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
By Whom, all things; for Whom, all things.

FIFTY-SIXTH YEAR.

JANUARY—JUNE.

NEW YORK

1880.



THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE ENCYCLICAL LETTER.

IN the chapel of Santa Caterina at Pisa is an altar-piece by Traini—a painting of Thomas Aquinas, *Doctor Angelicus*. The saint is enthroned in light, with Christ in glory above him and with bishops and priests beneath him; he is surrounded by prophets, apostles, and philosophers. The heretics Arius, Sabellius, and Averroës lie conquered at his feet, and, as if to assert his philosophical pre-eminence, Plato appears on his right with the *Timæus* and Aristotle on his left with the *Ethics*. The picture is an old one dating from the fourteenth century, but it tells silently and more briefly than words can do of the influence of the great Dominican in philosophy and in the church. In the six centuries that have elapsed since St. Thomas was born, the scholasticism of which he was the most perfect representative has passed away. It has gone as feudalism has gone. Revolution and Reformation in their new attire have taken the place of the sombre forms of monastic reflection and scholastic learning. But with Revolution and Reformation have come other powers. Instead of Arianism, the church encounters Atheism; instead of Arabian heresies, Materialism. Hostility is displayed not only to the old church but to the reformed religion. Private judgment must vindicate its claim to religious truth in considering the evidences of Christianity.

But the church of Rome expressing the principle of authority in religion is equally opposed to Protestantism and Infidelity. In her eyes they are ultimately the same. She herself professes to have taught but one doctrine which is unchangeable and infallible. The understanding of religious truth is in her eyes not progressive, but abiding. In view of modern unbelief, she looks not forward to increasing light in science, but

backward to her popes, her fathers, and her saints. From the seat of authority in Rome the decree has been pronounced which indicates her proposed line of defence against the dangerous influences of to-day.

The last encyclical letter of Leo XIII. is not a mere political document lamenting the temporal misfortunes of the Holy See and exhorting the faithful to continue loyal to the successor of Peter. Pius IX. made the world sufficiently familiar with such appeals. The object of the new pope is evidently to call attention to the false teachings of the age, and to suggest a way of meeting them. Philosophy should not be set aside altogether; for he says, "Philosophy if understood in its true sense contributes to smooth and strengthen the path that leads to true faith." With some parade of learning this idea is defended and emphasized. The faith, it is admitted, has had many enemies, but the church has at all times risen to overthrow them. The apologetical period of Christian doctrine was one most fruitful in theological literature, and the writings of the fathers have brought down to us that which we call patristic thought.

His Holiness does not specify with any degree of exactness what the prevailing errors and the impending dangers are. His letter is not a review of current scientific heresies nor a polemic against modern infidelity. It is a cautious word of warning and a positive word of direction. In order that philosophy may accomplish the end in view, "it must never deviate from that line traced of old by the holy fathers and approved by the solemn vote of the Vatican Synod."

Every one who has looked impartially at the patristic writings knows well that they differ widely on many points, and that some of their better doctrines must be dug out from the midst of puerile speculations and useless discussions. Nothing could well be more unsatisfactory than to search for the foundations of faith in these remote authors. Men like Augustine, it is true, stand out from the long line of patristic writers with something like philosophic renown. It would, however, be inexpedient to refer men to the works of Augustine. He was not distinctively a papal writer. His works have been an authority in many matters with Calvinists, Jansenists, and other notorious rebels. There are other reasons that will be pointed out below.

The foundation on which modern Catholicism may more conveniently repose is the thought of the schoolmen, "who undertook the mighty work of carefully gathering up the rich and abundant harvest of doctrine scattered abroad in the works of the holy fathers into one place, as it were, for the use and convenience of posterity."

