vainly, but in accordance with fixed and immutable law. And then recur all the perplexing questions which we have hinted at, touching the relation of law to intelligence. It may be said that such an argument is inconclusive, and this is true. But this train of thought certainly seems to render the argument for bare materialism inconclusive also, and to leave us ready to accept with gratitude the theistic belief that an Intelligence is at the origin of all things, and that "in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth."

It may be said again, that the only consequence of idealism is the scepticism which Hume developed from Berkeley's arguments, and which Huxley upholds to-day as the most rational philosophy touching the origin of all things. But we may safely conclude that absolute scepticism is an impossibility for the vast majority of thinking men. We must learn to use scepticism rightly, before we can settle down in faith. We must learn to doubt the tacit assumptions and outspoken sneers of some who wish, under the powerful name of scientific thought, to get rid of mind in man, and of God in the universe. We must go down to these fundamental principles, these eternal antitheses which have



divided and are likely to divide the philosophical thought of man during his whole existence.

As the conclusion of our investigations, we lay down the following propositions which seem to stand on a firm basis of positive knowledge :

1. There exists something (we may call it "Mind," or "the *ego*,") which knows, and recognises itself as knowing, feeling, or willing. This knowledge, which we term consciousness, is the most certain to which we can attain.

2. Consciousness implies not merely the knowledge of an instantaneous mental state. but along with each specific act of consciousness there exists the recognition of self (or the *ego*) as something previously existing, and as having been the subject of like or unlike mental experiences in the past. Thus our knowledge of self is really our consciousness of the permanence of the *ego*, through all the changing mental states which it experiences.

3. All human thought is conditioned by the fundamental antithesis of the *ego* and the non-*ego*; or the "self," and "not self."

4. All our knowledge of the non-*ego*, or the "external world," comes to us invariably through the channel of consciousness. If we analyse each impression believed to be made upon us by an external object, we find it to imply not only the belief in some external cause (external to the *ego*), but also a knowledge of self as recognising that cause and assigning it to the non-*ego*.

5. The conviction of the existence of an external universe is produced in us, not so much by our contemplation of any specific object, as by our acquired knowledge of the existence of groups of related objects. These groups of related objects lead us to the perception of law and order as existing in the external world, so far as known to us. This applies, not to our instinctive common sense *belief* in an external world, but to our speculative attempts to prove the existence of such a world.

6. Law and order, as known to us, are either merely products of our own experience, or they are not such products. If they are, we do not know whether they existed prior to our experience of them; and hence we can form no scientific hypothesis as to

the method of evolution of the cosmos. If they are *not* products of our experience, but have an independent existence, we cannot conceive of them as properties of matter, but as qualities of intelligence and will, which necessitate our belief in the existence of a Divine Mind.

7. If our intelligence acting through its experience can create the ideas of law and order, then our intelligence is able also to create the idea of a material external world; and we can have no evidence as to the existence of anything except mind.

8. Pure idealism cannot shake our faith in the existence of a material universe; but it can be employed to show that pure materialism is quite as absurd and unreasonable, and as directly opposed to our fundamental convictions.

9. We can thus convince ourselves speculatively of the real existence of the Mind or Spirit as the source of all our knowledge. Thus we are left open to all the converging lines of argument which prove that, behind all substance and law and order, there exists a Divine Intelligence and a Divine Will.

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### ARTICLE III.

## THE FAILURES AND FALLACIES OF PRE-HISTORIC ARCHÆOLOGY.

*The Epoch of the Mammoth, and the Apparition of Man upon the Earth.* By JAMES C. SOUTHALL, A. M., LL.D. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. Illustrated. Crown 8vo., pp. 430.

In a former number of this REVIEW, (January, 1877), an extended notice was presented of Mr. Southall's first work, entitled "The Recent Origin of Man." Great as were the merits of that volume, we felt confident that its author had just entered upon a career of investigation well suited to his genius and taste, and that other productions of his pen, on kindred subjects, would