His Holiness, then, would revive scholasticism in the Catholic universities, yet it must be evident to every one that scholasticism is a very broad and indefinite term. Abelard was in his own day the most powerful of the schoolmen, but he was imprisoned for grievous heresy. Roscellinus, the teacher of Abelard and the founder of Nominalism, was a schoolman, and tho he was a dignitary in the church, he was summoned before the Council of Soissons for heretical teaching. Erigena founded scholasticism, but he too was a heretic. But the encyclical letter specifies which schoolmen are referred to—Bonaventura the Seraphic, but especially Thomas Aquinas. At least one half of the letter is occupied with a eulogy of this great doctor of the Latin Church.

It may seem a matter of but little significance that the thought of St. Thomas should be recommended from the papal throne. It may seem somewhat idle for an infallible pontiff to abdicate in matters of philosophy in favor of a Dominican friar. But it cannot seem to be a fact of little meaning that the sovereign of a great hierarchy and the ruler of a powerful church should suggest the study of any specific author to the universities which own his sway. It can hardly be thought a matter of little interest that scholasticism set aside by Bacon and Descartes should now be revived. On examination it will be seen that the thought of St. Thomas cannot be recommended at Rome without affecting many interests and producing many results in the theological world.

In order to appreciate the full meaning of the pope's suggestion, it is only necessary to glance at the period when St. Thomas lived and wrote; especially to examine that scholasticism in which he was so commanding a figure.

The thought of the middle ages has been greatly misrepresented. It is certain that this period was unfruitful in scientific discovery. Even had a Bacon been born to explain the method

of induction to the contemporaries of Anselm or Albert or Thomas, no one would have been allowed to follow it. The method that begins with experience and experiment would have found little favor with the ecclesiastical authorities. The cause of this unfruitfulness is to be found in the idea prevailing in those times that the church or the Bible as explained by the church was the source of scientific truth, and that non-ecclesiastical science was heresy. Men might reason about principles given on churchly authority, but might not advance to original investigation. Instead of facts and laws obtained by induction they had facts and laws determined by authority. To these they applied the deductive method of Aristotle. As the syllogism gives nothing in the conclusion which is not contained in the premises, scholastic science came to a standstill. Theology, however, being founded on dogmas obtained by revelation, being a science in process of evolution but not a science of progression, flourished during the scholastic ages. The fathers had discussed most of the questions relating to the nature and attributes of God; it was for the schoolmen to look at man, his fallen and depraved nature, his inheritance of original sin, the imputed guilt of Adam, besides doctrines relating to faith, the sacraments, and even the immortality of the soul. These subjects exercised the minds of men like Anselm and Abelard, and awakened a practical interest in their dull logical formulæ.

But scholasticism received a new impulse by the revival of Aristotle. This must be considered as one of the most notable events in the history of thought. The works of the Stagyrte were given to medieval Europe by Mussulmen—by Avicenna in the East, by Averroës in the West; the one a Syrian, the other a native of Cordova. Both were heretics, but the effect of their work was to bring the spirit and method of Aristotle into contact with Christian dogma. The coalition of the two elements was effected by Bonaventura, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas. This was the period when scholasticism reached its highest point of development, and well may Leo XIII. exclaim, "The mind turns with great delight to those most illustrious academies and schools that once flourished in Europe." This was indeed the brightest day in the intellectual history of the Latin Church.

Thomas Aquinas has been appropriately called the Christian Aristotle. If Aristotle had been a Christian, he might have written the *Summa*; had St. Thomas not been a Christian, he might have written the *Metaphysics*. But the saint was first a theologian, then a philosopher. He did not erect his theological system on human knowledge or human reasoning, but received it as revealed in its dogmatic form. Man might defend Christianity according to rational principles, but could not arrive at the essential truths of religion without revelation. The works of Aquinas are thus opposed to rationalism and positivism, and His Holiness may well suggest their study in these days of doubt.

It is surely a question of some interest whether this revival of Thomas Aquinas in Catholic schools and universities is likely to produce the more important results that are anticipated in the encyclical letter. There are certain characteristics of scholastic thought, even of the scholastic thought of St. Thomas, that make it useless in modern times. In the limits of this article it will be impossible to point out more than two or three of these characteristics.

It is improbable that scholastic philosophy of any kind can have an enlightening influence in the realm of physical science, or can be of use in combating the dangers to the church that arise from scientific quarters. Indeed the paragraphs upon this subject in the encyclical letter make it evident that the writer was hardly familiar with the means and method employed by the schoolmen for reaching scientific truth. I quote in full the passages relating to this subject :

“ Physical sciences too, so highly prized in these times and awakening admiration by so many remarkable discoveries, so far from being kept back would be greatly benefited by a restoration of the early philosophy. For the examination of facts and the contemplation of nature are not sufficient of themselves for the fruitful exercise and advancement of those sciences. *But when facts are determined one must go higher, and care must be given to determine the nature of corporeal things, the laws which they obey, and the principles from which their order, their unity in variety and mutual affinity in diversity proceed.* It is astonishing how much force, light, and how many resources the scholastic philosophy if wisely taught would afford these researches. For this purpose it is necessary to caution men against the great injustice done to this philosophy by charging it

with putting obstacles in the way of the growth and increase of the natural sciences."—The schoolmen "have understood of themselves that nothing is more useful for the philosopher than to search diligently the arcana of nature and to work long and often in the study of physical science. This they proved by their own actions, for St. Thomas, the Blessed Albert the Great, and other chiefs of the schoolmen did not give themselves up to philosophic contemplation so much as not to devote great care to the knowledge of nature. Indeed there are not a few of their words and thoughts of this sort which our modern masters approve, and which are acknowledged to accord with the truth. Besides, in this very era many illustrious doctors of physical science declare publicly and openly that there is really no conflict between the certain conclusions of the more recent science and the philosophical principles of the school."

There are a good many things confused in these labored sentences. The words that I have put in italics might easily be conceived to have been written by Bacon. If the schoolmen, as is here implied, did not stop with facts altho they understood that one must investigate the arcana of nature, and if one must ascend to the laws and not simply descend from them, why was the Baconian method such a revolution in philosophy? The difference between the method of the more advanced scholastic science and the Baconian induction is briefly stated in the *Novum Organum* :

"Both ways set out from the senses and particulars and rest in the highest generalities ; but the difference between them is infinite. For the one just glances at experiment and particulars in passing, the other dwells duly and orderly among them. The one, again, begins at once by establishing certain abstract and useless generalities, the other rises by gradual steps to that which is prior and better known in the order of nature."

If we suppose both methods to begin by the examination of facts, it may be fairly asked why a good Catholic with a taste for chemistry or physics should be referred for information to the writings of Bonaventura or the Angelic doctor. A student in one of our modern laboratories could find out more about the "*arcana Naturæ*" in half an hour than all the scholastic writers could teach him.

But the faithful are warned that great injustice is done by representing the schoolmen as hindering the advance of science. It is true that this accusation has been brought, but one must

confess to some surprise at finding the justice of the accusation doubted. Even admitting that the opinions of St. Thomas on matters pertaining to physical science are worthy of attention, it is interesting to notice their source. The physics of St. Thomas are taken from the writings of Albert the Great, who commented on the physics of Aristotle. Albert knew the Aristotelian physics only through the Latin translations. What their character and value are may be determined by reference once more to Bacon. In discussing the philosophers who are biassed by the Idols of the Theatre, he mentions Aristotle, "who corrupted natural philosophy by his logic: fashioning the world out of categories;" "in the physics of Aristotle you hear hardly anything but the words of logic;" "having first determined the question according to his will, he then resorts to experience, and bending her into conformity with his placets, leads her about like a captive in procession; so that even on this count he is more guilty than his modern followers, the schoolmen who have abandoned experience altogether." During the time of Innocent III. the teaching of the physics of Aristotle was altogether forbidden, but as M. Martin says: "Nous verrons bientôt que ce définitif ne fut que du provisoire, et que l'Eglise dut capituler avec le stagirite." The doctrines of the Greek were molded to suit ecclesiastical dogma. Thus the student of physical science who takes scholasticism as a guide finds himself necessarily in a dilemma. If the physics of Albert and Thomas are founded on experience, why is not modern experience, which is methodical and more enlightened, a better source of knowledge, and why does scholastic science differ so widely from that of our time? If, on the other hand, these views of natural science are derived from authority, why is Aristotle, the fountain-head, not a better source to draw from than Albert or Thomas? Why, however, the heathen Aristotle in the hands of the Doctor Angelicus should be better than the heathen Darwin in the hands of an infallible pontiff is not altogether clear.

Perhaps His Holiness intends not so much to recommend St. Thomas's doctrines of physical science as his orthodox opposition to the errors that may arise from false views of nature. These errors are various and numerous, but there are two which are especially noticeable in our own time. These two are Athe-

ism and Materialism. We are told by the pope that "there is no part of philosophy that he (St. Thomas) has not treated with acuteness and solidity." And here let me say that from a speculative and dogmatic point of view no one can fail to admire the teachings of St. Thomas. The question is, however, as to their value in view of the tendencies of this century. I shall notice but three points—the views of the saint concerning God, the soul, and logical doctrine.

In his first and principal argument in support of the Being of God, St. Thomas adopts the doctrine of Aristotle, that motion implies a mover who is himself moved by no one. This argument is hardly satisfactory when considered in relation to modern science. It is established that all things move—in the words of Herakleitus, "πάντα χῶρεῖ, καὶ ὄνδεν μένει." It may be disputed whether we can arrive at an unmoved beginning of motion. If a part of the essence of matter is motion, why should we be required to pass beyond it to the source of motion? The reasoning of the saint rests on a vulgar view of motion, and the objections of Kant to the cosmological argument might be modified to apply here with more than ordinary force.

In his second theistic argument St. Thomas, almost as if anticipating the objections to which the first was open, attempts to show that it is not possible that efficient causes should proceed *in infinitum* "quia in omnibus causis efficientibus ordinatis primum est causa medii et medium est causa ultimi;" but if causes proceed *in infinitum*, there is no first one in the series. Now, to show that the causes do not proceed *in infinitum* by assuming that there is a first of the series is a palpable *argumentum in circulo*.

The third is derived from the accidental existence of all things. St. Thomas maintains that as the accidental cannot depend on the accidental, it must have its essence in the necessary. It is here assumed that the necessary being or beings are God. It is assumed that the necessary beings on which the accidental depends do not form a continuous series, but lead us at once to God. The fourth is a purely speculative argument that the imperfection of the universe implies a Perfect Being. There are comparative degrees of qualities which imply a superlative degree. It is hardly necessary to point out the unwarrantable

conclusion, it is sufficient to notice its uselessness in modern controversy.

The fifth argument is the only one deserving of attention. It is a lame statement of the teleological argument, and is set forth in a few lines. The form of the argument is so imperfect that it is in strong contrast with the ordinary demonstrations of the author of the *Summa*.

Considering the time at which these arguments were framed, they represent an extraordinary power compared to the atheism of that day. But it must be borne in mind that medieval atheism was but a shadow of the atheism now. It is quite clear, at all events, that the reasoning of St. Thomas is not adapted to confront this great foe of the modern church.

Of course the Holy See may stand indifferent to infidelity without the church, may assert her authority to support Faith in spite of argument, may not recognize the power and novel forms of modern scepticism. This is indeed the logical position of Rome and, it may be said, her historical position. In former days an Inquisition made argument dangerous as well as useless, but the present age demands liberty of thought. If Leo XIII. sees fit to notice the advance of infidelity, the dangers attending its progress, and is moved to suggest a remedy, it is of little advantage for him to point to the writings of the thirteenth century. Roman Catholic dogma may perhaps have stood still, but is it not rather presumptuous to suppose that the unbelieving race has stood still; that infidelity has not changed its form and atheism its garb? The issue with respect to atheism has been of late confined to two questions: first, the question of final causes; secondly, that as to conscience. The one depends on our view of nature, the other on our view of the mind of man. It is hardly necessary to say that the *Summa Theologiæ* is not competent to lead men to the settlement of these questions. Atheists are not Catholics, they must be met on non-Catholic ground, and this makes all appeal to authority useless.

The psychology of St. Thomas is taken chiefly from Aristotle, and the views of the latter are so well known that it is not necessary that I should here set them forth. St. Thomas avoids the materialistic tendencies that sometimes appear in the philosophy of the Greek, but adheres in part to the classification of the

psychical faculties. From a theological point of view there is little to find fault with. Viewed as a means of counteracting error, however, the Thomistic philosophy appears to less advantage. Of course the point at which materialism enters the world of thought is psychological. What is the soul? Now the doctrines of Aquinas are purely speculative. His classification is antiquated; the principle of the classification may be shown to be false.

But the materialism that pervaded the later Roman philosophy and is even to be found in the writings of the fathers is only a crude and undeveloped form of the materialism that is deduced from the discoveries of modern physiology. The science of the nervous centres is one of recent birth, the doctrine of development in its modern form is a product of the last quarter of a century. If materialism is to be met, it must be met on its own ground and not by a reference to writers of the thirteenth century.

The logic of St. Thomas bears comparison with that of the present. The formal logic of Aristotle has not been superseded in its own sphere. The application of the doctrines of Aristotle has been changed, but the doctrines with few exceptions have been allowed to stand. Thomas Aquinas was a strong adherent to the Aristotelian organon, and there are two points that appear in his writings that deserve observation, the one for its unlawful application in science, the other for its falsity as a logical theory. The first of these points is the syllogism; the second, the doctrine of the notion.

It is not my purpose here to discuss the function and value of the deductive syllogism, nor to attempt to defend it against the severe criticisms of Bacon, Locke, or Mill. It will be sufficient to point out the generally admitted fact that while it forms an essential element in deduction, it is not a means of acquiring new knowledge. Every beginner knows that the conclusion cannot go beyond the matter contained in the premises. The means of acquiring new knowledge is induction. Of this St. Thomas like most of the schoolmen took no heed. Following him as a guide, Catholic universities can scarcely hold their own in physical or psychical science. The general substitution of scholastic for inductive logic would close every laboratory in

the land and leave men to pass as best they might from general principles to their application in special instances. Better the indifference of Sokrates to speculations about Nature than persistent advance on a road that leads to no new discovery. Of course, if induction and its results are unsafe, His Holiness is wise in recommending Aquinas to his subjects. But if it be once admitted that the speculations of St. Thomas are to be commended because they agree on some points with the discoveries of the present, it is surely an acknowledgment that the latter have been to some extent successful.

But to revive the logic of Thomas Aquinas is also to revive Aristotelian Realism (*universalia in re*). It may seem somewhat remarkable to men reared in the Nominalism of France and Great Britain, and to those who have followed the Conceptualism of Reid and Kant, that Realism should once more be supported and taught. There is but little probability that the controversy that excited so much interest among the schoolmen should be carried on now, and I will not enter into the discussion of the reality of the genus. Is "Beauty" only a name, or a conception of the mind that is named, or is it a reality that exists in all beautiful things, in which all beautiful things have their essence? Do I observe a number of beautiful objects and designate their common quality by a common name, or do I observe in them a common quality which I name beauty which is a concept, the result of a mental process called conception, or is there an Essence Beauty that has a reality in all beautiful objects, the flower, the sky, the sea, the stars? These questions, altho not found in this form in St. Thomas's writings, must be raised in connection with his doctrines. Now as a matter of logic, the general has reality only as a concept, as an act of thought. We do not know as a reality a genus animal that while neither horse, dog, nor ox, is yet existent in horse, dog, and ox, and constitutes the essence of all. It is by first observing similarity in certain attributes of horse, dog, ox, and other singulars that we reach the universal. Beauty, too, is nothing but a concept, when taken by itself. If considered in relation to individual objects it is a quality of each object, not a genus permeating all. Its general character first appears in thought. It must be confessed that as a logical doctrine there is little probability of this Realism spreading, par-

ticularly in English-speaking countries that have felt the influence of Induction. The tendency of modern thought is all in the other direction toward Individualism, Nominalism, and that peculiar doctrine advanced by Herbert Spencer that may be named *Symbolic Conceptualism*.

There has been much confusion on this subject of general and abstract notions arising from the careless language of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, but the argument in favor of Conceptualism as opposed to Nominalism on the one hand and Realism on the other is conclusive. If the genus is only a name, of what is it a name? If of an individual only, then why may it be applied to every object comprised in the genus? If of a class, then the class is a notion or concept and Nominalism must be abandoned for Conceptualism. I do not think it will be necessary in this place to pursue any attack against Realism as a logical doctrine. It will be sufficient to point out its results in theology.

St. Thomas supported the Aristotelian Realism as distinguished from the Platonic (*universalia in re not ante rem*). It is well known to readers of theology that Realism was adhered to most tenaciously by the orthodox party in the medieval church on account of its supposed connection with the doctrine of the Trinity. Here then begins to appear a plausible reason for the Thomistic revival. The Socinianism of French Protestantism, the Broad Church party everywhere, may perhaps wander less into theological errors if right views be held as to the reality of the universal. But is it so certain that Realism is favorable to belief in the Trinity? God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost are one God, the same in substance of the same essence, and all three are God. Leo XIII., the Emperor of Germany, and Garibaldi are one man, for all are of the same essence, Man. Is it in this sense that modern Catholicism understands the decrees of Nice and the Athanasian Creed?

“It is clearly taught in Scripture and universally believed in the church that the persons of the Trinity are one God in an infinitely higher sense than that in which all men are one man. The precise difference is that the essence common to the persons of the Godhead is numerically the same; whereas the essence common to all men is only specifically the same, *i.e.*, of the same kind tho numerically different.”

“The great point of dispute in the Council of Nice between the Arians

and the orthodox was whether the persons of the Trinity are *ὅμοι* of *ὁμοουσίοι*, of a like or of the same essence. If *ὁμοουσίοι*, it was on both sides admitted that they are but one God, because if of the same substance, they are equal in power and glory. Now it is expressly asserted that all men are not *ὅμοι*, but *ὁμοουσίοι*, and therefore, by parity of reasoning, they must constitute one man in the same sense as there is one God, and all be equal in every attribute of their nature."¹

If the genus is a reality existent in all the individuals, then, as all things belong ultimately to one *summum genus*, all things have the same essence. This *summum genus* is a reality in all, in God as well as Man, Man as well as the material universe. The result is Pantheism. The pope may profitably recommend modern German thought to the faithful if they would see to what pantheism leads.

The third theological result of Realism brings up questions that have been hotly disputed in our own time and in our own country. Was Adam the real head of the race or only regarded as the head of the race? Have we the same essence as Adam or only an essence like Adam's? Is the sin of Adam imputed to us because he was of our essence, or because he represented us as a federal head? This may perhaps be regarded as a non-essential point in the theology of the present. Realism was the doctrine of Augustine, of Anselm, of many among the early reformers. But the question may be put with reference to Jesus Christ: When he became incarnate, did he take Human Nature as a real essence or only qualities like Man possessed? Of course, if Human Nature as an essence was corrupted with Adam, Jesus Christ in assuming Human Nature assumed a corrupt Humanity. It is difficult to see how any one can escape from this view unless he takes refuge behind the convenient excuse that it is a mystery. In that case, however, one is entitled to claim at least as much credibility for Conceptualism as for Realism. These are certainly the logical results of the theory. Perhaps Roman Catholic doctors may refrain from making these deductions, but the laity may make them in spite of the clergy. It is not difficult to understand why the *Doctor Angelicus* found it impossible to accept the immaculate conception of the Virgin, with such a view of Human Nature as this.

¹ Hodge, Syst. Theol., vol. ii. pp. 58, 59.

It would be only a weariness to the reader for me to occupy any more space with the consideration of these ancient theological questions, and those who have followed the discussion to this point may perhaps be ready to say with M. Jourdain: "Voilà des mots qui sont trop rébarbatifs. Apprenons autre chose qui soit plus joli." I believe, however, that I have shown several radical defects in the recommendation of the encyclical letter. If science is to be pursued, then it seems that the works of Thomas Aquinas are not adapted to its pursuit, being wrong in method and antiquated in matter. If science is not to be pursued, then why is it necessary to suggest a way of pursuing it? Even if the speculations of St. Thomas led to some results that modern science has confirmed, it does not show that his method is to be commended. I have also indicated that the relations of science have so much changed as to call for new modes of investigation in natural inquiry, and new modes of defence where scientific heresies arise. A few of the theological results of the Thomistic logic have been stated above.

But an attentive glance at the history of St. Thomas's doctrines in the Church of Rome may well strike the thoughtful Protestant with surprise and the devout Catholic with alarm.

About fifteen centuries have gone by since the Council of Carthage passed a sentence of condemnation on the teachings of a Roman monk named Pelagius, and for centuries "Pelagianism" was a byword and term of reproach. Against it were directed the eloquent arguments of Augustine and the dialectic of the highest authorities in the church. The Augustinian doctrines of original sin and inability, of grace and eternal election, were terrors to the sinner, and in the minds of many a thoughtful monk and learned doctor they awakened a wondering awe and a spirit of earnest devotion. But as time went on the degeneracy of the clergy, the worldliness of the church, the carelessness of the people, softened these stern parts of Christian doctrine. From time to time they were reiterated by devout scholars like Anselm, and the orthodox party was still imbued by the spirit of Paul and the Bishop of Hippo. It was St. Thomas who represented the anti-Pelagian party in his own day, and his followers were as earnest as their master. But the followers of Duns Scotus set forth doctrines that were decidedly

Pelagian in their tendency. From this arose the great discussion between Thomists and Scotists, between the successors of Dominic, the fanatical spirit of the early Inquisition, and those of Francis d'Assisi, the pious but superstitious devotee. The synergism of the Scotists, supported by the powerful party of the Franciscans, became more and more prevalent. St. Thomas differed from St. Augustine with reference to these peculiar doctrines on but one point. The grace given to man to prompt him to good was not *irresistible* but *prevenient*. The Thomistic party became weaker and weaker, until the Tridentine Council met in the sixteenth century. At this time these views of Augustine were being advanced boldly and emphatically by the Genevan theologians, by Calvin and his followers. The inferences drawn by the reformers forced the papal theologians to the other extreme. The decrees of the Tridentine Council were semi-Pelagian, were anti-Thomistic, and since that time the Latin Church has followed these decrees. The controversy is represented in the reformed churches by the Calvinists and Arminians. Does Leo XIII. propose to revive the anthropology of St. Thomas? Former attempts to do this in the Church of Rome have not always been successful, and the importance of the question may be better appreciated after a glance at a few familiar facts of history.

In the early part of the seventeenth century, during a contest between the Dominicans and Jesuits on the subject of Grace, Jansenius, Bishop of Ypres, died, leaving behind him a work entitled "Augustinus." The distinctively Dominican doctrines traced to Augustine were set forth and defended in this celebrated book. It created a movement that awakened theologians of all parties, aroused the doctors of the Sorbonne, the fathers of the Oratory, and the active interference of the state. The result may be read in the trial of Arnauld, in the controversies that followed, above all in the satire and eloquence of a single man, the suffering genius of Port Royal. Even before this time, in 1588, the work of Molina ("Liberi arbitrii cum gratiæ donis concordiæ"), which was published at Lisbon, made an uproar among the Jesuits but failed to elicit a decision at Rome. Sixty-five successive congregations of the Sacred College left Clement VIII. unable to decide whether the infallible word of

the church should be in favor of Thomists or Jesuits. But in the time of Pascal there were different successors of St. Peter at Rome. Alexander VII. and Innocent X. condemned the doctrines of the Jansenists, then the condemnation was revoked and the casuistry of the Jesuits was condemned. The pressure of the civil government of France was stronger at Rome than the passing eloquence of Pascal, and Jansenism fell more and more into disfavor. The judgment passed upon the work of Quesnel at the beginning of the eighteenth century closes the career of Jansenism, or more properly Augustinianism, in the Church of Rome. Altho the works of that eloquent writer had received the eulogies of a pope and of Cardinal de Noailles, they were condemned in 1713 by the famous bull *Unigenitus*. With the signature of the bull Jansenism died in France and Thomistic doctrine at Rome. The Jesuits are not dead. The keen edge of "the drawn sword whose hilt is at Rome" is felt in more than one part of the world. Had the society any fixed theological character, one might easily suspect this revival of Dominican thought to be a mark of disfavor toward that party that has made Rome so hateful at Berlin and at Paris.

The encyclical letter evades a good deal of criticism that might be brought, in recommending "the wisdom of Thomas Aquinas" (*sapientiam Thomæ Aquinatis*), and it might well be asked whether those doctrines that I have mentioned may be called *sapientia*. A man's wisdom may fairly be supposed to refer either to God, the soul, the world, or all put together. If a man's theistic arguments, his psychology and logic, and his physics are defective, what shall be said of a commendation of his "wisdom?"

But these contradictory decrees from the Holy Chair, these references to popes whose doctrines clash with those of fathers and schoolmen, to fathers and schoolmen whose doctrines clash with those of popes, may well arrest the inquirer who would build his religion on authority. The present encyclical letter seems to me a striking example of the fallacy of putting authority not above but to the exclusion of private assent in matters of either faith or science. Just as no man can withhold volition, just as it is impossible to will not to will, so it is impossible for a man to judge against his judgment, to assent to

that from which he withholds assent. I say this not because it is a new point for controversy, but because there is a tendency in our day to go from an extreme of scepticism to an extreme of credulity, from doubt of Reason to a belief in sacerdotalism. Men who have religious feelings without any fixed object of religion go wandering off into scepticism until they reach its utmost bounds, then discover their mistake. The next thing is to discover something to which one can cling. The church of authority says, "I am here for such an one as you, cling to me." A reaction follows, and he who doubted everything is now ready to believe all. Such a man believes that he has renounced private judgment, and he has done nothing of the kind. He has simply judged that authority is better than doubt. Why should he not repose on John Wesley as much as on the decree of a pope? Simply because he judges that the pope is nearer the truth and has a higher authority in religion. Even the dictum *credo quia absurdum* is an act of private judgment to lead to assent to a higher authority. The very choice of an authority involves private judgment that the authority is the best to choose. So it is illogical and one may say absurd for a man to suppose that by escaping scepticism and accepting the authority of pope or of council that he has escaped the exercise of private judgment in matters of religion. Faith is quite different from a wild grasp at something historical or a burst of enthusiasm for something esthetic.

Two things may perhaps suggest themselves in view of what has been said. The confusion that attends trust in scientific dogma may lead men to look more directly at the facts of nature interpreted by Induction, and those wandering after a religious faith in the desert of patristic and scholastic learning may perhaps be ready to exclaim with the Jewish king, "Oh that one would give to me to drink of the water of the well of Bethlehem!"

ARCHIBALD ALEXANDER.